Of commandos, drones and human rights

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Of commandos, drones and human rights​

WASHINGTON: US diplomatic cables leaked over the past 24 hours show that Pakistan twice requested American soldiers to embed with its Frontier Corps in North Waziristan and South Waziristan, desperately sought US helicopters to deal with the insurgents and Pakistani leaders quietly approved drone attacks inside Fata.

“Chief of Army Staff Gen Kayani told Ambassador he was ‘desperate’ for helicopter support as he had only five MI-17s operational,” says a cable the then US ambassador, Anne W. Patterson, sent to Washington on May 5 last year.

These and other cables show a greater cooperation between the US and Pakistani armed forces than either side seems willing to acknowledge.

“It is critical to our interests that they receive help as soon as possible,” the ambassador writes. “We request expedited congressional notification of the MI-17 waiver. In the meantime, we continue to seek Cobra helicopter spare parts.”

Another set of cables contradict sustained denials by US and Pakistani officials of American military presence in Pakistan. The cables reveal that US military Special Operations Forces have been conducting offensive operations inside Pakistan, helping direct US drone strikes and conducting joint operations with Pakistani forces against Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents in North and South Waziristan and elsewhere in Fata.

According to an Oct 9, 2009, cable by Ambassador Patterson, the operations were “almost certainly (conducted) with the personal consent of (Pakistan’s) Chief of Army Staff General Kayani” and were coordinated with the US Office of the Defence Representative in Pakistan.

US forces operating in Fata were forward operating troops from the Joint Special Operations Command, the most elite force within the US military made up of Navy SEALs, Delta Force and Army Rangers.

In one operation in September last year, four US special operations forces personnel “embedded with the Frontier Corps (FC)… in the Fata,” provided “ISR” — intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

The support from the US forces, according to the cable, “was highly successful, enabling the FC to execute a precise and effective artillery strike on an enemy location”.

A month later, the Pakistan army again “approved deployment of US special operation elements to support Pakistani military operations”, the cable adds. This was documented in the cable as a “sea change” in Pakistan’s military leaders’ thinking, saying they had previously been “adamantly opposed (to) letting us embed” US special operations forces with Pakistani forces.

The cable notes that “US special operation elements have been in Pakistan for more than a year, but were largely limited to a training role”, adding that the Pakistani units that received training from US special operations forces “appear to have recognised the potential benefits of bringing US SOF personnel into the field with them”.

In another operation cited in the cables, the US teams, led by JSOC, are described as providing support to the Pakistani Army’s 11th Corp and included “a live downlink of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) full motion video”. Whether the drones were used for surveillance or as part of a joint offensive is unclear from the documents.

“Patient relationship-building with the military is the key factor that has brought us to this point,” the cable says.

The embassy also notes the potential consequences of the leaking of the activities: “These deployments are highly politically sensitive because of widely-held concerns among the public about Pakistani sovereignty and opposition to allowing foreign military forces to operate in any fashion on Pakistani soil. Should these developments and/or related matters receive any coverage in the Pakistani or US media, the Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance.”

A second set of cables deals with US drone attacks inside Fata. One such cable describes a 2008 meeting with Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani in which he brushes aside concerns about the use of Predator drones against targets in the tribal areas and gives an insight into how he would deny any cooperation.

The cables quote Ambassador Patterson as saying that the country’s political leadership approved the strikes in Pakistan’s tribal regions.

The cable says that Interior Minister Rehman Malik suggested “we hold off alleged Predator attacks until after the Bajaur operation”.

The prime minister brushed aside Mr Malik’s remarks and said: “I don’t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We’ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it.”

It seems that Pakistan saw the drone attacks as so effective they wanted some of their own. At a meeting in Islamabad in June 2009 attended by then US National Security adviser Gen James Jones, President Asif Ali Zardari “made repeated pleas for drones to be ‘put in Pakistan’s hands’ so that Pakistan would own the issue and drone attacks (including collateral damage) would not provoke anti-Americanism”, one cable says.

President Zardari said the technology behind them was “not cutting-edge” and said he had raised the issue with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Human rights violations

In some cables sent to Washington, Ambassador Patterson also expresses deep concerns about alleged human rights violations in Swat and adjacent areas.

“A growing body of evidence is lending credence to allegations of human rights abuses by Pakistan security force” during fighting in the Swat valley and the tribal belt, Ambassador Patterson wrote in Sept 2009.

She said the most worrisome allegations concerned murders in which both regular army and paramilitary frontier corps soldiers — who are drawn from the Pashtun tribes — were implicated.

The ambassador said cultural traditions meant revenge killings were “key to maintaining a unit’s honour”, while commanding officers complained that Pakistan’s weak judicial system was incapable of prosecuting detainees.

Pakistani police were also involved in the killings but were dealt with through a separate chain of command, she said, adding that an estimated 5,000 detainees — picked up during anti-Taliban operations in Malakand division — were at risk. Ms Patterson proposed a number of measures to counter the problems, ranging from offering human rights training and promoting prison reform, to helping draft a new law that would create a “parallel administrative track” for charging and sentencing combat detainees. British officials could help draft the law, she suggested.

The embassy “fully recognises that there is little that the (US government) can do to change the culture of revenge that underlies many of the extra-judicial killings,” the ambassador wrote.

“However, it is our view that if senior commanders are offered a viable alternate to deal with detained combatants … the prevalence of human rights abuses will diminish. Much of this is dependent on goodwill … that can easily erode if too much public criticism from USG (US government) officials over these incidents is forthcoming. For this reason, post advises that we avoid comment … and that efforts remain focused on dialogue and the assistance strategy,” she added.

Of commandos, drones and human rights | Pakistan | DAWN.COM

 

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US embassy cables: US concerned about massive human rights abuses by Pakistan army​

Summary
In the aftermath of the campaign against the Taliban in Swat, the US becomes aware of massive human rights abuses, including extra-judicial executions, carried out by soldiers, paramilitaries and police. US officials analyst why this occurs - weak judicial systems, a "culture of revenge" - and strategise on how to help the army leadership stop the killings. But they do so in private - public criticism could be counter-productive, they say. Key passages highlighted in yellow.

Thursday, 10 September 2009, 14:40
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 002185
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 09/07/2034
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, PTER, MOPS, MASS, KJUS, PK
SUBJECT: ADDRESSING CONCERNS ABOUT PAKISTAN SECURITY
FORCES' HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
REF: ISLAMABAD 2074
Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b and d


1. (S/NF) A growing body of evidence is lending credence to allegations of human rights abuses by Pakistan security forces during domestic operations against terrorists in Malakand Division and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. While it is oftentimes difficult to attribute with accuracy any responsibility for such abuses, reporting from a variety of sources suggests that Frontier Corps and regular Pakistan Army units involved in direct combat with terrorists may have been involved. The crux of the problem appears to center on the treatment of terrorists detained in battlefield operations and have focused on the extra-judicial killing of some detainees. The detainees involved were in the custody of Frontier Corps or Pakistan Army units. The allegations of extra-judicial killings generally do not/not extend to what are locally referred to as "the disappeared" -- high-value terrorist suspects and domestic insurgents who are being held incommunicado by Pakistani intelligence agencies including the Inter-Services Intelligence Division (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI) in their facilities.

2. (S/NF) Revenge for terrorist attacks on Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps personnel is believed to be one of the primary motivating factors for the extra-judicial killings. Cultural traditions place a strong importance on such revenge killings, which are seen as key to maintaining a unit's honor. Senior military commanders have equally and repeatedly stressed their concerns that the court's are incapable of dealing with many of those detained on the battlefield and their fears that if detainees are handed over to the courts and formally charged, they will be released, placing Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps troops at risk. This fear is well-founded as both Anti-Terrorism Courts and the appellate judiciary have a poor track record of dealing with suspects detained in combat operations such as the Red Mosque operation in Islamabad and have repeatedly ordered their unconditional release. Post assesses that the lack of viable prosecution and punishment options available to the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps is a contributing factor in allowing extra-judicial killings and other human rights abuses of detained terrorist combatants to proceed. There may be as many as 5000 such terrorist detainees currently in the custody of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps from operations in Malakand, Bajaur, and Mohmand. As operations in these areas and other parts of the FATA proceed, this number will increase.

3. (S/NF) NWFP Police have also been implicated in the abuse and extra-judicial killing of terrorist suspects that they believe responsible for attacks on police stations and individuals in the run-up to the conflict. This is a separate problem set from those detained in combat by Frontier Corps and Pakistan Army units. The NWFP Inspector General of Police has publicly announced the establishment of a Human Rights Unit within his office to prevent, investigate, and punish human rights violations committed by his forces. As a component of the police training program that we are now standing up for the NWFP, post intends to offer assistance to the Inspector General of Police and his new unit on education and prevention of human rights abuses and investigations and prosecutions where abuses are suspected.

4. (S/NF) In an effort to stem extra-judicial killings and other human rights abuses of these detained in combat by Pakistan security forces, post is proposing a multi-pronged approach as follows:

Short Term:

-- Diplomatic Engagement: Continue to privately raise this issue repeatedly and at the highest levels of the Pakistan government and military. Ensure that expressions of concern over the alleged extra-judicial killings coupled with calls for transparent investigations and, as appropriate, prosecution are included in the talking points of all senior USG civilian and military visitors in meetings with Pakistani civilian and military counterparts. Timeline: Ongoing. Funding: None required.

-- Offer Assistance: Coordinate with the British High Commission on an offer of assistance to the Defense Minister and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). To the Defense Minister propose assistance in drafting a new Presidential Order that would create a parallel administrative track for charging and sentencing terrorists detained by the military in combat operations. Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act are already well underway. To the COAS, propose bringing over a team of American and British experts to evaluate the detainee issue and to determine jointly what assistance is required from coalition partners. If COAS agreement is forthcoming, bring over a team of American military lawyers to meet with Pakistan military officials with a view to obtaining concurrence on training in battlefield evidence collection, investigation and prosecution of human rights abuses by military personnel, and assistance on drafting the new Presidential Order proposed to the Defense Minister: Timeline: Meeting with COAS and Defense Minister by end of September 09. Team deployed by October 09. Funding: Reallocation of existing Foreign Assistance funding.

-- Evaluate Detainee Situation: Local Pakistan military commanders and FATA/NWFP officials have approached various offices with request for assistance on dealing with detained combatants under the guise of reintegration. Post proposes bringing over a senior representative from INL's prison reform office to lay the groundwork for a visiting team that would conduct a formal assessment of conditions and infrastructure/personnel/systems needs of the local prison system for potentially housing these detainees. This report would form the baseline for development of an assistance strategy to help the GOP address the issue. Timeline: INL initial visit in September 2009. Followed by assessment mission in October 2009 with report to be completed by November 2009. Funding: INCLE funds will need to be reallocated.

Medium Term

-- Draft Ordinance: Get UK agreement to lead a team of British, and possibly American, experts to work with the Pakistan Defense Ministry and Army to draft a new Presidential Ordinance for the administrative prosecution and punishment of terrorists detained in combat operations (this process is already underway in Pakistan). Representatives of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) will need to agree to participate in the drafting process. Post will approach the HRCP at an appropriate time but will require Washington/Geneva assistance in obtaining ICRC agreement. Adoption of the Presidential Ordinance would offer a credible way for the Pakistan military/government to prosecute and punish terrorists detained in combat operations. Timeline: Deploy team by December 09 with a view to completing ordinance by April 2010. Funding: Reallocation of existing Foreign Assistance funds.

-- Pakistani JAG and Intelligence Officer Training: Offer Detainee Operations training for Pakistan's JAG and intelligence officers. This five-day course would cover evidence collection on the battlefield, proper detainee handling, interrogations, international humanitarian law, laws governing internal armed conflicts, and war crime prosecutions. Timeline: Training courses to begin by January 2010. Funding: IMET funds have been allocated for this training.

Long Term

-- Assist in Implementation of Ordinance: Provide training to Pakistan military and Frontier Corps personnel on collection of battlefield evidence and its use in prosecution. Coordinate with British on providing appropriate training for personnel of administrative structure to be established through Presidential ordinance. Timeline: Training courses to begin by May 2010. Funding: Reallocation of existing IMET and other Foreign Assistance funding.

-- Prison Reform: Design and fund a prison reform program to construct/rehabilitate existing federal/provincial prisons to accommodate terrorists detained in combat operations both pre-trial and post-conviction. Convince other donors to assist GOP in developing post-release programs to reintegrate into their communities detainees deemed not fit for trial or those who have served their sentences. Timeline: Launch prison reform program by October 2010. Approach donors on reintegration by September 2010 through SRAP. Funding: New INCLE funds will be needed.

4. (S/NF) Comment: Post fully recognizes that there is little that the USG can do to change the culture of revenge that underlies many of the extra-judicial killings taking place in the Malakand Division and FATA. However, it is our view that if senior commanders are offered a viable alternate to deal with detained combatants and a credible detention facility under control of the Prisons Department is established, the prevalence of human rights abuses will diminish. Post recognizes that much of this is dependent on goodwill within the Pakistan military and civilian establishment that can easily erode if too much public criticism from USG officials over these incidents is forthcoming. For this reason, post advises that we avoid comment on these incidents to the extent possible and that efforts remain focused on dialogue and the assistance strategy outlined above. End Comment.

PATTERSON

 

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US 'kept Pakistani army Swat murders secret'
WikiLeaks cables reveal hundreds of extra-judicial killings in Swat Valley and tribal belt since 2009


A deeply entrenched "culture of revenge" in the Pakistani army led to a spate of murders during fighting against the Taliban in Swat and the tribal belt, according to a secret US assessment last year.

But while US diplomats voiced private concerns about the killings – now admitted to number in the hundreds – they deemed it was better not to comment publicly in order to allow the Pakistani army to take action on its own.

Last October, one year after the assessment was sent to Washington, US officials made moves to sanction several Pakistani military units accused of the killings. Pakistan's army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, has also launched an investigation.

"A growing body of evidence is lending credence to allegations of human rights abuses by Pakistan security force" during fighting in the Swat valley and the tribal belt, the US ambassador, Anne Patterson, wrote in September 2009.

She said the most worrisome allegations concerned murders in which both regular army and paramilitary frontier corps soldiers – who are drawn from the Pashtun tribes – were implicated.

Patterson said cultural traditions meant revenge killings were "key to maintaining a unit's honour", while commanding officers complained that Pakistan's weak judicial system was incapable of prosecuting detainees.

Commanders feared that if detainees were handed over to the courts and formally charged, they would be released, placing army and frontier corps troops at risk.

Pakistani police were also involved in the killings but were dealt with through a separate chain of command, she said.

An estimated 5,000 detainees – picked up during anti-Taliban operations in Malakand division, which includes Swat, and Bajaur and Mohmand tribal agencies, along the Afghan border – were at risk, she said.

Patterson proposed a number of measures to counter the problems, ranging from offering human rights training and promoting prison reform, to helping draft a new law that would create a "parallel administrative track" for charging and sentencing combat detainees. British officials could help draft the law, she suggested.

The cable contained no mention of the Leahy amendment, a 1997 US legal provision that obliges the government to cut funding to foreign military units found guilty of serious human rights violations.

"Post fully recognises that there is little that the [US government] can do to change the culture of revenge that underlies many of the extra-judicial killings," the ambassador wrote. "However, it is our view that if senior commanders are offered a viable alternate to deal with detained combatants … the prevalence of human rights abuses will diminish.

"Much of this is dependent on goodwill … that can easily erode if too much public criticism from USG [US government] officials over these incidents is forthcoming. For this reason, post advises that we avoid comment … and that efforts remain focused on dialogue and the assistance strategy."

After shocking footage emerged earlier this year that purported to show Pakistani soldiers murdering six men, it emerged that the US government planned to cut aid to at least six Pakistani military units.

Senator Patrick Leahy, author of the Leahy amendment, told a reporter: "I am not going to close my eyes to it because of our national interests in Pakistan."

Sources told the Guardian that the targeted units included elements of the 12 Punjab infantry regiment and the paramilitary Frontier Corps. By conservative estimates at least 300 people have been murdered by security forces in Swat since 2009. But at a meeting in Washington in September, Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, told human right activists the real number was much higher.