What's new

My Life with the Taliban

Status
Not open for further replies.

Philosopher1

BANNED
Joined
Apr 8, 2010
Messages
101
Reaction score
0
“My Life with the Taliban” – on study and Islamic values

app


zaeef.jpg


In “My Life with the Taliban”, Abdul Salam Zaeef — who fought with the mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan and later served in the Taliban government before it was ousted in 2001 — writes of how he longed to escape the trappings of office and instead follow in the footsteps of his father as the Imam of a mosque, learning and teaching the Koran.

“It is work that has no connection with the world’s affairs. It is a calling of intellectual dignity away from the dangers and temptations of power. All my life, even as a boy, I was always happiest when studying and learning things. To work in government positions means a life surrounded by corruption and injustice, and therein is found the misery of mankind,” he writes in his memoirs, newly translated and edited by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn.

Zaeef became best known as the Taliban ambassador to Islamabad at the time of the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks — he was then arrested and sent to Guantanamo — and his memoirs provide a unique insight into the developments which led to the eight-year-old war in Afghanistan. That alone makes it a must-read, providing an alternative and very personal account to set alongside Western concepts of the Taliban – more closely associated with their human rights record, their treatment of women, and their refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden to the United States after 9/11.

But the ideological heart of the book lies in his belief in the value of study (Talib means student) and his unswerving faith that only an Islamic system based on the implementation of sharia can drag Afghanistan out of its current misery. Given the current discussion about whether a political settlement can be reached with the Taliban, it is perhaps his representation of this internal faith, as much as the outward trappings of jihad, that merit the most serious attention.

Zaeef was born in 1968 to a poor but educated family in Afghanistan, was orphaned as a boy, and later fled with his relatives to Pakistan shortly before the Soviet invasion in 1979. At the age of 15, without telling his family, he ran off to join the jihad against the Soviets. Countering the commonly held view that the movement emerged — or was created by Pakistan — only in 1994, he writes that the Taliban were very much present and active in the 1980s.

A group of religious scholars and students, they stood out from the other mujahideen because of their piety and their commitment that those who fought with them must continue their studies even on the battlefield. ”The Taliban were different,” Zaeef writes. ”Jihad was not just about fighting; in our view there had to be a strong educational perspective as well as a provision for justice.”

Despite the gruelling conditions, the injuries and deaths, these early years had an innocence to them, forging bonds among the Taliban that would endure through decades of war. ”It’s hard to believe, maybe, but we were happy.” One night, he remembers Mullah Muhammad Omar, who lost an eye in the fighting and later became the leader of the movement, singing a ”ghazal” – a form of poetry more commonly associated nowadays with Sufi Islam than with the austere brand of Islam represented by the Taliban.

During the descent into civil war which followed the Soviet withdrawal and subsequent collapse of the Soviet-backed government, the Taliban faded into the background. But as Afghanistan collapsed into chaos and lawlessness, the former fighters living in and around Kandahar decided in 1994 — after months of discussion — to try to impose order. (This is a narrative which is not forgotten in southern Afghanistan today, where support for the Taliban derives in part from a view that they are better placed to restore justice and security than the representatives of the central government in Kabul, seen as weak and corrupt.)

Mullah Omar was chosen as the leader of the movement and Zaeef became one of his most loyal followers. One of his most common habits, writes Zaeef, was to listen carefully to every side of an argument. ”He would listen to everybody with focus and respect for as long as they needed to talk, and would never seek to cut them off. After he had listened, he then would answer with ordered coherent thoughts.”

The movement founded in the late autumn of 1994 was committed to implementing sharia, prosecuting vice and promoting virtue — and when it took control of Kabul, it did just that. Zaeef writes with very little defensiveness about how women were no longer allowed to work, instead stressing how the Taliban restored security. He also cites examples of how — through what he sees as the correct implementation of sharia – convicted criminals were offered both justice and forgiveness.

In 2000, Zaeef learned of his appointment as ambassador to Pakistan on the radio. (Mullah Omar’s ability to listen to all sides of the argument appears to have escaped him at this point since Zaeef made clear he did not want to go, but his loyalty to his leader was such that he had no choice.)

Right from the beginning of his time in Islamabad, Zaeef was deeply wary of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, suspecting it of double-dealing with the Taliban’s own enemies in Afghanistan. This included the Northern Alliance, the Afghan opposition movement which was then — according to Pakistan — backed by Iran, India and Russia to try to destabilise the Pakistan-backed Taliban government in Kabul. (Readers are allowed to be confused here and rest assured: everyone else is too.)

“In my dealings with them (the ISI) I tried not to be so sweet that I would be eaten whole, and not so bitter that I would be spat out,” Zaeef writes.

Zaeef suggests — but does not say — that Pakistan might have been worried that the Taliban in Afghanistan would try to export their own version of sharia law to a country whose identity has always been torn between the pro-Western secular stance of its elite, its South Asian roots, and its commitment to Islam. He notes only that Mullah Omar wrote to then President Pervez Musharraf at the beginning of 2001 calling on him to implement sharia law and give Pakistan an Islamic government.

As ambassador to Pakistan, he was the man who received foreign delegations begging him to stop the destruction of the Bamyan Buddha statues — giant statues of Buddha carved out of rock which were dynamited by the Taliban in 2001. Pay close attention to what he writes about this since it happened before 9/11. Stripped of the politics which followed the attacks on New York and Washington, it may give a better insight into whether Taliban and Western thinking can ever be reconciled.

Zaeef recounts that a Japanese delegation suggested that the statues — built during the days when parts of Afghanistan were at the heart of a great Buddhist kingdom – could either be covered up or removed piece-by-piece and reassembled in Japan. He argued in turn that Afghans had evolved from the days it believed in Buddhism and had since discovered the “true religion”. ”Furthermore, the Buddha statues are made out of stone by the hands of men. They hold no real value for religion, so why were they so anxious to preserve them?” He says he believes the destruction of the statues — although he was not party to the decision — was within the bounds of sharia. At the same time, he also says ”the destruction was unnecessary and a case of bad timing”.

Even before the 9/11 attacks, the Taliban came under pressure to hand over Osama bin Laden to America over the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa. But Zaeef insists — and here is where the Taliban’s legalistic and intellectual approach comes to the fore –that Afghanistan could not hand over bin Laden since it had no extradition treaty with the United States. The Taliban — and to read Zaeef they sound still like students debating a point of law of law — suggested instead that bin Laden should be put on trial. If the United States did not accept a trial in Afghanistan, he writes, the alternative was for three, or four, Islamic countries to put him on trial and let Washington submit the evidence; even to use the U.N. court in The Hague as a face-saving compromise for both sides.

Such was the naivety of the Taliban approach — or so you are led to understand — that even after 9/11 Mullah Omar believed that there was less than a 10 percent chance that America would attack Afghanistan, thinking that it would first meet his demand that Washington held a formal investigation and supplied evidence of bin Laden’s involvement in 9/11.

It was not until Zaeef was detained in early 2002 that he fully understood what was going on. In the words of the Pakistani official who arrested him: “Your Excellency, you are no longer an Excellency! America is a superpower. Did you not know that? No one can defeat it, nor can they negotiate with it. America wants to question you and we are here to hand you over to the USA.”

The arrest led to long years of humiliation and degradation in jails first in Afghanistan and later in Guantanamo – a story which deserves a separate article in itself. For now, here is how he recounts being handed over to the Americans near Peshawar after being driven there from Islamabad. As soon as he was handed over, he was attacked and his clothes ripped with knives. “Pakistani and American soldiers stood around me. Behind these soldiers, I could see military vehicles in the distance, one of which had a general’s number plate.”

“The Pakistani soldiers were all staring as the Americans hit me and tore the remaining clothes off my body. Eventually I was completely naked, and the Pakistani soldiers — the defenders of the Holy Koran — shamelessly watched me with smiles on their faces, saluting this disgraceful action of the Americans.”

“That moment,” he says, ”is written in my memory like a stain on my soul.”


Finally freed from Guantanamo without charge on Sept. 11 2005, he returned to Kabul where he now lives under government protection. He continues to believe that a solution to Afghanistan can be found only by respecting Islamic values and Afghan traditions, and while he would like peace for a country which has suffered three decades of war, is sceptical about whether this can be achieved.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai, he says, would like to bring peace but also to remain in power, and therefore does not know how to achieve it. Karzai came to power the wrong way, through foreign backing, without acquiring the wisdom and trusted advisers of a man who had earned his role as a leader in Afghanistan. ”Karzai is trying to find a solution and one can feel that he is not a cruel man,” he writes, noting that he had met him three or four times at Karzai’s invitation. “He can play a crucial role. But Afghanistan’s problems are going on above his head. He is just a pawn in the hands of the main player.”

America, he says, should seek a real peace in Afghanistan and let Afghans decide how it should be run rather than imposing a system of government from outside. “Perhaps it is true that the Americans want peace as well. But it is their own peace on their own terms.”

Even after eight years of war, the United States offered peace accompanied by threats. The administration of President Barack Obama appeared to be making all the same mistakes as its predecessor by sending an extra 30,000 troops. Obama had failed to understand that after eight years of war, force was not a solution. “And yet still they send more troops. The current conflict is a political conflict and as such cannot be solved by the gun.”

(File photo of Zaeef as ambassador; shortly after he applied for political asylum in Pakistan in 2001)

41Tce4nDYmL._SS500_.jpg


“My Life with the Taliban” – on study and Islamic values | Analysis & Opinion | Reuters
 
REVIEW
Confessions Of An Opiate Seeker



book_cover.jpg


Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef has all the credentials to write a book titled My Life with the Taliban. He was 11 years old when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. He became a refugee in Pakistan and went to a madrassa. He was intimately involved in the movement that came to be known as the Taliban. He was in the same room as Mullah Omar when the latter lost his eye in a firefight with the Soviet forces. Zaeef was among those who proposed Mullah Omar’s name for leadership of the Taliban movement when it was formally launched in the autumn of 1994. Mullah Omar agreed, without too much fuss, but demanded total loyalty to him. Zaeef later occupied important positions in the Taliban government in Kabul, rising to the high posts of deputy and acting defence minister. Mullah Omar appointed him the Taliban regime’s ambassador to Pakistan, which he resisted but had to accept; no one could defy Mullah Omar once he had made up his mind. His stint in Islamabad provides the most interesting insights on Taliban rule, coinciding as it did with 9/11, the negotiations over handing over Osama bin Laden, the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas, isi’s repeated efforts to win or buy over the author, etc. Surprisingly, Mullah Zaeef does not seem to have met, even once, Osama. He spent four years in Guantanamo, and now lives in Kabul.


Indian and Western as well as Pakistani readers would be surprised to learn from this book that relations between the Taliban and Pakistan were not always harmonious. In the weeks leading up to the American attack on Afghanistan in October 2001, Zaeef was accused by the isi chief of planning to assassinate Gen Musharraf. Zaeef invariably refused to go to the isi offices, insisting instead that they visit him at his official residence. Once the Russian ambassador asked the director in the foreign office to arrange a meeting with Zaeef, but Zaeef offered to meet him at a neutral place; the meeting never materialised. Tripartite talks between Afghanistan, US and Pakistan were sabotaged by Pakistan, he says. He told the American ambassador more than once that he should contact him directly. “Pakistan is never an honest mediator and will control and manipulate any talk they mediate or participate in,” Zaeef told him. Elsewhere, he writes: “Pakistan, which plays a key role in Asia, is so famous for treachery that it is said they can get milk from a bull. They have two tongues in one mouth, and two faces on one head so they can speak everybody’s language; they use everybody, deceive everybody. They deceive the Arabs under the guise of Islamic nuclear power, they milk America and Europe in the alliance against terrorism, and they have been deceiving Pakistani and other Muslims around the world in the name of the Kashmiri jihad.” As for imprisonment in Pakistani jails, he concluded that Afghan and American jails were much better than Pakistani jails. He is understandably bitter about the way he was treated by Pakistan and handed over to the Americans in Peshawar.


Zaeef held four meetings with the US ambassador in Islamabad to discuss Osama bin Laden before 9/11. America had only one demand: hand over Osama. Zaeef told him that was the one thing they could not do. He made alternative proposals. If America provided enough evidence of Osama’s involvement in the Kenya and Tanzania bombings, Afghanistan would try him. Or, he could be tried in an Islamic country in a special court consisting of attorney generals of three Islamic countries. Finally, he offered to curb any and all activities of Osama, who would also be stripped of all communications equipment so as to limit his outreach. Eventually, he even suggested that Osama could be tried in The Hague. He met US state department official Christina Rocca, well known in India, and writes: “Every word she uttered was a threat, hidden or open”.

Incidentally, Zaeef must have been a good diplomat. He frequently met with ambassadors of other countries in Islamabad, even though they did not recognise the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The only one he refused to meet was the Russian ambassador. He has particularly negative memories of the Belgian, German and Kuwaiti ambassadors. He found the Palestinian ambassador “most sympathetic and pitiable”. He has high praise for the ambassador of China, who was the only one to maintain good relations with the Afghan embassy and with Afghanistan. Zaeef even arranged a meeting between the Chinese ambassador and Mullah Omar in Kandahar, where he conveyed his government’s concern that Afghanistan was allegedly assisting Muslims in Xinjiang. Mullah Omar gave him the necessary assurances. Zaeef makes no mention of ever having met the Indian ambassador.

When the Taliban minister for the propagation of virtue and prevention of vice decided to destroy the world heritage Buddha statues in Bamiyan, ambassador Zaeef had a troublesome time. Delegates and diplomats from across the world descended upon his embassy in protest. He singles out China, Japan and Sri Lanka as being the most active. Sri Lanka proposed to take the statues out for ‘repair’. Japan made the greatest effort. It sent a delegation led by its prime minister and suggested that it could take the statues out piece by piece and reassemble them in Japan. Alternatively, it proposed that it could cover the statues from head to toe such that no one could recognise them. Japan also offered to pay for the statues. The Japanese argued that Afghans had been the forefathers of their religion and they had only followed them by adopting Buddhism. In that case, argued Zaeef, why did the Japanese not follow the Afghans when they found true religion and embraced Islam? Zaeef admits that the controversy surrounding the statues was a difficult period for him (just as the destruction of the Babri Masjid was a challenging time for this reviewer when he was representing India at the United Nations). He believed that while the decision on the statues was within the Sharia law, the issue was more than simply religious and that the destruction was unnecessary and badly timed.
The main interest of the book for Indian readers would be the revelations of the mistrust between the Taliban—at least this particular Taliban member—and Pakistan. Just before the US attacked Afghanistan in October 2001, Zaeef had been warning his leadership, in particular Mullah Omar, about the impending disaster. Mullah Omar did not pay heed because he took at good faith the assurances of Musharraf and the isi, deliberately conveyed to mislead him, that there was no such plan. The book contains useful nuggets about the isi’s modus operandi. In addition to funding and equipping the Taliban, it also kept its options open with the Northern Alliance and regularly supplied them with funding and other necessities. There might be a lesson in this for us.

Not surprisingly, Zaeef is convinced that the US will not succeed in Afghanistan. He summarily dismisses the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban. “They (meaning America, Britain and Karzai) think that the Taliban exist for money or power, so logically it would seem that they can be destroyed with money and power. In reality, the Taliban movement is one based on Islamic ideology.... The thought of dividing them into moderates and hardliners is a useless and reckless aim,” he concludes.

Zaeef’s book reveals the lack of trust between the Taliban and Pakistan. He chooses to remain silent on the indispensable part Pakistan’s isi played in equipping, funding, training and leading the Taliban’s march to Kabul, thereby suggesting, not quite truthfully, that the Taliban was an entirely home-grown movement. Even Pakistan does not deny that the Taliban was and is their creation. In fact, Pakistan’s leaders proudly proclaim to the Americans that Afghanistan’s problems cannot be solved and it can never be stable without Pakistan’s help and involvement. It would be tempting for us in India to read too much into Zaeef’s bitterness towards Pakistan in today’s context, when Pakistan is poised to play a central role in constructing Afghanistan’s future political structures. My life with the Taliban, however, should caution the international community against accepting at face value all the claims of Pakistanis about their influence over the Taliban.


www.outlookindia.com | Confessions Of An Opiate Seeker



Any doubts for members?? then read the book.
 
wow, indians think taliban being evil bad, but still they believe what talibans say and its interseting that the book is entitled "my life with talibans" and indians only managed out to highlight the small pakistani part in which the writer is cursing pakistanis. isi has served keeping pakistan interests.
 
wow, indians think taliban being evil bad, but still they believe what talibans say and its interseting that the book is entitled "my life with talibans" and indians only managed out to highlight the small pakistani part in which the writer is cursing pakistanis. isi has served keeping pakistan interests.

Not "Indians" , its "Indian", i wish to be addressed as singular.

I know, you know the facts, you are among the privileged who knows its true. But other ignorant people can gain knowledge of the truth , so i posted.:P
 
its interseting that the book is entitled "my life with talibans"

can u suggest another title for that book , that has got nothing to do with INDIA and is written by a Taliban minister of Afghanistan.??/
 
self delete

my answer will be labeled as raciest
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top Bottom