Lebanon's Politics Gives Hezbollah Power

[Tiki Tam Tam]

Lebanon's Politics Gives Hezbollah Power
Ibrahim Zabad | 25 Aug 2006
World Politics Watch Exclusive

Amid the shattered dreams of a grand transformation, Lebanon, a land fabled for its vulnerability to foreign intervention, offered an opportunity, a deliverance from the troubles that have afflicted U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Since at least 1990, Syria had established dominion in Lebanon and rendered it a base for all sorts of pro-Syrian militant organizations -- Palestinian and Lebanese, secular and fundamentalist. Many Lebanese were not happy with the Syrian order, and the opportunity for change came with the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on March 14, 2005.

Hariri was a man with a vision for his country: retrieving the lost glory of the days when Lebanon had been a cosmopolitan center for Arab finance and commerce, a land of genuine pluralism, open-mindedness and tolerance. His vision clashed with that of the Syrian regime, and his assassination unleashed anger that had been simmering for years against the Syrian order.

Waves of demonstrators swept into the streets and a revolution was ushered in. It was a historic moment for Lebanon and for the United States, which was desperately searching for good news from the Middle East. Lebanon seemed a divine gift. The United States vigorously supported the anti-Syrian forces, which eventually succeeded in liberating Lebanon from the Syrian grip. A new American era, it seemed, had descended on Lebanon.

The Obstacle: Hezbollah
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The Americans could claim a great success. They even gave the revolution its name: the "Cedars Revolution" after the famed tree that adorns the Lebanese flag. But there remained a formidable obstacle to Lebanon becoming a showcase of the American drive to reshape the Middle East: Hezbollah.

That has not changed. After the guns fell silent on Aug. 14, it was clear Hezbollah remained an organization with the capacity to disrupt American objectives. The outcome of the war seems nebulous. No side can claim a decisive victory; probably, it is a draw. However, the American dream of transforming Lebanon into a showcase of democracy and presenting it as a vindication of their larger Middle East policy appears shattered by the cruel, intractable reality of Lebanese politics. Despite the power of Israel's military offensive, the fox will remain in the henhouse.

In a speech broadcast on Hezbollah's Al Manar satellite television on Aug. 3, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah gave notice to those who were listening: Whatever the outcome of the war, he said, Lebanon will not be in America's orbit or become "part of the new Middle East."

Lebanon's Political System

This might sound like so much bluster, but American policy makers should take notice. Nasrallah was referring to Hezbollah's capacity to exercise a veto not only on the decisions of the Lebanese government but also on the character of Lebanon. This is not only a result of the military strength of Hezbollah: It is the very nature of the Lebanese political system.

Since its creation in the early twentieth century, Lebanon has been a fragile and vulnerable country, a multiconfessional polity whose stability is based on consensus. It is not suited for autocracy and could not be made so. Nor is it a full-blown democracy where the majority rules. Lebanon is a consociational democracy where consensus among the various Lebanese sects constitutes the heart and soul of its political order, and any meddling with this fragile system might tear the country apart.

Within this system, the Shia of Lebanon make up between 35 percent and 40 percent of the population and Hezbollah, along with its close ally, the Amal movement, holds a monopoly on the Shiite representation in the state. This is what Nasrallah meant when he said Lebanon would never become an American ally. He is perfectly aware of the intricacies of Lebanese politics and of the Shiite place in it. It is not possible to change the character of Lebanon without the consent and approval of the Shiite community, regardless of the military capacities of Hezbollah. An outright military defeat would not have changed those facts.

Hezbollah remains very confident of its monopoly over the representation of the Shiite community. No serious contender could possibly emerge now and, remember, wars drown out moderate voices. Degrading the military power of Hezbollah will not have a noticeable bearing on its political power; the opposite might even be true. A wounded Hezbollah might further radicalize a humiliated community and polarize it around its leadership. Hezbollah does not derive its sweeping popularity solely from its military muscle but also from its vast network of social services that the historically weak Lebanese state can't match.

Therefore, any hope to change Hezbollah's power over the Shiite community depends on a long-term social and cultural transformation, for which the United States does not seem to have the patience.

The United States' Flawed Assumption

After the deep and intense U.S. involvement in the bloodletting, it is beyond doubt that the current conflict was never about a simple response to the abduction of two Israeli soldiers across the blue line. Israel had limited objectives: settle scores with Hezbollah, demonstrate its military superiority to bolster future deterrence, and assert its hegemony in the region. For the United States, a lot more was at stake: reviving and vindicating its faltering Middle East policy.

But the nebulous outcome of the war is now further evidence of the overreach of recent U.S. policy in the Middle East.

From day one, the United States framed the conflict as part of its broader campaign against global terrorism and its policy of regime transformation in the Middle East. Lebanon was declared a new front in the war on terrorism. Therefore, the success of the American policy of supporting the war was contingent on the capacity to effect domestic changes in Lebanon that favor American plans.

There were those who hoped that a military defeat of Hezbollah and the devastation visited upon the Shiite community would convince the Shia of Lebanon of the futility of supporting the militant group. However, not only did the popularity of Hezbollah swell in the Arab world and its leader become an icon of Arab resistance, but the bloodied and embattled Shiite community has become more radicalized and more supportive of Hezbollah.

Thus, Hezbollah will retain its monopoly over the representation of the Shia in Lebanon and will retain a veto on the character of the political processes. The nature of the Lebanese political system precludes any grand transformation: Lebanon, as a minimum, will remain contested terrain.

Ibrahim Zabad, a native of Lebanon, is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of California-Davis.
http://worldpoliticswatch.com/Article.aspx?id=138

Unless the Hezbollah tones down, there will much to worry about in the Middle East.

The future does not bode well.

It is time to talk and not make war or incite and inflame.

 

[Tiki Tam Tam]

[COLOR="Red"]The Middle East Conflict: Birth Pangs or a Miscarriage?[/COLOR]
Tim Lister | Bio | 04 Aug 2006
World Politics Watch Exclusive

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice drew many raised eyebrows when she predicted that the battle between Israel and Hezbollah marked the 'birth pangs' of a new Middle East. Maybe she was showing extraordinary prescience; maybe foolhardy optimism. Several weeks and hundreds of deaths after the conflict erupted, the path to a 'new' Middle East looks as treacherous as it has for a generation. The deck seems stacked against Secretary Rice's hopeful forecast.

The government of Israel is determined - and is solidly backed by public opinion at home - to put an end to the Hezbollah threat and thereby break a tool of Iran. Even Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres has been sounding hawkish about the need for Israel to win decisively and be seen doing so. "Israel must emerge from this war as a winner or else the war will continue," he said. Eti Livni, a friend of Olmert and Knesset member, told Time magazine: "If Nasrallah is alive at the end of this and gives one of his speeches it cannot look like an Israeli victory."

However, the greater range of Hezbollah rockets means that even pushing guerrillas north of the Litani River may not protect northern Israel. If Israel fails to secure a military victory, that will be widely interpreted as a political victory for Hezbollah. Its resistance strengthens its bargaining position within Lebanon. And Israel's expanding military campaign -- by causing greater destruction in Lebanon -- pushes the Lebanese government and Hezbollah closer.

Even some in Israel (like former Mossad chief Danny Yatom) say Hezbollah cannot be eliminated. If it is left standing, it can only be disarmed by negotiation, and that negotiation would have to include Syria. If not beholden to Syria, Hezbollah at least relies on it as a supply line for its military potential. By demanding that Syria put pressure on Hezbollah, the U.S. Administration has acknowledged that co-operation from Damascus is essential to a resolution. But at the same time the United States is unwilling to talk with the Syrians, who therefore have little incentive to play a positive role. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak told Time magazine: "Attempts to isolate Syria are counterproductive. Syrian aspirations to free the occupied Golan Heights must be accommodated and fulfilled." Even some Israelis believe such an accommodation as essential to breaking the cycle of conflict. Avi Segal, an expert on military policy and strategy at Emek Yezreel College, says that trying to deal with Lebanon without talking to Syria is "simply not realistic."


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Meanwhile, the size, origin and mandate of an international force for southern Lebanon are issues still to be settled; its deployment is at least weeks away. France -- frequently suggested as the leader of such a force -- has different priorities than the United States. It wants a ceasefire in place before troops are deployed; Washington and Israel say the troops should be in place first. Would its mandate include monitoring the border with Syria and Lebanese coastline to implement a 'rocket embargo' against Hezbollah, as Israel demands? There may also be another wrinkle: French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy met his Iranian counterpart in Beirut and suggested that "Iran can play a role of stabilization" in Lebanon. Not welcome news to Washington. There is consensus that the force would be deployed under Chapter 7 of the charter -- the basis for NATO's intervention in Bosnia. This would give it robust rules of engagement (though Israeli officials are concerned that Israel might be open to sanctions should it take unilateral action against Hezbollah while the force is deployed). French defense officials say the force must be well-armed with substantial firepower, and at least 15,000 strong. But several likely contributors are already stretched by existing missions. (France in Ivory Coast and elsewhere; Turkey on its border with Iraq.)

The Longer Term

The longer Israeli operations in Lebanon continue -- and the longer their impact is shown on the Arab news networks -- the more alienated Arab publics become. In turn, that will set back or more likely ruin the U.S. mission to "refashion" the Middle East. The (largely Shi'ite) government that the United States helped install in Iraq has joined in the condemnation of Israel (and by implication Washington). After the bombing of Qana, Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi said: "These ugly massacres, which are being implemented by the hands of the Israeli aggression, incites in us the spirit of brotherhood." At a huge rally of Shi'ites in Baghdad called by Moqtada al Sadr the chant was: ""Mahdi Army and Hezbollah are one, let them confront us if they dare" -- which must be music to the ears of U.S. forces deployed in Iraq.

Washington's refusal to join calls for an immediate ceasefire further undermined its credibility among moderate Arab states. They are already angered by what they perceive as a debacle in Iraq, lack of consistent U.S. engagement on the Palestinian issue, and high-sounding nothings about democracy in the Arab world. They say Washington has given Israel a free hand in Lebanon -- noting that in the first three weeks of conflict, President Bush did not once speak with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal made an unusually public criticism of US policy -- predicting its vision of a "new Middle East" will have all the same old problems. In the view of Rami Khouri, writing in the Daily Star in Beirut: "Washington is feeling the pain of its own self-inflicted diplomatic castration, as a consequence of siding so strongly with Israel."

The internal dynamics of the Arab world are also changing -- with unpredictable implications. Hezbollah's ability to inflict more casualties on Israel than any adversary since the Arab-Israeli wars of thirty years ago has further exposed the gulf between Arab governments and peoples. Columnist Hussam Itani, writing in the Lebanese daily as-Safir, argues that that the Arab 'system' has collapsed, its leading actors no longer governments but revolutionary groups: Hezbollah and Hamas. (Perhaps to these might be added the powerful militia emerging in Iraq.) Groups close to Iran are ascendant as traditional negotiating partners are forced on the defensive.

Another part of this sea-change in the Arab world is the contrast between governments and publics in their perception of the Shia-Sunni relationship. The dilemma is most evident in Saudi Arabia and might help explain its official unease. Hostile to Iran's sponsorship of Hezbollah, the Saudis at first criticized Hezbollah's "uncalculated adventures" -- not least because they have invested heavily in Lebanon's reconstruction. Within days they switched to (unsuccessfully) pushing the Bush administration to work for an immediate ceasefire and warning -- in King Abdullah's words -- that the alternative would be a wider war.

Many Saudi clerics called on the faithful to disavow Hezbollah, seen by Wahhabi Sunnis as devotees of heresy. In a religious edict, Sheikh Abdullah bin Jibreen said: "It is not acceptable to support this rejectionist party ('Rafedhin') and one should not fall under its command." But other Saudis lauded Hezbollah. Mohsen al-Awaji -- an outspoken Sunni lawyer -- wrote on his website that Hezbollah "had formed the tip of the spear that wounds the enemy. . . . Every fighter of this occupation is a hero and the least we can do is support him with every legitimate means." The same discord played out in Egypt. The Grand Mufti of the al-Azhar seminary, Sheikh Mohammed Sayyed Tantawi, described Nasrallah as a megalomaniac. But Mohammed Habib of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, told Reuters news agency that the Saudi fatwa "gives the impression that there is a Shi'ite danger that threatens the region and introduces division at the level of the Arab and Muslim world." More pointedly, the Brotherhood's leader Mohamed Mahdi Akef said: "Some governments are trying to disguise their failure to assist the resistance and even support for the Zionist aggression and American arrogance by bringing up matters such as the difference between Shia and Sunna." Saudi lawyer Bassem Alem told the Washington Post that Hezbollah's popularity and the war in Lebanon had "created a clear and undeniable schism between the Arab public and the region's rulers." It's a schism born less out of affection for Hezbollah than frustration with rulers who have proved so ineffective in confronting Israel, on the battlefield and in the conference chamber. Certainly, Christians, Druze and Sunni politicians in Lebanon are apprehensive of Shia domination, but have kept their counsel in the face of Israel's demolition of Lebanon's infrastructure.

For Secretary Rice's optimism to prevail would require extraordinary commitment and risks in resolving the current crisis -- and a leap of imagination from all sides on the Israel-Palestinian front. Three weeks into the war in Lebanon Ehud Olmert told the Associated Press: "The emergence of a new order that will provide more stability and that will defeat the forces of terror, will help create in this free environment . . . momentum between us and the Palestinians." But among Israelis support seems to be ebbing for Olmert's "realignment" plan. In any case, the idea that Hamas would be willing to make the concessions needed strike a deal with Israel in the light of current events verges on the absurd, while Mahmoud Abbas would be unable to deliver on any agreement.

Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erakat told the Jerusalem Report in July -- before the fighting in Lebanon: "We need to revive the ability to talk" -- a sentiment echoed by Qatari Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. He told the al-Jazeera network on July 31st: "It is truly a dangerous and tragic situation. However, we also hope that this is a turning and hopeful point in the Arab mentality, especially to those in charge of making decisions or in the Arab world in general." He called for direct negotiations between the Arab states and Israel on a new architecture for the region . U.S. policy would require a similar leap -- a consistent and high-profile engagement in the region, even with pariah governments, and a readiness to push Israel more urgently toward recognizing a geographically coherent Palestinian state. The confluence of these two crises -- in Lebanon and the Occupied Territories -- suggests the birth pangs of a new Middle East may in fact be a miscarriage.

Indeed if it is a miscarriage, then Middle East would be in its death throes?

Or would it resurface like a rekindled fire?