Yeti
BANNED
- Joined
- Nov 26, 2010
- Messages
- 7,400
- Reaction score
- -7
- Country
- Location
In March, Indian ships unloaded thousands of tonnes of humanitarian aid bound for Afghanistan at the Iranian port at Chabahar. This seemingly inconspicuous event may have long been forgotten, but its geopolitical undercurrents are far-reaching as the recent talks on the development of the port among Iran, India, and Afghanistan demonstrate.
On August 26, the parties agreed to establish a working group to explore the trade and transit potential of the port in the effort to boost economic development and interregional connections.
As an active actor in the process, New Delhi is unlikely to pass
an opportunity to expand ties with Kabul and Tehran to complement its strategy for the broader Eurasia. This is despite the strong calls by the world's mightiest military power, the United States, on allies and partners to pursue stronger sanctions against the regime in Iran, which is suspected of pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
It is therefore hardly surprising that, in the multi-centric world characterized by dispersion of power and the arguable need for flexible foreign-policy approaches, India views Iran as an opportunity while other actors consider it solely as a threat.
India's planned investment in the Chabahar port, whose translated name "four seasons" suggests a possible use of the port throughout the year, will help Delhi solidify ties with the energy-rich Iran, which already serves as a strong commercial partner and a bridge for India's trade with the Middle East.
It will also allow India to gain access to Central Asian markets, including in Afghanistan, as India "battles" rival Pakistan over influence in the broader region ahead of the withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan by 2014. Finally, it would give Delhi a stronger position vis-a-vis China - its geo-economic contender and Islamabad's patron that already has helped Pakistan build a functioning port at Gwadar amid the lingering plans to develop the port at Chabahar. In its dealings with Iran, a rising Delhi has no desire to offend Washington. But nor does it wish to see the interests of other powers dictate those of its own.
India views it a success to have moved so close to finalizing the decade-long project. Iran has already invested approximately US$340 million in the port, while India is expected to invest $100 million. India reportedly spent $136 million to connect Chabahar to Afghanistan's ring-road highway, a logical extension of the deal concluded by Iran, India, and Russia in 2000 to develop North-South transport corridors linking the Indian sub-continent and the landlocked Central Asia.
Over the past 10 years, Delhi has invested more than $2 billion in infrastructure in the war-torn Afghanistan. It now considers linking Chabahar to Hajigak by rail to exploit iron ore deposits; the Hajigak area in Afghanistan could contain mineral deposits worth $1-$3 trillion. Iran, in turn seeks to build a railway line to link its city of Mashhad with Heart in Afghanistan.
The development of the Chabahar port would enable Delhi to trade with Afghanistan without having to rely on Pakistan, which does not allow trade from India to Afghanistan and on to Central Asia. Iran would be able to develop its eastern regions and diversify its ties with other countries amid sanctions and strained relationship with the Arab states in the neighborhood.
Perhaps more importantly, the project would be crucial for development of Afghanistan, which, besides posing plenty security risks, also offers numerous development opportunities whose impact can extend as far as the energy-rich yet potentially explosive region of Central Asia.
Landlocked Afghanistan, which imports half of its oil from Iran, would be able to enjoy access to the Arabian Sea not only though Pakistan but also via Iran, thereby reducing its dependence on Pakistan. It would also raise its potential to stimulate more investment from and trade with outside powers like India. This is especially important given the planned drawdown of coalition forces and the distrust that is still plaguing the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The development of Afghanistan according to India's vision would in turn enable Delhi to pursue its recently launched "Connect Central Asia" policy toward the energy-rich Central Asian region more effectively. India needs this policy to work fast. Otherwise, it risks remaining a permanent shadow of China, whose rapidly spreading regional economic and political influence may soon not only dwarf that of Russia and the US but also translate into its military presence.
India's trade with Central Asia amounts to $500 million, while China's is $29 billion. Delhi now plans to establish 14 flight connections with the five countries to promote regional development, hoping that its "Connect" policy will boost trade with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. This policy adds structure to Delhi's overall strategy for the region, focusing on development of information technology, energy, banking, and pharmaceutical industries and security cooperation to address the issues of terrorism and extremism. Afghanistan, connecting Central and South Asia, is an inescapable part of India's new policy.
The development of Afghanistan is closely linked to the use of the Chabahar port and the US-launched New Silk Road initiative designed to promote trade and transit in and between Central and South Asia. But promoting regional trade and prosperity is harder without having Iran, a perceived hostile enemy, and Pakistan, an alleged distrusted partner, partake in cross-regional trade and transit development projects.
Considering the need to ensure a responsible transition in Afghanistan ahead of the pull-out of coalition forces, the US seems to acknowledge this line of thinking, at least in public statements.
"These three countries are neighbors. They have to get along," State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland said on September 27 when responding to questions on the agreements involving India, Iran, and Afghanistan to develop the Chabahah port. "We are obviously interested in increased trade and commerce back and forth there. So anything that ameliorates that situation is something that we would support."
Washington has seemingly agreed to overlook India's growing ties with Tehran in exchange for Delhi's decision to reduce oil imports from Iran, but India is expected to cooperate more, rather than less, with Iran now that the development of the port is close to reality.
India already depends on Iran for approximately 12% of its oil needs. The trade between the two countries stands at $16 billion and is expected to increase further as Iran and India expands their search for trade partners. In March, India and Iran agreed that India would pay for some Iranian oil in Indian rupees, facilitating bilateral trade in general and the Indian exports to Iran in particular.
This is not to say that India has ignored Washington. It has cooperated with the US on civil nuclear cooperation, having signed the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement in 2008. It has voted against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency several times. And it has started to reduce oil imports from Iran amid oil sanctions by purchasing crude from other countries (albeit more slowly than expected given its still high dependence on oil imports). This later move can also be interpreted as India's genuine desire to diversify its energy imports.
As it seeks to ensure access to resources in the tough neighborhood to feed its booming economy and buttress its power, India is more than willing to pursue cooperation with Iran and Afghanistan. As it does so, it is cautious not to challenge the US in fundamental ways.
But nor is it hesitant to promote its own vision of cross-regional development involving broader Eurasia, seen as also sharing and reinforcing the New Silk Road concept promoted by Washington. The development of the Iranian Chabahar port is the cog allowing Delhi to do just that, especially given India's vivid need to stay ahead of its perceived rivals like China and Pakistan.
Roman Muzalevsky works for iJet Intelligent Risk Systems Inc, focusing on global and regional security analysis. He is also a contributing analyst on Eurasian affairs and security at Jamestown Foundation and a contributing an alyst on the North America, Russia and Central Asia, and Globalization desks at the geopolitical and security consultancy Wikistrat.
Asia Times Online :: India's Eurasia strategy leverages Iranian ports
On August 26, the parties agreed to establish a working group to explore the trade and transit potential of the port in the effort to boost economic development and interregional connections.
As an active actor in the process, New Delhi is unlikely to pass
an opportunity to expand ties with Kabul and Tehran to complement its strategy for the broader Eurasia. This is despite the strong calls by the world's mightiest military power, the United States, on allies and partners to pursue stronger sanctions against the regime in Iran, which is suspected of pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
It is therefore hardly surprising that, in the multi-centric world characterized by dispersion of power and the arguable need for flexible foreign-policy approaches, India views Iran as an opportunity while other actors consider it solely as a threat.
India's planned investment in the Chabahar port, whose translated name "four seasons" suggests a possible use of the port throughout the year, will help Delhi solidify ties with the energy-rich Iran, which already serves as a strong commercial partner and a bridge for India's trade with the Middle East.
It will also allow India to gain access to Central Asian markets, including in Afghanistan, as India "battles" rival Pakistan over influence in the broader region ahead of the withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan by 2014. Finally, it would give Delhi a stronger position vis-a-vis China - its geo-economic contender and Islamabad's patron that already has helped Pakistan build a functioning port at Gwadar amid the lingering plans to develop the port at Chabahar. In its dealings with Iran, a rising Delhi has no desire to offend Washington. But nor does it wish to see the interests of other powers dictate those of its own.
India views it a success to have moved so close to finalizing the decade-long project. Iran has already invested approximately US$340 million in the port, while India is expected to invest $100 million. India reportedly spent $136 million to connect Chabahar to Afghanistan's ring-road highway, a logical extension of the deal concluded by Iran, India, and Russia in 2000 to develop North-South transport corridors linking the Indian sub-continent and the landlocked Central Asia.
Over the past 10 years, Delhi has invested more than $2 billion in infrastructure in the war-torn Afghanistan. It now considers linking Chabahar to Hajigak by rail to exploit iron ore deposits; the Hajigak area in Afghanistan could contain mineral deposits worth $1-$3 trillion. Iran, in turn seeks to build a railway line to link its city of Mashhad with Heart in Afghanistan.
The development of the Chabahar port would enable Delhi to trade with Afghanistan without having to rely on Pakistan, which does not allow trade from India to Afghanistan and on to Central Asia. Iran would be able to develop its eastern regions and diversify its ties with other countries amid sanctions and strained relationship with the Arab states in the neighborhood.
Perhaps more importantly, the project would be crucial for development of Afghanistan, which, besides posing plenty security risks, also offers numerous development opportunities whose impact can extend as far as the energy-rich yet potentially explosive region of Central Asia.
Landlocked Afghanistan, which imports half of its oil from Iran, would be able to enjoy access to the Arabian Sea not only though Pakistan but also via Iran, thereby reducing its dependence on Pakistan. It would also raise its potential to stimulate more investment from and trade with outside powers like India. This is especially important given the planned drawdown of coalition forces and the distrust that is still plaguing the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The development of Afghanistan according to India's vision would in turn enable Delhi to pursue its recently launched "Connect Central Asia" policy toward the energy-rich Central Asian region more effectively. India needs this policy to work fast. Otherwise, it risks remaining a permanent shadow of China, whose rapidly spreading regional economic and political influence may soon not only dwarf that of Russia and the US but also translate into its military presence.
India's trade with Central Asia amounts to $500 million, while China's is $29 billion. Delhi now plans to establish 14 flight connections with the five countries to promote regional development, hoping that its "Connect" policy will boost trade with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. This policy adds structure to Delhi's overall strategy for the region, focusing on development of information technology, energy, banking, and pharmaceutical industries and security cooperation to address the issues of terrorism and extremism. Afghanistan, connecting Central and South Asia, is an inescapable part of India's new policy.
The development of Afghanistan is closely linked to the use of the Chabahar port and the US-launched New Silk Road initiative designed to promote trade and transit in and between Central and South Asia. But promoting regional trade and prosperity is harder without having Iran, a perceived hostile enemy, and Pakistan, an alleged distrusted partner, partake in cross-regional trade and transit development projects.
Considering the need to ensure a responsible transition in Afghanistan ahead of the pull-out of coalition forces, the US seems to acknowledge this line of thinking, at least in public statements.
"These three countries are neighbors. They have to get along," State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland said on September 27 when responding to questions on the agreements involving India, Iran, and Afghanistan to develop the Chabahah port. "We are obviously interested in increased trade and commerce back and forth there. So anything that ameliorates that situation is something that we would support."
Washington has seemingly agreed to overlook India's growing ties with Tehran in exchange for Delhi's decision to reduce oil imports from Iran, but India is expected to cooperate more, rather than less, with Iran now that the development of the port is close to reality.
India already depends on Iran for approximately 12% of its oil needs. The trade between the two countries stands at $16 billion and is expected to increase further as Iran and India expands their search for trade partners. In March, India and Iran agreed that India would pay for some Iranian oil in Indian rupees, facilitating bilateral trade in general and the Indian exports to Iran in particular.
This is not to say that India has ignored Washington. It has cooperated with the US on civil nuclear cooperation, having signed the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement in 2008. It has voted against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency several times. And it has started to reduce oil imports from Iran amid oil sanctions by purchasing crude from other countries (albeit more slowly than expected given its still high dependence on oil imports). This later move can also be interpreted as India's genuine desire to diversify its energy imports.
As it seeks to ensure access to resources in the tough neighborhood to feed its booming economy and buttress its power, India is more than willing to pursue cooperation with Iran and Afghanistan. As it does so, it is cautious not to challenge the US in fundamental ways.
But nor is it hesitant to promote its own vision of cross-regional development involving broader Eurasia, seen as also sharing and reinforcing the New Silk Road concept promoted by Washington. The development of the Iranian Chabahar port is the cog allowing Delhi to do just that, especially given India's vivid need to stay ahead of its perceived rivals like China and Pakistan.
Roman Muzalevsky works for iJet Intelligent Risk Systems Inc, focusing on global and regional security analysis. He is also a contributing analyst on Eurasian affairs and security at Jamestown Foundation and a contributing an alyst on the North America, Russia and Central Asia, and Globalization desks at the geopolitical and security consultancy Wikistrat.
Asia Times Online :: India's Eurasia strategy leverages Iranian ports
