tushar
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Till a few years ago, the term "interoperability" was virtually missing from the Indian military's lexicon. Indian commanders learnt it in the flurry of joint combat exercises with US armed forces after the post-Pokhran-II thaw of 1998. Today, the Indian top brass flings the word "interoperability" about with as much ease as American generals.
But internally, the 1.13-million strong Indian Army grapples with a new buzzword: transformation. With Army chief General V K Singh leading the charge, the aim is to transform the world's second largest army, with a poor teeth-to-tail ratio, into "an agile, lethal, versatile and net-worked force, which is capability-based to meet future challenges". Gen Singh says the transformation must be 360 degrees and "enhance operational capability through reorganization, restructuring, force development and relocation." Those are big words, but the force is not all talk. The Army has conducted 13 transformation studies. These range from ways to consolidate strike capabilities and "flatten" HQs, to "synergising" all resources and revamping the Corps of Military Police. The results of the studies were pondered by the just-concluded Army commanders' conference in Delhi.
Some of the Army's new transformative concepts are already being "test-bedded" and Gen Singh has ruled that delays will not be tolerated. The "stipulated timeframes" for overall transformation, even though revolutionary in scope, are expected to fructify in the next year or two. Deadlines are "sacrosanct", Gen Singh has warned. Change is urgently needed. The Army needs to be transformed considering it is engaged on still-unresolved borders with two nuclear-armed neighbours, even as it tackles militancy in the hinterland. Altogether, the Army is said to face "a two-and-a-half front challenge".
In any case, India needs to build military capabilities that chime with its expanding geo-political aspirations and the vast expansestretching from the Persian Gulf right up to the Straits of Malaccadubbed its "primary area of interest". What led to this much-needed re-think? It didn't happen overnight but its origins could loosely be traced back to the December 2001 attack on Parliament, which led the Army to launch the ponderous 'Operation Parakram', the 10-month-long massive forward troop mobilization along the western front.
Operation Parakram's lumbering mobilization of "strike formations" at the border launch pads took almost a month. That gave Pakistan time enough to shore up its defences and the US to pressure the then NDA government to back off. That was when the mood swung towards transformation, modernization and the "pro-active war strategy", loosely called the 'Cold Start' doctrine, which has rattled Pakistan no end. Ever since, the Army has worked to build the capability to mobilize fast and hit hard with self-contained and highly mobile "battle groups". It wants to be ready-and-out within 96 hours to ensure Pakistan does not have the time to prepare for counter attack.
The proposed transformation seeks to further hone this. A crucial element, for instance, is to bring together the Army's three principal offensive formations -- 1 Corps (Mathura), 2 Corps (Ambala) and 21 Corps (Bhopal)under one operational strategic command. Gen Singh, in fact, says the Army wants to "re-organize and relocate to enhance and optimize operational capabilities both for plains and mountains", create "network-centricity", integrate logistics to support the "high tempo of future operations'' and enhance operational synergy with the Air Force and Navy.
Big words again but the subtext is clear. After decades of working to a Pakistan-centric strategy geared to battle on the plains, the Army now wants to also build its capability for offensive mountain warfare with China. Transformation also entails major force accretions and modernization for the eastern front, along with the simultaneous strengthening of capabilities on the western one.
The lessons have been learnt. A new South-Western Command was created as the Army's sixth operational command at Jaipur in 2005, falling between the Western and Southern Commands, to provide a greater offensive punch on the western front. Similarly, two new mountain warfare divisions centred around Zakama (Nagaland) and Misamari (Assam) have now been raised, with 1,260 officers and 35,011 soldiers, as well as spy drone bases, for the eastern front with China. An almost Rs 10,000-crore plan was cleared last year to for military infrastructure development in the North-East, with a new mountain strike corps and a third artillery division also on the anvil.
The Indian Air Force, much smaller than the Indian Army, is also taking steps to bridge the gaping military asymmetry with China. After Tezpur, it is now basing Sukhoi-30MKIs at Chabua (Assam), as well as upgrading eastern sector ALGs (advanced landing grounds) like Pasighat, Mechuka, Walong, Tuting, Ziro and Vijaynagar and helipads in Arunachal Pradesh. Plans are also underway to progressively base six surface-to-air Akash missile squadrons in the North-East to counter Chinese fighters, helicopters and drones.
So far so good. The problem is the Army's modernization is lagging, with critical deficiencies in artillery, air defence, aviation and night-fighting capabilities. India's lengthy and controversy-ridden military procurement process, coupled with the embarrassing lack of a robust domestic defence-industrial base, are an enormous problem in the planned modernization. But, most important of all is the operation of that term "interoperability" between the Army and defence ministry.
Missing in action - The Times of India
But internally, the 1.13-million strong Indian Army grapples with a new buzzword: transformation. With Army chief General V K Singh leading the charge, the aim is to transform the world's second largest army, with a poor teeth-to-tail ratio, into "an agile, lethal, versatile and net-worked force, which is capability-based to meet future challenges". Gen Singh says the transformation must be 360 degrees and "enhance operational capability through reorganization, restructuring, force development and relocation." Those are big words, but the force is not all talk. The Army has conducted 13 transformation studies. These range from ways to consolidate strike capabilities and "flatten" HQs, to "synergising" all resources and revamping the Corps of Military Police. The results of the studies were pondered by the just-concluded Army commanders' conference in Delhi.
Some of the Army's new transformative concepts are already being "test-bedded" and Gen Singh has ruled that delays will not be tolerated. The "stipulated timeframes" for overall transformation, even though revolutionary in scope, are expected to fructify in the next year or two. Deadlines are "sacrosanct", Gen Singh has warned. Change is urgently needed. The Army needs to be transformed considering it is engaged on still-unresolved borders with two nuclear-armed neighbours, even as it tackles militancy in the hinterland. Altogether, the Army is said to face "a two-and-a-half front challenge".
In any case, India needs to build military capabilities that chime with its expanding geo-political aspirations and the vast expansestretching from the Persian Gulf right up to the Straits of Malaccadubbed its "primary area of interest". What led to this much-needed re-think? It didn't happen overnight but its origins could loosely be traced back to the December 2001 attack on Parliament, which led the Army to launch the ponderous 'Operation Parakram', the 10-month-long massive forward troop mobilization along the western front.
Operation Parakram's lumbering mobilization of "strike formations" at the border launch pads took almost a month. That gave Pakistan time enough to shore up its defences and the US to pressure the then NDA government to back off. That was when the mood swung towards transformation, modernization and the "pro-active war strategy", loosely called the 'Cold Start' doctrine, which has rattled Pakistan no end. Ever since, the Army has worked to build the capability to mobilize fast and hit hard with self-contained and highly mobile "battle groups". It wants to be ready-and-out within 96 hours to ensure Pakistan does not have the time to prepare for counter attack.
The proposed transformation seeks to further hone this. A crucial element, for instance, is to bring together the Army's three principal offensive formations -- 1 Corps (Mathura), 2 Corps (Ambala) and 21 Corps (Bhopal)under one operational strategic command. Gen Singh, in fact, says the Army wants to "re-organize and relocate to enhance and optimize operational capabilities both for plains and mountains", create "network-centricity", integrate logistics to support the "high tempo of future operations'' and enhance operational synergy with the Air Force and Navy.
Big words again but the subtext is clear. After decades of working to a Pakistan-centric strategy geared to battle on the plains, the Army now wants to also build its capability for offensive mountain warfare with China. Transformation also entails major force accretions and modernization for the eastern front, along with the simultaneous strengthening of capabilities on the western one.
The lessons have been learnt. A new South-Western Command was created as the Army's sixth operational command at Jaipur in 2005, falling between the Western and Southern Commands, to provide a greater offensive punch on the western front. Similarly, two new mountain warfare divisions centred around Zakama (Nagaland) and Misamari (Assam) have now been raised, with 1,260 officers and 35,011 soldiers, as well as spy drone bases, for the eastern front with China. An almost Rs 10,000-crore plan was cleared last year to for military infrastructure development in the North-East, with a new mountain strike corps and a third artillery division also on the anvil.
The Indian Air Force, much smaller than the Indian Army, is also taking steps to bridge the gaping military asymmetry with China. After Tezpur, it is now basing Sukhoi-30MKIs at Chabua (Assam), as well as upgrading eastern sector ALGs (advanced landing grounds) like Pasighat, Mechuka, Walong, Tuting, Ziro and Vijaynagar and helipads in Arunachal Pradesh. Plans are also underway to progressively base six surface-to-air Akash missile squadrons in the North-East to counter Chinese fighters, helicopters and drones.
So far so good. The problem is the Army's modernization is lagging, with critical deficiencies in artillery, air defence, aviation and night-fighting capabilities. India's lengthy and controversy-ridden military procurement process, coupled with the embarrassing lack of a robust domestic defence-industrial base, are an enormous problem in the planned modernization. But, most important of all is the operation of that term "interoperability" between the Army and defence ministry.
Missing in action - The Times of India
