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Robert Hewson delves into the world of airborne missile programmes.
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Looking back over the headlines of 2001, the single most newsworthy item was probably the 1 May debut of Israelââ¬â¢s long-secret active-radar beyond visual range (BVR) missile programme, the Derby. In a series of tightly controlled briefings first details were released of the new weapon which, until then, the world had not even been sure what to call.
While the existence of this classified project had been known for some time, speculation had ranged widely as to what it was capable of when it had entered service, even what it looked like and what it was called.
The Derby name ÃÂ one of the many random codewords for national defence projects that pop out of the Israeli Ministry of Defence computer ÃÂ had been associated with the missile programme for some time, but so too had Alto, Glory, Firefly, Project Five and Python 5.
In 2001 a window was opened onto the Israeli design when South Africa unveiled its own new BVR missile, the Kentron R-Darter. There was very close collaboration between Rafael and Kentron on radar missile development and when the wraps finally came off the R-Darter, the world at last got a pretty good idea of what the Derby looked like too.
Many sources close to the South African programme confessed that the R-Darter and the Derby were one and the same ÃÂ though both companies now espouse a very different (public) view on their current working relationship. However, when placed side-by-side it is impossible to tell the R-Darter and the Derby apart. The only difference, according to the published specification, is that the R-Darter weighs 2kg more.
The importance of these weapons lies in the fact that they now offer a credible level of advanced BVR missile performance without too many export restrictions. The BVR weapon of choice, the AIM-120 AMRAAM, comes with many strings attached by the US State Department. The US authorities are still reluctant to sell the AMRAAM in a region where no equivalent threat weapon has been fielded.
Chile has not yet secured AMRAAM approval for its new Block 50 F-16s. There have been credible press reports that Chile has opted for the Derby instead and Rafael confirms there is at least one export customer for the new missile. Brazil has also been identified as a serious potential client, as part of the Israeli-led upgrade of its F-5Es.
The R-Darter is now in service on SAAF Cheetah Cs and will be integrated on South Africaââ¬â¢s Gripens when they enter service. One important factor driving the declassification of the R-Darter (and by extension the Derby) was the decision by Gripen international to offer the R-Darter as a weapons option on the Gripen. As the Gripen team has also struck up a very close relationship with Rafael àoffering the Python 4 and SPICE stand-off weapon on the aircraft àit is not entirely inconceivable that the Derby is for sale to export customers also.
Strangely, Israel has shown a surprising lack of interest in the Derby with the IDF/AF saying publicly that it would like to acquire the missile but cannot afford it at the moment. Instead, Israel has been working hard to secure approval for the AIM-120 and is already integrating the US weapon on part of its F-15A/C fleet. Both the F-15I and F-16I will have AMRAAM capability, although the IDF/AF would ideally also like to equip its F-16s with the Derby over which it has full control of important technologies like ECCM configurations.
Chinese Pythons
Israeli weapons of a different kind were also in the news during April following the interception of and subsequent collision with a US Navy EP-3E Aries by a Chinese Shenyang J-8. The PLAAF fighters that shadowed the EP-3E were all clearly armed with the Chinese version of the Python III missile, the PL-8. While it had been known for some time that Israel had supplied Python III technology to ChinaÃÂ and perhaps even some real missiles ÃÂ this was the best view that anyone had of the missile in PLAAF service.
It also transpired South Africa had probably been a Python III operator when a senior Kentron official confirmed the SAAF had operated a foreign-sourced missile under the codename ââ¬ËV3Sââ¬â¢. This missile was introduced on the Mirage F1CZ from 1989 onwards and is understood to have been the Python III àintroduced to meet shortcomings exposed in the SAAFââ¬â¢s available missile stocks by the war in Angola.
In Europe, the two rival next-generation short-range missile programmes àthe MBDA ASRAAM and BGTââ¬â¢s IRIS-T àboth encountered a bit of a rough ride. The ASRAAM saga took an unwelcome turn when the UK authorities, in the form of Procurement Minister Baroness Symons, made an unprecedented public announcement that the ASRAAM didnââ¬â¢t work.
It is common for new weapons systems not to perform quite as advertised but it is most unusual for a national programme to be criticised in such a specific way by the customer. MBDA rejected the Baronessââ¬â¢s claims and produced its own evidence to support the ASRAAMââ¬â¢s effectiveness.
The truth of the matter lay somewhere in between. The ASRAAM was having trouble discriminating certain types of targets under certain types of conditions in certain types of cloud. This is a problem for all IR-guided missiles, no matter how sophisticated, and is not something that can always be legislated in the laboratory. While the ASRAAM team stated it had met the required paper specification for the missile, it seemed once the missiles went flying in their captive trials, things were not always working out in the real world.
The most significant aspect of the MoDââ¬â¢s ASRAAM pronouncement was the way that its ââ¬Ëproblemsââ¬â¢ were directly linked to the ongoing negotiations for the pan-European Meteor BVR missile programme. Baroness Symons said: ââ¬ÅWe are also determined to draw the lessons from thisÃâ° when we sign the contract for the Meteor.ââ¬Â Such an attitude must have caused some alarm for the Meteorââ¬â¢s UK shareholder, BAE Systems.
Canada and the IRIS-T Causing alarm elsewhere was the Canadian decision to drop out of the German-led development effort for the IRIS-T missile. The IRIS-T is a future short-range agile dogfight missile àthe product of a team of German, Italian, Swedish, Greek, Canadian and Norwegian industries being led by Germanyââ¬â¢s BGT. IRIS-T is earmarked for use on Germanyââ¬â¢s Eurofighters and Swedenââ¬â¢s Gripens.
With work on the programme largely complete, Canada announced in October it was leaving the project on grounds of cost. As the only Hornet operator in the IRIS-T group, Canada would have had to be sole bearer of all the Hornet integration costs. Canadaââ¬â¢s workshare portion was low but its value to the team was much higher as it provided access to the worldwide F/A-18 community which has now been shut off. With potential customers such as Switzerland and Finland expressing an interest in the project, this was bad news for the IRIS-T.
In July, the Eurofighter fired its first AMRAAM missile (and its first ASRAAM), over the Decimomannu range in Sardinia. At around the same time the first AMRAAM firings from an Australian Hornet were undertaken at Woomera ÃÂ marking only the second time that trial AMRAAMs have been fired outside the USA.
The final saga to merge the missile interested partners, of the Anglo French Matra BAE Dynamics and Italyââ¬â¢s Alenia came to an end on 18 December when MBDA was finally formed. This saw MBDA take under its wing the missile interests of Alenia Marconi Systems (AMS) in return for BAE Systemsââ¬â¢ radar business joining AMS.
Source: Global-Defence
Robert Hewson delves into the world of airborne missile programmes.
<div class='bbimg'></div>
Looking back over the headlines of 2001, the single most newsworthy item was probably the 1 May debut of Israelââ¬â¢s long-secret active-radar beyond visual range (BVR) missile programme, the Derby. In a series of tightly controlled briefings first details were released of the new weapon which, until then, the world had not even been sure what to call.
While the existence of this classified project had been known for some time, speculation had ranged widely as to what it was capable of when it had entered service, even what it looked like and what it was called.
The Derby name ÃÂ one of the many random codewords for national defence projects that pop out of the Israeli Ministry of Defence computer ÃÂ had been associated with the missile programme for some time, but so too had Alto, Glory, Firefly, Project Five and Python 5.
In 2001 a window was opened onto the Israeli design when South Africa unveiled its own new BVR missile, the Kentron R-Darter. There was very close collaboration between Rafael and Kentron on radar missile development and when the wraps finally came off the R-Darter, the world at last got a pretty good idea of what the Derby looked like too.
Many sources close to the South African programme confessed that the R-Darter and the Derby were one and the same ÃÂ though both companies now espouse a very different (public) view on their current working relationship. However, when placed side-by-side it is impossible to tell the R-Darter and the Derby apart. The only difference, according to the published specification, is that the R-Darter weighs 2kg more.
The importance of these weapons lies in the fact that they now offer a credible level of advanced BVR missile performance without too many export restrictions. The BVR weapon of choice, the AIM-120 AMRAAM, comes with many strings attached by the US State Department. The US authorities are still reluctant to sell the AMRAAM in a region where no equivalent threat weapon has been fielded.
Chile has not yet secured AMRAAM approval for its new Block 50 F-16s. There have been credible press reports that Chile has opted for the Derby instead and Rafael confirms there is at least one export customer for the new missile. Brazil has also been identified as a serious potential client, as part of the Israeli-led upgrade of its F-5Es.
The R-Darter is now in service on SAAF Cheetah Cs and will be integrated on South Africaââ¬â¢s Gripens when they enter service. One important factor driving the declassification of the R-Darter (and by extension the Derby) was the decision by Gripen international to offer the R-Darter as a weapons option on the Gripen. As the Gripen team has also struck up a very close relationship with Rafael àoffering the Python 4 and SPICE stand-off weapon on the aircraft àit is not entirely inconceivable that the Derby is for sale to export customers also.
Strangely, Israel has shown a surprising lack of interest in the Derby with the IDF/AF saying publicly that it would like to acquire the missile but cannot afford it at the moment. Instead, Israel has been working hard to secure approval for the AIM-120 and is already integrating the US weapon on part of its F-15A/C fleet. Both the F-15I and F-16I will have AMRAAM capability, although the IDF/AF would ideally also like to equip its F-16s with the Derby over which it has full control of important technologies like ECCM configurations.
Chinese Pythons
Israeli weapons of a different kind were also in the news during April following the interception of and subsequent collision with a US Navy EP-3E Aries by a Chinese Shenyang J-8. The PLAAF fighters that shadowed the EP-3E were all clearly armed with the Chinese version of the Python III missile, the PL-8. While it had been known for some time that Israel had supplied Python III technology to ChinaÃÂ and perhaps even some real missiles ÃÂ this was the best view that anyone had of the missile in PLAAF service.
It also transpired South Africa had probably been a Python III operator when a senior Kentron official confirmed the SAAF had operated a foreign-sourced missile under the codename ââ¬ËV3Sââ¬â¢. This missile was introduced on the Mirage F1CZ from 1989 onwards and is understood to have been the Python III àintroduced to meet shortcomings exposed in the SAAFââ¬â¢s available missile stocks by the war in Angola.
In Europe, the two rival next-generation short-range missile programmes àthe MBDA ASRAAM and BGTââ¬â¢s IRIS-T àboth encountered a bit of a rough ride. The ASRAAM saga took an unwelcome turn when the UK authorities, in the form of Procurement Minister Baroness Symons, made an unprecedented public announcement that the ASRAAM didnââ¬â¢t work.
It is common for new weapons systems not to perform quite as advertised but it is most unusual for a national programme to be criticised in such a specific way by the customer. MBDA rejected the Baronessââ¬â¢s claims and produced its own evidence to support the ASRAAMââ¬â¢s effectiveness.
The truth of the matter lay somewhere in between. The ASRAAM was having trouble discriminating certain types of targets under certain types of conditions in certain types of cloud. This is a problem for all IR-guided missiles, no matter how sophisticated, and is not something that can always be legislated in the laboratory. While the ASRAAM team stated it had met the required paper specification for the missile, it seemed once the missiles went flying in their captive trials, things were not always working out in the real world.
The most significant aspect of the MoDââ¬â¢s ASRAAM pronouncement was the way that its ââ¬Ëproblemsââ¬â¢ were directly linked to the ongoing negotiations for the pan-European Meteor BVR missile programme. Baroness Symons said: ââ¬ÅWe are also determined to draw the lessons from thisÃâ° when we sign the contract for the Meteor.ââ¬Â Such an attitude must have caused some alarm for the Meteorââ¬â¢s UK shareholder, BAE Systems.
Canada and the IRIS-T Causing alarm elsewhere was the Canadian decision to drop out of the German-led development effort for the IRIS-T missile. The IRIS-T is a future short-range agile dogfight missile àthe product of a team of German, Italian, Swedish, Greek, Canadian and Norwegian industries being led by Germanyââ¬â¢s BGT. IRIS-T is earmarked for use on Germanyââ¬â¢s Eurofighters and Swedenââ¬â¢s Gripens.
With work on the programme largely complete, Canada announced in October it was leaving the project on grounds of cost. As the only Hornet operator in the IRIS-T group, Canada would have had to be sole bearer of all the Hornet integration costs. Canadaââ¬â¢s workshare portion was low but its value to the team was much higher as it provided access to the worldwide F/A-18 community which has now been shut off. With potential customers such as Switzerland and Finland expressing an interest in the project, this was bad news for the IRIS-T.
In July, the Eurofighter fired its first AMRAAM missile (and its first ASRAAM), over the Decimomannu range in Sardinia. At around the same time the first AMRAAM firings from an Australian Hornet were undertaken at Woomera ÃÂ marking only the second time that trial AMRAAMs have been fired outside the USA.
The final saga to merge the missile interested partners, of the Anglo French Matra BAE Dynamics and Italyââ¬â¢s Alenia came to an end on 18 December when MBDA was finally formed. This saw MBDA take under its wing the missile interests of Alenia Marconi Systems (AMS) in return for BAE Systemsââ¬â¢ radar business joining AMS.
Source: Global-Defence
