beijingwalker
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Nov 4, 2011
- Messages
- 65,195
- Reaction score
- -55
- Country
- Location
Japan, Australia, India, the US and the UK Can Contain China
Conflict in the Indo-Pacific looks increasingly plausible, and the US is going to need lots of help from Australia, India, Japan and the UK.
ByHal Brands
November 3, 2022 at 6:00 AM GMT+8
The US-China rivalry is a global affair, but the heart of the contest is in the Indo-Pacific. This is the world’s most populous, economically dynamic and strategically important region. It is where the Chinese challenge to US power, and to the international system that power underpins, is most severe. It is where outright war between Washington and Beijing is most likely.
And it’s where four key countries — the subjects of a series of columns over the next two weeks — could shape the outcome of a Sino-American showdown through the choices they make.
Just two years ago, it was still a fringe opinion to suggest that China might invade Taiwan or otherwise touch off a major regional conflict in the 2020s. Now, in Washington at least, that view is becoming conventional wisdom.
More and more, I hear U.S. officials — including those who are hardly card-carrying hawks — privately saying that Washington and Beijing may be headed for a test of strength in the next three to five years. America’s top naval officer stated that a fight could come sooner than that. China’s growing ambition to retake Taiwan and remake the region, the thinking goes, are about to crash into America’s determination to prevent that.
If there is a US-China war, it won’t simply be a fight over Taiwan or some other hotspot. The war would be a fight for hegemony in a crucial region, and for all the global influence that follows.
If China defeated the US, it could shatter American military power — and confidence therein — up and down Asia’s maritime periphery, while reinforcing Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s narrative that the East rises as the West declines. If Washington thrashes Beijing, say goodbye to the idea that China is destined for dominance in Asia and beyond.
Regardless of who wins, a US-China war would have cascading consequences. The conflict might expand geographically, as the Pentagon blockades China’s energy imports or targets its naval vessels wherever they can be found. War would precipitate an economic earthquake, tearing apart supply chains and disrupting some of the most lucrative trade routes on the planet. There would be a very real prospect of nuclear escalation. And a war in the Western Pacific wouldn’t simply be a China-America duel: Its course could change fundamentally based on how other countries position themselves.
How well China fares in a Taiwan fight hinges, in large part, on how big and strong the opposing coalition is. Whether the US can operate effectively across the vast distances of the Pacific depends on what sort of support, logistical and military, it has from partners and allies. Countries that don’t directly join the fighting could still make a difference by granting (or denying) Washington access to ports and airfields, replenishing depleted US ammunition stockpiles, or joining in economic and technological punishment against Beijing.
Unfortunately, from Washington’s perspective, there isn’t much certainty around this issue. The Indo-Pacific lacks a single, region-wide military alliance akin to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, so any response to Chinese aggression will be a geopolitical pickup game.
Over the next two weeks, I’ll be traveling to Japan, Australia, India and the UK to find out how these four critical countries are thinking about a war they hope will never come. These countries comprise the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, India, Japan and the US) and AUKUS (Australia-UK-US), the two most important mini-lateral security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific.
Collectively, they include three close US treaty allies and a sometimes-distant security partner, India. Short of war, they are already deeply engaged in the struggle to mold the Indo-Pacific future. If war erupts, they would be among Washington’s best bets for broad international support — yet all would confront hard choices about whether and how to respond.
A war that the US fights in the Western Pacific without allies is a war it runs a very high risk of losing. A war that it fights at the head of a large democratic coalition is one China probably cannot win. The more Beijing fears the latter scenario, the better deterred it may be from using force in the first place.
The Chinese-American rivalry is a contest for Indo-Pacific hegemony. But in what they do and don’t do, an array of middle powers will have their say in who wins.
www.bloomberg.com
Conflict in the Indo-Pacific looks increasingly plausible, and the US is going to need lots of help from Australia, India, Japan and the UK.
ByHal Brands
November 3, 2022 at 6:00 AM GMT+8
The US-China rivalry is a global affair, but the heart of the contest is in the Indo-Pacific. This is the world’s most populous, economically dynamic and strategically important region. It is where the Chinese challenge to US power, and to the international system that power underpins, is most severe. It is where outright war between Washington and Beijing is most likely.
And it’s where four key countries — the subjects of a series of columns over the next two weeks — could shape the outcome of a Sino-American showdown through the choices they make.
Just two years ago, it was still a fringe opinion to suggest that China might invade Taiwan or otherwise touch off a major regional conflict in the 2020s. Now, in Washington at least, that view is becoming conventional wisdom.
More and more, I hear U.S. officials — including those who are hardly card-carrying hawks — privately saying that Washington and Beijing may be headed for a test of strength in the next three to five years. America’s top naval officer stated that a fight could come sooner than that. China’s growing ambition to retake Taiwan and remake the region, the thinking goes, are about to crash into America’s determination to prevent that.
If there is a US-China war, it won’t simply be a fight over Taiwan or some other hotspot. The war would be a fight for hegemony in a crucial region, and for all the global influence that follows.
If China defeated the US, it could shatter American military power — and confidence therein — up and down Asia’s maritime periphery, while reinforcing Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s narrative that the East rises as the West declines. If Washington thrashes Beijing, say goodbye to the idea that China is destined for dominance in Asia and beyond.
Regardless of who wins, a US-China war would have cascading consequences. The conflict might expand geographically, as the Pentagon blockades China’s energy imports or targets its naval vessels wherever they can be found. War would precipitate an economic earthquake, tearing apart supply chains and disrupting some of the most lucrative trade routes on the planet. There would be a very real prospect of nuclear escalation. And a war in the Western Pacific wouldn’t simply be a China-America duel: Its course could change fundamentally based on how other countries position themselves.
How well China fares in a Taiwan fight hinges, in large part, on how big and strong the opposing coalition is. Whether the US can operate effectively across the vast distances of the Pacific depends on what sort of support, logistical and military, it has from partners and allies. Countries that don’t directly join the fighting could still make a difference by granting (or denying) Washington access to ports and airfields, replenishing depleted US ammunition stockpiles, or joining in economic and technological punishment against Beijing.
Unfortunately, from Washington’s perspective, there isn’t much certainty around this issue. The Indo-Pacific lacks a single, region-wide military alliance akin to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, so any response to Chinese aggression will be a geopolitical pickup game.
Over the next two weeks, I’ll be traveling to Japan, Australia, India and the UK to find out how these four critical countries are thinking about a war they hope will never come. These countries comprise the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, India, Japan and the US) and AUKUS (Australia-UK-US), the two most important mini-lateral security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific.
Collectively, they include three close US treaty allies and a sometimes-distant security partner, India. Short of war, they are already deeply engaged in the struggle to mold the Indo-Pacific future. If war erupts, they would be among Washington’s best bets for broad international support — yet all would confront hard choices about whether and how to respond.
A war that the US fights in the Western Pacific without allies is a war it runs a very high risk of losing. A war that it fights at the head of a large democratic coalition is one China probably cannot win. The more Beijing fears the latter scenario, the better deterred it may be from using force in the first place.
The Chinese-American rivalry is a contest for Indo-Pacific hegemony. But in what they do and don’t do, an array of middle powers will have their say in who wins.
America Can Contain China With an Alliance of Five
Conflict in the Indo-Pacific looks increasingly plausible, and the US is going to need lots of help from Australia, India, Japan and the UK.
www.bloomberg.com
