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Google translate article from the Norwegian
F-35 and air-to-air role
Published by Morten Hanche 2. juni 2017
Norway's fifth F-35 landed at Luke Air Force Base in Arozina 25. May 2017 11:13 local time. PHOTO: Luke Air Force Base
In February, I was allowed to talk about the F-35 during the annual air power seminar at the Air Force Academy in Trondheim. The order was F-35 air-to-air role. I've written a lot about the F-35 and dogfight in other blog posts. This post is an adapted version of the speech I held in Trondheim, and it has a slightly different angle. Initially I summarize unexpected performance perspective, before I go into the main part of the article: How should the Armed Forces use the F-35 air-to-air role? I think this is an important question that we need to have good and clear answers. Seen in a wider perspective seems not think it's smart to try to disentangle the role of air-to-air from the air-to-ground. The point must be that the military must have a plan for how to use the F-35. I will return to this in a later post.
The term "femtegrenerasjons Air Force" was repeated seminar. Although I am a little unsure of what it really means. When I nevertheless have used the phrase in the speech, it was with a very simple interpretation in the bottom: A "fifth-generation Air Force" is something better - more effectively - than what we have today. Our graduates can certainly elaborate on this in the future. Here you have the lecture:
The king in the air
I've meant a lot about the F-35 earlier. The last time I felt something at the Air Force Academy, my background reading specifications, test reports and have flown simulator. When claiming I know the machine was formidable. Now I have flown the machine in just over a year and I'm pleased to say; What did I say? F-35 is the king in the air!
I'll be a bit more precise: With full armaments is my experience with the F-35A that
Let me give you some practical examples that I believe supports my argument.
Winger Exploration crow
When I took the F-35 in the air for the first time, I noticed right away that the aircraft was easy to fly. The impression has only grown stronger since then. F-35 has a nice balance of soft and accurate response on one side, for example when we fly in tight formation. On the other side reacts machine instantly and violently when I need it, such as in combat. In the F-35, we prefer sometimes challenge from low speed, because the F-35 can be controlled reliably in slower speeds than what I'm used to. Another aspect of the F-35 and the user is that it is easy to take up in the air and easy to land. This is particularly evident when landing in a crosswind: F-16 is like a wobbly crow, which you must guard until walking speed. For comparison experienced F-35 almost like a train on rails.
I live there and know what I'm talking about.
Is it so important that the machine is easy to fly? Should not the pilots, with costly education (and big ego) cope with a little challenge? It should be obvious that an aircraft which is simple in use is safer to operate; pilot gets more profit to plan ahead, and make better decisions. This is especially important with the F-35, since there is not a two-seater for use in training. There will never be an instructor in a rear seat, ready to salvage a dangerous situation. Good Flight properties is therefore a great advantage when a couple of years to bring totally fresh pilots home from eternal summer in Arizona and a little poorer and colder weather in Orland. (I live there and know what I'm talking about).
Supersonic speed
The most important thing though is that a machine that is easy to use gives the pilot more energy to take good fight technical decisions. Good decisions needed to accomplish the mission. We will, in other words more 'tactical value "out of the weapons platform when the pilot does not plundrer with the plane.
I will tell you about a different impression from my first flight in the F-35, and that is that the F-35 is a fast machine. F-35 keeps effortless high cruising speed. Unlike the F-16, this also applies with weapons load. The machine is so "smooth" that we have to make new F-35 pilots particularly aware of this. F-35 has to sneak up to speed if you do not supplied. Therefore, it is not uncommon for a pilot unintentionally end up in supersonic speed!
In addition to being a fast machine, the F-35 quick to pick up speed - it accelerates well. It is evident in the melee. I can use the rate in exchange for a temporary tighter turn, when I maneuver in relation to the opponent. Still, if I veer a bit on the bend and give the aircraft a break, I get quickly back speed. I can therefore vary between crab speed and full sprint in a short period of time.
The F-35 can vary between crab speed and full sprint in a short period of time. PHOTO: Torbjørn Kjos Violence / Armed Forces
"The cat"
I have been known as "El Gato" during the fall, when he learned to fly the F-35 with us. "Gato" is an experienced F / A-18 pilot, who has gone through the weapons schools both US Marine Corps and US Navy, also known as Top Gun. Let me quote El Gato, after his first flight in the F-35A, "... it flies like a hornet, but with four engines ...". (In comparison, F-18 usually two motors). Or to quote one of my Italian colleagues, after his first taste of the F-35, "In didn't think performance like this was possible." (In other words, in the positive sense.)
Is it important to fly fast? Do we not have missiles flying fast on our behalf? With an elongated country is an advantage that we can maintain high speed for a long time. We can fly from Orland to Banak on the hour, and still have the reach to solve a mission. (We can not with F-16). Or, we can quickly be on hand to help our colleagues on the ground or at sea.
In addition, high speed and high altitude important in dogfight. For the same reason as spear throwers takes gutter speed, we take the warp speed of the aircraft; we give the missile a higher total energy, which means more range. More range means it is even more difficult for the opponent to "twist" away when the shot comes.
«Dogfight»
A controversial topic among (second) bloggers with strong opinions have been F-35 in combat, or "dogfight". Many critics have been unilaterally negative for the F-35 as compared to air-to-air role, particularly in relation to combat. I've read that the F-35 is "a grape, '' a turkey" and "a failure". (Thus the negative sense). I want to ask a counter question? Is it relevant to speak of "dogfight"? I think many exaggerate the importance of close combat. My experience is that "dogfight" rarely involving two aircraft that are actively fighting against each other. More often it is the case that one party has an overview, while the other unsuspecting become a victim. The victim is shot down without having tried in a defensive maneuver. I think we with the F-35 will rarely be the victim, but rather the one that amazes opponent.
I think many exaggerate the importance of close combat.
Regardless of background, let us now assume that "Dogfight" is a fact. One year ago, we had just begun to teach us how we fought challenge from the F-35. Now we have come a long way, and I have a different impression than the critics: I have learned that the F-35 is a maneuverable machine, creating serious trouble for the F-16, and others, when we meet those in combat. My experience is that it is easier to keep an offensive base, but also; that it is easier to turn around a neutral or defensive starting to offensive. What this means: If I were to be surprised in the F-35, then turns I still struggle to my advantage. If I find you first, then hang the F-35 as a gadfly, and you do not live nearby.
«Not slådde»
I want to emphasize an important difference from the F-16 in this context. F-16 at air show is maneuverable and impressive vigorous, but the F-16 with armaments is "a leveled." F-35 for its part is maneuverable and fast also with armaments. (The first time I flew with internal weapons load of the F-35, I can honestly tell you that I could not see the difference)
Melee in the air is a dangerous arena, as we want to keep us away. F-35's main strength lies clearly in the ability to find and kill others before they have the opportunity to catch up. Nevertheless, if the missiles were going to err, if I'm out of missiles or if your opponent has the perfect antidote; then I know that the F-35 is maneuverable and powerful enough to bite down also in close combat against any other fighter out there.
"If I would be surprised in the F-35, then turns I still struggle to my advantage. If I find you first, then hang the F-35 as a gadfly, and you do not live nearby. "PHOTO: Torbjørn Kjos Violence / Armed Forces
Ninja in felt slippers
Before I I go into the very core of the talk, I want to talk about lavsignatur and sensors. Some have argued that lavsignatur closest is something mythical, or at least a fragile concept, which, at best, have a limited validity. My experience is something else. Reference is mainly having flown against F-16 in scenarios where F-16 had support from ground control ( "Ground Control Intercept"). What happens then? Yes, already at a long distance, I know I where formation of F-16's, and I have plenty of time to plan the attack. F-16 in turn is dependent on being led right up to us by ground control, they should have the opportunity to catch up. Yet the outcome is happy that all F-16 is shot down without having fired a single shot in our direction. There is nothing chivalrous about this. It is a completely uneven battle. It is as if you were being assaulted on the street by a camouflage clad ninja in felt slippers, that jumps out from behind a bush and slaps you in mind with a bat. It is raw, brutal and totally surprising. Another experience is that we manage to sneak undetected past the formation of F-16, if we wish. I have taken myself to grin a little when I 'lists me "past our opponents in this way. It gives a special sense of superiority: Knowing that I can shoot you now, or now, but I do not. While your opponent can not retaliate. I have taken myself to grin a little when I 'lists me "past our opponents in this way. It gives a special sense of superiority: Knowing that I can shoot you now, or now, but I do not. While your opponent can not retaliate. I have taken myself to grin a little when I 'lists me "past our opponents in this way. It gives a special sense of superiority: Knowing that I can shoot you now, or now, but I do not. While your opponent can not retaliate.
It is as if you were being assaulted on the street by a camouflage clad ninja in felt slippers, that jumps out from behind a bush and slaps you in mind with a bat.
Is this just bragging or I have an important point? I think the combination of good sensors, low signature and high performance makes us better able to both solve the mission and come home again. In other words it both ways! We get more "bang for the buck" with the F-35 than with F-16 (also) in the air-to-air role.
A composite arena
Before I go further, I want to warn against well-intentioned critics its often binary interpretation: dogfight is a complex arena. My experience is that the world is not black and white, that a single performance parameter, a single specification or a detached excerpt of a test report does not tell the whole story and that man enough is the main factor. "That depends on" is a response I often hear in discussions with other pilots. There is more to say about the F-35 air-to-air role, but we will take the bar (where unbridled praise belongs).
I have tried to give you my user perspective on the F-35. I hope I was clear that the F-35 is lethal in air-to-air role. I'm sure (because I'm sure I would not like to meet the F-35 in the air itself). Therefore, I think also the order of the course was a bit frustrating: Now it's time to believe us when we repeatedly says that the F-35 is effective in air-to-air role. We must move forward in the debate, and grasp the most important issue; how should we choose to use the F-35 in the counter-air role? As long as our political and military leaders do not have a finished plan in response to precisely this, we have no fifth generation Defense!
The control and warning chain
Norwegian military doctrine has had a strategic defensive and tactical offensive ambition. Strategic defensively is uncontroversial. Nor has there been much discussion about how we possibly should try to act tactically offensive. I think it is because we have had little real ability to actually be able to act offensively. Poor survivability allows the Armed Forces can not follow an offensive line with F-16. At least not in the face of a sophisticated adversary. Our old F-16 are particularly vulnerable to modern air defense systems, which practically closes airspace to us. F-16's bad sensor capabilities enable our F-16 is also entirely dependent on the control and notification chain to be effective on a mission.
Now it's time to believe us when we repeatedly says that the F-35 is effective in air-to-air role.
Because the F-16 is so dependent on the support of monitoring and warning chain, our F-16 traditionally been held on "tight link" with regard to rules of engagement and authority to deliver weapons. The pilot has in practice been given approval to engage every single air targets. There are good reasons to keep a tight link, not least in order to avoid undesirable political and strategic consequences, but also to avoid that we engage other own forces.
Unlike the F-16, F-35 a robust ability to identify air targets on their own and with great accuracy. Before I go any further, do I track a bit of order to emphasize an important assumption: That we have an updated and validated electronic library in our F-35. The library describes both friendly and enemy radio transmitters of all kinds, such as radars. Putting it bluntly; an inaccurate electronic library causes the F-35 pilot shoot down passenger aircraft instead of the enemy fighter. Therefore, I believe the priority of just programmeringslab was an invaluable step towards a greener Defense.
Norwegian military doctrine has had a strategic defensive and tactical offensive ambition. PHOTO: Torbjørn Kjos Violence / Armed Forces
More power to cockpit
Back on track. Assuming a good online library and robust ability to identify targets on their own; in a full war situation should therefore greater authority delegated to the pilot in the F-35. About strategic and operational leadership does not dare to delegate authority to "cockpit" and cling to our old patterns of behavior, where the control and notification chain "approves" every shot, we will always be less efficient than what is possible with the F-35. We will operate a fifth-generation weapons platform in a third-Defense.
Greater delegation of authority to "cockpit" also means that the control and notification chain gets a slightly different role. There is less emphasis on control and more emphasis on alert than we are used to. (F-16 must in practice "rented" the way into the boxing ring, whether it should be some battle. F-35 will find the road itself, from the locker room.) Since the F-35 only need to be led in the "general direction" we have normally seen little need to speak with the inspectors on the ground. An updated situation picture, which shows both land, sea and air targets, and being handed over data link, is probably most often all that is needed. ( "Voice control" was the British adept at already under Battle of Britain.)
Greater confidence from management
Another likely challenge for our command and control apparatus, is that the F-35 can suddenly be the only sensor that follows a air targets. This may be because the control and notification chain does not have the sensor coverage area, or because the sensors are destroyed. Whatever brings it up again the issue of delegation of authority. Maybe we have no other data on this goal, but the F-35 has identified it as hostile, with a high degree of reliability. What decision should boss Naoc take? Should he be part of the process? Could he be part of the process, if the goal is volatile - you imagine a cruise missile - or if the F-35 is out of radio coverage?
Delegation of greater authority to "cockpit" requires great confidence from higher management (which will surely see for themselves the F-35 squadrons as a lair of "strategic" ensigns- and lieutenants). Continued good education lays the foundation for trust and delegation, but I doubt that education alone will bring us completely objective. I think it is important that higher management takes an active role and engage in order to learn and understand fully what the F-35 brings. This understanding is essential that the leaders should dare to trust the system F-35. Without greater degree of delegation, we will hardly be able to utilize F-35 fully.
New and important choices
This was perhaps a little diversions. Back to Air Force. Defensive counter-air with the F-16, or air defense, we are in Norway familiar with. F-16's bad sensor capacity and low survivability has made F-16 to a purely defensive resource, for use on "home soil": We are waiting for your opponent comes to us, sending up F-16 to engage the opposition's fly in the air, over Norway. (Hopefully b ø r weapons load is provided). Goal Selection of our F-16 in the counter-air role lends itself therefore even; we hunt for enemy aircraft in the air. The aircraft is the goal. This is a reactive action, forcing the defense to keep high alert over time. High alert requires huge resources. (Have the Armed Forces great resources?) With F-35, and the term "Joint & Naval Strike Missile" (JSM & NSM), this changes.
Good survivability allows the F-35 can operate in a closed F-16. Good sensors allows the F-35 can be effective even without the support of the control and warning range. (In other words, not only on the "home"). Therefore, the F-35 our military and political leadership of the new and important choices. Options that must be taken now, and that must result in the date headers, attitudes, concepts and plans of the government, ministries and operational headquarters. (If this is in place, it is only squadrons that are set to be ready in 2019. Do we have a fifth-generation defense?)
Delegation of greater authority to "cockpit" requires great confidence from higher management. PHOTO: Torbjørn Kjos Violence / Armed Forces
counter Air
Our leaders can choose to use the F-35 just the way we use the F-16 today as a kind of Super-16. (An F-16 of the steroid). F-35 will do better in this role than the F-16 today, but the conduct is still reactive, requires huge resources and we have limited own Goal Selection. (It's like using a modern PC just like an electric typewriter, without ever having to log on to the web. Not to talk about a game of solitaire.)
With the F-35, our political and military leaders for the first time choose to be tactical offensive. In a counter-air campaign does not Goal Selection only to be enemy aircraft in the air over Norway. We can choose to intervene in the opposition's chain at an earlier paragraph. Within the framework versus air to natural targets being command and control systems, the opposition's airports with aircraft on the ground, runways and weapons caches, or the opponent's logistics chain. It should be obvious that these goals can provide greater efficacy in an opponent, especially over time. None of these options are on the table with the F-16 alone.
Main instrument of power
If we choose to be more aggressive in the use of air power, we go simultaneously to a proactive role. It moves us away from a forced attrition, and will be an advantage in terms of resources. Especially for Norway's small defense. An offensive action forces the offender to simultaneously having to deal with dismay.
A natural continuation of this train of thought must be to clarify what role the F-35 will have in the defense of Norway in a joint operational context. Thus, not only the air-to-air and air power, in a vacuum. What should we prioritize, with limited number of aircraft available? Shall we give close support to the Army Finnmarkvidda? Shall we fly patrol over frigates for the Navy? Can we do it all at once, or must FOH prioritize other objectives, which can provide a greater effect?
I argue not for the fact that Norway only to react aggressively. What would be the proper use of force in a given situation, it is up to our top leaders to decide. My point is that our leaders have a job to do: Our leaders need to think through the new freedom of choice, and determine whether, when, where and how the F-35, which the Armed main instrument of power, possibly to be used tactically offensive in defense of Norway. We do not have a fifth generation of Defense, before we have this answer crystal clear.
https://nettsteder.regjeringen.no/kampfly/2017/06/02/f-35-og-luft-til-luft-rollen/
F-35 and air-to-air role
Published by Morten Hanche 2. juni 2017
Norway's fifth F-35 landed at Luke Air Force Base in Arozina 25. May 2017 11:13 local time. PHOTO: Luke Air Force Base
In February, I was allowed to talk about the F-35 during the annual air power seminar at the Air Force Academy in Trondheim. The order was F-35 air-to-air role. I've written a lot about the F-35 and dogfight in other blog posts. This post is an adapted version of the speech I held in Trondheim, and it has a slightly different angle. Initially I summarize unexpected performance perspective, before I go into the main part of the article: How should the Armed Forces use the F-35 air-to-air role? I think this is an important question that we need to have good and clear answers. Seen in a wider perspective seems not think it's smart to try to disentangle the role of air-to-air from the air-to-ground. The point must be that the military must have a plan for how to use the F-35. I will return to this in a later post.
The term "femtegrenerasjons Air Force" was repeated seminar. Although I am a little unsure of what it really means. When I nevertheless have used the phrase in the speech, it was with a very simple interpretation in the bottom: A "fifth-generation Air Force" is something better - more effectively - than what we have today. Our graduates can certainly elaborate on this in the future. Here you have the lecture:
The king in the air
I've meant a lot about the F-35 earlier. The last time I felt something at the Air Force Academy, my background reading specifications, test reports and have flown simulator. When claiming I know the machine was formidable. Now I have flown the machine in just over a year and I'm pleased to say; What did I say? F-35 is the king in the air!
I'll be a bit more precise: With full armaments is my experience with the F-35A that
- It is easier to fly than the F-16.
- It is faster than the F-16.
- It has a longer range than the F-16.
- It flies higher than the F-16.
- It is more maneuverable than the F-16.
- It finds opposition on the longer distance (than F-16 would be connected).
- Opponents detects F-35 later than one F-16 would be found.
- And it looks tougher out!
Let me give you some practical examples that I believe supports my argument.
Winger Exploration crow
When I took the F-35 in the air for the first time, I noticed right away that the aircraft was easy to fly. The impression has only grown stronger since then. F-35 has a nice balance of soft and accurate response on one side, for example when we fly in tight formation. On the other side reacts machine instantly and violently when I need it, such as in combat. In the F-35, we prefer sometimes challenge from low speed, because the F-35 can be controlled reliably in slower speeds than what I'm used to. Another aspect of the F-35 and the user is that it is easy to take up in the air and easy to land. This is particularly evident when landing in a crosswind: F-16 is like a wobbly crow, which you must guard until walking speed. For comparison experienced F-35 almost like a train on rails.
I live there and know what I'm talking about.
Is it so important that the machine is easy to fly? Should not the pilots, with costly education (and big ego) cope with a little challenge? It should be obvious that an aircraft which is simple in use is safer to operate; pilot gets more profit to plan ahead, and make better decisions. This is especially important with the F-35, since there is not a two-seater for use in training. There will never be an instructor in a rear seat, ready to salvage a dangerous situation. Good Flight properties is therefore a great advantage when a couple of years to bring totally fresh pilots home from eternal summer in Arizona and a little poorer and colder weather in Orland. (I live there and know what I'm talking about).
Supersonic speed
The most important thing though is that a machine that is easy to use gives the pilot more energy to take good fight technical decisions. Good decisions needed to accomplish the mission. We will, in other words more 'tactical value "out of the weapons platform when the pilot does not plundrer with the plane.
I will tell you about a different impression from my first flight in the F-35, and that is that the F-35 is a fast machine. F-35 keeps effortless high cruising speed. Unlike the F-16, this also applies with weapons load. The machine is so "smooth" that we have to make new F-35 pilots particularly aware of this. F-35 has to sneak up to speed if you do not supplied. Therefore, it is not uncommon for a pilot unintentionally end up in supersonic speed!
In addition to being a fast machine, the F-35 quick to pick up speed - it accelerates well. It is evident in the melee. I can use the rate in exchange for a temporary tighter turn, when I maneuver in relation to the opponent. Still, if I veer a bit on the bend and give the aircraft a break, I get quickly back speed. I can therefore vary between crab speed and full sprint in a short period of time.
The F-35 can vary between crab speed and full sprint in a short period of time. PHOTO: Torbjørn Kjos Violence / Armed Forces
"The cat"
I have been known as "El Gato" during the fall, when he learned to fly the F-35 with us. "Gato" is an experienced F / A-18 pilot, who has gone through the weapons schools both US Marine Corps and US Navy, also known as Top Gun. Let me quote El Gato, after his first flight in the F-35A, "... it flies like a hornet, but with four engines ...". (In comparison, F-18 usually two motors). Or to quote one of my Italian colleagues, after his first taste of the F-35, "In didn't think performance like this was possible." (In other words, in the positive sense.)
Is it important to fly fast? Do we not have missiles flying fast on our behalf? With an elongated country is an advantage that we can maintain high speed for a long time. We can fly from Orland to Banak on the hour, and still have the reach to solve a mission. (We can not with F-16). Or, we can quickly be on hand to help our colleagues on the ground or at sea.
In addition, high speed and high altitude important in dogfight. For the same reason as spear throwers takes gutter speed, we take the warp speed of the aircraft; we give the missile a higher total energy, which means more range. More range means it is even more difficult for the opponent to "twist" away when the shot comes.
«Dogfight»
A controversial topic among (second) bloggers with strong opinions have been F-35 in combat, or "dogfight". Many critics have been unilaterally negative for the F-35 as compared to air-to-air role, particularly in relation to combat. I've read that the F-35 is "a grape, '' a turkey" and "a failure". (Thus the negative sense). I want to ask a counter question? Is it relevant to speak of "dogfight"? I think many exaggerate the importance of close combat. My experience is that "dogfight" rarely involving two aircraft that are actively fighting against each other. More often it is the case that one party has an overview, while the other unsuspecting become a victim. The victim is shot down without having tried in a defensive maneuver. I think we with the F-35 will rarely be the victim, but rather the one that amazes opponent.
I think many exaggerate the importance of close combat.
Regardless of background, let us now assume that "Dogfight" is a fact. One year ago, we had just begun to teach us how we fought challenge from the F-35. Now we have come a long way, and I have a different impression than the critics: I have learned that the F-35 is a maneuverable machine, creating serious trouble for the F-16, and others, when we meet those in combat. My experience is that it is easier to keep an offensive base, but also; that it is easier to turn around a neutral or defensive starting to offensive. What this means: If I were to be surprised in the F-35, then turns I still struggle to my advantage. If I find you first, then hang the F-35 as a gadfly, and you do not live nearby.
«Not slådde»
I want to emphasize an important difference from the F-16 in this context. F-16 at air show is maneuverable and impressive vigorous, but the F-16 with armaments is "a leveled." F-35 for its part is maneuverable and fast also with armaments. (The first time I flew with internal weapons load of the F-35, I can honestly tell you that I could not see the difference)
Melee in the air is a dangerous arena, as we want to keep us away. F-35's main strength lies clearly in the ability to find and kill others before they have the opportunity to catch up. Nevertheless, if the missiles were going to err, if I'm out of missiles or if your opponent has the perfect antidote; then I know that the F-35 is maneuverable and powerful enough to bite down also in close combat against any other fighter out there.
"If I would be surprised in the F-35, then turns I still struggle to my advantage. If I find you first, then hang the F-35 as a gadfly, and you do not live nearby. "PHOTO: Torbjørn Kjos Violence / Armed Forces
Ninja in felt slippers
Before I I go into the very core of the talk, I want to talk about lavsignatur and sensors. Some have argued that lavsignatur closest is something mythical, or at least a fragile concept, which, at best, have a limited validity. My experience is something else. Reference is mainly having flown against F-16 in scenarios where F-16 had support from ground control ( "Ground Control Intercept"). What happens then? Yes, already at a long distance, I know I where formation of F-16's, and I have plenty of time to plan the attack. F-16 in turn is dependent on being led right up to us by ground control, they should have the opportunity to catch up. Yet the outcome is happy that all F-16 is shot down without having fired a single shot in our direction. There is nothing chivalrous about this. It is a completely uneven battle. It is as if you were being assaulted on the street by a camouflage clad ninja in felt slippers, that jumps out from behind a bush and slaps you in mind with a bat. It is raw, brutal and totally surprising. Another experience is that we manage to sneak undetected past the formation of F-16, if we wish. I have taken myself to grin a little when I 'lists me "past our opponents in this way. It gives a special sense of superiority: Knowing that I can shoot you now, or now, but I do not. While your opponent can not retaliate. I have taken myself to grin a little when I 'lists me "past our opponents in this way. It gives a special sense of superiority: Knowing that I can shoot you now, or now, but I do not. While your opponent can not retaliate. I have taken myself to grin a little when I 'lists me "past our opponents in this way. It gives a special sense of superiority: Knowing that I can shoot you now, or now, but I do not. While your opponent can not retaliate.
It is as if you were being assaulted on the street by a camouflage clad ninja in felt slippers, that jumps out from behind a bush and slaps you in mind with a bat.
Is this just bragging or I have an important point? I think the combination of good sensors, low signature and high performance makes us better able to both solve the mission and come home again. In other words it both ways! We get more "bang for the buck" with the F-35 than with F-16 (also) in the air-to-air role.
A composite arena
Before I go further, I want to warn against well-intentioned critics its often binary interpretation: dogfight is a complex arena. My experience is that the world is not black and white, that a single performance parameter, a single specification or a detached excerpt of a test report does not tell the whole story and that man enough is the main factor. "That depends on" is a response I often hear in discussions with other pilots. There is more to say about the F-35 air-to-air role, but we will take the bar (where unbridled praise belongs).
I have tried to give you my user perspective on the F-35. I hope I was clear that the F-35 is lethal in air-to-air role. I'm sure (because I'm sure I would not like to meet the F-35 in the air itself). Therefore, I think also the order of the course was a bit frustrating: Now it's time to believe us when we repeatedly says that the F-35 is effective in air-to-air role. We must move forward in the debate, and grasp the most important issue; how should we choose to use the F-35 in the counter-air role? As long as our political and military leaders do not have a finished plan in response to precisely this, we have no fifth generation Defense!
The control and warning chain
Norwegian military doctrine has had a strategic defensive and tactical offensive ambition. Strategic defensively is uncontroversial. Nor has there been much discussion about how we possibly should try to act tactically offensive. I think it is because we have had little real ability to actually be able to act offensively. Poor survivability allows the Armed Forces can not follow an offensive line with F-16. At least not in the face of a sophisticated adversary. Our old F-16 are particularly vulnerable to modern air defense systems, which practically closes airspace to us. F-16's bad sensor capabilities enable our F-16 is also entirely dependent on the control and notification chain to be effective on a mission.
Now it's time to believe us when we repeatedly says that the F-35 is effective in air-to-air role.
Because the F-16 is so dependent on the support of monitoring and warning chain, our F-16 traditionally been held on "tight link" with regard to rules of engagement and authority to deliver weapons. The pilot has in practice been given approval to engage every single air targets. There are good reasons to keep a tight link, not least in order to avoid undesirable political and strategic consequences, but also to avoid that we engage other own forces.
Unlike the F-16, F-35 a robust ability to identify air targets on their own and with great accuracy. Before I go any further, do I track a bit of order to emphasize an important assumption: That we have an updated and validated electronic library in our F-35. The library describes both friendly and enemy radio transmitters of all kinds, such as radars. Putting it bluntly; an inaccurate electronic library causes the F-35 pilot shoot down passenger aircraft instead of the enemy fighter. Therefore, I believe the priority of just programmeringslab was an invaluable step towards a greener Defense.
Norwegian military doctrine has had a strategic defensive and tactical offensive ambition. PHOTO: Torbjørn Kjos Violence / Armed Forces
More power to cockpit
Back on track. Assuming a good online library and robust ability to identify targets on their own; in a full war situation should therefore greater authority delegated to the pilot in the F-35. About strategic and operational leadership does not dare to delegate authority to "cockpit" and cling to our old patterns of behavior, where the control and notification chain "approves" every shot, we will always be less efficient than what is possible with the F-35. We will operate a fifth-generation weapons platform in a third-Defense.
Greater delegation of authority to "cockpit" also means that the control and notification chain gets a slightly different role. There is less emphasis on control and more emphasis on alert than we are used to. (F-16 must in practice "rented" the way into the boxing ring, whether it should be some battle. F-35 will find the road itself, from the locker room.) Since the F-35 only need to be led in the "general direction" we have normally seen little need to speak with the inspectors on the ground. An updated situation picture, which shows both land, sea and air targets, and being handed over data link, is probably most often all that is needed. ( "Voice control" was the British adept at already under Battle of Britain.)
Greater confidence from management
Another likely challenge for our command and control apparatus, is that the F-35 can suddenly be the only sensor that follows a air targets. This may be because the control and notification chain does not have the sensor coverage area, or because the sensors are destroyed. Whatever brings it up again the issue of delegation of authority. Maybe we have no other data on this goal, but the F-35 has identified it as hostile, with a high degree of reliability. What decision should boss Naoc take? Should he be part of the process? Could he be part of the process, if the goal is volatile - you imagine a cruise missile - or if the F-35 is out of radio coverage?
Delegation of greater authority to "cockpit" requires great confidence from higher management (which will surely see for themselves the F-35 squadrons as a lair of "strategic" ensigns- and lieutenants). Continued good education lays the foundation for trust and delegation, but I doubt that education alone will bring us completely objective. I think it is important that higher management takes an active role and engage in order to learn and understand fully what the F-35 brings. This understanding is essential that the leaders should dare to trust the system F-35. Without greater degree of delegation, we will hardly be able to utilize F-35 fully.
New and important choices
This was perhaps a little diversions. Back to Air Force. Defensive counter-air with the F-16, or air defense, we are in Norway familiar with. F-16's bad sensor capacity and low survivability has made F-16 to a purely defensive resource, for use on "home soil": We are waiting for your opponent comes to us, sending up F-16 to engage the opposition's fly in the air, over Norway. (Hopefully b ø r weapons load is provided). Goal Selection of our F-16 in the counter-air role lends itself therefore even; we hunt for enemy aircraft in the air. The aircraft is the goal. This is a reactive action, forcing the defense to keep high alert over time. High alert requires huge resources. (Have the Armed Forces great resources?) With F-35, and the term "Joint & Naval Strike Missile" (JSM & NSM), this changes.
Good survivability allows the F-35 can operate in a closed F-16. Good sensors allows the F-35 can be effective even without the support of the control and warning range. (In other words, not only on the "home"). Therefore, the F-35 our military and political leadership of the new and important choices. Options that must be taken now, and that must result in the date headers, attitudes, concepts and plans of the government, ministries and operational headquarters. (If this is in place, it is only squadrons that are set to be ready in 2019. Do we have a fifth-generation defense?)
Delegation of greater authority to "cockpit" requires great confidence from higher management. PHOTO: Torbjørn Kjos Violence / Armed Forces
counter Air
Our leaders can choose to use the F-35 just the way we use the F-16 today as a kind of Super-16. (An F-16 of the steroid). F-35 will do better in this role than the F-16 today, but the conduct is still reactive, requires huge resources and we have limited own Goal Selection. (It's like using a modern PC just like an electric typewriter, without ever having to log on to the web. Not to talk about a game of solitaire.)
With the F-35, our political and military leaders for the first time choose to be tactical offensive. In a counter-air campaign does not Goal Selection only to be enemy aircraft in the air over Norway. We can choose to intervene in the opposition's chain at an earlier paragraph. Within the framework versus air to natural targets being command and control systems, the opposition's airports with aircraft on the ground, runways and weapons caches, or the opponent's logistics chain. It should be obvious that these goals can provide greater efficacy in an opponent, especially over time. None of these options are on the table with the F-16 alone.
Main instrument of power
If we choose to be more aggressive in the use of air power, we go simultaneously to a proactive role. It moves us away from a forced attrition, and will be an advantage in terms of resources. Especially for Norway's small defense. An offensive action forces the offender to simultaneously having to deal with dismay.
A natural continuation of this train of thought must be to clarify what role the F-35 will have in the defense of Norway in a joint operational context. Thus, not only the air-to-air and air power, in a vacuum. What should we prioritize, with limited number of aircraft available? Shall we give close support to the Army Finnmarkvidda? Shall we fly patrol over frigates for the Navy? Can we do it all at once, or must FOH prioritize other objectives, which can provide a greater effect?
I argue not for the fact that Norway only to react aggressively. What would be the proper use of force in a given situation, it is up to our top leaders to decide. My point is that our leaders have a job to do: Our leaders need to think through the new freedom of choice, and determine whether, when, where and how the F-35, which the Armed main instrument of power, possibly to be used tactically offensive in defense of Norway. We do not have a fifth generation of Defense, before we have this answer crystal clear.
https://nettsteder.regjeringen.no/kampfly/2017/06/02/f-35-og-luft-til-luft-rollen/
