Newest trend in Pak-Afghan ties

[ghazi52]

.,.,,.

Newest trend in Pak-Afghan ties​

by Umer Gujjar

Written by Umer Gujjar

A highly regretful incident occurred on Sunday at the Pak-Afghan Chaman border when Afghan troops resorted to unprovoked and indiscriminate firing from across the border that resulted in the martyrdom of six innocent civilians and serious injuries to 17 others. According to the Pakistan Army media wing, the Afghan border forces used heavy weapons in the attack, while Pakistan’s troops gave a befitting albeit measured response against the uncalled-for aggression, but avoided targeting innocent civilians in the area.

Pakistan’s relations with the interim Afghan government are not going well over the past several months, Islamabad continuously receiving pellets and bullets from across Turkham and Chaman.

Historically, the Pakistani State and its institutions had always failed to assess, manage and neutralize geostrategic threats to the nation, and their myopic bureaucratic recipes proved to be counter-productive and caused additional damage to the country. Ranging from local political engineering to Afghan Jihad, and participation in the global war on terror to the recent peace accord with the Pakistan Tahreek-e-Taliban (TTP), all decisions were based on ambitious ideas and imaginary calculations without any rational assessment of the situation and psychological study of the people and the area that finally led to a strategic failure or unendurable success for the country.

Presently, the country is in a pre-2007 situation when terrorism was taking momentum in KP and Erstwhile FATA while the NATO and Afghan troops were attacking Pakistani border posts in the Bajor and Mohmand areas including the Salala check-post. Unfortunately, Pakistani strategists have lots of personal and family commitments and often lack spare time to deliberate on national security issues to conceive a plausible strategy to secure national interests, thus the state pays price for their incompetence and slackness.

After the assassination attempt against Pakistan’s Ambassador to Kabul, we have categorically stated on these pages that there is a clear change in the Afghan interim government’s policies toward Pakistan, those who are unable to steer Afghanistan, have the desire to transform Pakistan in their way. Presently, there is an urgent need for the government to review its Afghan policy and reset clear goals to protect Pakistan’s core interest in the region.

Throughout history, Pakistan sought its security and survival in foreign elements and regional geostrategic dynamics and mostly received backlash and anger for the failure and inability of other nations. Pakistan is a sovereign nation with a nuclear armed strong military, that is fully capable to thwart all internal and external challenges. After multiple failed experiences, the government must adopt a Pakistan-centric independent policy without any compromise and relying on external sticks so no external factor undermines Pakistan’s internal peace and security in the future.

Newest trend in Pak-Afghan ties

A highly regretful incident occurred on Sunday at the Pak-Afghan Chaman border when Afghan troops resorted to unprovoked and indiscriminate firing from across the border that resulted in the marty…

thefrontierpost.com

 

[Goritoes]

This is forced relationship, only one type of people wants good relationship with Afghanistan, rest of the Pakistani's hate them and rightly so.

 

[ghazi52]

,..,

SS S​

An Urdu maxim: So (100) sunaar ki aik (01) lohaar ki. I have ardently been following vlogs of journalists since VONC, and I must say that Wajahat Khan's single vlog is more comprehensive and well-articulated than the agglomeration of local vloggers'. Your vlogs depict how well-educated you are. Having a research-based analysis, Sir, kyaa baat hai aap ki!

 

[ghazi52]

.,.,

https://twitter.com/x/status/1603342615604301831

 

[nangyale]

Unfortunately, Pakistani strategists have lots of personal and family commitments and often lack spare time to deliberate on national security issues to conceive a plausible strategy to secure national interests,

I believe this is the crux of the matter here. The Pakistani Army elite is busy enriching itself and is playing political musical chairs. The country is bereft of any grand foreign or security policy as a result.

 

[alphapak]

Napak Army is busy with their War against PTI or anyone who raises a voice
against their corruption.

They are too busy defending their corruption and legalising it through PDM.

 

[TheSolution]

 

[Riz]

Aik nagmay ki maar hain yeh saly is taliban ISPR k

 

[HAIDER]

No use of drones .... strange .. these attacks can easily be countered by using drones...

 

[Imran Khan]

taliban are not even one command everyone is taliban now a days in afghanistan

 

[alphapak]

No use of drones .... strange .. these attacks can easily be countered by using drones...

They will use these drones against PTI long marches only. They didn't even use
out of date tear gas shells or rubber bullets against these Afghans.

They are only good at oppressing their own people just to save their corruption.

 

[ghazi52]

.,,.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1603660326398005250

 

[Hakikat ve Hikmet]

Afganistan is a 100% narcotic state! What else do you expect? Anyway, as long as the "White men (real and pretentious)" need to spend 100s of billions of $s from their 100% Haram wralth for the "recreational staffs" to cut their nights short while putting adventures into their lives, keep on leveraging it.....

By the by, the Taliban in Kabul is 1b times better than the Hindutva worshipping NA pedophile thugs over there.....

 

[ghazi52]

Please don’t blame R&AW or India. Start sorting out your problem which is internal security & border management with overall political/economical.
Afghan psyche is they’ll call you Panjabi whether your name is Abdullah or Ranjodh Singh. Talibs will call you not true muslims.

 

[ghazi52]

,.,.

Understanding the Afghan Taliban​

Riaz Mohammad Khan
December 17, 2022

A FEW events in quick succession — the targeting of Pakistan’s ambassador at the embassy compound and the unprovoked attacks at the Chaman border, one of which killed eight Pakistani civilians — warrant review of our understanding and expectations of Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan and, importantly, how we should respond to the increasingly disappointing Afghan behaviour.

It would be presumptuous to claim comprehension of all the factors that shape Afghan behaviour towards Pakistan at the individual or country level.

Historically, the 1979 Soviet military intervention marked a watershed which pushed Pakistan into the role of a key player.

For good political reasons, Pakistan chose to resist the Soviet intervention, but soon the underlying motivation went beyond political considerations to incorporate ideological undertones. At the core level, those setting and handling the policy were only comfortable with hard-line Islamist groups.

These resonated with president Zia’s own Islamist outlook, showed will and could arguably be trusted to move away from the irritants of the Durand Line and Pashtunistan, which long troubled bilateral relations. In some measure, the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan Taliban are the product of our policy preferences.

One early disaster for our Afghan policy came at the hands of extremist elements, who during the 1989 Jalalabad siege massacred over 100 defecting soldiers from Kabul’s army, showing utter disregard for discipline, planning and even common sense. We also failed to provide crucial guidance.

I was told by a former vice foreign minister in the Najibullah government that Najibullah had written off Jalalabad as indefensible and had plans to shield Kabul at Sarobi, but then the murder of the defecting soldiers turned the tables. Had the fall of Jalalabad materialised in 1989, it could have changed the complexion of the conflict.

There have been occasions when Najibullah and, after the American intervention, Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani reached out to Islamabad. The last two wanted Pakistan’s help to control the Taliban and create more political space for themselves. But the possibility of a more ‘dependable’ government in Kabul, with Taliban participation, proved seductive.

Although officially disclaimed, we remained attracted to such ill-conceived notions as finding ‘strategic depth’ and having a ‘friendly government’ in Kabul. Many educated Afghans, especially among the Afghan diaspora, blame Pakistan for foisting the Taliban on their country.

Today, our sights have been lowered to a minimal demand that the Taliban government restrain the TTP and other anti-Pakistan elements, something which the earlier Kabul regimes appeared ready to oblige. We trusted the Afghan Taliban on this score and are clearly disappointed.

Even if we cannot comprehend the pathology of Afghan hostility, we must have clarity in our response.

There is debate as to what lies behind the Afghan Taliban’s rancour, visible in the frequent provocations along the border and even in outbursts from the Taliban leaders. The fence obviously rankles the Taliban.

Have they hyped the issue to distract attention from failures at home? Are there disconnected free-wheeling elements within the Taliban? Do governments in Kabul draw political credibility in appearing to be standing up to Pakistan? Do they wish to push the TTP, the IS-K and other undesirable elements, who were once brothers-in-arms, into the (former) Fata region to disgorge the problem on to Pakistan, or still more sinister, change the complexion of the Pakistani tribal belt? We seem to be groping for an explanation.

Even if we cannot comprehend the pathology of Afghan hostility, we must have clarity in our response. First, the situation requires decisions involving the political and military leadership, the KP and Balochistan leaders, the Foreign Office and the intelligence agencies. A few thoughts readily come to mind.

We must take clear positions with the Pakistani Taliban and with the Afghan Taliban. No conflicted messaging. The Pakistani Taliban can return to Pakistan only if they surrender their arms.

Any country which tolerates armed autonomous groups on its soil is doomed. We should avoid hitting the TTP deep inside Afghanistan, where any action will inevitably result in civilian casualties, complicating the situation. We must, nevertheless, forcefully counter TTP militancy on the border and within Pakistan.

Kabul must be left in no doubt that we regard subversion against Pakistan by the TTP or other groups operating from Afghanistan as unfriendly acts which can oblige us to exercise self-defence. We should, however, not look to overt or covert foreign assistance for this purpose.

The TTP seeks to establish its sway in former Fata. There are reports that we ignored TTP elements returning to the area, in particular Waziristan. If true, this was a grave lapse.

Despite provocations, we need to deal with the Afghan Taliban with sensitivity. As Afghans, they are characteristically proud, resent being patronised and are uneasy about being reminded of favours done by Pakistan.

One guiding principle: the Afghans expect courtesy but respect firmness. We should avoid retaliatory steps that may hurt the Afghan people and continue with the facilitation we have been providing, and even accommodate reasonable new requests.

The Taliban worldview is blind to norms such as inclusive government, women’s education and the right to work. The resulting international censure hinders Pakistan (and Afghanistan) from exploiting the region’s geopolitical potential for economic development.

In an ideological sense, the Afghan Taliban do not see themselves aligned to Pakistan but to their brothers in faith in Pakistan, which partly explains their empathy with the TTP.

For them, other relations are essentially expedient. We are familiar with such thinking and have been ourselves tainted with religious irrationality (eg, we have perversely turned into a political tool the two Islamic virtues of ‘sadiq’ and ‘amin’). I will not venture further on this point.

The Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship is a unique one. We should be content with de facto Afghan acquiescence in treating the Durand Line as the border and allow it to remain soft.

There is no conventional threat across this border; no armies from the north will descend on Pakistan. We may recall that in 1965 and 1971, Kabul assured us peace along this border. The Pashtunistan issue died with the Soviet intervention decades ago.

The Afghan Taliban experience makes it clear, however, that we cannot transpose our aspirations on to the Afghans. Our dealings with Afghanistan should remain within the framework of a correct state-to-state relationship.

The writer is an author and a former foreign secretary.
Published in Dawn, December 17th, 2022