The SC
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Feb 13, 2012
- Messages
- 32,233
- Reaction score
- 21
- Country
- Location
The new missiles announced by President Vladimir Putin draw a major attention. However, they are either non-operational yet or undergoing test operations or trials. In 2016 the aniship Kh-32 missile for Tu-22M3 bombers became operational. Its high characteristics considerably changed the balance on oceanic and sea theaters of warfare, expert Konstantin Sivkov writes in the Military-Industrial Courier.
Close up picture of a X-32 anti-ship missile during a test flight with a Tu-22M3 bomber in summer-autumn 2013 (original photo by Sergei Lysenko, http://russianplanes.net/id121764).
The Raduga Maritime Design Bureau has been developing the missile since 1998. It is a deep modernization of the well-known Kh-22 which made the maiden flight in 1963, was accepted into service in 1968 and is still operational. It has the hull of the predecessor. The size and weight of Kh-32 are the same. It weighs close to 5800 kg, is 12 meters long with a one-meter diameter and a three-meter wingspan. It is carried on the same suspensions as Kh-22. Open sources said the warhead is lighter. On Kh-22 it weighs 900 kg and the new one weighs 500 kg. The empty space is used to carry additional fuel.
Kh-32 has a more effective and powerful engine. It is distinguished by a new radar targeting system with radio command adjustment according to terrain relief by altimeter. Kh-22 homing warhead operates by a set of fixed frequencies.
The problems of electromagnetic compatibility limit the number of missiles in a salvo, and the missile is extremely vulnerable to modern electronic warfare means. Kh-32 controls are free of the drawbacks. Experts said the weapon is highly protected from jamming by the latest emission sources.
The trajectory has three sections: the launch one to reach the cruising altitude, the cruising one when Kh-32 flies at the 40-km ceiling, and the final one when it nosedives to attack.
Experts believe Kh-32 can lock on the target from under the aircraft wing which allows the operator to select the target. However, the range of 600-1000 km does not provide such a possibility as the distance is too big for the warhead to detect and track the target. The radars of the carrier, reconnaissance or AEW aircraft cannot do it.
Tu-22M3 number 9804 in flight test with 2x Kh-32 in 2013. Designed to break the enemy's air defense and attack carrier battle groups, Russian media reported that the missiles are able to exchange information after launch via datalink and able to withstand 20mm gun fire as well as small surface to air missiles. Photo by Sergei Lysenko, http://russianplanes.net/id121764
The range of the homing warhead is 200-300 km. The operator selects the target after detecting a group of adversary warships (radar-contrast ground targets) and sends a radio command. Vulkan missiles and their predecessors Basalt operate by the same principle on project 1164 cruisers.
It is clear the fire range in the technical assignment should allow to strike without entering the air defense of the aircraft-carrying formation. The longest interception range of seaborne US aircraft on duty in the air is 700 kilometers from the carrier when aimed by AWACS (E-2S Hawkai and E-3 various modifications). It means Kh-32 range should be 800 km (experts say 600 to 1000 km). It is quite possible as Kh-22 flew for over 350 km yet in early 1960s. A more powerful engine and two times higher ceiling will boost the speed. Experts estimate the cruising speed at 5400 km/h.
As a result, it is an antiship missile launched from an altitude of 1 to 13 thousand meters and flying at an altitude of some 40 km at a speed of 1500 meters per second. The missile does not meet modern stealth requirements.
Let us analyze the capabilities of the latest and most powerful air defense of the US Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers and Arleigh-Burke-class destroyers with Aegis information-control system and the latest Standard-6 antiaircraft guided missiles.
The missile (RIM-174 SM-6 ERAM) became operational in the US Navy in 2013. It is distinguished by an active radar homing warhead which allows to fire and forget the missile.
It increases the effectiveness of engagement against low flying targets also beyond the horizon and allows destroying targets by outside aiming data, e.g. from an AWACS aircraft.
The Standard-6 launch weight is 1500 kg, the range is 240 km and the maximum altitude is 33 km. The speed is Mach 3.5 or nearly a thousand meters per second.
Maximum maneuvering overload is 50g. The warhead is kinetic (for ballistic targets) or fragmentation (for aerodynamic targets), weighs 125 kg which is twice as much as the previous missiles of the family.
Maximum speed of the attacked aerodynamic target is estimated at 800 meters per second. The hit probability by one missile at an aerodynamic target is 0.95.
The comparison of Kh-32 and Standard-6 shows the flying section of Kh-32 is seven kilometers above the top destruction level of the US missile and nearly two times surpasses its maximum speed for aerodynamic targets: 1500 against 800 meters per second.
But that does not mean the United States will not fire at hypersonic missiles. The Aegis system can detect them and provide aiming information as it is capable of missile and even satellite defense. Therefore, Standard-6 will be engaged, but it remains to see how effectively.
The hit probability characteristics are usually provided for ranges where the target does not maneuver and flies at the best speed for its destruction. In real combat the hit probability is usually lower due to aiming specifics which are limited by the speed of the maneuvering target and its altitude.
The hit capability of Standard-6 will be affected also by the detection range of the active homing warhead, the precision of the approach to target lock-on area, admissible maneuvering overload and atmosphere density, as well as errors in determining the movement specifics of the target by radars and information-control systems. All the factors determine the main thing - whether the missile can contact and select the miss distance to a level which will guarantee the warhead hitting the maneuvering target.
Open sources provide no data on the range of Standard-6 homing warhead. The size and weight of the missile can suggest that it can see an aircraft with five square kilometer effective echoing ratio at a distance of 15-20km. Kh-32 missile effective echoing ratio is 0.5 square kilometers, so the range of Strandard-6 warhead is 8-12 kilometers. The fire at attacking antiship missiles will be naturally held at head-on courses. It means the missiles will approach each other at a speed of 2200-2330 meters per second which leaves only three-four seconds for the approaching maneuver. The hit probability is low specifically at altitudes above the limit where rarefied atmosphere considerably decreases maneuvering capabilities. It means Standard-6 has to be launched with an error not exceeding 30-40 meters to successfully hit Kh-32 at the flying section. The hit probability of a nosediving KH-32 in the dense layers of the atmosphere is also limited by little time of the flight to the mission point - 20 seconds.
Calculations show the hit probability of Kh-32 by one Standard-6 can hardly exceed 0.05-0.08 even in favorable conditions and aiming directly from the carrier. Hit probability by data from an AWACS aircraft is close to zero (0.01-0.02) because of errors in determining the location of the carrier and the targeting source and the time to exchange information. It means the most effective US and NATO Standard-6 missile has a low capability to hit Kh-32. One can object and say the Americans fired from a Ticonderoga-class cruiser and hit a satellite flying at a speed of 27 thousand km/h at an altitude of 240 km. But it did not maneuver and its position was precisely determined after a long observation which helped bring the missile directly to the target. There will be no such possibilities in repelling an attack by a maneuvering Kh-32.
It is necessary to estimate the probability of Ticonderoga-class cruiser or Arleigh-Burke-class destroyer to hit Kh-32. The range of their radars to detect Kh-32 at an altitude of 40 km can be estimated at 230-270 km. It means the missile will approach the target in less than three minutes after it is detected. The Aegis system operational time is 30-35 seconds between the detection and launch. In the remaining time two universal Mk.41 launchers can fire 20-30 guided missiles capable of destroying the attacking Kh-32.
The hit probability by Vulcan Phalanx is next to nothing. Therefore, Ticonderoga or Arleigh-Burke can potentially destroy one of two Kh-32. It means two such warships can destroy two-four Kh-32.
Close up picture of a X-32 anti-ship missile during a test flight with a Tu-22M3 bomber in July 2013 (original photo by Vitaly Yurtayev, http://russianplanes.net/id114329).
There is also electronic warfare of active deception and passive jamming. There is sufficient time for it and their complex engagement can disrupt the targeting to a major extent. The operational time of electronic warfare weapons of a warship and their expected efficiency result in a maximum probability hit of 0.3-0.4. In case of fire at a group it is highly probable that the homing warhead would lock on another target. During Falkland hostilities a British aircraft carrier engaged passive jamming and the attacking Exoset missile changed the target and hit and sank the Atlantic Conveyers container ship. Kh-32 speed may leave no time for another warship in a formation on which the warhead may lock to engage electronic warfare and divert it.
It means a group of two cruisers or destroyers is incapable of repelling a strike from two Tu-22M3 bombers carrying two Kh-32 missiles each even in favorable conditions. At least one warship would be damaged with a 0.6-0.7 probability. A strike by a wing of three aircraft with six Kh-32 will definitely destroy both warships.
A salvo of 24 Kh-32 at an aircraft-carrying force would be fatal. The probability to destroy or sink an aircraft carrier with two-three escort ships is 0.75-0.85. Russian aircraft will attack from outside the operational zone of adversary seaborne fighter jets. It means a strike by 12 Tu-22M3 with two missiles each will be sufficient to destroy an aircraft-carrying force with a high probability.
A group of two-three aircraft carriers can be destroyed by a strike of two regiments of Tu-22M3 with 72 Kh-32. They can fire from a distance of two-three thousand kilometers from the Russian coast, i.e. long before the aircraft-carrying force arrives at the distance of seaborne aircraft engagement.
Even limited long-range aviation forces can considerably neutralize US aircraft-carrying formations. However, they have to be properly aimed at the targets and defended from adversary coastal fighter jets. If it is not provided, the Kh-32 potential will not be implemented.
The United States is actively developing hypersonic missiles but so far there is no data about the design of weapons similar to Kh-32. Russia is likely to dominate in the sphere for ten years and more.
Still it is necessary to arm the aviation with a sufficient number of such missiles. The troops need at least 250-300 of them. But the navy and the air force are unlikely to get such a number of missiles because of the state of the economy and the defense industry, as well as upcoming conversion. It means Kh-32 will remain an excellent but rare Russian weapon.
The serial production of Kh-32 means a revolution in the naval arts. The relative parity in the offense-defense balance will be replaced by a situation when the attack potential will considerably surpass the defense capability.
The review analyzed the most perfect foreign arms. The capabilities of other weapons are considerably inferior to Aegis and Standard-6.
It is necessary to design new methods and forms of naval warfare, in particular, the destruction of surface forces of the adversary and promotion of combat sustainability of your own forces. Adequate increase of the air defense potential of warships will likely demand to review the conceptual basis of such systems. It will take 10-15 years or may be more, expert Konstantin Sivkov writes in the Military-Industrial Courier.
http://www.navyrecognition.com/inde...ile-becomes-operational-in-russia-part-1.html
http://www.navyrecognition.com/inde...ile-becomes-operational-in-russia-part-2.html
Kh-32 has a more effective and powerful engine. It is distinguished by a new radar targeting system with radio command adjustment according to terrain relief by altimeter. Kh-22 homing warhead operates by a set of fixed frequencies.
The problems of electromagnetic compatibility limit the number of missiles in a salvo, and the missile is extremely vulnerable to modern electronic warfare means. Kh-32 controls are free of the drawbacks. Experts said the weapon is highly protected from jamming by the latest emission sources.
The trajectory has three sections: the launch one to reach the cruising altitude, the cruising one when Kh-32 flies at the 40-km ceiling, and the final one when it nosedives to attack.
Experts believe Kh-32 can lock on the target from under the aircraft wing which allows the operator to select the target. However, the range of 600-1000 km does not provide such a possibility as the distance is too big for the warhead to detect and track the target. The radars of the carrier, reconnaissance or AEW aircraft cannot do it.
It is clear the fire range in the technical assignment should allow to strike without entering the air defense of the aircraft-carrying formation. The longest interception range of seaborne US aircraft on duty in the air is 700 kilometers from the carrier when aimed by AWACS (E-2S Hawkai and E-3 various modifications). It means Kh-32 range should be 800 km (experts say 600 to 1000 km). It is quite possible as Kh-22 flew for over 350 km yet in early 1960s. A more powerful engine and two times higher ceiling will boost the speed. Experts estimate the cruising speed at 5400 km/h.
As a result, it is an antiship missile launched from an altitude of 1 to 13 thousand meters and flying at an altitude of some 40 km at a speed of 1500 meters per second. The missile does not meet modern stealth requirements.
Let us analyze the capabilities of the latest and most powerful air defense of the US Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers and Arleigh-Burke-class destroyers with Aegis information-control system and the latest Standard-6 antiaircraft guided missiles.
The missile (RIM-174 SM-6 ERAM) became operational in the US Navy in 2013. It is distinguished by an active radar homing warhead which allows to fire and forget the missile.
It increases the effectiveness of engagement against low flying targets also beyond the horizon and allows destroying targets by outside aiming data, e.g. from an AWACS aircraft.
The Standard-6 launch weight is 1500 kg, the range is 240 km and the maximum altitude is 33 km. The speed is Mach 3.5 or nearly a thousand meters per second.
Maximum maneuvering overload is 50g. The warhead is kinetic (for ballistic targets) or fragmentation (for aerodynamic targets), weighs 125 kg which is twice as much as the previous missiles of the family.
Maximum speed of the attacked aerodynamic target is estimated at 800 meters per second. The hit probability by one missile at an aerodynamic target is 0.95.
The comparison of Kh-32 and Standard-6 shows the flying section of Kh-32 is seven kilometers above the top destruction level of the US missile and nearly two times surpasses its maximum speed for aerodynamic targets: 1500 against 800 meters per second.
But that does not mean the United States will not fire at hypersonic missiles. The Aegis system can detect them and provide aiming information as it is capable of missile and even satellite defense. Therefore, Standard-6 will be engaged, but it remains to see how effectively.
The hit probability characteristics are usually provided for ranges where the target does not maneuver and flies at the best speed for its destruction. In real combat the hit probability is usually lower due to aiming specifics which are limited by the speed of the maneuvering target and its altitude.
The hit capability of Standard-6 will be affected also by the detection range of the active homing warhead, the precision of the approach to target lock-on area, admissible maneuvering overload and atmosphere density, as well as errors in determining the movement specifics of the target by radars and information-control systems. All the factors determine the main thing - whether the missile can contact and select the miss distance to a level which will guarantee the warhead hitting the maneuvering target.
Open sources provide no data on the range of Standard-6 homing warhead. The size and weight of the missile can suggest that it can see an aircraft with five square kilometer effective echoing ratio at a distance of 15-20km. Kh-32 missile effective echoing ratio is 0.5 square kilometers, so the range of Strandard-6 warhead is 8-12 kilometers. The fire at attacking antiship missiles will be naturally held at head-on courses. It means the missiles will approach each other at a speed of 2200-2330 meters per second which leaves only three-four seconds for the approaching maneuver. The hit probability is low specifically at altitudes above the limit where rarefied atmosphere considerably decreases maneuvering capabilities. It means Standard-6 has to be launched with an error not exceeding 30-40 meters to successfully hit Kh-32 at the flying section. The hit probability of a nosediving KH-32 in the dense layers of the atmosphere is also limited by little time of the flight to the mission point - 20 seconds.
Calculations show the hit probability of Kh-32 by one Standard-6 can hardly exceed 0.05-0.08 even in favorable conditions and aiming directly from the carrier. Hit probability by data from an AWACS aircraft is close to zero (0.01-0.02) because of errors in determining the location of the carrier and the targeting source and the time to exchange information. It means the most effective US and NATO Standard-6 missile has a low capability to hit Kh-32. One can object and say the Americans fired from a Ticonderoga-class cruiser and hit a satellite flying at a speed of 27 thousand km/h at an altitude of 240 km. But it did not maneuver and its position was precisely determined after a long observation which helped bring the missile directly to the target. There will be no such possibilities in repelling an attack by a maneuvering Kh-32.
It is necessary to estimate the probability of Ticonderoga-class cruiser or Arleigh-Burke-class destroyer to hit Kh-32. The range of their radars to detect Kh-32 at an altitude of 40 km can be estimated at 230-270 km. It means the missile will approach the target in less than three minutes after it is detected. The Aegis system operational time is 30-35 seconds between the detection and launch. In the remaining time two universal Mk.41 launchers can fire 20-30 guided missiles capable of destroying the attacking Kh-32.
The hit probability by Vulcan Phalanx is next to nothing. Therefore, Ticonderoga or Arleigh-Burke can potentially destroy one of two Kh-32. It means two such warships can destroy two-four Kh-32.
There is also electronic warfare of active deception and passive jamming. There is sufficient time for it and their complex engagement can disrupt the targeting to a major extent. The operational time of electronic warfare weapons of a warship and their expected efficiency result in a maximum probability hit of 0.3-0.4. In case of fire at a group it is highly probable that the homing warhead would lock on another target. During Falkland hostilities a British aircraft carrier engaged passive jamming and the attacking Exoset missile changed the target and hit and sank the Atlantic Conveyers container ship. Kh-32 speed may leave no time for another warship in a formation on which the warhead may lock to engage electronic warfare and divert it.
It means a group of two cruisers or destroyers is incapable of repelling a strike from two Tu-22M3 bombers carrying two Kh-32 missiles each even in favorable conditions. At least one warship would be damaged with a 0.6-0.7 probability. A strike by a wing of three aircraft with six Kh-32 will definitely destroy both warships.
A salvo of 24 Kh-32 at an aircraft-carrying force would be fatal. The probability to destroy or sink an aircraft carrier with two-three escort ships is 0.75-0.85. Russian aircraft will attack from outside the operational zone of adversary seaborne fighter jets. It means a strike by 12 Tu-22M3 with two missiles each will be sufficient to destroy an aircraft-carrying force with a high probability.
A group of two-three aircraft carriers can be destroyed by a strike of two regiments of Tu-22M3 with 72 Kh-32. They can fire from a distance of two-three thousand kilometers from the Russian coast, i.e. long before the aircraft-carrying force arrives at the distance of seaborne aircraft engagement.
Even limited long-range aviation forces can considerably neutralize US aircraft-carrying formations. However, they have to be properly aimed at the targets and defended from adversary coastal fighter jets. If it is not provided, the Kh-32 potential will not be implemented.
The United States is actively developing hypersonic missiles but so far there is no data about the design of weapons similar to Kh-32. Russia is likely to dominate in the sphere for ten years and more.
Still it is necessary to arm the aviation with a sufficient number of such missiles. The troops need at least 250-300 of them. But the navy and the air force are unlikely to get such a number of missiles because of the state of the economy and the defense industry, as well as upcoming conversion. It means Kh-32 will remain an excellent but rare Russian weapon.
The serial production of Kh-32 means a revolution in the naval arts. The relative parity in the offense-defense balance will be replaced by a situation when the attack potential will considerably surpass the defense capability.
The review analyzed the most perfect foreign arms. The capabilities of other weapons are considerably inferior to Aegis and Standard-6.
It is necessary to design new methods and forms of naval warfare, in particular, the destruction of surface forces of the adversary and promotion of combat sustainability of your own forces. Adequate increase of the air defense potential of warships will likely demand to review the conceptual basis of such systems. It will take 10-15 years or may be more, expert Konstantin Sivkov writes in the Military-Industrial Courier.
http://www.navyrecognition.com/inde...ile-becomes-operational-in-russia-part-1.html
http://www.navyrecognition.com/inde...ile-becomes-operational-in-russia-part-2.html
Last edited:
