A significant political re-adjustment in Asia in recent years has been the upgrading of low-key relations between Japan and India to a global and strategic partnership.
Particularly in the last decade, India-Japan relations have gathered significant momentum. The foundation for this was laid when Yoshiro Mori, the then prime minister of Japan visited India in August 2000 to establish the ‘Global Partnership in the 21st Century’, a term which had previously been used by Japan only to describe its relations with the United States.
A few months later Japan lifted all nuclear-related economic sanctions imposed after India’s nuclear explosions in May 1998, and in 2006 the two countries elevated their relationship to a Strategic and Global Partnership. Since then, a multitude of joint statements and dialogues have added substantive layers to this relationship.
India and Japan affirm that they are partners with a mutual stake in each other’s progress and prosperity and that their relations are rooted in their similar perceptions of the evolving environment in the region and the world at large.
From an annual summit between the political leaders to several strategic dialogues, including between the foreign ministers, the foreign secretary of India and the vice-minister for foreign affairs of Japan, the defence ministers, the defence secretary of India and the vice-minister of defense of Japan, the National Security Advisor of India and the Japanese counterpart, as well as coast guard and navy staff talks have been institutionalized.
Both countries are conducting bilateral naval exercises since 2012, and soon India hopes to become the first country to purchase defence equipment from Japan since 1967 with the purchase of the Shin Maywa US-2 amphibious aircraft from Japan.
The bilateral economic relations too have been on an upward trajectory. The institutional framework to further accelerate and consolidate business activities between India and Japan has been put in place with the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) that came into effect in August 2011.
With trade between India and Japan at US$ 18.51 billion in 2012-13, the target of achieving $25 billion by 2014 appears well within reach. Currently, Japan is the fourth largest investor in India, with foreign direct investment of $16.26 billion between April 2000 and April 2014.
A total of 2,542 Japanese business are operating in India, which is an increase of 738 establishments (41 percent) compared to last year. Japan is also India’s largest bilateral developmental assistance donor and India has been the top recipient of yen loans from Japan since 2003 surpassing China, which had been holding that position for many years.
Undoubtedly, the geo-political context in which Japanese perspectives on India have undergone a transformation in recent years is China’s growing regional assertiveness. From Tokyo’s perspective, expanding Sino-Japanese trade and investment – China replaced the United States as Japan’s biggest investment destination in 2007 and in 2010 surpassed Japan to become the second largest global economy – has not mitigated the security tensions between the two.
Rather, Japan has watched with grave concern the increase in frequency as well as level of Chinese aggression in the recurring cycles of tensions over historical animosity and territorial disputes. And with China’s use of economic instruments of pressure at these times the traditional Japanese policy of separation of economics and politics, wherein Sino-Japanese relations were ‘economically hot and politically cold’ is under severe strain.
As Japan has hedged India has moved up substantially in its strategic priorities. And Japan has not been reticent in expressing this, both ideationally and tangibly. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe not only included India in his formulation of Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond, the National Security Strategy unveiled in December 2013 lists India as a partner with which it shares strategic interests and with which Japan will strengthen cooperative relations.
Likewise, Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso frankly stated that it was necessary for his country to re-think the self-imposed ban on the export of defence equipment and technologies for Japan and India to become net providers of regional security as Asia’s two largest maritime democracies.
Similarly, support for ambitious Indian projects such as the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) is part of Japan’s economic diversification strategy to reduce dependence on China. Indeed, the Indian policy establishment, irked by the delay in the signing of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement, would do well to keep in mind that Japan’s decision to start the negotiations on such a domestically sensitive issue was itself momentous.
Much has been written about the convergence in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s and Prime Minister Abe’s nationalist orientations as well as an apparent personal chemistry. However, these can only be augmenting factors. What is more crucial is a strategic visualization of Japan’s importance to India’s comprehensive national security and correspondingly pursuing appropriate strategies to strengthen this partnership.
That India in its quest for rapid economic development has much to gain from a strong relationship with Japan is widely accepted in the Indian policy establishment. The development focus of the new government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi leads one to be optimistic that long-awaited measures to improve the business environment and revitalize the Indian economy will be taken up on priority and in turn give a boost to India-Japan economic engagement.
It is time Indian strategic thinking also incorporated India-Japan relations as an important component of the country’s security policy and articulated a clear vision to guide this partnership. Japan is an essential pillar of a multi-polar Asia that India seeks wherein it is in India’s interest to provide India-Japan security cooperation greater traction. A stable and peaceful Asian security architecture can emerge only with proactive India-Japan collaboration.
The abrupt postponement of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Japan has made the Japanese side uneasy. Viewing of India-Japan relations through the prism of national security will enable India to shed its hesitancy about greater security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and restore Japan’s confidence in India’s commitment to the global and strategic partnership between the two countries.
Japan Must Become An Integral Part Of India’s Strategic Calculus - Analysis | Eurasia Review
Particularly in the last decade, India-Japan relations have gathered significant momentum. The foundation for this was laid when Yoshiro Mori, the then prime minister of Japan visited India in August 2000 to establish the ‘Global Partnership in the 21st Century’, a term which had previously been used by Japan only to describe its relations with the United States.
A few months later Japan lifted all nuclear-related economic sanctions imposed after India’s nuclear explosions in May 1998, and in 2006 the two countries elevated their relationship to a Strategic and Global Partnership. Since then, a multitude of joint statements and dialogues have added substantive layers to this relationship.
India and Japan affirm that they are partners with a mutual stake in each other’s progress and prosperity and that their relations are rooted in their similar perceptions of the evolving environment in the region and the world at large.
From an annual summit between the political leaders to several strategic dialogues, including between the foreign ministers, the foreign secretary of India and the vice-minister for foreign affairs of Japan, the defence ministers, the defence secretary of India and the vice-minister of defense of Japan, the National Security Advisor of India and the Japanese counterpart, as well as coast guard and navy staff talks have been institutionalized.
Both countries are conducting bilateral naval exercises since 2012, and soon India hopes to become the first country to purchase defence equipment from Japan since 1967 with the purchase of the Shin Maywa US-2 amphibious aircraft from Japan.
The bilateral economic relations too have been on an upward trajectory. The institutional framework to further accelerate and consolidate business activities between India and Japan has been put in place with the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) that came into effect in August 2011.
With trade between India and Japan at US$ 18.51 billion in 2012-13, the target of achieving $25 billion by 2014 appears well within reach. Currently, Japan is the fourth largest investor in India, with foreign direct investment of $16.26 billion between April 2000 and April 2014.
A total of 2,542 Japanese business are operating in India, which is an increase of 738 establishments (41 percent) compared to last year. Japan is also India’s largest bilateral developmental assistance donor and India has been the top recipient of yen loans from Japan since 2003 surpassing China, which had been holding that position for many years.
Undoubtedly, the geo-political context in which Japanese perspectives on India have undergone a transformation in recent years is China’s growing regional assertiveness. From Tokyo’s perspective, expanding Sino-Japanese trade and investment – China replaced the United States as Japan’s biggest investment destination in 2007 and in 2010 surpassed Japan to become the second largest global economy – has not mitigated the security tensions between the two.
Rather, Japan has watched with grave concern the increase in frequency as well as level of Chinese aggression in the recurring cycles of tensions over historical animosity and territorial disputes. And with China’s use of economic instruments of pressure at these times the traditional Japanese policy of separation of economics and politics, wherein Sino-Japanese relations were ‘economically hot and politically cold’ is under severe strain.
As Japan has hedged India has moved up substantially in its strategic priorities. And Japan has not been reticent in expressing this, both ideationally and tangibly. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe not only included India in his formulation of Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond, the National Security Strategy unveiled in December 2013 lists India as a partner with which it shares strategic interests and with which Japan will strengthen cooperative relations.
Likewise, Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso frankly stated that it was necessary for his country to re-think the self-imposed ban on the export of defence equipment and technologies for Japan and India to become net providers of regional security as Asia’s two largest maritime democracies.
Similarly, support for ambitious Indian projects such as the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) is part of Japan’s economic diversification strategy to reduce dependence on China. Indeed, the Indian policy establishment, irked by the delay in the signing of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement, would do well to keep in mind that Japan’s decision to start the negotiations on such a domestically sensitive issue was itself momentous.
Much has been written about the convergence in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s and Prime Minister Abe’s nationalist orientations as well as an apparent personal chemistry. However, these can only be augmenting factors. What is more crucial is a strategic visualization of Japan’s importance to India’s comprehensive national security and correspondingly pursuing appropriate strategies to strengthen this partnership.
That India in its quest for rapid economic development has much to gain from a strong relationship with Japan is widely accepted in the Indian policy establishment. The development focus of the new government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi leads one to be optimistic that long-awaited measures to improve the business environment and revitalize the Indian economy will be taken up on priority and in turn give a boost to India-Japan economic engagement.
It is time Indian strategic thinking also incorporated India-Japan relations as an important component of the country’s security policy and articulated a clear vision to guide this partnership. Japan is an essential pillar of a multi-polar Asia that India seeks wherein it is in India’s interest to provide India-Japan security cooperation greater traction. A stable and peaceful Asian security architecture can emerge only with proactive India-Japan collaboration.
The abrupt postponement of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Japan has made the Japanese side uneasy. Viewing of India-Japan relations through the prism of national security will enable India to shed its hesitancy about greater security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and restore Japan’s confidence in India’s commitment to the global and strategic partnership between the two countries.
Japan Must Become An Integral Part Of India’s Strategic Calculus - Analysis | Eurasia Review
.On topic we should not waste any more time & Sign a treaty with the Japanese we get cutting edge tech & they get a huge market
