India's Nuclear Policy

[IND151]

India’s Nuclear Policy
Rajesh Rajagopalan

Introduction

India has had an uncomfortable relationship with nuclear weapons. From the early
days of independence, Indian leaders, especially Jawaharlal Nehru, took a very
public and very vocal stand against nuclear weapons. But Nehru, a modernist, was
also convinced that nuclear technology had a role to play in national development.
1
To a lesser degree, he also thought that nuclear weapons technology might have a
role to play in national defence if efforts at nuclear disarmament should fail. These
somewhat contradictory strands are still visible today, as they have been through
much of the last six decades of Indian nuclear policy.
But it would be foolish to suggest that Nehru’s perspective on nuclear weapons
was the only determinant in Indian nuclear policy. India’s nuclear policy was
also influenced by India’s international security condition as well as by domestic
variables such as the vagaries of political change and the influence of bureaucratic
elites. Indeed, India’s decision to build a nuclear force was taken only in the late
1980s, much after it had become clear that Pakistan —with Chinese technological
assistance— had made rapid advances in the nuclear weapons programme. As for
bureaucratic influence, some defence scientists played a key role in keeping the
weapons programme alive even when there was no political support or indeed,
active opposition, while other bureaucrats were responsible for creating political
awareness of India’s declining nuclear options. Nevertheless, these variables suggest
a moderate Indian approach to nuclear weapons and thus reinforce the dominant
tendency towards a political rather a military approach to looking at nuclear
weapons. They do not suggest any dramatic changes nor rapid advances in India’s
nuclear weapons programme.

The Purpose of India’s Nuclear Weapons

Indian leaders have generally considered nuclear weapons at best a necessary
evil. Prime Ministers Lal Bahadur Shastri and Rajiv Gandhi sought international
solutions to avoid committing to nuclear weapons; Prime Minister Morarji Desai
shut down the weapons program for a time.
2
Even Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee,
who ordered the nuclear tests in 1998, was more ambivalent two decades earlier,
siding with Desai in voting against restarting the nuclear weapons program in 1979.
As a number of analysts have concluded, growing nuclear threats and a progressively
unaccommodating global nuclear order forced New Delhi to move towards a declared
nuclear arsenal in the 1990s.
3
This discomfort with nuclear weapons has defined the
manner in which India has viewed nuclear weapons.
Much of the Indian debate about nuclear weapons between the 1960s and the
1990s did not consider how nuclear weapons might be used within the framework
of Indian strategy. The arguments and propositions largely revolved around whether
India should go nuclear, not what India should do with nuclear weapons.
4
It was only
in the 1980s that some Indian strategists such as K. Subrahmanyam and General
K. Sundarji started writing about what nuclear weapons might be useful for.
5
This
also coincided with greater attention among decision-makers to such questions.
Both Sundarji and Subrahmanyam argued that the kind of bloated nuclear arsenals
that the US and the Soviet Union developed during the Cold War were unnecessary
and wasteful. Nuclear deterrence could be had at far cheaper cost, with a relatively
small arsenal. In essence, as Tellis has argued, what Sundarji and Subrahmanyam
were suggesting was a view of nuclear weapons that emphasized its political rather
than military utility, its deterrence rather than war-fighting capability.
6
This view of
the political utility of nuclear weapons is also reflected in arguments about nuclear
weapons providing political space and strategic autonomy, arguments that former
Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh has made.
7
Not surprisingly, the eventual
Indian nuclear deterrent emphasized small numbers and a capability to retaliate,
rather than building a deterrent force that would have parity with other nuclear
powers.
But the notion that nuclear weapons are political tools is primarily about how
India views the usability of nuclear weapons. It does not extend to India’s views
about how other states, particularly Pakistan, might see nuclear weapons. In fact
Indian views about what nuclear weapons in others’ hands might do are highly
pessimistic, assuming implicitly that other states might not be as responsible as New
Delhi is or has been. India’s view on nuclear proliferation is one indicator of this
deeply pessimistic view that India has of the possibility of nuclear weapons use by
other states. Though India objected to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT),
it has seen proliferation itself as a threat to international stability and has repeatedly
touted its “exemplary non-proliferation record of four decades and more.”
8
Thus the
Indian view of the spread of nuclear weapons is fundamentally different from the
‘more may be better’ arguments of proliferation optimists such as Kenneth Waltz,
9
or even the radical rejection of the concept of non-proliferation by China prior to
1991.
10
Indian officials do not think that nuclear weapons have stabilized the region;
rather they believe that nuclear weapons in Pakistani hands increase the nuclear risk
in the region because Pakistan is seen as irresponsible.
11
This fits a larger pattern of
contradiction which assumes that other powers, Pakistan in particular, will not be as
responsible as India has been.
Indian views about missile defenses are a further indication of the contradictionin Indian views about nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons are essentially political
weapons, not usable in fighting wars, the logic of missile defenses seems difficult
to understand: clearly missile defenses are needed only if one assumes that nuclear
weapons are going to be used. Nevertheless, New Delhi has pursued a ballistic
missile defence (BMD) system since at least the mid-1990s.
12
India’s search for an
appropriate BMD system appears linked to the growth of Pakistan’s missile delivery
capability, including the transfer of Chinese missiles such as the M-11. As with
nuclear weapons, the search for a BMD system has continued despite changes of
political leadership and ideology in New Delhi. At various times, India has sought the
Russian-built S-300, the Israeli-American Arrow, and the US-built Patriot ballistic
missile defence systems. India is also thought to have a domestic BMD system in
development, built around the still under-development Akash Surface-to-Air missile
(SAM). New Delhi’s decade-long search has been unsuccessful possibly because
Indian decision-makers have not given sufficient thought to what kind of system
India needs. Indeed, it is not clear how missile defenses will fit into the existing
Indian nuclear doctrine. India’s official nuclear doctrine has made no mention of a
missile defence system, and it is unlikely that the war-fighting orientation of missile
defenses will sit well with the political/deterrence driven sentiment that dominates
the nuclear doctrine. None of the Indian governments that have been in power since
1995 have given any reason why they want missile defences, though the issue had
created dissension among some of allies of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
government when it included communist parties because New Delhi has been
seeking to buy a US-built system based on the Patriot PAC-3. Thus India’s view
of nuclear weapons suggests an element of inconsistency: nuclear weapons are
essentially political weapons and unusable militarily by India, but other states might
not be as restrained. As a consequence, India both opposes the spread of nuclear
weapons and pursues BMDs.


India’s Changing Nuclear Doctrine

India’s nuclear doctrine, in its declaratory form if not in its operational variation,
has undergone some changes since it was first announced in August 1999. The 1999
doctrine was produced by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), a group
of non-governmental experts, and its status was thus somewhat suspect. Indeed,
the government formally claimed that the doctrine was not the official doctrine.
However, much of what was stated by the NSAB in the “unofficial” nuclear doctrine
was what had already been stated by various government officials, including the
prime minister, at different times in and out of parliament. The only major difference
between the various official statements and what was stated in the NSAB’s nuclear
doctrine was that the NSAB document discussed the need for a nuclear triad for
India, which the government had not acknowledged until then but which was both
logical and unsurprising. Thus, the government’s coyness about the doctrine was
probably unnecessary.

In any case, when some details of the Indian nuclear doctrine were officially
released in January 2003 it in many ways stuck to some of the main elements of
the 1999 doctrine though there were some important differences. The 2003 nuclear
doctrine was released as a brief press statement, but it did state the key elements of the
doctrine. The actual nuclear doctrine is reported to be a much more comprehensive
document. Below I briefly outline the main elements of the 1999 doctrine and the
changes made in the 2003 version.

The 1999 doctrine suggested a nuclear doctrine that was based on an unspecified
minimum force but one which would also be credible and survivable. In addition,
India would not use nuclear weapons first (no-first use of nuclear weapons or NFU)
and will not use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries (Negative Security
Assurance or NSA). The doctrine emphasized the need for credible nuclear forces
that would be able to survive a first strike against it as well as the need for strict
political control over nuclear forces. The NSAB document also emphasized India’s
nuclear disarmament objectives. None of these were new: what was new, however,
was that the doctrine also talked about a nuclear triad of aircraft, long-range ballistic
missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

In January 2003, the government released a brief press statement (of just 349
words) that revealed some aspects of the ‘official’ nuclear doctrine. From the press
statement, it is unclear when this doctrine was formulated and its relationship to
the 1999 doctrine, though it could be read as having been the official doctrine
for a while. The press statement revealed that many of the elements of the Indian
nuclear doctrine was the same as in the 1999 doctrine, but a number of caveats
had been added, and some pledges especially that of the NFU and non-use against 100 Major Power’s Nuclear Policies and International Order in the 21st Century
non-nuclear powers had been diluted. There were also details about command and
control aspects that were new.
There were at least three variations of note in the new doctrine. First was the

 

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introduction of the notion of ‘massive’ retaliation to a nuclear attack on India.
The 1999 doctrine had only talked of a ‘punitive’ retaliation that would cause
‘unacceptable’ damage. It is still unclear why this change was introduced, and indeed
whether this was a change at all because some key individuals who presumably had
a role in drafting the doctrine appeared unaware of the consequence of the change
in such key concepts. A cynical but plausible interpretation is that this was simply
public braggadocio, especially since the press release came in the wake of India’s
failed attempt at coercive diplomacy in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the
Indian parliament in December 2001. Whatever the interpretation of these words,
there was little explication either in the press statement or subsequently about the
meaning or logic of this change.

The second significant variation was the dilution of both India’s NFU pledge
as well as the pledge not to attack non-nuclear countries (NSA). The original
NFU pledge and the NSA pledge not only in the 1999 doctrine but also in various
official statements in and out of parliament was without any qualifiers. But in the
2003 version, there is an important qualifier: India will consider the use of nuclear
weapons in response to a ‘major attack’ on India or on Indian forces anywhere with
chemical or biological weapons (CBW). This dilutes both the NFU pledge as well as
the pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. It dilutes the NFU
pledge because India could use nuclear weapons first against nuclear powers which
decide to use chemical or biological weapons against India.

For example, if Pakistan
uses chemical weapons against India, India might use nuclear weapons in retaliation,
though in such cases, New Delhi would also be violating its NFU pledge. Similarly,
it dilutes the NSA because New Delhi could potentially use nuclear weapons against
a state that does not have nuclear weapons. Hypothetically, if a country such as
Bangladesh were to use chemical weapons against India, Indian leaders might be
forced to consider the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation for such an attack, even
if it is clear that Bangladesh does not possess nuclear weapons, thus violating India’s
non-attack against non-nuclear countries pledge. These contradictions have either
not been thought through by those who framed the doctrine or else they have not
taken these modifications seriously.
Interviews with Indian officials have suggested two reasons for such changes. India’s Nuclear Policy 101
First, since India no longer has CBW, it has only nuclear weapons to deter potential
CBW use against India. The argument appears to be that there is a potential that
Indian territory or forces might come under chemical or biological weapon attack
from a non-nuclear country or even a terrorist entity but would be unable to respond
because of the earlier blanket pledge on NFU. The second reason is that these
changes reflect the government’s response to domestic criticism about the NFU
pledge being too weak to deal with potential threats. I suspect that the second reason
is closer to the truth. Once again, the timing of these changes is significant. By
late 2002, New Delhi was feeling particularly frustrated with Pakistan’s support for
terror and India’s inability to do much about it, as well as the failure of Operation
Parakram (the military mobilization in 2001– 2002). A muscular nuclear doctrine
may have been seen as one way of responding to this frustration. On the other hand,
it is unclear if the government considered the problems of what Scott Sagan had
called the ‘commitment trap’.
13
Sagan had argued that making such a commitment
might force decision-makers into either using nuclear weapons unnecessarily or
create credibility problems that will end up diluting deterrence. This will happen
because unless you carry out your threats, threats on which your deterrence depends
might not be very credible in the future. Thus leaders and decision-makers have to
be careful and prudent about the deterrence threats they make in order to make sure
that these are actually threats that can be carried out if the contingency arose. There
is little indication that the implications of these contradictions have been considered
seriously by the government. In any case, the 2003 press statement remains the only
official statement of India’s nuclear doctrine to date.

 

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India’s Assured Retaliation Strategy
Though Indian officials continue to characterize the nuclear doctrine as one of
minimum deterrence, I have characterized it elsewhere as ‘assured retaliation’.
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Minimum deterrence is politically attractive because it suggests limited goals and
a responsible attitude towards nuclear weapons. Though this largely reflects India’s approach towards nuclear weapons, the changes that have taken place in the doctrine,
especially the dilution of the NFU and NSA pledges and the reference to massive
retaliation all suggest that assured retaliation is a better characterization of India’s
nuclear strategy than ‘credible minimum deterrence’.
Assured retaliation includes the NFU pledge, with the problematic caveats
noted earlier. It also includes the certainty of retaliation, but there is little indication
that such retaliation will take place prior to an enemy attack striking India. Indian
leaders appear content to wait until an attack has already landed on Indian soil
before considering retaliation. In other words, there are no declaratory or operational
indicators that suggest that India might adopt either a launch-on-warning (LOW) or
a launch-under-attack (LUA) posture for its nuclear force. Indeed, Indian nuclear
forces are still reportedly kept de-alerted and de-mated, which would obviate LOW or
LUA strategies. Such a posture assumes that there will be considerable time between
an attack and an order to retaliate because it will be many hours before the various
components of India’s nuclear forces can be brought together and mated for delivery.
This might change once India’s nuclear submarines assume a strategic deterrent role
because India will then have to keep its submarine-based nuclear weapons mated,
but it is unlikely that the nuclear submarine component of India’s strategic forces
would be ready for many more years.
Assured retaliation as strategy also includes massive retaliation, though this
has certain other well-recognized problems. First, it is not very credible to threaten
massive retaliation under all circumstances. For example, it will be difficult for
Indian decision-makers to justify a massive retaliatory attack against Pakistan if
Pakistan had only used one nuclear warhead to attack an advancing Indian military
column inside Pakistani territory. Though this is an extreme scenario, it is possible to
think of other scenarios of a limited Pakistani nuclear use in the context of a military
confrontation between India and Pakistan. The massive retaliation doctrine will
then force Indian leaders on to the horns of a dilemma: either stick to the doctrine
and launch an unjustifiably large retaliation, or suffer the loss of credibility of not
sticking to the doctrine.
Second, massive retaliation might force any potential adversary to also plan a
massive attack and potentially a plan a counter-force first-strike as part of a damage
limitation strategy. In other words, if Pakistan is convinced that India will launch
a massive retaliation irrespective of the size of the original Pakistan attack, then
Pakistan would have little reason to keep their nuclear first strike limited. After all why keep your first blow limited —and risk losing your own nuclear forces in an
Indian retaliation— if New Delhi will in any case retaliate massively ? New Delhi
does not appear to recognize that its own choices can affect the choices of potential
adversaries, sometimes with negative consequences for India.
Of course, one potential positive consequence also needs to be kept in mind. If
an adversary thinks that India might actually carry out a massive retaliation and that
no nuclear war was likely to remain limited to isolated or discrete nuclear exchanges,
it could force them to reconsider any offensive plans. The choice for an attacker then
would be all or nothing: such drastic choices might be unpalatable.

India’s Nuclear Capabilities

India’s nuclear capabilities are not known with any certainty. India is thought to have
anywhere between 70 and 100 nuclear warheads. These are reportedly kept de-mated,
with components in the hands of different agencies. Such a posture ensures greater
safety for the nuclear assets and reduces the likelihood of accidents and inadvertent
use of nuclear weapons. But there have been murmurs within the armed services
about the feasibility of keeping weapons and delivery vehicles separated and about
the smoothness and speed of integrating them. Given the sensitivity of the topic,
obviously little is known about either the procedures or any problems.

India has significant stores of fissile materials, as much as ten tons. This would
be sufficient for as many as 1000 warheads if it were all to be used for nuclear
warheads. However, most of this stockpile appears intended for feeding India’s
indigenously built fast breeder reactors. Though that should eventually yield an
even larger stockpile, India is not thought to have enough reprocessing capability to
convert this to weapons-grade plutonium.
India’s nuclear delivery capability has grown very slowly. Though the Indian
guided missile development programme is almost a quarter century old, it has yet to
develop a long-range missile capable of targeting all of China. Even the current underdevelopment long-range missile, the Agni-3, has a range of only 3500 kilometers
which is too short to target much of China. The Agni-3 has now been tested four
times, the fourth test being conducted by the Army as a user trial.
15
Nevertheless, it
will be some time before the missile is deployed with the Indian strategic forces.The rumors that an even longer range missile, the Agni-5, is under development have
now been officially confirmed by senior defence research officials.
16
The Agni-5 will
have a range of more than 5000 kilometers, allowing it to target much of China. The
Agni-5 development is expected to begin shortly, and the first test should happen
within two years.
India’ current ballistic missile and combat aircraft are sufficient, however, for
targeting Pakistan. India has a number of missiles including the Prithvi, the Agni-1
and Agni-2, as well as the Agni-3 for targeting Pakistan. India has a number of combat
aircraft too which can be used as delivery vehicle vis-à-vis Pakistan, including the
Jaguar, the Mirage-2000 and the Su-30.
India is also developing a sea-based deterrent in the form of a nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarine. The first of these missile submarines, the Arihant, has
been launched, though it will be some time before the submarine will be ready for
sea-trial and even longer before it joins the deterrent force. Two more submarines of
the same type are planned. What missile they will carry is unclear, with contradictory
reports in the India media. It is also unclear how New Delhi will deal with the
command and control issues that are raised by these platforms, including the thorny
issue of how to keep these weapons de-mated in a submarine. Indian civilian leaders
has consistently emphasized political control over these weapons, but maintaining
political control over nuclear weapons in submarines has been a problem for all
countries that have opted to put nuclear missiles in submarines.
The most notable aspect of the nuclear weapons capabilities has been their rather
slow development. It has taken India a quarter century to develop even intermediate
range missiles such as the Agni-3, and it has yet to develop one with intercontinental
ranges. Similarly, the number of India’s warhead stockpile has grown only very
slowly. On the other hand, it is unclear what final state of capabilities India is aiming
at, either in terms of the warheads or in terms of delivery vehicles. These decisions
have probably not been finalized, and are likely to remain flexible to respond to
changing strategic requirements.

 

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The Implications of the US–India Nuclear Deal
The US– India nuclear deal was essential to India because India’s traditional
approach towards nuclear cooperation had reached a dead-end. Traditionally, India
sought international nuclear cooperation, even while maintaining a nuclear weapons
program, by agreeing to partial safeguards on nuclear imports. This strategy allowed
India to supplement its domestic nuclear power capability with international
cooperation, as long as there were willing international partners. However, when the
rules of international nuclear commerce changed from partial safeguards (safeguards
only on the specific imported item) to full-scope safeguards (safeguards on the entire
nuclear program as a condition for any nuclear commerce), India was faced with the
choice of either giving up its nuclear weapons program, or giving up on international
nuclear commerce. Not surprisingly, India chose the latter. What the US– India
nuclear deal does is give India the option yet again to both keep its nuclear weapons
program while also preserving its access to international nuclear commerce. The
issue had become even more vital for India because India’s explosive economic
growth has put much greater strains on its electricity generation capacity, leading to
peak power shortages of as such as 11 percent. Now that the nuclear deal is complete,
and India has the necessary waiver from the NSG that permits other nuclear powers
such as France and Russia to supply India with civilian nuclear technology, India is
expected to significantly enhance its civilian nuclear power sector with international
cooperation. Indeed, several agreements have already been signed to bring to fruition
additional nuclear power generating capacity and more nuclear power agreements
are expected to be signed over the next two years.
The nuclear deal is unlikely to have major impact on India’s nuclear weapons
program. In the last two decades, ever since India went nuclear in the late 1980s, India
has only built a few dozen nuclear warheads. Most estimates suggest that India has
enough fissile material for about 65 –110 warheads, with some estimates suggesting even lower numbers. If we assume a median of 85 warheads, it would suggest that
India has only built, on average, about four warheads a year. This suggests that India
feels no great pressure to rapidly increase its arsenal. The suggestion, by some arms
control experts, that access to foreign nuclear fuel will free India’s domestic fuel
resources for weapons does not hold much water because India has much larger
stockpiles of fuel (about one ton) that it could have converted for weapons if it
had wanted to do so.
23
In other words, the small size of the Indian nuclear force
is the consequence of deliberate choice rather than because of any fissile material
shortage.

Conclusion
India’s nuclear policy has evolved gradually rather than dramatically. This is
unlikely to change. Indian leaders and the political and administrative system are
cautious and risk-averse. And India faces no existential insecurities and is indeed
a fairly confident and secure state that dominates its region. Thus, there is little
domestic political or international reasons to expect rapid changes in India’s nuclear
policy. But just as it is cautious in advancing its nuclear weapons arsenal, it will
also be cautious in advancing on the nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda.
India is unlikely to sign either the CTBT or the FMCT, should they be presented to
New Delhi in the next couple of years. On the other hand, India is also unlikely to
stage more nuclear tests or hugely increase its nuclear arsenal. Over the next decade,
India should be expected to gradually increase the size of its arsenal and make it
more robust and reliable, with some 6000 kilometer plus range ballistic missiles
and possibly one or two submarines capable of firing long-range ballistic missiles.
India has sought BMDs for over a decade. Though it is possible that India might buy
a BMD system or develop one indigenously, it is unlikely that such systems will be
deployed in the next few years. India can also be expected to campaign vigorously
for nuclear disarmament. New Delhi can also be expected to continue to worry about
the negation of its conventional military deterrent, but it is unlikely that it will find a
solution to this puzzle either in the immediate future.

http://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rc...5cz7Ag&usg=AFQjCNFJYWYVYsMtud8VCruNWyab0nXU9A

 

[IND151]

we really require at least 4 SSBNs

but most importantly K 6/Agni 6 as with it we will be able to cover whole china even if A 6 is fired from safe locations like northern odisha

 

[IND151]

we should have at least 10 Agni 5 and 10 Agni 6/K 6

 

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Nuclear Arms Control
Over the last several decades, India has emphasized nuclear disarmament rather than
nuclear non-proliferation. New Delhi’s position on the spread of nuclear weapons
was a complex one. On the one hand, India always saw such spread of nuclear
weapons as a danger. Its decision not to sign the NPT despite taking part in the
negotiations was a difficult one, reached after New Delhi concluded that signing the
treaty would adversely affect Indian security especially because neither Washington
nor Moscow appeared willing to provide any form of extended deterrence cover
for India’s security. In other words, India never accepted the idea that nuclear
proliferation was legitimate, unlike, for example, China in the 1950s and 1960s.
21
Therefore, though New Delhi refused to sign the NPT, it also refused to help other
states such as Libya with nuclear technology.

New Delhi was also quite meticulous about ensuring that its nuclear weapons
technology did not reach other non-nuclear weapon states. Though there have been
some concerns raised that India might have illegally acquired some technologies and
materials, and that it may have been careless in ensuring the security of some of its
nuclear technology, the Indian record in protecting its technology from leaking is far
better than that of most other nuclear powers.
22
In the process, New Delhi built up
a reputation as a ‘responsible nuclear power’ that became an unexpected bonus in
dealing with the international community, especially as India sought a waiver from NSG guidelines. India squared this circle of both opposing the NPT and opposing
nuclear proliferation by taking the position that though each country should be free
to decide on how to meet its security needs, states that did sign the NPT had an
obligation to live up to their commitments. Thus, on both North Korea and Iran,
India’s position has been to argue that because these countries voluntarily accepted
the NPT, they have an obligation to live up to their treaty commitments. India’s
response to the threat of nuclear proliferation was to take an active part in nuclear
disarmament diplomacy, seeing the elimination of nuclear weapons as both a way
of dealing with the threat of proliferation as also a way of avoiding the unpleasant
decision about building its own nuclear weapons. India also was at the forefront
in pressing that all commitments in the NPT be honored, including the Article 6
obligation towards nuclear disarmament, rather than focusing only on the spread of
nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. Thus, a favorite Indian argument about nuclear
proliferation was to point out that what mattered was not just horizontal proliferation
(or the expansion of the nuclear weapons club) but also vertical proliferation (the
expansion of the arsenals of the existing members of the nuclear club).
Nevertheless, as the global nuclear non-proliferation regime comes under
increasing threat due to non-compliance or even outright violations by countries
such as Iran and North Korea, India will have to increasingly face up to the needs of
fashioning a more appropriate approach to the non-proliferation regime. In addition
to focusing on nuclear disarmament and non-compliance by NWS (Nuclear Weapon
States), India will also have to come up with meaningful and effective ways of
dealing with non-compliance by NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States), something
that India had previously ignored. One of the disadvantages that India faces in
making this policy transition is that India is not a member of the NPT and it is
unlikely to become one unless India’s de facto NWS status is accepted as de jure
status by the NPT members. This is unlikely. But the alternative —India giving up
its nuclear weapons and joining the treaty as a NNWS— is equally unlikely. In
essence, then, India’s relationship with the treaty is unlikely to undergo any formal
changes though India can be expected to play a more active diplomatic role in trying
to keep the NPT system together.
As stated earlier, India is likely to continue stressing nuclear disarmament as a
way of resolving the problems of nuclear proliferation. Though India’s disarmament
drive is sometimes seen a cynical ploy to divert attention from its unwillingness to
accede to the NPT, a good number among India’s political and administrative eliteappear sincerely committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon free world. This may
very well be because no serious cost-benefit analysis has been undertaken within the
government of the implications of nuclear disarmament on India’s security interest.
If so, it would not be the first time: India originally supported both the NPT and
the CTBT without realizing the full import of these treaties on India’s security.
India eventually refused to accede to either treaty. Nevertheless, India does strongly
support a Nuclear Weapons Convention with the objective of eventual comprehensive
nuclear disarmament. Even after openly declaring itself as a nuclear weapon state,
India has reiterated its commitment to comprehensive nuclear disarmament.
Obviously, nuclear disarmament is unlikely in the immediate future. In the
meantime, India faces some key nuclear arms control challenges in the next couple
of years. The most immediate of these issues are those related to the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT).
For New Delhi, the CTBT is a domestic rather more than an international problem.
There is a continuing dispute within the Indian defence science community about
the success of the H-bomb test in 1998. A section of India’s scientific community,
mostly retired scientists, has argued that the H-bomb test was not successful and that
India should test again. The Indian government as well as serving nuclear scientists
have repeatedly stated that they are satisfied with the results of the 1998 tests and no
further tests are necessary. In addition, there is some disquiet among some members
of the Indian strategic community about India signing the CTBT after just six tests.
Both of these concerns make for serious and rather vocal opposition to any moves by
New Delhi to sign the CTBT. Though the government can overcome such opposition,
it would require the kind of political commitment that the current government has so
far not suggested it is willing to expend. Thus, they are hoping that either opposition
in the US Senate or some other problem will slow the CTBT. The loss of momentum
in the U.S. Senate on the CTBT thus comes as good news to New Delhi. In any case,
it is highly unlikely that New Delhi will sign the CTBT in the near future given such
domestic issues, unless all the main nuclear powers sign and ratify the treaty.
The FMCT presents a different and more serious problem. It is unclear if India’s
fissile material stockpiles are sufficient to meet India’s current and future strategic
needs. India agreed to join the FMCT negotiations, one suspects, with the same
short-sightedness that it joined the NPT and CTBT negotiations. From New Delhi’s
perspective, the FMCT is thankfully tied up in a number of controversies, especially
the one about the scope of the treaty. But should these problems be resolved India
might suddenly find itself once again staring at a treaty that it helped negotiate but
which does not serve its strategic needs. But unlike the CTBT, the FMCT is not so
much a domestic political issue as a practical issue that has to do with decisions
about the size of the nuclear arsenal that India wants. Until now, Indian decisionmakers have been reluctant to make these decisions, and they can be expected to put
off such decisions for as long as possible.

 

[IND151]

guys i would like your opinion on the subject

 

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poll added

 

[3Idiots]

India's nuclear deterrence primarily had to lie to nuclear submarines which can launch MIRV missiles from atleast 10,000 kms away, i.e. we should be able to reach Beijing and Harbin from deep inside the Indian Ocean or far off in the Pacific Ocean.

 

[IND151]

^^ 6,000 KM Agni 6/K6 is enough

if we develop even 8,000 KM missile, it will provoke US to take steps against us like they did against china

 

[Abingdonboy]

I'd say, despite past hiccups, India's strategy of minimal credible nuclear detrance is on track and soon to be fully utilised with the pace development having rapidly increased in recent years. By 2020 India will be in an incredibly strong passive position- having a fully operational advanced BMD shiled in the major cities, 4/5 SSBNs conducting deterent patrols equipped with 6000-8000+ sub-launched ballistic missiles and ICBMs with 10,000+ km range (ie Agni 6). No one will be in a position to push India around.

 

[IND151]

^^by 2020 we will have at max 3 SSBNs and GOI wont go beyond 6,000 km k 6, not for at least 15 years

 

[Abingdonboy]

^^by 2020 we will have at max 3 SSBNs and GOI wont go beyond 6,000 km k 6, not for at least 15 years

Well the AIRIHANT class is to have 4 SSBNs in it and there has been talk of Agni 6 having 10,000+ km range and that work has already started on it and it will be ready in 4/5 years.

 

[The enlightened]

Well the AIRIHANT class is to have 4 SSBNs in it and there has been talk of Agni 6 having 10,000+ km range and that work has already started on it and it will be ready in 4/5 years.

With the snail-pace of Indian defence procurements, 3 SSBN's by 2020 is a more realistic, rather an optimistic thought.
Agni 6 with 10,000+ KM range. Buddy we don't need these type of missiles. Atleast not in front of the world. This will only create suspicions among our western allies and we may risk becoming the new China [metaphorically].