MUSLIM IDENTITY IN THE GlOBAL AGE

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Interesting Read this is.
Kashif


SHARED VAluES, SHARED FATE:
MuSliM iDENTiTy iN THE GlobAl AGE

overview

Increasingly, Muslim identity goes beyond the way in which people live their daily lives and
extends to the way they view their neighbors, their governments, Muslims outside their
countries, and the non-Muslim world. Whereas notions of transnational Muslim solidarity
were abstract for centuries, the steady migration of people and ideas—due in part to the
rise of electronic media—have made Muslims’ connection to an international Muslim community
far more immediate.

In an effort to understand better the forms of Muslim identity and how nonradical networks
and identities shape the views of Muslims across the globe, the Middle East and South
Asia programs at CSIS convened a one-day conference on May 30, 2007. The conference
brought together a broad range of scholars from a wide spectrum of disciplines, with expertise
stretching around the globe.

Key Points

■ Among most people in the world, Muslims included, religion is just one of multiple identities.
Though religion does not necessarily trump other sources of identity such as ethnicity
and nationality, its implicit assertion of divine endorsement gives it a special claim to authority.
Traditions such as a single annual pilgrimage for Muslims around the world help emphasize
common Muslim identities; so, too, do lavishly funded efforts to promote orthodox
understandings of Islam among diverse communities.

■ Even when Muslim networks focus on local issues, they often use global issues such as
the Palestinian cause to make a point about how the world operates. In some cases, political
parties also use global issues, such as opposition to the war in Iraq, for political gain.

■ Many Muslim groups share historical narratives emphasizing a sense of suffering from
injustice. Other narratives perceive that violence and retribution are legitimate, that moral
purification is necessary to strengthen society, and that the West is hypocritical in its relations with Muslim states and societies.

■ Though they often cloak themselves in tradition, many Muslim networks are among
the most modern organizations in the world, using high-tech modes of recruitment,
communication, and information distribution. They are adaptive, dynamic, and highly
opportunistic.

■ The increasing salience of religious identity to Muslims means in part that broad populations
may be more sympathetic to ideas that resonate with that identity than those that
seem foreign or imposed. For example, Islamic theology includes a richly developed literature
on the notion of “justice” that can engage across the religious-secular spectrum,
whereas “democracy” is often seen as a secular foreign import.

Main Themes

Over the last five years, a huge amount of attention and resources
has been devoted to understanding radical transnational
Muslim movements. Far less, however, has been focused on
understanding the evolving ties between mainstream Muslims,
who represent an overwhelming preponderance of the world’s
1.3 billion Muslims. Away from the radical and violent fringes, an
evolving sense of identity and solidarity is taking hold and shaping
the way Muslims view their place in the world. The emerging
pan-Muslim worldview manifests itself not only in the Middle
East, but in urban America, in the slums of West Africa, and in
the glistening cities of Southeast Asia.

Transnational Muslim identities do not take a single form, nor do
they share identical contents. For some, the connection is principally
one of faith and charity. For others, it has an explicitly political
connection, influencing both how one believes one’s country
should be governed and how one sees other governments. In some countries, Islamic identity is intertwined in complicated ways with national identity. Especially in Pakistan, the two reinforce each other and tend to heighten animosity toward India and sometimes, at the popular level, toward the United States. In most Muslim communities, support for the Palestinian cause is often
taken for granted as a pan-Islamic issue; anti-Americanism
is increasingly seen as an adjunct. The Danish cartoon affair and
the controversy over the Pope’s speech were both associated
with significant mobilization of transnational Muslim sentiment.
The CSIS conference considered public opinion polls, which suggest
that Islam is an increasingly dominant frame of reference
for Muslims around the world. Elizabeth Mueller Gross discussed
recent Pew polling among American Muslims, which found that
a majority are decidedly American and largely middle class. Dalia
Mogahed, of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, argued that
their polling suggests that Islam has a unique ability to engage its
followers at both the local and global levels, but it is on the local
level that Muslim networks are often most robust.

Consensus emerged that there is no single attitude toward Islamic
identity, and its shape is often a consequence of social,
political, and local contexts. The degree of openness in political
systems and the role of Islamic political parties provide another
layer to the formation of Muslim identity. On the international
level, Islamic parties often manipulate global issues such as the
Palestinian struggle to demonstrate how the world operates; still,
as in the United States, local issues often determine the shape
and outcome of political contests. Naimah Talib cited the example
of the interplay between international and local Islamic
issues in how religious parties in Southeast Asia target their constituencies.
The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) for example, a
party that appeals to conservative Malays who identify as Muslims,
has used the war in Iraq to capitalize on local anti-American
sentiment. During the Afghan war, it also encouraged Muslim
youth to participate in jihad against the Soviets. Talib argued
that many of these parties respond to the electorate, and that
local circumstances and politics drive which issues these parties
choose to highlight.

Mustapha Kamal Pasha outlined four common narratives that
link Muslims throughout the world. First, the historical injustice
narrative perceives Muslims as victims of Western attacks and
humiliation through motifs such as the Crusades, colonialism,
and the Palestinian struggle. Second, violence, including violence
against civilians, is seen as moral retribution in an asymmetrical
war waged by the West on Islam. Third, moral purification has
become a rallying point for many movements including Salafis
and even more moderate forces to decry Western influence as
cultural pollution. This narrative is accentuated by anxiety over
gender roles and the decline of patriarchal systems. Finally, the
desire to demonstrate Western hypocrisy drives radicals to seek
to provoke the West into changing its liberal identity through an
unending war. Pasha argued that this desire to provoke an illiberal
response has been largely the strategy of al Qaeda–inspired
movements around the world.

These narratives are fueled by three central grievances. First,
Muslims perceive a Western lack of respect for Islam, epitomized
by the Danish cartoon episode. Second, they share a sense of
continuing injustice and that past wrongs have never been fully
accounted for. Finally, the illegitimacy and ineffectiveness of the
modern state throughout the Muslim world has been encapsulated
by the abandonment of development as a goal (as manifested
by industrialization) and its replacement by the quest for
modernity (as manifested by trade).
Tensions between the modern nation-state and traditional forms
of identity have spurred a competition for authority within Islam.
Numerous actors and centers now compete for Islamic legitimacy
and followers, ranging from traditional theocratic hierarchies
to autodidacts schooled on the Internet. In this regard, it is telling
that none of the September 11 hijackers had seminary training.
Government-sponsored clerics represent the intrusion of the
secular into the spiritual, in both Muslim majority and minority
countries. (Muqtedar Khan noted that there are more government-
sponsored imams in Belgium per capita than anywhere else
in the world). Maha Azzam cited the growing importance of independent
religious authorities like Yusuf Qaradawi as examples of those who have also emerged to claim a space within Islam. In addition, nonclerical voices like Amr Khaled and Tariq Ramadan
have entered the crowded arena and achieved immense success
by blending modern media techniques with advice on how to lead
good Muslim lives. Despite greater competition, both Peter Mandaville
and Robert Satloff questioned whether the state’s declining
influence in the Islamic sphere was as dire as some have predicted.

Policy implications

Toward a change in regional perceptions
The age of secular politics in the Muslim world has failed to deliver
development and economic opportunity for a majority of
the world’s Muslims. After the optimism that set in at the end
of the colonial period, a rising number of young people feel not
only disadvantaged and wronged, but also culturally rootless.
Secular liberals—the most visible heirs to the Western legacy in
these countries—are increasingly marginalized in local debates,
for they have been unable either to dislodge the authoritarian
order in their societies or create a positive and attainable vision
for their societies that enjoys broad appeal. Islam has emerged as
the strongest alternative to the present order, providing both a
feeling of authenticity and a comprehensive critique of the status
quo. Increasingly, the United States is used as a foil for that unacceptable
status quo, both undermining national interests and
helping secure and legitimize the rule of despots. Democracy discourse
has become a dialogue of the deaf, seen both as an effort
to impose American norms on other societies, and as a cynical
cover for the continued support of repressive regimes out of a
narrow security interest. More effective engagement requires
the United States to align itself with causes that Muslims care
about and to be a vehicle for helping them achieve their goals.

Focus on justice

Several conference participants suggested that the U.S. push for
democracy in the Muslim world is ill directed and argued instead
for a U.S. concentration on the idea of promoting justice. The
idea of justice is deeply developed in Muslim thought, and the
concept needs no translation for Muslim audiences. The sudden
rise of Islamist political parties named some variant of “Justice
and Development,” in Turkey, Morocco, and elsewhere, is a sign of just how powerful this
idea is. Articulating a U.S.
position as one of supporting
justice around
the world—and equally
important, having a policy
that does so as well—
would do a tremendous
amount to reposition the
United States with Muslim
publics, to engage
Muslim networks, and
to demonstrate that the
United States is using its
power as a force for collective
good rather than
for malice.

Engage diverse networks

The emergence of Islam and identity politics as a political force
has coincided with heightened cultural and religious consciousness
throughout the Muslim world. In some cases the confluence
of the two produces radicalization, but this is not a given. Participants
argued that the opportunity exists for broad and meaningful
engagement with a more ideologically diverse set of actors.
Part of the problem participants saw was a U.S. inclination to
work with only a small part of the religious community in many
countries—moderates who support, or at least maintain their
silence about, a wide variety of U.S. government policies and
have some degree of support for Western-style separations of
church and state. Those whom the United States has defined as
“moderates” are increasingly marginalized within their societies,
and identifying them as moderates sometimes marginalizes them
still further. Participants argued vigorously that moderates in
the Muslim world today are not necessarily those who embrace
liberal Western values, but rather those who seek to reconcile
cultural and religious values with modernity. Most participants
agreed that expanding contacts well beyond traditional clienteles—
that is, secular liberals with Western graduate degrees—is
vital for capturing the imaginations of future generations in Muslim-
majority countries.

Key uncertainties

While participants agreed on many issues, they also recognized
that the rise of Muslim networks creates challenges with deep
and broad implications that are not yet fully understood.

■ broader u.S. engagement with Muslim actors
The challenge of a more inclusive approach is that many nonradical
Muslims hold views that fundamentally contradict Western
liberal values, including women’s rights and circumstances
in which violence is warranted. There is understandable reluctance
to engage with those who defend the legitimacy of suicide
bombing in Israel, for example, or who insist that Muslims should
have different rights than non-Muslims in Muslim-majority societies.
Yet without reaching out to a broader set of interlocutors,
the United States will not only isolate itself even further from
the mainstream in Muslim societies, but also remain blind to significant
developments and rising forces in Muslim society. If the
goal is to create more pluralism in these societies, it is hard to see
how to get there without engaging with a broader diversity of
actors, including those who hold some offensive views. Reconciling
the need to reach more broadly with the need to be true to
American values will be an ongoing challenge.

■ Transnational Muslim networks and the authority of the
state
How states will continue to accommodate the rise of Muslim networks,
especially authoritarian states, will be a major challenge
for these states in the years ahead. Their strategy up to now has
been to promote state religious institutions, but non-state clerics
and lay experts increasingly question their legitimacy. The rise of
literacy, combined with the spread of information technology,
increasingly flattens the playing field between regime clerics and
their sometimes lay-led opposition. It is unclear if regimes will
continue to yield space to extra-governmental religious actors,
or whether they will take more decisive action to control the
religious sphere, as governments such as Morocco have recently
done.

■ Evaluating Muslim attitudes
Polling data on Muslim opinion concentrates on beliefs rather
than actions, and it rarely seeks to connect the two. Instead, the
connection is assumed to be implicit. This connection needs to
be examined so as to distinguish between pro forma rhetorical
support and incipient activism.

■ Radicalization and cultural consciousness
Increased cultural consciousness in Islamic societies and radicalization
are assumed to be identical, or at least parallel, trends.
The rise in headscarves among women, for example, is widely
seen as an indicator of zealotry. While the two may overlap in
certain cases, their confluence is not a given. Greater effort must
be made to distinguish between cultural or religious identity and
radicalization.

■ Muslim networks in the West
The lines between Muslim majority and minority countries are
increasingly blurred, and its utility as a descriptive variable is no
longer clear. Half of all Muslims live as religious minorities, but for
recent immigrants immersed in the Information Age, they often
remain intimately tied to their countries of origin. The rapid movement
of ideas and people across state boundaries not only raises
questions of how the immigrant assimilation process will change
as a result, but also how ideas from outside Muslim majority countries
can filter back into those countries and change approaches to
religion and religious practice.

Conclusion
Muslim identity is in constant flux. Among mainstream Muslims,
increased literacy and education, travel, and communications
technology have changed the nature of transnational links. This is
true not only among Muslim-majority communities from Morocco
to Malaysia, but also with the Muslim diasporas of Europe, North
America, and beyond. Shaped by an increasingly diverse range
of influences and ideas, Muslim identity has grown in complexity.
Understanding how nonradical Muslim networks set agendas,
mobilize populations, and coordinate action throughout the world
is vital to ensuring that future interaction with Muslim actors is
both successful and well informed. How these ties evolve will be a
powerful force shaping the twenty-first century world, both within
the Muslim-majority countries and outside them.

Acknowledgments
This conference was carried out with the generous financial support
of the Starr Foundation. The Center for Global Studies at
George Mason University provided significant financial and programmatic
support as well. For further information on the Muslim
Networks project and the CSIS Middle East Program, please refer
to our Web site at www.csis.org/mideast. ■


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