Libya: direct military hits, unclear political targets

[monitor]

Libya: direct military hits, unclear political targets

One of some 110 missiles targeted by US and British vessels at Libyan support radar and anti-aircraft sites on 19 March

The military action begun by Western countries against Libya on 19 March 2011 has already gone further than the imposition of a no-fly zone. Attacks on Libyan forces by French fighter aircraft appear to have halted a government advance on the rebel-held eastern city of Benghazi. The biggest questions surrounding the mission are about its precise objectives, its command structure and its likely duration.

The green light for the operation was provided on 17 March by the United Nations Security Council, which voted to take 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians under threat of attack in Libya. In addition, Resolution 1973 imposed a no-fly zone. While it excluded a 'foreign occupation force' in Libya, the language of the resolution did not appear to preclude action by ground forces. The scope for military action was broad, and it commenced immediately after a meeting of coalition leaders in Paris.

The Security Council vote was preceded by intense behind-the-scenes discussion between governments, rather than by a political groundswell of opinion in likely Western participants in military action. Crucially, the League of Arab States voted on 12 March to 'invite the Security Council to shoulder its responsibilities by imposing an air embargo on Libyan airspace to protect the people of Libya'. While this provided important regional backing, there were divisions between Western countries on the issue, with the United Kingdom and France strongly advocating action, and the United States notably unenthusiastic. The Obama administration appeared to come round to supporting the UN vote more through a wish to back the initiative of its close allies than by a genuine belief in the correctness and likely efficacy of action. No country voted against the resolution, but Brazil, India and Germany – all aspirants to permanent membership of the Security Council – joined Russia and China in abstaining.



No-fly zone plus
Britain was an early mover. Prime Minister David Cameron told parliament on 28 February: 'We must not tolerate this regime using military force against its own people. In that context, I have asked the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff to work with our allies on plans for a military no-fly zone.' France was also a keen advocate of military action, but US Defense Secretary Robert Gates expressed caution, saying on 2 March that an air exclusion zone would require 'a big operation in a big country' and would start with an attack on Libya's air defences. It was therefore a surprise when Susan Rice, the American UN ambassador, said on 16 March: 'The US view is that we need to be prepared to contemplate steps that include, but perhaps go beyond, a no-fly zone at this point, as the situation on the ground has evolved, and as a no-fly zone has inherent limitations in terms of protection of civilians at immediate risk.' This, following the Arab League's support, cleared the way for the Security Council to provide the legal backing that was seen by most as essential for action to proceed.

As predicted by Gates, one of the first actions of the campaign was an extensive attack on Libya's air-defence systems. Some 110 Tomahawk missiles were fired from US warships and submarines, and from a British submarine. The probable targets were surface-to-air missile batteries, radar systems, and command and control infrastructure. US Air Force B-2 bombers flying from Missouri struck a Libyan air-force base, while Royal Air Force Tornado GR4 aircraft flew missions from the UK using the Storm Shadow cruise missile.Admiral Mike Mullen, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that, following these attacks, 'effectively that no-fly zone has been put in place'. Fighter jets from the US, UK, France, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Qatar and Spainwere arriving to enforce the zone. US Navy EA-18 Growler jamming aircraft were also in theatre. British and French E-3D airborne warning and control system aircraft were also deployed, with the RAF also using Sentinel aircraft fitted with ground surveillance radar, as well as Nimrod R1 signals-intelligence aircraft. The US Global Hawk intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was also believed to be in use.

Even before these attacks, Libya's ability to put military planes into the air, while extensive on paper, was limited in practice. Of more than 300 airframes scattered across about a dozen main airfields, no more than 40 combat aircraft were believed to be operational. Most of Libya's aircraft were made in the Soviet Union: the MiG-23 Flogger fighter, the Su-17/22 Fitter ground attack aircraft and the Su-24 Fencer strike aircraft, as well as the Mi-24 Hind combat support helicopter and Mi-8 and Mi-17 Hip transport helicopters. The air force also had a small number of French-made Mirage F1s. There had been problems with support and maintenance of this obsolescent equipment, most of which had been supplied in the late 1970s or early 1980s, with Su-24s delivered from the late 1980s. Training was almost certainly inadequate, and crew combat-readiness poor: pilots may not have been able to carry out anything beyond basic reconnaissance missions and daylight bombing with conventional free-fall munitions. The defection of two pilots with their aircraft to Malta on 21 February also suggested an issue with morale among those ordered to attack fellow Libyans.

In recent operations against the rebels, MiG-23, Su-22 and Su-24 aircraft had been used as well as Mi-24, Mi-17 and Mi-8 helicopters. Use of fixed-wing aircraft appeared to have been limited to the dropping of freefall iron bombs of questionable accuracy. However, even in its reduced state, the air force represented an advantage for the regime over the rebels – especially its Mil Mi-24 Hind combat-support helicopters, with their ability to provide close air support for ground forces.

Libya's fixed-wing aircraft posed a limited threat to foreign aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone, but its surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems were a greater risk. The regime was understood to have been exercising its ground-based air-defence radars on a near-daily basis, as a warning to those considering imposition of an air exclusion zone. SAM systems operated by the Libyan air force and army include the SA-2 Guideline, SA-3 Goa and SA-6 Gainful medium-range systems, delivered by the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s. Long-range air defence capability was provided by the SA-5 Gammon system delivered in the mid-to-late 1980s. Short-range systems included the SA-8 Gecko and the French Crotale. The SA-9 Gaskin and SA-13 Gopher short-range systems were in service with the army, as well as the SA-7 Grail man-portable air-defence system, and there were indications that newer shoulder-launched SAMs were also used, including the SA-18 Grouse. However, the extent of Libya's integrated air-defence command and control capability was in doubt, even though the military had made efforts to upgrade air-defence systems since the end of the international arms embargo in 2004. Initial assessments of the strikes against the Libyan military's fixed surface-to-air missile sites suggest that they have significantly degraded the regime's air-defence capabilities.

As Defense Secretary Gates has noted, imposing an air exclusion zone can be an extensive operation: Libya is 35 times larger than Bosnia, where NATO implemented a no-fly zone in the 1990s using around 240 aircraft from a dozen nations. However, there are less demanding options in terms of geographical coverage that would allow for an operation to be mounted with significantly fewer aircraft.



Targeting Gadhafi – or not
While the imposition of an air exclusion zone is a relatively easily defined task with which NATO nations have plenty of experience, other aspects of the mission are less clear. Many states taking part in military action have said they want an end to the rule of Muammar Gadhafi. However, this is not the language of Resolution 1973, and therefore is apparently not the objective of military commanders enforcing the resolution. Admiral Mullen told NBC's Meet the Press programme: 'It isn't about seeing him go. It is about supporting the United Nations resolution, which talked to eliminating his ability to kill his own people as well supporting the humanitarian effort.' Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, refused to speculate on whether the action would lead to the ousting of Gadhafi but said she hoped there would be more defections from the regime to the opposition. George Osborne, UK finance minister, told the BBC's Andrew Marr Show: 'What this is all about is creating the space for the Libyan people to make their own decisions about their future and not be under vicious military assault from their own government.'

Coalition aircraft have, however, taken a direct hand in the conflict. The French air force Rafale and Mirage 2000 aircraft that attacked Libyan armoured forces moving on Benghazi were providing clear support to rebel forces on the assumption that if the regime's forces entered the city they would have killed many civilians. Though this appeared to have been prevented, there were reports of continued fighting in the towns of Misurata and Ajdabiya. On 21 March an administration building within Gadhafi's residential compound appeared to have been destroyed by a missile. UK Defence Minister Liam Fox seemed to suggest that Gadhafi himself could be a legitimate target, although this was denied by officials and military officers.

The attacks on Libyan forces were carried out under Resolution 1973's mandate for 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians. Since the only step specifically excluded in the resolution was 'foreign occupation', the actions taken so far leave open the question of whether there could be direct participation on the ground in addition to attacks from air and sea – although US President Barack Obama said explicitly that no US ground troops would be deployed.


Several additional types of military action seem possible:



Regime communications, command networks and state broadcasting could be attacked by offensive electronic warfare. In theory it would be possible to replace state broadcasting with anti-regime broadcasts. The US Air Force has the capability to do this, but it is not clear if similar capabilities exist elsewhere. US efforts to shut down and replace Iraqi state broadcasting in 2003 were only partially successful. The Libyan government does not appear to be sufficiently networked for a cyber attack to be effective.

Warships gathered off Libya could contribute to attacks on regime forces. Given that the most of the population, roads and infrastructure are close to the coast, naval gunfire could complement air strikes, as could attack helicopters flown from aircraft carriers and amphibious shipping.

A maritime exclusion zone could deny areas of sea and airspace to ships and aircraft, to prevent any naval superiority enjoyed by Gadhafi from affecting the land campaign. The navy left under Gadhafi's control includes at least a frigate and various patrol boats with anti-ship missiles. Given the many coalition warships gathered offshore, an exclusion zone could in practice already be in place. Resolution 1973 also tightens the previous Resolution 1970 in mandating enforcement of an arms embargo at sea.

Supply of non-lethal aid to rebels including fuel, rations and secure communications. This could be delivered directly or through neighbouring states.

Supply of information and intelligence to rebels. This could begin quickly, but it is not clear that rebel forces are sufficiently organised to exploit such material.

Supply of weapons to rebels. Easy-to-use anti-armour weapons, both unguided and guided, as well as mortars and shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles would be particularly useful. Their effectiveness would depend on training and tactical ability. This action might be interpreted as breaking UN sanctions, although it has been argued that these only apply to the government. There would also a risk of weapons falling into unfriendly hands.

Provision of military training to rebels. This could involve deployment of trainers, advisers or special forces in Libya. It would take time to have effect, and would carry a risk of casualties and capture by regime forces. This would also be difficult to explain when the coalition is intending to put no 'boots on the ground'.





Who's in charge?
The initial assault on Libya has been under the operational leadership of Admiral Samuel Locklear, commander of NATO's Allied Joint Force Command Naples, who also heads US naval forces in Europe and Africa. However, Admiral Mullen has said that the US expects to cede control in a few days, and 'recede to a position of support'. Precisely what the command arrangements would be was not clear. British PM Cameron said he expected command to pass to NATO, but this seemed potentially problematic given the reservations of some NATO members, notably Turkey and Germany. Joint French/UK command seemed another possibility. The issue is important: experience of other such interventions suggests that, whatever the desire of the political leaders who have ordered the intervention, the involvement in Libya will become a long-term one.

Uncertainty about the duration of the mission seems likely to increase, given how little is known about the make-up and leadership of the forces ranged against Gadhafi. While these may include personnel who were previously in the regular military, their equipment has basically been obtained from former regime military bases and arms depots, from defectors, or acquired after combat. Therefore, the degree to which they could mount coordinated actions is in doubt. Further – as was shown by a possible 'blue-on-blue' incident when a MiG-23 in the hands of the rebels was reportedly downed by rebel fire over Benghazi – the lack of effective communications and protocols can have disastrous results. Any move by international forces to assist the rebels will be made against this somewhat blurred background.

Political commitments to international interventions have often been undermined by the realities of war and by inevitable civilian casualties. Just as in Iraq and Afghanistan, it will be important to define the precise objectives and the criteria for success. So too will be the commitment of sufficient military force to achieve whatever goals are set. These tasks remain to be addressed.

 

[monitor]

Losing in Libya?
Posted on April 11, 2011

By Robert Stacy McCain

Scarcely three weeks after the U.S. military launched Operation Odyssey Dawn, the war in Libya is beginning to look like President Obama’s worst failure to date. While official Washington and the political press have been focused on budget negotiations and the prospect of a federal government shutdown, a foreign-policy disaster has been slowly unfolding in the deserts of the North African nation that Col. Moammar Gaddafi has ruled for more than four decades.


It was more than a month ago, during a March 3 press conference, that Obama declared his intent to “send a clear message: the violence must stop; Muammar Gaddafi has lost the legitimacy to lead and he must leave.” Gaddafi hasn’t left yet, nor has the 68-year-old dictator indicated any intention of leaving any time soon, and the military actions of the United States and our allies do not seem calculated to force Gaddafi from power.

Least of all does Gaddafi’s continued rule seem jeopardized by the poorly armed and ill-organized Libyan rebels. Since March 28, when the Benghazi-based rebels had advanced far enough west to threaten Gaddafi’s hometown of Sirte, they have retreated more than 200 miles. The rebel retreat has entailed their loss of the oil ports of Ras Lanuf and Brega on the Mediterranean coast in eastern Libya and, as of Thursday, it appeared the rebels might even be on the verge of retreating from their forward base at Ajdabiya, 50 miles east of Brega. Further west, meanwhile, the rebels were grimly holding onto parts of Misrata, Libya’s third-largest city, under a relentless siege by Gaddafi’s forces.

Army Gen. Carter Ham, head of U.S. Africa Command, told a Thursday hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee that the military situation in Libya has developed into a stalemate. Gen. Ham’s assessment may actually be a bit optimistic, as there were reports yesterday of ” mass panic” among the rebels near Ajdabiya and their total defeat seems more likely than a decisive victory over Gaddafi’s army.

The military shortcomings of the Libya rebels were dramatically illustrated last weekend when Geraldo Rivera of Fox News accompanied a group of fighters toward the front near Brega and came under fire. After being pinned down and then nearly left behind when the rebels retreated, Rivera angrily huffed that he was “as worried about getting shot in the back by the good guys as I was getting shot in the front by the Gaddafi forces.” Describing the “absolute disorganization” of the rebels, whom he called an “unruly gang,” Rivera warned against giving them additional arms: “I swear to God, if you give these people weapons more powerful than they have right now, they will be a grave danger to themselves and others.” Nor was Rivera alone in this low estimate of the rebels. Another reporter in Libya described them as “a hapless bunch” armed with a “mishmash” of weapons “which few of them know how to use.” Despite worries that the rebel forces are influenced by al-Qaeda operatives or other Islamic jihadists, their alleged extremism is clearly no substitute for military competence.

Military competence also seems in short supply among our NATO allies whose air power was supposed to keep Qaddafi’s forces in check. Last weekend, a NATO strike mistakenly killed 13 rebels and there was another reported NATO friendly-fire incident Thursday which knocked out some of the rebels’ precious few tanks and killed several more opposition fighters, prompting one angry rebel to ask, “Why did they do this? Do they want Gaddafi to win?”

It’s a fair question. The problem, of course, is that the United States and NATO have intervened under terms that (officially at least) require a sort of agnostic approach toward the outcome of the fighting between Gaddafi’s forces and the opposition. When the U.S. launched Operation Odyssey Dawn on March 19, it was in fulfillment of a United Nations Security Council “humanitarian” mandate, to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya and prevent Gaddafi’s regime from slaughtering civilians. So while Obama has made various bellicose declarations — “The noose has tightened around” Gaddafi, whose “days are numbered,” the president told CBS News last week — achieving regime change in Libya is not part of NATO’s UN-approved mission. Such are Obama’s self-proclaimed “core principles” in seeking to avert a “potential humanitarian crisis” on behalf of “the entire international community,” as he explained at a March 21 press conference.

Obama’s eloquent expressions of his commitment to multilateralism aren’t much help to the ragtag rebels fighting Gaddafi’s army. Neither did the rebels derive any military gain from the decision this week of Italy to join France and Qatar in extending diplomatic recognition to their interim government, the Benghazi-based Libyan National Council. Obama’s admirers who have sometimes compared their idol to John F. Kennedy might not find the comparison so flattering, now that the president has stumbled into a situation that is beginning to resemble the botched 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.

The most tragic aspects of this situation are playing out in the sands of North Africa, where anti-Gaddafi fighters are dying for an increasingly forlorn hope. (The military stalemate may result in something very much like Roger Kaplan’s proposed idea for the partition of Libya.) While hardly comparable to the suffering of the Libyans, the domestic political consequences of Obama’s foreign-policy failure are not to be underestimated. Many of his liberal supporters were dismayed by the president’s resort to military intervention, and the prolonged conflict in Libya — is it too soon to call it a “quagmire”? — has helped push gasoline prices closer to $4 a gallon. Libya ranks only 18th among nations in terms of oil production, but the loss of its 1.5 million barrels per day is not insignificant, and crude oil is now trading at prices not seen since September 2008. Some analysts expect prices to reach as a high as $150 a barrel later this year, and at least one Democratic consultant has said the spike in fuel prices is a “mortal peril” to Obama’s re-election prospects.

None of this is to say that the situation in Libya is entirely hopeless. Gaddafi’s regime is being squeezed by economic sanctions, there are reportedly shortages of food and other necessities in Tripoli, and the dictator might be ousted next week or next month, for all we know. Three weeks into the first American military intervention of Obama’s choosing, however, the prospects are not encouraging. The best support that New York Times columnist Tom Friedman could offer for Obama’s Libya policy was his prayer that the president would be “lucky.” That was on March 29, when anti-Gaddafi fighters still controlled Ras Lanuf and Brega. One report late yesterday described a rebel retreat that had turned into a “stampede” from Ajdabiya toward Benghazi. And so it appears that Obama’s luck may be running out in Libya.

 

[Tractor]

I have heard that Obama had said if the world do not like Gaddafi he must left.Actually Obama a person with at least minimum sensibility he has no reason to hate Gaddafi and he know very clearly in his mind Gaddafi leave or not should not be base on some people's preferences.
I have said in this forum that I wish Mr Gaddafi's leadership maintain as long as possible and he is doing so pretty well.