Solomon2
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Hey, none of that. Stating goals don't get Pakistan's generals off the hook of debating the effects of their choices.The term "Strategic Depth", is a more abused and misunderstood than any other in recent military history, however if you read the entire combat doctrine associated with "Strategic Depth", you will see that it calls for -
The problem with the military approach is that it always seeks more power and resources as a means to deal with every contingency. That's the best reason for military decision-making to be moderated by politicians. It's the politicians who should ultimately decide strategy. It's the politicians who should decide if money and moral capital is better spent on war-making or peace-making and economic growth. It's the politicians who can make friends and construct most useful relations with neighbors who are not underlings, not the military. Otherwise the Army would not have resigned itself to Z.A.B.'s rule in 1971. Powerless after defeat, only a politician could have freed those 90,000 Pakistani Army prisoners. Too bad the lesson wasn't learned then - and it's quite apparent it needs to be learned now.All of the above are necessary if Afghanistan is to help us by allowing us a spring board against an Indian offensive.
The dominate-Afghanistan approach would not be necessary if Pakistan concentrated on making peace with its neighbors rather than ever-seeking more power and influence abroad.
It was the Pakistani leadership - Zia - who insisted upon the final offensive that destroyed much of Kabul and overthrew the Soviet-supported regime, not the U.S.However, the post Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan left it in shambles with the country a wreck of it's former self (Thank the powers and the USA).
Nobody compelled Pakistan to choose nuclear weapons over good relations other than Pakistan itself, and no one compelled Pakistan to mess up Afghanistan further after the Soviet withdrawal other than Pakistan itself. (Well, maybe the Iranians in western Afghanistan...)In such a situation, Pakistan even after being sanctioned by much of the free world, housed and fed over 7 million Afghan Refugees and in doing so, inherited the treasures of illegal firearms and drugs. Remind me who should be complaining again?
Correct me if I'm wrong but the "hammer and anvil" approach requires the mobile striking force to drive the enemy into a non-mobile and numerous defensive force. So in any combined coalition-Afghan operation Pakistan has to serve as the anvil. The other way 'round can't work.We tried the Hammer and Anvil by launching a combined offensive in the Bajuar/Kunnar region. Operation Lion Heart (Sherdil for Pakistan) was supposed to drive the militants to the mountains where both sides would bomb shell them into submission.
Driving the terrorists into the hills rather than out of them to face the tender arms of Pakistani infantry and armor seems mighty peculiar strategy to me. I wonder if ISAF really wanted to do this, or did they resign themselves to Pakistani "guarantees"? Perhaps you can answer that question.
I do not share your self-serving appraisal of the situation.Pakistani generals have co-ordinated a successful campaign against the terrorists but their reputation is being maligned by the powers as they try to secure their back sides in case of a post-withdrawal Taliban takeover.