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As US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrives in India on Monday for the second round of the bilateral strategic dialogue, there has been quibbling in both Delhi and Washington over a number of issues, including the fulfilment of their mutual nuclear commitments and defence cooperation.
While Delhi and Washington must iron out the many wrinkles in their bilateral relationship, Clintons India visit will be judged by the ability of the two sides to develop a cooperative political agenda in the ****** region and in East Asia, which are undergoing rapid geopolitical evolution.
Washington has made no secret of concerns on Indias nuclear liability legislation that is seen by the US companies as imposing unbearable costs in building 10,000 MW of nuclear capacity that India has set aside for them.
Delhi is unhappy that the United States did not stop the Nuclear Suppliers Group from taking steps that could prevent future transfers of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies for commercial application in India.
Sections of the US establishment continue to crib over the elimination of Boeing and Lockheed from the first round of the bidding for the sale of 126 medium-range multi-role combat aircraft to the Indian Air Force.
India, on the other hand, points to the fact that US companies have won orders for weapons systems worth $8 billion in the last few years. Delhi also suggests that American companies might be on the verge of winning other defence contracts worth billions of dollars.
Some in the US are asking what Washington has got for the political investments that the Bush and Obama administrations have made into the construction of a new partnership with India in recent years. Delhi, on the other hand, warns against letting accountants judge the Indo-US strategic partnership.
Neither India nor the United States would want to build the kind of transactional relationship that America and Pakistan have. Nor should they want to emulate the very cynical US-China alliance against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
What Delhi and Washington need is a partnership that has the political bandwidth to deal with their common threats in the ****** region and the shared interests in East Asia and the waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
In the northwestern marches of the subcontinent, the American raid on Abbottabad and the execution of Osama bin Laden have brought into the open the deep contradictions between the United States and Pakistan in Afghanistan and the war on terror.
Washington thought it could buy Pakistan Armys support by defeating al-Qaeda and stabilising Afghanistan. Rawalpindis interest has been different to establish a pliable government in Kabul and secure strategic depth in Afghanistan through the Taliban and the Haqqani network, both of which have had enduring connections to al-Qaeda.
Despite its relentless drone attacks, Washington is nowhere near bending the Pakistan army to act against the terror groups that are fighting the United States. Delhi has far fewer leverages in pressing the Pakistan army to dismantle the anti-India terror infrastructure on its soil.
Yet, Washington and Delhi think they can manage the Pakistan problem on their own and dont want to be associated too closely with each other in Afghanistan. The prospects for the stabilisation of the ****** region will remain bleak until there is a measure of strategic coordination between Delhi and Washington.
Despite a very different situation, the story is similar in East Asia where Clinton heads after completing her Indian sojourn in Chennai.
In the past, India vigorously objected to Sino-American partnership during the Cold War and after. Delhi must now come to terms with the increasingly tense relationship between Washington and Beijing in Asia.
A rising China, unsurprisingly, would like to diminish the US influence on its Asian periphery. In the face of an increasingly assertive China, Beijings neighbours are turning to Washington for protection.
During her last visit to Southeast Asia a year ago, Clinton proclaimed Americas return to Asia after a prolonged preoccupation with the Middle East, and extended support to Chinas smaller neighbours in their maritime territorial disputes with Beijing. Since then matters have taken a turn for the worse in the waters of Asia. As in the ****** region, so in East Asia, the old geopolitical assumptions are no longer sustainable.
Through the last six decades, the US relations with China and Pakistan have been major sources of Delhis wariness about Washington. The United States had little time for Indian concerns as it built instrumental partnerships with Beijing and Rawalpindi.
Today, the US ties with both China and Pakistan have entered an uncertain phase as the ties between Delhi and Washington have improved.
More broadly, Indias worldview since Independence has been shaped by an enduring distrust of the West and the suspicion that the United States is opposed to Indias territorial integrity and her aspirations for a larger role in the world.
Indias problem today is not an unfettered Western dominance, but the increasing manifestations of American weakness in the face of a rising China and the resulting strategic ambiguities.
For an United States that must now shed some of its global security burdens, an emerging India is a valuable partner in managing the impending chaos in the ****** region and promote political stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.
For nearly six decades, India and the United States struggled to limit the damage to their bilateral relations from their divergent strategic trajectories. Today, the challenge for Clinton and her Indian hosts is to build on the convergence of their interests in Asia in the continents southwestern and eastern parts.
Looking at Asia - Indian Express
While Delhi and Washington must iron out the many wrinkles in their bilateral relationship, Clintons India visit will be judged by the ability of the two sides to develop a cooperative political agenda in the ****** region and in East Asia, which are undergoing rapid geopolitical evolution.
Washington has made no secret of concerns on Indias nuclear liability legislation that is seen by the US companies as imposing unbearable costs in building 10,000 MW of nuclear capacity that India has set aside for them.
Delhi is unhappy that the United States did not stop the Nuclear Suppliers Group from taking steps that could prevent future transfers of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies for commercial application in India.
Sections of the US establishment continue to crib over the elimination of Boeing and Lockheed from the first round of the bidding for the sale of 126 medium-range multi-role combat aircraft to the Indian Air Force.
India, on the other hand, points to the fact that US companies have won orders for weapons systems worth $8 billion in the last few years. Delhi also suggests that American companies might be on the verge of winning other defence contracts worth billions of dollars.
Some in the US are asking what Washington has got for the political investments that the Bush and Obama administrations have made into the construction of a new partnership with India in recent years. Delhi, on the other hand, warns against letting accountants judge the Indo-US strategic partnership.
Neither India nor the United States would want to build the kind of transactional relationship that America and Pakistan have. Nor should they want to emulate the very cynical US-China alliance against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
What Delhi and Washington need is a partnership that has the political bandwidth to deal with their common threats in the ****** region and the shared interests in East Asia and the waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
In the northwestern marches of the subcontinent, the American raid on Abbottabad and the execution of Osama bin Laden have brought into the open the deep contradictions between the United States and Pakistan in Afghanistan and the war on terror.
Washington thought it could buy Pakistan Armys support by defeating al-Qaeda and stabilising Afghanistan. Rawalpindis interest has been different to establish a pliable government in Kabul and secure strategic depth in Afghanistan through the Taliban and the Haqqani network, both of which have had enduring connections to al-Qaeda.
Despite its relentless drone attacks, Washington is nowhere near bending the Pakistan army to act against the terror groups that are fighting the United States. Delhi has far fewer leverages in pressing the Pakistan army to dismantle the anti-India terror infrastructure on its soil.
Yet, Washington and Delhi think they can manage the Pakistan problem on their own and dont want to be associated too closely with each other in Afghanistan. The prospects for the stabilisation of the ****** region will remain bleak until there is a measure of strategic coordination between Delhi and Washington.
Despite a very different situation, the story is similar in East Asia where Clinton heads after completing her Indian sojourn in Chennai.
In the past, India vigorously objected to Sino-American partnership during the Cold War and after. Delhi must now come to terms with the increasingly tense relationship between Washington and Beijing in Asia.
A rising China, unsurprisingly, would like to diminish the US influence on its Asian periphery. In the face of an increasingly assertive China, Beijings neighbours are turning to Washington for protection.
During her last visit to Southeast Asia a year ago, Clinton proclaimed Americas return to Asia after a prolonged preoccupation with the Middle East, and extended support to Chinas smaller neighbours in their maritime territorial disputes with Beijing. Since then matters have taken a turn for the worse in the waters of Asia. As in the ****** region, so in East Asia, the old geopolitical assumptions are no longer sustainable.
Through the last six decades, the US relations with China and Pakistan have been major sources of Delhis wariness about Washington. The United States had little time for Indian concerns as it built instrumental partnerships with Beijing and Rawalpindi.
Today, the US ties with both China and Pakistan have entered an uncertain phase as the ties between Delhi and Washington have improved.
More broadly, Indias worldview since Independence has been shaped by an enduring distrust of the West and the suspicion that the United States is opposed to Indias territorial integrity and her aspirations for a larger role in the world.
Indias problem today is not an unfettered Western dominance, but the increasing manifestations of American weakness in the face of a rising China and the resulting strategic ambiguities.
For an United States that must now shed some of its global security burdens, an emerging India is a valuable partner in managing the impending chaos in the ****** region and promote political stability and economic prosperity in East Asia.
For nearly six decades, India and the United States struggled to limit the damage to their bilateral relations from their divergent strategic trajectories. Today, the challenge for Clinton and her Indian hosts is to build on the convergence of their interests in Asia in the continents southwestern and eastern parts.
Looking at Asia - Indian Express
