Dak Bangla Intelligence Scan : Bangladesh: The Mujib Bahini in 1971
thursday, november 11, 2004
Bangladesh: The Mujib Bahini in 1971
Even though Mujib himself was not present among the freedom fighters, his devoted and worthy disciples were there. Sheikh Fazlul Hoque Moni, Sirajul Alam Khan, Abdur Razzaque and Tofael Ahmed were unflinching Mujibists. Tajuddin, on the other hand, was different and the four young leaders knew it. And, that is why they had no confidence in him. They considered Tajuddin to be Mujib's rival.
Mujib Bahani, which has no record of fighting during the entire period of armed struggle excepting trying to impose them as the political commissars, that was unacceptable to the regularly-constituted Mukti Bahini and the Guerrilla force, christened as the Bangladesh Defence Forces (BDF), maintained its entity with the informal sanction of the Indian Intelligence and General Uban. Mujib Bahini. It was not acceptable to the High Command when Uban proposed the name of the special force as Mujib Bahini. According to them, a doubt might be created in the minds of the people inside Bangladesh, and there might even be friction between the Mukti and Mujib bahinis. The young leaders did not agree to accept this decision of the High Command. They said, 'Let others say what they like, these boys will be known as Mujib Bahini inside Bangladesh.'
Mujib Bahini vs Mukti Bahini -AL's infighting during the Liberation War
Mahmud Hasan
In Bangladesh (the then East Pakistan), in March, 1971, excepting a few Pakistan-minded men and their agents, all the people were unanimous in demanding freedom. There was no infighting among them. Sadly, it was not the same case among those who were at the forefront of the leadership of the fighting country - the Awami League, especially its leaders. There was hardly any unanimity among them. There were serious differences of opinions and perspectives in the leadership about how the future Bangladesh should look politically and who should control its administration. The Awami leadership may be said to have been deeply faction-ridden. Some time ago a retired Indian Major General, S. S. Uban, wrote a book entitled Phantoms of Chittagong Fifth Army in Bangladesh. In that book there is a chapter where Uban has given us some details about those infightings and dissensions. Here we can see a distinct difference between the people and the leadership. The common men of the country had not even an inkling of what was going on among their leaders. I think I should make it clear that Uban had the sympathy and support for a chief faction in the infighting = the Mujib Bahini. And he has written his book from their perspective. Yet, if we look at it objectively, we may find some useful and factual information about the events.
Major General Uban starts the relevant chapter like this: 'Colonel M. A. G. Osmany was the temporary Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh army and, as such, also the head of the freedom fighters. He used to advise the provisional Bangladesh government on the training of the freedom fighters and the arrangements that should be made for their deployment against the Pakistani military authorities. Later, when the Indian government decided to aid the freedom fighters in their training, Colonel Osmany used to have communication with J. S. Aurora, Lieutenant General and G. O. C. of the Eastern Command.
Needless to say, those events took place after the provisional government for independent Bangladesh was installed in Mujibnagar on the 10th of April.
Uban complains that the selection procedure of the freedom fighters was not rational and fool-proof. He writes, 'Young men had been coming in their thousands at this time to have training, but there was no satisfactory procedure to find out the sincerity and motive of all those who were coming for the purpose of training. For this the training camps had to depend on the certificates given by the National Assembly members (MNA) appointed by the provisional government about the sincerity of the trainees. MNAs used to issue the certificates, blindly based on the list prepared by the Bengali officers, but some of these trainees had a future political motive. As a result, a few groups vanished with their weapons into the deep interior of Bangladesh, while some others would return after hiding their weapons and report that the weapons had been captured and gone out from their hands. To put an end to these unhappy activities, a foolproof solution was put forward, but the senior officials did not accept it, because, being in higher positions, they considered their knowledge to be superior too.'
At this time the four vanguards of the Mujib Bahini appeared on the scene. They availed themselves of the full opportunity of the circumstances and tried to turn the events to their advantage. This is how Uban introduced those leaders to us: ' During this noisy time we came into contact with some dedicated young leaders who had been well-known in Bangladesh. They were Sheikh Fazlul Hoque Moni, Tofael Ahmed, Sirajul Alam Khan and Abdur Razzaque.' Uban had very high regard for them. According to him ' their do-or-die promise appeared to be rooted in the heart' . And it seemed to Uban without any doubt that their leadership was acceptable to the freedom fighters both inside and outside Bangladesh. The government wanted them to be trained under the leadership of the freedom fighters and then get them down to the battlefield. The four young leaders, however, did not want it at all. ' Because of their single-minded loyalty to Mujib and their closeness to him, they were more eager to be known as the Mujib Bahini. They had been issuing certificates of genuineness, selecting from their old colleagues. Choosing enough sacrificing, upright and faithful men from Bangladesh, they were putting pressure that they should receive unconventional training in fighting techniques unlike the commando training received by members of the Mukti Bahini. Perhaps they wanted to give leadership to such a political party which has its organisational branches in each town, thana and tehsil.'
The real thing is clear here. The young leaders wanted political leadership. And the infighting was for this leadership. But these dissensions and infightings did not crop up in a single day. They had been going on for quite some time. It does not appear that Uban was acquainted with the whole thing. The tussle between the Mujibists and the anti-Mujibists among the Awamis had reached by then reached a critical state. Mujib himself was absent during the whole period of the Liberation War, and his family was interned in a Dhanmondi house, having official subsistence, as would be the case under the circumstances.) And it was his considered political decision not to be around. He surrendered to the Pakistan army on 25/26 March without any fight and courted arrest most willingly. The argument that is put forward in his defence is that if he had not surrender the way he did, the Pakistanis would have killed many more men in their search for him. The question arises how far this argument is valid. According to Sheikh Mujib himself and other Awami leaders, three million men, women and children lost their lives at the hands of the occupying Pakistani forces.
How many more would have died if Mujib had not surrendered? The Awamis have given us no account of this nor have we got it from any other source.
Let us now come back to our original subject of discussion ' Mujib Bahini vs. Mukti Bahini' . Even though Mujib himself was not present among the freedom fighters, his devoted and worthy disciples were there. Sheikh Fazlul Hoque Moni, Sirajul Alam Khan, Abdur Razzaque and Tofael Ahmed were unflinching Mujibists. Tajuddin, on the other hand, was different and the four young leaders knew it. And, that is why they had no confidence in him. They considered Tajuddin to be Mujib's rival. Even Mujib started thinking like that - especially after the birth of Bangladesh. Consequently, he removed Tajuddin from his Cabinet at the first opportunity. For this his excuse was 'Tajuddin's attachment for India' . But the real reason was different. Sheikh Mujib, the leader, who was an absentee during the Liberation War, was finding it difficult to face Tajuddin who had worked in the fields, bazaars and ghats during the period of the war. The freedom fighters knew co-fighter Tajuddin directly, and not Sheikh Mujib. That is why Mujib had little faith in the first Bangladesh army composed of freedom fighters. And so he created and placed the Rakkhi Bahini over the military institution's head. He promoted one or two of his faithful favourites in the army without caring for the rules of seniority. The result was that dissatisfaction became manifest in the army.
The four young leaders of the Mujib Bahini took up absentee Mujib's cudgel in the battlefield in 1971. They not only opposed Tajuddin, they were opposed to Osmany, Commander-in-Chief of the Mukti Bahini, as well. They also did not have a high opinion of the provisional government-in-exile because Tajuddin headed it. Rather, the four leaders had regard for Syed Nazrul Islam, the acting President, standing in for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The four young leaders did not like the fact that Tajuddin and his government were maintaining a good relationship with the Indian government and with Aurora, the General appointed by the government of India. Uban has written about this: 'The young leaders were always complaining that General Aurora had a special type of collusion with Tajuddin as both of them were putting pressure so that the Mujib Bahini came under their command and was directed by them, and did not remain under the young leaders who were disloyal to Tajuddin.' Uban further says, ' I tried my best to dispel this misunderstanding, but as it was rooted deep in the past, the old attitudes could not be put right and nothing of consequence happened.'
The young leaders were not, however, the type of men who would remain inactive and silent. They were carrying on with their job. In the words of Uban: 'In some way or other, the young leaders might have influenced the elderly MNAs and MPs and started the propaganda that the post of the Prime Minister had gone to the wrong man. According to them the post should have gone to somebody else. I think they had in mind Syed Nazrul Islam when they were saying it. The matter might take an ugly turn as the young leaders were almost mad to show Tajuddin his proper place. At this stage any break-up in the provisional government could be disastrous for the whole movement. I think I was able to make the young leaders understand that any such step would be dangerously risky for their mission and might even bring more fatal consequences during the independence and post-independence days of Bangladesh. Fortunately, they agreed with me though they had been roasting Tajuddin within themselves which, except for a few persons like me, no one else knew. I think Syed Nazrul Islam also warned them against it and that is how it was possible to get over a fatal political threat.'
One cannot but be dumbfounded at those happenings in the most critical days of the country how the freedom flag-carrying Awami League leaders were indulging in infighting and conspiracy among themselves when thousands were losing their lives at the hands of the Pakistani killers and hundreds of sisters and mothers were being violated! Was that patriotism?
Awami League, especially the Mujibists among them, used to think that the communists 'especially the pro-Chinese ones' were bigger enemies than the Pakistanis. About this Uban says, 'These four leaders inform us that many undesirable persons similar to the Naxalites are making inroads (into the Mukti Bahini) in Bangladesh and are getting training and weapons. They warn that these weapons will not be used against the Pakistanis; rather, they are being hidden in Bangladesh so that they can be used after independence in support of movements similar to the Naxalite one. In fact, they mention the names of the pro-Chinese communist leaders who are connected to some army officials of Bangladesh and through whose approval a large number of communist cadres were being recruited and trained and armed with weapons. The matter was brought to the notice of the authorities confidentially, but the result was nil.' Perhaps, like Uban, the four young leaders were also disappointed at this. One may feel a little surprised at the whole thing, because neither Tajuddin and his government nor the Indian government considered the communists to be their allies. So, one doubts the truth of the information supplied by the Mujibist leaders. Moreover, why cannot the communists, other than the Muscovite puppets, be patriots?
Let us now come to what the provisional government of Bangladesh thought about the Mujib Bahini. About this Uban writes, 'The provisional government of Bangladesh'
which meant Tajuddin ? never did agree with the leaders of the Mujib Bahini and took all their complaints lightly. Colonel Osmany accepted directives from his government and, though outwardly friendly to the young leaders, he did not like that there ought to be a separate force in the name of Mujib Bahini 'especially because that force which would not be under his overall command. General Aurora of the Eastern Command, who was appointed to direct the total operation, was unhappy about the thing as Mujib Bahini was not directly under his command. It seems the relationship between the two factions of the Awami League was like that of the snake and mongoose and that also during the Liberation War.'
A new dimension regarding the communist terror was added to the minds of the young leaders from another direction. 'The young leaders have seen Bangladesh's Naxalite men gossiping with the Indian officials in an aristocratic hotel of India. Perhaps the Naxalites lived in such hotels. The young leaders knew that during military rule in East Pakistan those people had been their worst enemies. It was originally against them that the youth organisation of the Awami League was established. The young leaders failed to understand why India was partial towards their identified enemy. So they mistakenly concluded that the goal of our government was to enable a communist party to stand on solid ground in Bangladesh. They also came to know through a reliable source that the Marxist workers and Moulana Bhasani's followers were getting separate training and weapons.' The young leaders saw Uban and, expressing their anger, told him, 'We never expected you to train the Marxists and Naxalites and give them weapons to nullify what we have achieved in the last 25 years.'
Getting annoyed at what the young leaders said, Uban went to meet Secretary Kao to verify the truth. Kao told him, in the words of Uban, 'Moulana Bhasani's Naxalites are getting their training in a different venue. They had not been put in my custody, because he was certain I would not keep any such promise and the young leaders would very soon find out where those trainees were. This would cause a very serious disturbance.' Uban was astonished at Kao's reply. He was not prepared for this discovery. Kao further said to him, 'We have done nothing against the wishes of the provisional government of Bangladesh and they think Bhasani's men are a very valuable resource against the Pakistanis. How can we disregard their advice? Tell your young leaders that even if they do not like it they have to swallow it. In the overall planning we will support them only as a key branch, but not as an entity possessing an independent political leadership. We cannot do anything if they do not walk on the right path. Let them go to the dogs.'
The Mujibist leaders became more careful after this. 'They would not divulge their secrets to the key personnel of their government - not even to the Prime Minister Tajuddin. They suspected that Tajuddin would capture power for himself after ousting Sheikh Mujib. They then told me sincerely, "Tajuddin is in union with D. P. Dhar, your communist minister. We do not trust either of them. Even your government do not know what plans they have about Bangladesh after the country's independence." The young leaders did not trust the provisional government or anyone connected with the government'. Uban informs us, 'They would not divulge any information even to Colonel Osmany, who had been working closely with Tajuddin, nor even to Lieutenant General Aurora who, they suspected, was acting as their political adversary for some unaccountable reasons. They would often tell me that General Aurora had been instigating Tajuddin to meet Indira Gandhi and putting pressure so that Mujib Bahini came under his command.'
There was also a big problem about the name Mujib Bahini. Neither the government-in-exile nor the military High Command was supporting this name. At that time, seizing an opportunity, the young leaders put forward the name of Mujib Bahini otherwise christened as the Bengal Liberation Force (BLF). While the Mukti Bahini was fighting splendidly on the border and inside Bangladesh, the Mujib Bahini, so-called, was in reserve in their Dehradun camp by the Indian faction of the Indian Army ostensibly with the nod from Delhi's political bosses.
But Mujib Bahani, which has no record of fighting during the entire period of armed struggle excepting trying to impose them as the political commissars, that was unacceptable to the regularly-constituted Mukti Bahini and the Guerrilla force, christened as the Bangladesh Defence Forces (BDF), maintained its entity with the informal sanction of the Indian Intelligence and General Uban. Mujib Bahini. It was not acceptable to the High Command when Uban proposed the name of the special force as Mujib Bahini. According to them, a doubt might be created in the minds of the people inside Bangladesh, and there might even be friction between the Mukti and Mujib bahinis. The young leaders did not agree to accept this decision of the High Command. They said, 'Let others say what they like, these boys will be known as Mujib Bahini inside Bangladesh.'
Followingter this arose the question of how the operational work would be shared between the two bahinis. General Aurora solved the problem. This is how he divided the responsibilities. Mukti Bahini would be responsible for up to 20 miles inside the border and the Mujib Bahini would be in charge of further interior regions inside the country. The young leaders also wanted this and so there were no differences there. Aurora, however, wanted the Mujib Bahini to work under his command, but they were not accepting it. Another problem cropped up with regard to the operational work. Another decision was needed in the matter relating to the method of infiltration after crossing the border and the army and the Mukti Bahini had been in charge of that.
The Indian army established wide corridors including safe houses all around Bangladesh and the boys of the Mukti Bahini did prepare an outstanding line of communication as far as the villages through their well-established networks. Uban informs us, 'Lieutenant General Aurora used to pressure my boys to find out the routes they used, their entry-route on the border, and about the safe houses they used and their destinations. The young leaders had no problem to divulge their entry-routes on the border so that the army units were vigilant to allow them to infiltrate. But they were not willing to divulge any information about their corridors, safe houses and destinations. This was because they doubted the sincerity of many Mukti Bahini leaders who had been their political enemies.'
Thus we see how the game of clashes being played between the Mujib Bahini and Mukti Bahini, between Mujib and Tajuddin and between the Awami League and the Awami League! And the country of Bangladesh and its people had to suffer for it.
At last, after a great effort, things were made agreeable to them for a peaceful solution. The solution was they would only inform the local army commanders who would allow them to enter their entry-routes.
Major General Uban was a supporter of the Mukti Bahini, sympathetic to the Mujibists and an admirer of the four young leaders. Yet we are in a position to know from his writings some of evidences of power struggle and the divisive and the autonomous role of an ideological elite force, so called, that never fought the war but merely kept in reserve for Mujibist take-over in the absence of Mujib, if it had come that after December 16, 1971. The infightings of the party continued even after the birth of the country and in a very ugly manner.
Uban ends the relevant chapter of his in the following words: 'Bangladesh is now free. Under the sacrificing Prime Minister Tajuddin, the provisional government has started the work in full swing. The new government of Bangladesh has directed the return of all illegal weapons and the very first of those who were told to do it were the boys of the Mujib Bahini. Sheikh Moni was furious about this.'
He made a definite complaint to me about the dicta adopted by Tajuddin. Among them were his staying in power and preparing a leftist force. He even showed me a group of armed communist youths in the corridors of the Hotel Intercontinental who had black bands tied around their foreheads.
'I was a witness to a hot debate between Sheikh Moni and Shree D. P. Dhar in connection with the surrender of weapons. Moni told Shree Dhar they would not surrender their weapons before Sheikh's arrival in Dhaka and, if necessary, they would wage a civil war' Moni later said to me that his observation hitherto has confirmed that Shree Dhar was a sworn enemy of his country.'
Mujibists became much more powerful after Sheikh returned to Dhaka on the 10th of January, 1972. Tajuddin was expelled from the Cabinet. Osmany left the Bangladesh army. Sheikh Mujib started to rule the country with the help of his devoted and enthusiastic disciples and the three bahinis the Rakshi Bahini, Sheikh Moni's Juba League and labour leader Mannan's Lal Bahini. The power of the police and the army was curbed, because the government had little faith in them. A reign of terror was unleashed in Bangladesh.
The ruling Awami League party and its factions 'and nobody else' were chiefly responsible for the anarchy and terrorist activities that pervaded Bangladesh in its first three years. The people of Bangladesh were deprived of the peace and security which they had hoped for in an independent country in what was the killing fields of Bangladesh during the Pakistan Military's occupation.
HOLIDAY 11/11/2004
