pakistani342
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Hard truths from Spencer Ackerman in The Guardian today here.
Although Ackerman does not reveal any new juicy bits from the scandal former secretary Gates' memoir has launched - he does a very good job of summarizing what the implications are of the revelations made by Gates.
His thesis is very simple - The Afghan involvement by the US is a sheer waste of time and resources because there is no coherent strategy to defeat the Taliban or address the Al-Qaeda problem in Pakistan.
He doesn't spare President Obama either: his submission is that President Obama should not have sent the the surge troops if he did not believe the mission could succeed.
Another very interesting observation is that recently there is seldom any mention of Pakistani malfeasance in the future that awaits Afghanistan. I guess what ever the scale of the Pakistani malfeasance maybe, it is insignificant when compared the the other issues that beset Afghanistan.
It is time to leave Afghanistan to Afghans.
excerpts below:
Once Obama turned the war over to McChrystal, and later to his successor, David Petraeus, fierce fighting took place, particularly in southern Afghanistan – fighting that combined not only conventional soldiers and marines, but, under Petraeus especially, a sharp escalation in airstrikes and special operations raids.
But never did the generals convert their faith that intensified military pressure would convince the Taliban to sue for peace into a viable strategy. Nor could they articulate how escalation in Afghanistan would ultimately weaken al-Qaida in Pakistan. Looking just at Afghanistan, military historians are likely to question the generals’ decision to flood southern Afghanistan with US troops, rather than focusing on the porous eastern Afghanistan border region.
The results that have come in thus far do not look good for Gates and the generals. The Taliban doesn’t just remain a potent force in Afghanistan; it has snubbed both US and Afghan government peace overtures, evidently waiting out the US troop drawdown slated for the end of this year. The longest war the US has ever fought is also its least popular, which clashes against the assumption Gates implicitly makes that the public would have accepted an open-ended troop commitment.
....
The strongest indictment of Obama on Afghanistan comes from an implication that Gates’ memoir raises. If Obama indeed lacked confidence in the troop surge and counterinsurgency strategy, then implementing it was a cynical calculation that gambled with the lives of US troops and Afghan civilians.
Although Ackerman does not reveal any new juicy bits from the scandal former secretary Gates' memoir has launched - he does a very good job of summarizing what the implications are of the revelations made by Gates.
His thesis is very simple - The Afghan involvement by the US is a sheer waste of time and resources because there is no coherent strategy to defeat the Taliban or address the Al-Qaeda problem in Pakistan.
He doesn't spare President Obama either: his submission is that President Obama should not have sent the the surge troops if he did not believe the mission could succeed.
Another very interesting observation is that recently there is seldom any mention of Pakistani malfeasance in the future that awaits Afghanistan. I guess what ever the scale of the Pakistani malfeasance maybe, it is insignificant when compared the the other issues that beset Afghanistan.
It is time to leave Afghanistan to Afghans.
excerpts below:
Once Obama turned the war over to McChrystal, and later to his successor, David Petraeus, fierce fighting took place, particularly in southern Afghanistan – fighting that combined not only conventional soldiers and marines, but, under Petraeus especially, a sharp escalation in airstrikes and special operations raids.
But never did the generals convert their faith that intensified military pressure would convince the Taliban to sue for peace into a viable strategy. Nor could they articulate how escalation in Afghanistan would ultimately weaken al-Qaida in Pakistan. Looking just at Afghanistan, military historians are likely to question the generals’ decision to flood southern Afghanistan with US troops, rather than focusing on the porous eastern Afghanistan border region.
The results that have come in thus far do not look good for Gates and the generals. The Taliban doesn’t just remain a potent force in Afghanistan; it has snubbed both US and Afghan government peace overtures, evidently waiting out the US troop drawdown slated for the end of this year. The longest war the US has ever fought is also its least popular, which clashes against the assumption Gates implicitly makes that the public would have accepted an open-ended troop commitment.
....
The strongest indictment of Obama on Afghanistan comes from an implication that Gates’ memoir raises. If Obama indeed lacked confidence in the troop surge and counterinsurgency strategy, then implementing it was a cynical calculation that gambled with the lives of US troops and Afghan civilians.
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