Modi, Kashmir and Pakistan

[ghazi52]

Modi, Kashmir and Pakistan​

Khurram Husain
May 8, 2025

INDIA and Pakistan are being driven, inexorably, towards a confrontation that neither side wants but neither side can avert. The drivers of conflict have multiplied, the limits tested by these episodic stand-offs have been stretched, and the points of contact between their militaries during the kinetic manoeuvres in each of these stand-offs has multiplied.

From the first such stand-off, perhaps in 1990, till today, there is an unmistakable trajectory of escalation. What is driving this?

One of the big drivers is India’s attempt to end its difficulties in occupied Kashmir using a violent development model that has lain behind the rise of Narendra Modi. The model was born in the early 2000s that saw two pivotal developments in both India and Pakistan. Up until 9/11, Pakistan was being pushed increasingly towards global isolation and its economy was depleted to near breaking point. The country had undergone three rounds of debt rescheduling and just finished a gruelling, short-term Stand-by Arrangement with the IMF that left the populace battered with unemployment and sharply rising energy costs. There was no further growth path for Pakistan in those years other than deeper structural reform, which was proving too heavy a burden even for a dictator with near absolute power.

However, 9/11 changed all that overnight. Instantly, Pakistan went from being an international pariah to a front-line state in a superpower’s war, and was eventually crowned with the status of ‘major non Nato ally’. The volume of money that poured into the country, coupled with the generous terms of debt rescheduling extended by the Paris Club in December 2001, impacting a total debt stock of $12.5 billion, allowed the regime of Gen Musharraf to pump growth to unprecedented levels, creating a bubble economy that made more fortunes for more people than any similar period in the country’s history.

Modi’s model of development rested on the ability to efficiently dispossess people and take land required for large-scale projects.

This sudden reversal of fortunes in Pakistan came as a rude shock to our neighbours in India. Over the course of the 1990s, India and Pakistan were locked in a stand-off over Kashmir, which left India increasingly embattled by the uprising in the occupied territory and Pakistan in the grip of sanctions and isolation. India accused Pakistan of sponsoring the uprising in occupied Kashmir, and of providing training and cover to militants in the troubled valley. At one point, Pakistan came close to being placed on the State Department’s list of sponsors of terrorism, a designation that would have had far-reaching implications for the country had it come to pass.

By 2001, India’s policy of imposing a crushing isolation on Pakistan was finally bearing fruit when 9/11 came along and reversed it all. This was a big shock to the Indian foreign policy establishment, which had shouldered a tremendous cost in men and materiel for repression of the uprising in occupied Kashmir, under the hopes that pressure on Pakistan would eventually cause the uprising to die down. All those hopes were dashed once Pakistan became a superpower favourite again.

The Congress party had seen its fortunes sag throughout the 1990s, losing power to the BJP by the end of the decade. But in 2004, it scored a surprising victory at the polls and renewed its electoral strength again in 2009 by increasing its seats in the Lok Sabha from 153 to 206.

Yet trouble brewed behind this double movement in the early 2000s, which had seen the return to power of the Congress party in India and a reversal of Pakistan’s fortunes. This was when Modi made his appearance on the big stage of Indian politics with the Gujarat riots in 2002, cynically using communal hate and violence as a tool to grab power. Once in power, Modi unrolled a model of violent development, which fused rent-seeking alliances with billionaires at the federal level, with high levels of public expenditure on infrastructure projects to promote ports, power plants, luxury urban housing developments and more. This model of development rested on the ability to efficiently dispossess people and take land required for large-scale projects, high levels of government spending and a close, symbiotic relationship between wealthy elites, the party apparatus and the government machinery of India.

Fortunes changed following the Great Financial Crisis in 2008. The Congress party was at a loss for ideas on how to restart growth in India, and Musharraf’s growth bubble burst comprehensively while Pakistan’s troubles with the US mounted. As Pakistan sank once more into its pre-9/11 state of isolation coupled with a depleted economy, the Congress party hurtled towards its most stunning electoral defeat ever in 2014. That was Modi’s year, when he also brought this model of violent development as his party’s vision for achieving a final resolution of New Delhi’s long-running Kashmir problem.

Two ideas were central to this vision, and both have a pedigree in India’s policy conversation going back at least to the early 2000s. One was to revoke Kashmir’s special status granted under Article 370 of the Indian constitution. The second was to cast off the constraints of the Indus Waters Treaty. With both these done, the government would be in a better position to use public funds to initiate large-scale infrastructure projects through which to select winners and losers within Kashmir. The idea was to reward those who would play ball with the government, and crush those who wouldn’t.

These are the broad developments that imparted such inexorable momentum to the episodic return of stand-offs between India and Pakistan. Modi’s India wants to make Kashmir its own, regardless of the wishes of Kashmir’s inhabitants. Pakistan is determined to thwart this ambition, regardless of the cost it has to pay along the way. Neither side can win in this situation. Yet none can afford to lose either.

The writer is a business and economy journalist.

Published in Dawn, May 8th, 2025

Modi, Kashmir and Pakistan

Modi’s model of development rested on the ability to efficiently dispossess people and take land required for large-scale projects.

www.dawn.com

 

[jupiter2007]

For the past two decades, Pakistan has operated under the illusion that normalizing relations with India will lead to resolving longstanding conflicts. This notion may coincide with broader U.S. strategic objectives, which push for Pakistan to recognize India’s regional supremacy and collaborate in countering China’s growing influence. However, the reality is that the sentiment behind "Aman ki Asha" has long faded, replaced by a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape where national interests must be safeguarded with decisive strategy rather than idealistic optimism.

Pakistan must move beyond symbolic gestures and adopt a proactive approach in shaping its narrative. Investing in compelling documentaries, thought-provoking dramas, and impactful films that challenge India's perspective can serve as a powerful means of influencing public discourse. Through the strategic use of media and storytelling, Pakistan can assert its stance on critical issues, dismantle misleading narratives, and present an informed perspective to global audiences.

Additionally, Pakistan must enhance its diplomatic outreach, leveraging think tanks, academic forums, and international symposiums to articulate its position effectively. Strengthening partnerships with like-minded nations and engaging in intellectual discourse will further reinforce Pakistan’s narrative on the international stage.

In an era where information warfare is as crucial as conventional defense, Pakistan must ensure that its strategic messaging remains robust, well-coordinated, and widely disseminated. By combining media influence with diplomatic engagement, Pakistan can counter external pressures and uphold its sovereignty in the face of evolving geopolitical challenges.

 

[ghazi52]

For the past two decades, Pakistan has operated under the illusion that normalizing relations with India will lead to resolving longstanding conflicts. This notion may coincide with broader U.S. strategic objectives, which push for Pakistan to recognize India’s regional supremacy and collaborate in countering China’s growing influence. However, the reality is that the sentiment behind "Aman ki Asha" has long faded, replaced by a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape where national interests must be safeguarded with decisive strategy rather than idealistic optimism.

Pakistan must move beyond symbolic gestures and adopt a proactive approach in shaping its narrative. Investing in compelling documentaries, thought-provoking dramas, and impactful films that challenge India's perspective can serve as a powerful means of influencing public discourse. Through the strategic use of media and storytelling, Pakistan can assert its stance on critical issues, dismantle misleading narratives, and present an informed perspective to global audiences.

Additionally, Pakistan must enhance its diplomatic outreach, leveraging think tanks, academic forums, and international symposiums to articulate its position effectively. Strengthening partnerships with like-minded nations and engaging in intellectual discourse will further reinforce Pakistan’s narrative on the international stage.

In an era where information warfare is as crucial as conventional defense, Pakistan must ensure that its strategic messaging remains robust, well-coordinated, and widely disseminated. By combining media influence with diplomatic engagement, Pakistan can counter external pressures and uphold its sovereignty in the face of evolving geopolitical challenges.

Well said !

 

[jupiter2007]

Well said !

I am deeply disappointed by the government and Pakistan’s diplomats in their efforts to present the country’s case to a global audience. Our diplomats lack the charisma, intellect, knowledge, and assertiveness required to effectively engage with international media. Their inability to deliver strong, persuasive arguments and articulate Pakistan’s stance on critical issues has severely undermined the nation’s credibility on the global stage.

 

[jupiter2007]

I'm uncertain about the situation. U.S. military planes have been landing in Indian Gujarat, raising questions about whether the U.S. is supporting India against Pakistan. So far, neither our Army nor the media has addressed this development. Meanwhile, India's kamikaze drones strikes have inflicted damage on Pakistani defense installations, further escalating tensions.

 

[jupiter2007]

Some voices from the Indian side speculate that China is abandoning Pakistan to safeguard its own interests in the ongoing trade war with the United States. However, China's relationship with Pakistan remains strategically vital, especially in terms of regional security and economic collaboration. Despite the intense negotiations and shifting alliances brought about by the U.S.-China trade war, there is no solid evidence to suggest that China has "sold out" Pakistan or is merely using it as a bargaining chip in trade discussions with Washington. The partnership between China and Pakistan continues to be shaped by long-term geopolitical considerations rather than short-term trade maneuvers.