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ref:Response: It is far too early to claim the war in Afghanistan has failed | Comment is free | The Guardian
Salaam....
It is far too early to claim the war in Afghanistan has failed By this autumn we could be seeing positive indicators of a nation slowly rebuilding itself
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Hew Strachan The Guardian, Thursday 21 April 2011 Article historyI have just returned from Afghanistan and am struggling to understand the evidence on which Julian Glover based his sweeping assertions (Few say it, but they all know: our Afghan war is a disaster, 11 April). Britain is "trapped in a war with no plan other than to kill as many baddies as we can before fleeing", he says. And the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan "collapsed not because of any single defeat but because the occupation became too expensive and incoherent to sustain. We are following the same path."
But only by this autumn will we know whether the Afghan national security forces really are ready to take the lead in the fight against the insurgents (although already the indications are surprisingly positive); whether the insurgents can cope with the recent losses both to their elites and to their arms caches; whether the opium crop has fallen not only in size (for the second successive year) but also in value; and whether Afghan village mullahs will embrace the cause of peace.
If the trends are all negative, then Glover's indictment will have been warranted. But for the moment his views owe more to retrospective than prospective judgments. It is easy to want to wind the clock back to 2001 and not be in Afghanistan, but we start from where we are now. Since 2009, the campaign has been reinvigorated, first by General Stanley McChrystal at the operational level and, second, by General David Petraeus at the civil-military interface.
Before visiting Afghanistan I had great doubts about our strategic and political aims. The International Security Assistance Force was capable of repeated tactical success, but Nato was divided with some in the US administration seeing the campaign's purpose as counter-terrorism and others embracing the much more ambitious goal of good governance for Afghanistan. In reality they are interlocking elements in a means-ends relationship. Even more seriously, Afghanistan seemed unlikely to be able to take charge of its own destiny. President Karzai was returned to power in a disputed election, and the US seemed to fall out with him on an almost monthly basis.
But the agreement to "transition" authority to Afghanistan, due to be completed by the end of 2014, seems to have produced a genuine consensus, despite inevitable areas of dispute. The Lisbon summit in November 2010 provided for the first time a political framework for Nato operations. Moreover, transition is not just a synonym for an "exit strategy", since Nato has promised an enduring relationship. But the alliance needs to identify whom the Afghans will choose to succeed Karzai in 2014, and how it will manage a relationship still vitiated by corruption and double-dealing.
It is a pity Glover did not address these issues, which desperately need resolution. From where will come the capacity and the professionalism to sustain not only the Afghan national security forces but also the ambitious schemes for district and provincial government? How will they be paid for when Nato is creating an Afghan army whose demands exceed Afghanistan's GDP? And, the most fraught question, what will that army's principal task be when many Afghans see the military challenges as the product of external interference, not internal division?
Salaam....
It is far too early to claim the war in Afghanistan has failed By this autumn we could be seeing positive indicators of a nation slowly rebuilding itself
Share Comments (44)
Hew Strachan The Guardian, Thursday 21 April 2011 Article historyI have just returned from Afghanistan and am struggling to understand the evidence on which Julian Glover based his sweeping assertions (Few say it, but they all know: our Afghan war is a disaster, 11 April). Britain is "trapped in a war with no plan other than to kill as many baddies as we can before fleeing", he says. And the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan "collapsed not because of any single defeat but because the occupation became too expensive and incoherent to sustain. We are following the same path."
But only by this autumn will we know whether the Afghan national security forces really are ready to take the lead in the fight against the insurgents (although already the indications are surprisingly positive); whether the insurgents can cope with the recent losses both to their elites and to their arms caches; whether the opium crop has fallen not only in size (for the second successive year) but also in value; and whether Afghan village mullahs will embrace the cause of peace.
If the trends are all negative, then Glover's indictment will have been warranted. But for the moment his views owe more to retrospective than prospective judgments. It is easy to want to wind the clock back to 2001 and not be in Afghanistan, but we start from where we are now. Since 2009, the campaign has been reinvigorated, first by General Stanley McChrystal at the operational level and, second, by General David Petraeus at the civil-military interface.
Before visiting Afghanistan I had great doubts about our strategic and political aims. The International Security Assistance Force was capable of repeated tactical success, but Nato was divided with some in the US administration seeing the campaign's purpose as counter-terrorism and others embracing the much more ambitious goal of good governance for Afghanistan. In reality they are interlocking elements in a means-ends relationship. Even more seriously, Afghanistan seemed unlikely to be able to take charge of its own destiny. President Karzai was returned to power in a disputed election, and the US seemed to fall out with him on an almost monthly basis.
But the agreement to "transition" authority to Afghanistan, due to be completed by the end of 2014, seems to have produced a genuine consensus, despite inevitable areas of dispute. The Lisbon summit in November 2010 provided for the first time a political framework for Nato operations. Moreover, transition is not just a synonym for an "exit strategy", since Nato has promised an enduring relationship. But the alliance needs to identify whom the Afghans will choose to succeed Karzai in 2014, and how it will manage a relationship still vitiated by corruption and double-dealing.
It is a pity Glover did not address these issues, which desperately need resolution. From where will come the capacity and the professionalism to sustain not only the Afghan national security forces but also the ambitious schemes for district and provincial government? How will they be paid for when Nato is creating an Afghan army whose demands exceed Afghanistan's GDP? And, the most fraught question, what will that army's principal task be when many Afghans see the military challenges as the product of external interference, not internal division?
