Featured Lessons For Tactical Commanders from Tamil Insurgency

[PanzerKiel]

Different insurgencies will never pose a single kind of threat, environment and conditions so that a universally approved solution may be applicable. The successful COIN drive against LTTE by the Sri Lankan Government is analyzed in the backdrop of their earlier attempts, with the purpose of drawing lessons and ascertaining their applicability in Pakistan in the prevalent environment. Although, pertinent lessons can be drawn from Sri Lankan COIN campaign at National and Army levels, however, to confine ourselves to the scope of this topic, focus will remain on lessons learnt at tactical level.

Analysis

• Right Man for the Right Job. Realizing Gen Fonseka’s importance to the COIN drive, Sri Lankan Government extended his service 2 x weeks prior to his retirement. This renewed the drive and focus on training and initiative during Elam War IV. The complete leadership at Tactical level was changed. Preferring performance over seniority, Gen Fonseka selected bold and innovative commanders at Division and Brigade level to carry the fight to the enemy.
• Improved Decision Making and Initiative. Decision-making process in the Sri Lankan Army was decentralized due to the change in mindset from conventional to sub-conventional warfare. Advance infantry platoon training involved all ranks in pragmatic tactical analysis and discussions during de-briefs, promoting creativity amongst all ranks. These measures, greatly improved the morale and fighting capability of the army.
• Attrition Oriented Objectives. As opposed to earlier Eelam wars, Sri Lankan Army during Eelam IV focused on elimination of LTTE as opposed to gaining ground to ensure destruction of insurgents and prevent their regrouping. This clarity of aim was missing in earlier Eelam wars, with the government showing a tendency to shuffle b/w peace talks and kinetic action.
• Singleness of Conception. Understanding and implementation of higher commander’s intent of attrition oriented operations down to sub-tactical level ensured success. This was evident from the clear aim given by Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa i.e, to eliminate LTTE. The intense tactical actions of Sri Lankan Army in Eelam IV were commensurate with this aim.
• Centre of Gravity (COG). Identification and neutralization of COG is essential to defeat the insurgent. LTTE’s COG resided in its leader Vellupilai Prabhakaran. This was correctly identified and the LTTE was ultimately defeated as its COG was effective neutralized. Conversely, population support figured out as the COG for Sri Lankan Army. Strong support of the whole nation throughout the Eelam IV War, boosted the common soldier’s morale and resulted in strong tactical actions against the LTTE.
• Think and Fight Like a Guerilla. Defeating the insurgent necessitates beating him at his own game. The redefining of military culture before Eelam IV, caused a paradigm shift from conventional to unconventional military thinking and guerrilla tactics. This change had a psychological impact as LTTE commanders were immobilized and had to restrict their movement, depriving insurgents of their frontline leadership.
• Learning From Past Experiences. Before Eelam IV, the Sri Lankan Army They needed to make changes to avoid the failures of the past. The Army had become a ‘learning organization’ that embraced tactical initiatives and innovations. This evolution encompassed all aspects from leadership skills and decision making to tactical methods and techniques of fighting.
• Bold Leadership at Junior Level. Small Teams of Specialist Individuals (SIOTs) conducted combat operations without officers. Planning was conducted jointly by officers and men while decisions were made in the field by sergeants. This required initiative by all ranks and led to innovation in tactics and techniques. Field commissions were given to bold junior leaders. Numerous corporals and sergeants of Sri Lankan Army were promoted to the rank of Lieutenants. This further increased the enthusiasm and performance.
• Use of Innovations. Innovations and improvisations demonstrated by LTTE and Sri Lankan Army in use of minor tactics and available technology was the hallmark of their respective successes. Use of reinforced mortar casings to float soldiers across flooded fields instead of boats, use of improvised gas masks, Bangalore torpedoes, spring-loaded ladders, modified tractors and innovative jungle warfare tactics allowed the Sri Lankan Army to regain the element of surprise.
• Integrated Intelligence. Before Eelam War IV, the element of tactical intelligence could not be exploited to fracture LTTE. However, during Eelam War IV the Sri Lankan Army field intelligence was improved by inducting Eastern Wing Tamils who defected under Col Kuruna as well as through a network of local informers, combat tracker teams and Small Teams of Specialist Individuals (SIOTs).
• Integrated Fire Support. Direct and indirect fire support for the Sri Lankan Army was improved with the introduction of new artillery and the use of UAVs to control fires in depth. The Special Infantry Operations Teams were trained to call in artillery, a capability that brought superior firepower under the control of junior commanders who were suitably located to target a concentrated enemy.
• Actions at Sub Unit Level. Long Range Recce Patrols operated throughout the LTTE areas and completed both reconnaissance and intelligence gathering tasks. Small teams of specialist individuals (SIOTs) within a battalion proved very effective in dealing with insurgents. The same concept has been adopted by US Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. Following advantages were accrued from these teams:-
  • Improved tactical intelligence.
  • Continuous surveillance of the battlefield.
  • Timely and accurate target acquisition.
  • Reduced casualties through dispersion and stealth.
  • Reduced civilian casualties by precision in operations.
• Correct Use of Weather and Terrain. After decades of combat experience, the leadership of Sri Lankan army had learned the hard lessons of fighting in the jungle. Jungle warfare required small groups that knew the jungle and felt at home there. Correct use of weather and terrain as demonstrated by LRRPs and SIOTs was essential to restrict LTTE’s freedom of action.
• Avoidance of Collateral Damage. Collateral damage in terms of civilian casualties can result in increased resentment and be counter-productive. This necessitates stringent measures to avoid collateral damage. These may include: -
  • Controlled use of artillery, air and heavy fire power assets.
  • Spelling out clear rules of engagements.
  • Damage control plans should be formulated beforehand for each operation.
• Tactical Flexibility. Tactical flexibility and fast tempo of operations by the Sri Lankan Army prevented the LTTE from re-grouping and dissipated their response. Due to SCW’s protracted nature, the LEAs tend to follow obvious pattern of operations. Militants carefully observe routine, drills and procedures and exploit the weaknesses. Operations and daily routine must not follow a predictable pattern. Innovative methods, variations in procedures and heterodox approach in conduct of operations must be the hallmark of a force operating in SCW.
• Media Handling. Leakage of mobile recorded video footage of operations by troops on social media during Eelam IV created undesired effects in international media. This highlighted the importance of effective media handling as a necessity for future.
  
  
  

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

• National Level
  • Clear Objectives and Aim. Clearly defining the political objective of the campaign is the first step in devising a COIN campaign. In our scenario, there is a need to delineate responsibility for NAP at provincial and district level to build up on successes of Operation Zarb-e-Azb and Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad.
  • Population Based Approach. Sustained peace can only be guaranteed by adopting population centric approach by addressing grievances of people, socio economic uplift of the area as well as involvement of locals in national mainstream. In tribal areas, where Civil administration does not have the capacity, “Civil Military Liaison Cells” should be established to accelerate the development and assist the civilian government. Local Tac commanders should continue to establish intimate and enhance connectivity with local people in order to deny Terrorists any link with population, liberty of action as well as demonstrate a sense of ownership amongst local people.
  • Dismantling Terrorists’ Network. An insurgency cannot be defeated by merely defeating the armed militants. It becomes imperative to dismantle the complete network by targeting planners, financers, abetters and executioners as well as disrupting their source of income and supplies.
• Tri Services Level
  • Tri Services Synergy. Bold and synergetic application of Armed Forces remains critical to decisively engage terrorists for ultimate victory. It is recommended that tri services interaction at schools of instructions be increased by involving Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) in basic and advance level tactical courses.
• Army Level
  • Visionary and Dynamic Leadership. Scarlet thread of any counter insurgency drive is the visionary leadership. Bold and dynamic leadership at Army level induces the same traits in junior leadership on the Battle Field. As manifested in our fight against terror, the leadership at all tiers led from the front and the practice should continue in conventional, unconventional and sub conventional conflicts.
  • Focus on Conventional Role. Prolonged and repeated deployment in sub conventional environment must not shift our focus from our conventional role.
  • In counter insurgency, tactical actions can create strategic effects. Eelam War IV was able to achieve in four years, what early Eelam Wars could not achieve in three decades, mainly, due to tactical innovations and improvisations. Units of Pak Army have also made a number of improvisations and innovations. This data is being recorded by Army Institute of Military History (AIMH), circulated among all School of Instructions and Formations and be even made part of Sub Conventional Package of all tactical courses.
• Operational / Tactical Level
  • Learning from the mistakes of past paves way for future successes. Pakistan Army has come a long way from its first induction in 2001 in Operation Al Mizan (OAM) and evolved correspondingly.
    • Sector Wise Operations Record are being maintained containing experiences of units which were part of any major / minor operations, both in Urdu and English, and circulated among all School of Instructions and Formations. Units earmarked for induction go through these records down till soldier level before induction.
    • Officers receiving war injuries, awards and citations share their experiences in written form and same is made part of Sector Wise Operations Record.
    • Quantity of heavy and light sniper rifles in infantry units has already been increased. Studies are already in progress to provide a Sniper Company to units employed in such areas.

 

[PDF]

Can we also get a brief introduction between the relationship of strategic and tactical levels and they depend on eachother or not?
What are the similarities and differences between them?

 

[PanzerKiel]

Can we also get a brief introduction between the relationship of strategic and tactical levels and they depend on eachother or not?
What are the similarities and differences between them?

Strategic Level
The strategic level focuses on defining and supporting national policy and relates directly to t he outcome of a war or other conflict as a whole. Usually, modern wars and conflicts are won or lost at this level rather than at the operational or tactical levels.
This level applies to all forms of war and conflict from military activities short of war through insurgent, conventional, and nuclear warfare. This level involves a strategic concept, plans for preparing all national instruments of power for war or conflict, practical guidance for preparing the armed forces, and leadership of the armed forces to achieve strategic objectives.

Operational Level

The operational level is concerned with employing military forces in a theater of war or theater of operations to obtain an advantage over the enemy and thereby attain strategic goals through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations.
In war, a campaign involves employment of military forces in a series of related military
operations to accomplish a common objective in a given time and space. In activities short
of war, a campaign consists of a series of related military, economic, and political operations t o accomplish a common objective in a given time and space. Commanders should design, orchestrate, and coordinate operations and exploit tactical events to support overall campaign objectives. Where and when to conduct a campaign is based on objectives, the threat, and limitations imposed by geographical, economic, and cultural environments, as well as the numbers and types of military resources available.

Tactical Level

In the traditional sense, the various operations that make up a campaign are themselves made up of maneuvers, engagements, and battles. From this perspective, the tactical level translates potential combat power into success in battles and engagements through decisions and actions that create advantages when in contact with or in proximity to the enemy. Tactics deal in the details of prosecuting engagements and are extremely sensitive to
the changing environment of the battlefield. Thus, in nuclear and conventional warfare, the focus of the tactical level is generally on military objectives and combat. However, combat is not an end in itself; it is the means to achieve goals set at the operational level.

 

[Kompromat]

The most important factor in a COIN strategy is persistent pressure policy through a sustained attrition.

We stopped inflicting the cost of war against TTP, BSNMs in Afghanistan that allowed them to re arm, recruit, replenish and now they are again bombing our cities from the safety of Afghanistan.

Once TTP was pushed into Afghanistan, what should have happened is that it should have been designated a "foreign" militant organisation, thus justifying the use of force against TTP in Afghanistan.

There's been no major assassination of a BSNM commander since the killing of Achu. That must change.

Another tier of ops must focus on intelligence based operations against Indian citizens who are handling ops from Afghanistan. They need to be targeted.

 

[PDF]

The most important factor in a COIN strategy is persistent pressure policy through a sustained attrition.

We stopped inflicting the cost of war against TTP, BSNMs in Afghanistan that allowed them to re arm, recruit, replenish and now they are again bombing our cities from the safety of Afghanistan.

Once TTP was pushed into Afghanistan, what should have happened is that it should have been designated a "foreign" militant organisation, thus justifying the use of force against TTP in Afghanistan.

There's been no major assassination of a BSNM commander since the killing of Achu. That must change.

Another tier of ops must focus on intelligence based operations against Indian citizens who are handling ops from Afghanistan. They need to be targeted.

We also need to prepare sleeper cells inside India. They have enjoyed for far too long. Once sufficient capacity is developed, hey should know for every attack they sponser inside Pakistan, they will get one inside India.

Perhaps due to NATO and US backing, we haven't really taken our gloves off inside Afghanistan. We have been too restraint and held back, that it is now costing us in casualties.
Afghanistan is no Syria but still, if Turkey, Israel can strike inside Syria for their interests, we need to muster the courage too. Not covert, byt overt strikes with statement sharing details that this x organization was targetted because they planned/already executed y terror incident.

 

[bhola record]

About the SIOT sir do we at the moment have this intitiative in our hand? Centre of Gravity (COG) the centre of gravity of war we are fighting is ideology we have seen crucial commander killed or arrested but the movement slows down but doesnot completely stop
Anyhow great read !!kudos

 

[blueazure]

bajwa doctrine =

dig defensive fortresses , get dug in, merely react to a provocation ( though measured ) .

offense is a NO NO . the enemy is expected to collapse on his own


pak war college strictly adheres to doctrine ,


doctrine = last refuge of the unimaginative


@PanzerKiel

 

[mazeto]

If the Tamil Tigers had a fraction of the manpower, weaponry or funds of the SriLankan state they would have conquered the entirety of SriLanka in a few months.
They were heads and shoulders above the Lankan armed forces 1to1 . The lesson from their demise is that quantity is also a quality..be it population, economy, geography or political space. While it was compulsory for them to win or stalemate every engagement with the SLA , the Lankan forces needed to win just one campaign to wipe out the Tigers.
I foresee Israel going the same way against Arabs ..if at some point the Arabs produce a leader who can unite the sects.

 

[CHI RULES]

One word '' Merciless" explains the key of success by Gen Fonseka. Same approach is required in first phase in Baluchistan against separatists and in second phase economic incentives should be offered.

 

[denel]

One thing which is not being highlighted was the mandated heavy use of Buffels and its adaptation to the conflict which allowed massive improvements.

 

[Paul2]

Lankese civil war was very unusual in that both sides were fighting a rather low tech war despite having high-tech weaponry.

LTTE has a distinction of being one of the very few genuine insurgencies in 20th century which had functioning air defence. They had expensive toys like Iglas, and, allegedly, even an Osa which they managed to smuggle from god knows where, which they never managed to use during the war.

Lankese army had not so few helicopters with modern optronics, which would've been very strong against anybody using jungles for cover, and not having armor.

I believe very few conflicts in 20th century after WW2 ever went down to trench warfare, and using fortifications, but Lankese civil war did.

From what I read, even conventional frontal warfare, and linear tactics was employed from time to time.

Conclusion: in rare cases when an insurgency gets to match its conventional military opponent by any significant extend, an advantage of having military hardware becomes much less decisive. In such cases, also expect the conflict to slow down significantly, as both sides will be much more wary of risks.