Next 18 Months Critical in Afghanistan, McChrystal Says

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Next 18 Months Critical in Afghanistan, McChrystal Says

WASHINGTON: The next 18 months will be crucial in Afghanistan, the new commander of NATO and U.S. forces there said today.

“I think that the next 18 months are probably a period in which this effort will be decided,” Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal told Tom Bowman in a National Public Radio interview. “I don't think it will be over. But I think that not only the American people, I think the Afghan people are looking and deciding which way this will go.”

McChrystal took command of coalition and U.S. efforts in Afghanistan on June 15. His job is to carry out the new strategy for the region.

The general said the conflict should not be viewed solely as a military struggle. It is not a question of whether the United States is winning, he said, but whether the Afghan people are winning. The Afghan government is the ultimate deciding factor, and while the government is not winning the war on extremists, “I don't say they’re losing,” McChrystal said.

“That’s an old axiom in counterinsurgency: If you’re not winning, you’re losing,” he said. “And the danger there is that that is true. So we see it as very, very important, probably over about the next 12 to 24 months, that we absolutely get a trend where we are clearly winning.”

McChrystal has spent much of his career in special operations, hunting down and killing or capturing terrorists. “What I learned is that much of the terrorism we fought years ago was very small groups that were finite. They were fanatical, and they could be attacked that way,” he said. “Nowadays, we have to fight the cause of terrorism, because terror is a tactic. You win by taking away from the enemy the one thing the insurgent absolutely has to have, and that’s access to the population.”

Hunting terrorists still has a place in the war in Afghanistan, McChrystal said, but the overall effort requires a mix of aggression and rebuilding. “I very much lean toward the importance of the building side,” he said.

The population needs to be safe so they can build an economy, build good governance and develop an infrastructure, the general explained. That gives the people something they want to continue and something they want to protect, so “the insurgent, then, becomes a troublemaker,” he said.

“The opposite could be perceived, even with good intentions,” he continued. “If we are just hunting Taliban, we can be perceived as coming into areas and being someone who upsets the neighborhood. But we do need to be able to keep a pressure on the enemy as we push them away. So there's always a balance.”

 

[muse]

You win by taking away from the enemy the one thing the insurgent absolutely has to have, and that’s access to the population

Think about this statement - What does access to the population give the Talib in Afghanistan and Pakistan? How do they Gain this access? What do they do with this access, in other words, why do they need this access?



If War is a continuation of politics by other means, what is that the Talib in Afghanistan and Pakistan want? What can we learn from their acts such as burning schools, in particular women's schools? What can we learn about what they want when they react to women in billboards, to TV and what can we learn about what they may want when they blow up music and DVD shops?

It is said that Talib are "terrorist group" -- What does this mean? That they engage in terrorism for the sake of terrorism? Or does it mean they use terror as a means to a end, a political end?? What might that politcal end be????

It is a common understanding that Utopians seek to arrest "CHANGE" in society -- see, if you have "the" perfect system or "the" perfect "way of life" - Why would you want to introduce change?

The people of Afghanistan will decide, says McCrystal - what does he mean? What if Karzai is reelected? Will bad or ineffective governance change??? But what if the American changes the focus of his attention from the central to the Provincial govts and people can see benefits of development, will the people want to stay ignorant, isolated and in poverty???

What will it mean for Pakistan?? Can Pakistan continue to hold on to anachronisms like the FATA?? Or will it demonstrate it's national interest by giving full political and legal rights to the territories that now constitue FATA??

 

[waraich66]

American general is putting himself in difficult satuation,if NATO and US forces could not perform the job in 8 years how they do it in 18 months ?

They have to vocate Afghanistan sooner or later .

We have not seen any improvement even lot of Iraq trained marines are now fighting with Talaban.

WAR is major trade of Afghans , if the foriegn forces go out of Afghanistan they will start fighting with each other ,as they did after defeat of Russia.

That is reason from thausand of years there is no stable government in Afghanistan.All foriegn invaders mogels,turks,greeks always wish to rule India.

There is only solution of Afghanistan is to divide it into three parts based on population of uzbik,tajik and Pushtoon , pushtoon part shall be merged with Pakistan other two with Uzbikistan and Tajikistan.

 

[muse]

Fundamentalist


All fighting or war begins with a idea -- A majority of Afghans want "Change" and some (Talib) want no Change or Stasis and they have disguised this arrest of chnage in society as Shariah.

So the struggle is between Change in the guise of Development (Freedom from ignorance - education - freedom from isolation and poverty) and Arrest of change in the guise of Shariah (freedom from consciousness and responsibility)

 

[waraich66]

Fundamentalist


All fighting or war begins with a idea -- A majority of Afghans want "Change" and some (Talib) want no Change or Stasis and they have disguised this arrest of chnage in society as Shariah.

So the struggle is between Change in the guise of Development (Freedom from ignorance - education - freedom from isolation and poverty) and Arrest of change in the guise of Shariah (freedom from consciousness and responsibility)

Muse

Shariah is not their issue, they are selling their daughters for few thausand rupees , what else you expect from them?

 

[muse]

Shariah is not their issue, they are selling their daughters for few thausand rupees , what else you expect from them?

WTF - Now we are back to "real" Talib and "real" Islam and "real" Shariah? Soon to be followed by "Whose" Islam, "Whose "Shariah"

That's why islamism is barren, a waste. We are Muslims and Pakistanis, Tauheed sustains us, Emaan humanizes us, Ittehad enriches us, and Nazm makes us unassailable - what need then for the sillyness that this Islamism unless of course we seek to arrest change in society, an idiot ambition.

 

[waraich66]

WTF - Now we are back to "real" Talib and "real" Islam and "real" Shariah? Soon to be followed by "Whose" Islam, "Whose "Shariah"

That's why islamism is barren, a waste. We are Muslims and Pakistanis, Tauheed sustains us, Emaan humanizes us, Ittehad enriches us, and Nazm makes us unassailable - what need then for the sillyness that this Islamism unless of course we seek to arrest change in society, an idiot ambition.

This is biggest delima of muslim ummah , every body is telling my Islam is correct but not focusing on real issues , haram,sirk,kufur,fasad,riba etc no body is thinking how to protect muslims from these evils, there is no end of greed and power hunger , you give taliban one country they will demand for another country.

 

[araz]

There is another facet that has not been explored. Post USSR collapse the taliban had control over a significant part of Afghanistan. they could not however, consolidate this into total control. The reasons were multifactorial. I think they can be divided into internal and external factors.
The internal factor was the inability of the taliban to coax the Northern alliance into a negotiated settlement. There are various reasons. Ethnicity may have been a factor, political immaturity of the taliban mayhave been another factor plus the lack of a serious effort to advice/guidance from outside could also have factored into the equation. Why try to conquer Jalalabad when you can negotiate and settle your differences and form a consensus Government? Stupidly the advise came from the very people who were the taliban,s "friends"to gian American favour. Then there was no effort to alleviate the problems of the masses.This was sheer lack of education and vision. I guess if left to their devices, better sense would have prevailed eventually, but this was not given enough time.
The external factors were mainlyIran and Saudi Arabia and pakistan. I think Zia was the only person who rued the fact that people are deserting the afghans at a very critical juncture when the power sharing problems have not been resolved. Nobody listened to him and uncle Sam promptly washed his hands and walked away. I cannot be 100% sure but I have a fleeting suspiscion that there was definately a tussle in Afghanistan between Saudi and Irani interests. The Northern alliance comprises areas where irans interests were based and these are areas of Shia majority. it was against iranian interest to allow Sunni Pushtoon Taliban to rule these areas, and the Saudis wanted the reverse to create a nuisance value to occupy the Iranians. The tussle evoved and further fueled the mistrust that existed between the two groups and resulted in the problems that we face today. Lastly access to Central Asia was something that was a dream of the strategic planners in Pakistan. I dont know for sure but Russia would not have looked at that with favour and so probably supported the very groups it fought with which further muddied the water. The talibans also did not do themselves any favours by inciting problem in the chinese Muslim population of the adjacent parts of China, which deprived them of the support of the very poeple who could have given them some support on the international scene.
So all in all the taliban government did not show any political maturity ,and the evolving and dynamic situation in the region meant that they were not given a second chance. I am sure that other members would like to discusss and further elaborate the role that the pakistani government of the time played/ did not play tha further added to the Afghans problems.
WaSalam
Araz

 

[muse]

thank you Araz for that super post

So all in all the talibangovernment did not show any political maturity ,and the evolving and dynamic situation in the region meant that they were not given a second chance

.

Would you agree that talib are not the kind of movement that seeks Change or development, in other words, would you agree that what the Talib want is to Prevent Change, prevent bringing the society in which they live from Changing, from evolving?

If, yes, that is if you do agree about that, would you not agree with those Afghan who charge that foreign powers (read, Pakistan, Saudi and UAE) only used the Afghan and did not care about the state or country of Afghanistan?

 

[S-2]

You've raised a very important issue. Fundamental, even. Islamism and their strictest adherents, even C.O. here have manipulated a religion for political gain.

O.K., but what "gain"? In short, what is offered? Do we take heart in the earlier manifestation of taliban rule? If not, what version now available offers more?

The evidence is weak that these archaic boobs can twist Islam to suit their narrow political agendas where a modicum of the population lives in more than stone-age conditions, either physically, culturally, or both. Ain't it odd that we see these men settle where they do- Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, S.A., Afghanistan, and Pakistan's tribal areas?

The correlation is undeniable. In the end, the articulated vision and ground experiments of these islamo-fascists have hardly endeared mankind. They are stasis personified.

So too, though, the tribal systems that so dominate the political landscape in Baluchistan, Afghanistan, and FATA. Even without the malignant presence of the taliban and AQI types, it remains the base conditions of health, opportunity, and education that make such fertile breeding ground.

Sadly, I don't see Afghan, Pakistani, nor American/ISAF political institutions morally prepared to assail these enduring tribal political anomalies that so pervert any real democratic system. It goes far to explain why Afghanistan continues to limp along. That's certain but I see no hint of it's de-emphasis...like some sacred cow. Or, as you've suggested, finally integrating FATA into full citizenship.

A lovely idea. Compelling thoughts, all.

It'll be interesting to see how our shift to "population security" changes the political interplay between Kabul and Washington D.C. Karzai certainly doesn't harbor great hope at this point by our calculus but we're obligated to see the agreed-process through. Nonetheless, he's a neutered head of state who's been unable to identify and mobilize the best in Afghan society to the tasks at hand.

Afghans suffer and don't display the human capital yet to rise to the next level...whatever that is. How long? Who knows...but, back to my point- the population is FAAAAR more than simply Kabul.

Securing and stabilizing such puts our efforts far, far away from the city limits of Kabul and moves our focus to the areas in which we operate and can most benefit by our presence- the southern provinces.

This may be a very good thing if delivering security and services is what it's really all about. Do so and the provinces will change the system from the bottom up, instead of top down through Kabul.

Afterall, Kabul isn't going to fall tomorrow. The taliban might be talked to death at the city gates in any case.

Perhaps that's really the idea-

It's become too difficult to effect change through an immature and dysfunctional Afghan state apparatus thus America will politely shift the focus in a way that's unobjectionable.

The taliban might be surprised to know they aren't the only entity interested in isolating Kabul.

 

[araz]

thank you Araz for that super post

.

Would you agree that talib are not the kind of movement that seeks Change or development, in other words, would you agree that what the Talib want is to Prevent Change, prevent bringing the society in which they live from Changing, from evolving?

If, yes, that is if you do agree about that, would you not agree with those Afghan who charge that foreign powers (read, Pakistan, Saudi and UAE) only used the Afghan and did not care about the state or country of Afghanistan?

Muse
There are obviously problems in the way things were implemented. The basic problem lies with lack of education even islamic education. It puts people with limited knowledge in positions where they have to interpret and act on problems which are way beyond their comprehension. This always leads to excesses and this is a time tested problem. The other problem which you have alluded to is the fact that local customs howsoever barbaric are often given religious intonations without people realizing it. One such examplke in NWFP and also in Sindh, is a lack of womans right to acquire a share in property of the father/husband.
What was needed was a leader of the class of Khomeini to lead an Islamic revolt. Trade him with Mullah Omer(no disrespect meant) and you have a recipe for disaster.
I will try to contribute more later.
Araz

 

[muse]

Thank you Araz, yes, please do contribute when you can.

I am sure you know the IT truism, "Garbage in, Garbage Out" - if you want to use this to define the kinds of understanding of reality, then of course we have to examine what the original "in" was and here you will find that Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and to some extent USA used expediency over a carefully crafted policy.

Recall that in the year the Soviet invaded Afghanistan, Iranian revolution was hijacked by a anti-West Shiah Islamist movement and as the war in the war against the soviet progressed in Afghanistan, Shiah Iran and Sunni (and US) Supported Iraq began a process of destabilizing each others regime.

After the Soviet was defeated, The Idea that Islam"ism" could now be used to political and military effect, partticularly in the sectarian wars for EXCLUSIVE claims to the TRUTH betwenn SHi'aah and Sunni, found great currency in Wahabi Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and Iran.

It is important to understand the divergent focus of Sunni and Shi'aah in realtion to each other. The Sunni confident, assertive that by sheer numbers they have the "truth" of Islam, project outwards - the Shi'aah similarly confident and assertive about the Exclusive claim to the "truth", project inwards towards the rest of islam to convince them of the "truth" of their understanding of "truth" of Islam.

The Wahabi/Salafi, a understanding of Islam closely related in timeline to the Ahmadi and Bahayi understanding of Islam, has been characterized by a seemingly irrational hatred of the Shi'aah Muslims, flush with Dollars, saw the turning of Saddam from client to enemy as a particularly harsh blow, at the same time, they had experienced success in Afghanistan via the Talib with the not so covert assistance of Pakistani Sunni extremist organizations and their patronization by elements of the state.

Now, if we today, have the "garbage out", we should not waste too much time bemoaning it's demise, recall it's "garbage", just because the word "islam" and the ideology marker "ism" is associated with it, does not change it's fundamental character, garbage.

The Challenege now is to create and display the detemination to "take the garbage out", to clean house and to move on with the reral business of the Pakistani people. Our internal challeneges need not be turned in to problems for our neighbors, because we have the capacity to solve them.

 

[muse]

- Pakistani readers are welcomed to think "if it good for the goose......."





Afghanistan: Our troops are giving their lives to safeguard a rigged election
Hamid Karzai's appalling and corrupt regime is the West's guilty little secret, suggests Mary Riddell.

By Mary Riddell
Published: 7:13PM BST 13 Jul 2009


Hamid Karzai presides over the fifth most corrupt government in the world Photo: AP

All wars have anthems for doomed youth. Afghanistan is no exception. At a memorial service yesterday, senior officers paid tribute to the eight British soldiers who died in the worst day of attrition since the Falklands.

Of the three youngest, William Aldridge had a gift for friendship, Joseph Murphy was a fine artist and James Backhouse, who wanted to be a fitness instructor, could run faster than the wind. Like his two comrades, he was 18 years old. Like them, he was, according to his superiors' eulogies, prepared to kill and to be killed.

Helmand province is not the Somme, but Wilfred Owen's lament for squandered life has seemed, back in the UK, to echo down the years. "What candles may be held to speed them all?/Not in the hands of boys but in their eyes/Shall shine the holy glimmers of goodbyes."

Owen blamed the state for sacrificing the young. Now, once again, government is deemed culpable as every parent sees, in the faces of the juvenile dead, an image of his or her own child. "What passing-bells for these who die as cattle?" Owen asked.

Almost a century later, there is no shortage of funeral hymns. Liam Fox, the shadow defence secretary, says Gordon Brown has "catastrophically" under-equipped the Armed Forces. For the Lib Dems, Nick Clegg challenges the PM to show the sacrifices of lives "have not been in vain". The Army demands extra troops and more equipment.

With the Taliban getting smarter and 15 British troops dead so far this month, Afghanistan is a dimestore war. In four decades, the defence budget has fallen from 6.5 per cent of GDP to 3 per cent, while Tony Blair's imperial ambitions committed troops to four major conflicts, of which Iraq was inexcusable and Afghanistan, on the current showing, unwinnable.

Mr Brown's critics imply that he is trying to fight a Prada war at Lidl prices. Although he disputes this, defence spending is undeniably out of kilter with reality. The PM's likely concession on Trident – cutting back on warheads and perhaps reducing the new fleet – is a feeble compromise that will not free up significant sums for the frontline. Nor is it likely that taxes will rise to boost defence.

But even if a war chest were to be found, there is little clarity about what we're fighting for: the end of brutal and repressive Taliban mandates or, as Mr Brown says, to stop terror being exported to the UK. With al-Qaeda moving sinously across the globe, the second goal looks hopeless.

The real question is whether the Afghan war can ever be won by military means alone, and the answer, as David Miliband has always recognised, is No. In stirring up trouble for the Government, the generals and the Tories risk peddling a delusion. Yes, extra helicopters may save some lives (though by no means all), but the truth about Afghanistan risks being obscured by political opportunism. Even vast injections of money, hardware and manpower would not, by themselves, subdue the Taliban or procure victory.

A political solution is the only guarantee of success, yet that objective is barely spoken of. In the US and the UK, next month's presidential election attracts almost no mention. Since the temporary increase in British troops is specifically to provide cover for the ballot, this silence is suspicious, if not downright sinister.

The appalling regime of Hamid Karzai is western leaders' grubby little secret. Mr Karzai, who boasts of being Washington's (and thus Britain's) man, presides over the fifth most corrupt government in the world. As well as turning a blind eye to last year's alleged loss, through abuse, of two thirds of his country's annual revenue amounting to $1.6 billion, Mr Karzai has failed the vulnerable and the trusting.

Naturally, Western leaders cannot impose an alternative placeman to sort out his narco-state. But, in a field of around 40 challengers, two credible candidates stand out. One, Abdullah Abdullah, is the former foreign secretary; the other, Ashraf Ghani, is the one-time finance minister and former chancellor of Kabul University.

Although Dr Ghani, once tipped to become UN Secretary General, has the only coherent agenda and a well-orchestrated e-campaign, the odds are greatly against him, and other contenders, because the election commission is stacked with Mr Karzai's henchmen.

Disgracefully, neither Washington nor London has publicly demanded a level playing field or complained that the election for which British soldiers are dying is effectively rigged. Meanwhile, Dr Ghani, who has no official protection, is making a swift transition from Washington technocrat to politician. His billboards in Mr Karzai's home town of Kandahar have been vandalized with acid and removed; supporters in Britain say he is putting his life at risk.

Until a few days ago, it looked impossible that Dr Ghani would ever institute his 10-year framework enshrining the rule of law, good governance and co-operation with local groups and the international community. But suddenly, Washington is growing nervous. As chilly signals about Mr Karzai reach Kabul, the president is hiding in his palace, declining to appear on the campaign trail or debate on television with his rivals.

Educated voters, informed by independent TV and radio, are disgusted by his pardon of drug-dealers and his ties to militia leaders. The UN and the Afghan human rights commission have logged many complaints about state interference in the election amid a dawning hope that Mr Karzai may not win outright in the first ballot. If he fails on August 20, then his network of powerful allies may collapse, leaving either of his main rivals a chance of victory.

Should Mr Karzai cling to power, which is still much the likeliest outcome, then it is just conceivable that the US "surge" will be enough to broker a deal with the Taliban. More probably, corruption will continue and insurgents will gloat at the prospect of a long war whose history will be written in British blood.

Our government must urgently address national security and the misfit between yesterday's under-funded defence strategy and today's myriad dangers. As Professor Paul Rogers, of Bradford University, says, the colonial era ended in 1947 with the partition of India. Mr Blair failed to notice the shift, and Mr Brown is left to pick up the pieces.

The omens could hardly be grimmer. Not only are the military objectives hazy, but a campaign costing $20 billion a month has no political direction. Voters here, as in Afghanistan, deserve the truth. We are pouring blood and money into a black hole, and the flow will not be staunched unless a political solution is found.

Until then, 18 year-olds with the fresh faces of your sons, or mine, will fight and fall. They do not require passing-bells, or candles; only good equipment and the guarantee that they are the brave architects of a better future. No civilised nation should ask its soldiers, young or old, to die for less.