senkakudefender
FULL MEMBER
- Joined
- May 6, 2013
- Messages
- 242
- Reaction score
- 0
INDIAN NAVAL SUBS Past, Present and Future
Posted on 01 October 2012
The 1980s were the halcyon days of the submarine arm of the Indian Navy. There were 20 of them in service, both old and new. Then followed the controversies about procurement of some of them. The stink reached the top then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. However, the HDW (named Shishumar class) subs that came from Germany were top of the line
The undersea dimension forms an integral element of every maritime nations security landscape. The extent of its commitment may vary depending on its strategic perspective, geopolitical imperatives, threat perception, and to a large extent its economic and military strength. Undersea capability can range from the non-glamorous and low-cost, albeit effective mine warfare to the other extreme of large ballistic missile submarines lurking in the ocean depths with an arsenal, capable of annihilating the world several times over. In addition, the elements required to counter these threats and the underwater battle space encompasses all the five dimensions viz., sub-surface, surface, air and increasingly, space and cyberspace.
The year 2012 has been a landmark year for the submarine arm and indeed, the Indian Navy. An Akula II class nuclear attack submarine (SSN), leased from Russia for 10 years, and has been commissioned as INS Chakra. The indigenously built strategic missile submarine, the Arihant is expected to be put to sea shortly for sea trials. The arrival of both these types could not have come a moment too soon and will provide the navy with a capability commensurate with the national interests.
Historical Perspective
The importance of the submarine was recognized with a force of four being part of the blueprint drawn up for the development of the navy soon after independence. However a combination of factors including financial constraints, a developmental agenda, and a foreign policy steeped in moralpolitik which perceived submarines as an offensive platform and an emphasis on acquisition of ships and aircraft delayed the inevitable.
The submarine arm of the Indian Navy finally came into being on 08 December 1967 with the commissioning of INS Kalvari, a Foxtrot class submarine at Riga (USSR). Within two years, three more similar submarines followed. These four boats underwent a baptism by fire as they played a significant role in Indias decisive rout of Pakistan in December 1971.Four more Foxtrot class submarines were acquired between 1972 and 1974. These were designated the Vela class named after the lead submarine.
INS Vela was finally decommissioned in June 2010 after a stellar commission of 38 years. The last of the Foxtrots, INS Vagli soon followed drawing to a close a chapter that shaped the firm foundation of the navys submarine arm.
Consolidation 1975-85
A long hiatus followed and no submarines were acquired for over a decade. This period was utilized to consolidate the skills learnt by the pioneering crews who received top class submarine training at HMS Dolphin in the UK and subsequently in the USSR. The benefits of this soon became evident across the entire gamut of submarine activity, be it operations, maintenance or training. At sea, the professionalism and confidence of the crew led to the operational envelope being continuously stretched and innovative tactical scenarios were exercised and validated.
The submarine training school INS Satavahana was commissioned in 1974, complete with an escape training facility. This included a 30 metre tower called the Tower of Confidence to train submariners in effecting an escape from a sunken submarine. Soon, all submarine training was being conducted in India and became the benchmark for training excellence in the Indian Navy.
Maintenance was accorded due priority and the Naval dockyards in Mumbai and Visakhapatnam soon set up facilities to take up various levels of submarine refits including medium refits. Capacity constraints, however, at the dockyards that necessitated submarines being sent to USSR for their medium refits.
Resurgence of the Arm 1986-1995
By the late 70s the need to augment and modernize the submarine force had become evident. After a great deal of deliberation interspersed by political considerations, a contract was inked with M/s HDW Germany for a 1500 ton bespoke variant of the Type 209 design. In agreement with the avowed aim of developing an indigenous capability, this project for four conventional submarines (SSK) included the outright purchase of two from the OEM and the licensed production of two at Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL), Mumbai. The first two submarines of the Shishumar class, as it was called, were commissioned within months of each other in 1986. These state-of-the-art submarines offered the best SSK technology the West had to offer. While the first two submarines were being built at Kiel in Germany, personnel from MDL Mumbai were being trained simultaneously to undertake indigenous construction. This entire project was extremely well conceived and was to be the springboard to launch Indias nascent shipbuilding industry into the complex and exclusive club of submarine construction. This transfer of technology arrangement should have led to a series production of submarines. However due to narrow political considerations including allegations of bribes having been paid, HDW was blacklisted and no further submarines were constructed.
A colossal investment in resources, manpower and money was wasted at the altar of political ambition and the country was that much the poorer. Ironically though, nobody in India was indicted for receiving a bribe.
Almost simultaneously, a contract was concluded with the Soviet Union to acquire eight Kilo class submarines. These were the latest SSKs in the Soviet inventory and India received the first export variant. These eight submarines known as the Sindhughosh class (named after the lead submarine) was commissioned in quick succession between 1986 and 1991.
In 1992, with the commissioning of INS Shalki, India joined a select group of nations possessing a submarine construction capability. INS Shankul, the fourth of the Shishumar class and the second indigenously built submarine joined the ranks in 1994. The INs submarine force level stood at an all-time high of twenty although the earlier Foxtrots had begun getting long in the teeth.
The institutional strength of the young submarine arm was evident in the rapidity by which training and maintenance facilities for these new classes were established while new landmarks were being achieved at sea. Long deployments became de-rigeur and logistic hiccups were overcome with the elan born of professional skill and maturity.
Underway on Nuclear Power
The late 1980s saw an epochal event occur in the Navys history. In perhaps a global first, a Charlie I (NATO designation) class SSN was leased from the erstwhile Soviet Union for three years. Commissioned in the Navy as INS Chakra, the submarine was operated extensively till her return in 1991 and provided a valuable insight into the complexities of nuclear submarining. The Transfer also underscored the depth of the strategic relationship between the erstwhile Soviet Union and India.
Onwards to the New Millenium
In the closing years of the last millennium, the submarine arm got a tremendous two fold boost which set the stage for the 21st century. The first was the induction of a Tube Launched Missile (TLM) on INS Sindhushastra, the tenth Kilo (Sindhughosh) class submarine. This was a very potent force multiplier and greatly enhanced SSKs tactical options by providing a lethal attack capability at stand-off ranges. The second was the Cabinet approval for a 30 year Indigenous Submarine Construction Plan which was the blueprint for a potent and contemporary SSK capability in the first half of the 21st century.
The New Millenium
The cataclysmic events of 11 Sep 2001 resulted in a paradigm shift in the strategic and operational approach to warfare. The post-Cold War emphasis on littoral warfare gained further momentum as the Global War on Terror was unleashed by the US led alliance. Tomahawk missiles delivered by American SSNs highlighted the efficacy of underwater capability in achieving joint effect and shaping the outcome on land.
In the decade since, the underwater battle space has assumed even greater strategic, operational and tactical significance. Bilateral and multilateral flashpoints continue to flare up and delineation of maritime boundaries has become increasingly contentious. More navies are now investing in submarines. This region is home to six of the worlds ten overt and covert nuclear powers. Of these, at least four view nuclear weapons as an existential necessity and some of these have an unhealthy non-proliferation record thus aiding and abetting this alarming state of affairs. Development of nuclear weapon capability will necessitate the presence of effective delivery platforms of which submarines remain the most potent. The submarine is and will also remain the most effective second strike platform of the nuclear triad.
At the operational and tactical level, with the focus of operations shifting towards the littoral, sea denial will become the raison detre of many regional navies who do not aspire or cannot afford a sea control capability. The modern SSK submarine is a very sophisticated platform with its standoff weapons, advanced sensors and technological advancements such as Air Independent Propulsion. It is an extremely effective force multiplier and perhaps delivers the most optimum bang for the buck and as a deterrent to even a vastly superior force in the littoral maritime battle space.
The retro fitment of the TLM with a land attack capability on a number of Sindhughosh class submarines has greatly boosted the Navy firepower and littoral warfare capability and the ability to deliver lethal attacks from standoff ranges.
Doctrinal aspects of Submarines in the Maritime Battlespace
The Indian Maritime Doctrine and the strategy document of 2009 broadly outline the contours of the future navy given our maritime interests and geo-strategic imperatives. The importance of the submarine is highlighted in the three dimensional battle space in developing a non-provocative strategic capability and also mentions the suitability of submarines in littoral warfare with their ability to hit the enemy deep inland and thus influence the overall outcome of battle.
The classic concepts of sea control and sea denial are mutually complementary and a potent sub surface element is integral to them. Submarines also provide a certain threshold of capability to make the cost of aggression sufficiently high for a superior aggressor thus providing a degree of deterrence, aided by their relative invulnerability to detection.
Future Force Development
The Indian Navys force development is aimed towards an optimum force capable of delivering maximum effect across the entire spectrum of conflict. Submarine capability would therefore include the following:-.
ν High Speed & Long Endurance at sea.
ν Ability to deliver ordnance at stand off ranges.
ν Effective shallow water operations
ν Second Strike
ν ISR capable
ν Clandestine and Special Operations
ν Effective maritime manoeuvre and speedy redeployment
ν Over-the-Horizon Targeting
The 30 Year Plan
In 1999, a comprehensive 30 Year Plan for Indigenous Submarine Construction was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (the countrys apex decision making body on security matters). This plan envisaged the development of two production lines on which six submarines apiece would be built in collaboration with a foreign submarine builder while the navy would, in the meantime, develop an indigenous submarine design. This would then be built on these two production lines so that by 2030, the Navy would have about 20 or so modern conventional submarines and would be able to maintain this desired force level for the foreseeable future.
Whither the Arm
Notwithstanding the excitement generated by the Arihant and the Chakra and the current decade promising to provide a considerable capability enhancement in the navys subsurface capability reminiscent of the expansion in the 1980s, the current state of the submarine arm is a major cause for concern.
In the next few years the navy would operationalize its nuclear submarine force which is an absolute necessity given the prevailing and emerging regional geopolitical environment. The Arihant will form the strategic vanguard as the sea- borneleg of the nuclear triad and provide an invulnerable second strike capability which in our case is essential given our commitment to No-First-Use. Media reports indicate that up to at least two more of these submarines are already on the anvil and ideally another two should follow to achieve continuous deterrence at sea.However, far too much hype has been generated around the Arihant.
We are already claiming membership of the exclusive nuclear submarine club based on a leased SSN and a SSBN that is yet to go to sea.Building a nuclear submarine is undoubtedly a remarkable achievement, but as the first ever submarine of its kind built in India, she will take a while to overcome her teething troubles which are inevitable and it would take at least three years for her to be deployed as a credible strategic deterrent after she puts to sea for the first time.
The leasing of the Akula II, commissioned as INS Chakra, is important because it not only provides the much needed SSN capability but is also invaluable in understanding the operational, maintenance and logistic complexities of operating such a technologically sophisticated platform. It is likely that its deployment would have to conform to various international restrictive regimes in force but would still add a substantial punch to the navys muscle. However, even if we were to lease more such submarines, it would not address our requirement of a fully operational SSN force for which indigenous construction would be a pre-requisite. It is also unlikely that leasing of such sophisticated technology from another nation would come without any strings attached. There is no capability within the country to build SSNs and needs to be expeditiously developed. It therefore seems unlikely that any more indigenous SSBNs or SSNs will be added in this decade and we should therefore be a little circumspect in evaluating our own capability.
Conventional Submarines.
Notwithstanding the induction of SSNs and SSBNs, it is the SSK which will continue to be the navys most effective weapon platform against a host of likely operational and tactical scenarios in our area of interest in the foreseeable future. The present force level of 14 submarines is getting older by the day and is a cause for grave concern. Even though the submarines have undergone extensive mid-life updates and a fair number have been retrofitted with the TLM, thus packing a powerful punch, it will become increasingly difficult to keep them fit for frontline deployment in adequate numbers. Submarine acquisition in India has always been in fits-and-starts which have led to issues with maintenance, refits, manning and operations.
To obviate this and to ensure a phased replacement and augmentation programme, the 30 Year Plan was promulgated and though still quoted, the extent to which it is being followed both in letter and spirit is debatable. The first part of the plan, designated Project 75 is currently underway with six submarines of the French Scorpene class under construction at MDL, Mumbai. The first of these is likely to be commissioned in 2015 with each of the remaining five following about one year apart. Therefore by the time the Project 75 programme is completed in 2020 ( an optimistic assessment), ten of the older submarines would be over 30 years old and even the last of the present lot over 20 years old. The effect of this on our undersea warfare capability in the emerging regional maritime scenario should ring a bell across the countrys security establishment.
While the delay in Project 75 was perhaps unavoidable due to a host of reasons, the delay in progressing the second phase of the 30 Year plan viz., Project 75(I) should be of utmost concern to the navy. A delay of over two years in issuing the RFP is baffling to say the very least. Considering that there are only four classes of submarines to choose from and the capabilities of all are known, selecting the right one for our requirements surely cannot be all that difficult. Even if the RFP is issued by the end of 2012, it would take at least ten years for the first submarine to enter service leading to a cascading effect on our depleting force levels. In the interim, to arrest the depletion in force levels and augment capability, outright purchase of two of these six submarines is also being considered which would alleviate the situation marginally.
The final phase of the plan, which envisages construction of an indigenous design on each of these two production lines, is in the design phase at present but is unlikely to commence before the end of this decade or till the Project 75(I) is well underway. The 30 year plan is already running at least seven years behind schedule and slipping further by the day. Naval acquisitions are capital-intensive, take time to build and integrate fully with existing platforms in a fully worked-up combat environment. It is thus important that a holistic view is taken of submarine force development to ensure a credible number of modern, well armed, state-of-the-art submarines at all times.
Conclusion
The Indian Navy, by virtue of its size and strategic location in the Indian Ocean is going is going to play an increasingly important role. The maritime posture will be a major determinant in the national security construct. This will necessitate a robust Indian naval presence, of which submarines will constitute a significant element. The Indian Navy has articulated a force level of 160 ships including three aircraft carriers and a proportional number of major surface combatants.
INDIAN NAVAL SUBS – Past, Present and Future | Defence and Security of India
Posted on 01 October 2012
The 1980s were the halcyon days of the submarine arm of the Indian Navy. There were 20 of them in service, both old and new. Then followed the controversies about procurement of some of them. The stink reached the top then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. However, the HDW (named Shishumar class) subs that came from Germany were top of the line
The undersea dimension forms an integral element of every maritime nations security landscape. The extent of its commitment may vary depending on its strategic perspective, geopolitical imperatives, threat perception, and to a large extent its economic and military strength. Undersea capability can range from the non-glamorous and low-cost, albeit effective mine warfare to the other extreme of large ballistic missile submarines lurking in the ocean depths with an arsenal, capable of annihilating the world several times over. In addition, the elements required to counter these threats and the underwater battle space encompasses all the five dimensions viz., sub-surface, surface, air and increasingly, space and cyberspace.
The year 2012 has been a landmark year for the submarine arm and indeed, the Indian Navy. An Akula II class nuclear attack submarine (SSN), leased from Russia for 10 years, and has been commissioned as INS Chakra. The indigenously built strategic missile submarine, the Arihant is expected to be put to sea shortly for sea trials. The arrival of both these types could not have come a moment too soon and will provide the navy with a capability commensurate with the national interests.
Historical Perspective
The importance of the submarine was recognized with a force of four being part of the blueprint drawn up for the development of the navy soon after independence. However a combination of factors including financial constraints, a developmental agenda, and a foreign policy steeped in moralpolitik which perceived submarines as an offensive platform and an emphasis on acquisition of ships and aircraft delayed the inevitable.
The submarine arm of the Indian Navy finally came into being on 08 December 1967 with the commissioning of INS Kalvari, a Foxtrot class submarine at Riga (USSR). Within two years, three more similar submarines followed. These four boats underwent a baptism by fire as they played a significant role in Indias decisive rout of Pakistan in December 1971.Four more Foxtrot class submarines were acquired between 1972 and 1974. These were designated the Vela class named after the lead submarine.
INS Vela was finally decommissioned in June 2010 after a stellar commission of 38 years. The last of the Foxtrots, INS Vagli soon followed drawing to a close a chapter that shaped the firm foundation of the navys submarine arm.
Consolidation 1975-85
A long hiatus followed and no submarines were acquired for over a decade. This period was utilized to consolidate the skills learnt by the pioneering crews who received top class submarine training at HMS Dolphin in the UK and subsequently in the USSR. The benefits of this soon became evident across the entire gamut of submarine activity, be it operations, maintenance or training. At sea, the professionalism and confidence of the crew led to the operational envelope being continuously stretched and innovative tactical scenarios were exercised and validated.
The submarine training school INS Satavahana was commissioned in 1974, complete with an escape training facility. This included a 30 metre tower called the Tower of Confidence to train submariners in effecting an escape from a sunken submarine. Soon, all submarine training was being conducted in India and became the benchmark for training excellence in the Indian Navy.
Maintenance was accorded due priority and the Naval dockyards in Mumbai and Visakhapatnam soon set up facilities to take up various levels of submarine refits including medium refits. Capacity constraints, however, at the dockyards that necessitated submarines being sent to USSR for their medium refits.
Resurgence of the Arm 1986-1995
By the late 70s the need to augment and modernize the submarine force had become evident. After a great deal of deliberation interspersed by political considerations, a contract was inked with M/s HDW Germany for a 1500 ton bespoke variant of the Type 209 design. In agreement with the avowed aim of developing an indigenous capability, this project for four conventional submarines (SSK) included the outright purchase of two from the OEM and the licensed production of two at Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL), Mumbai. The first two submarines of the Shishumar class, as it was called, were commissioned within months of each other in 1986. These state-of-the-art submarines offered the best SSK technology the West had to offer. While the first two submarines were being built at Kiel in Germany, personnel from MDL Mumbai were being trained simultaneously to undertake indigenous construction. This entire project was extremely well conceived and was to be the springboard to launch Indias nascent shipbuilding industry into the complex and exclusive club of submarine construction. This transfer of technology arrangement should have led to a series production of submarines. However due to narrow political considerations including allegations of bribes having been paid, HDW was blacklisted and no further submarines were constructed.
A colossal investment in resources, manpower and money was wasted at the altar of political ambition and the country was that much the poorer. Ironically though, nobody in India was indicted for receiving a bribe.
Almost simultaneously, a contract was concluded with the Soviet Union to acquire eight Kilo class submarines. These were the latest SSKs in the Soviet inventory and India received the first export variant. These eight submarines known as the Sindhughosh class (named after the lead submarine) was commissioned in quick succession between 1986 and 1991.
In 1992, with the commissioning of INS Shalki, India joined a select group of nations possessing a submarine construction capability. INS Shankul, the fourth of the Shishumar class and the second indigenously built submarine joined the ranks in 1994. The INs submarine force level stood at an all-time high of twenty although the earlier Foxtrots had begun getting long in the teeth.
The institutional strength of the young submarine arm was evident in the rapidity by which training and maintenance facilities for these new classes were established while new landmarks were being achieved at sea. Long deployments became de-rigeur and logistic hiccups were overcome with the elan born of professional skill and maturity.
Underway on Nuclear Power
The late 1980s saw an epochal event occur in the Navys history. In perhaps a global first, a Charlie I (NATO designation) class SSN was leased from the erstwhile Soviet Union for three years. Commissioned in the Navy as INS Chakra, the submarine was operated extensively till her return in 1991 and provided a valuable insight into the complexities of nuclear submarining. The Transfer also underscored the depth of the strategic relationship between the erstwhile Soviet Union and India.
Onwards to the New Millenium
In the closing years of the last millennium, the submarine arm got a tremendous two fold boost which set the stage for the 21st century. The first was the induction of a Tube Launched Missile (TLM) on INS Sindhushastra, the tenth Kilo (Sindhughosh) class submarine. This was a very potent force multiplier and greatly enhanced SSKs tactical options by providing a lethal attack capability at stand-off ranges. The second was the Cabinet approval for a 30 year Indigenous Submarine Construction Plan which was the blueprint for a potent and contemporary SSK capability in the first half of the 21st century.
The New Millenium
The cataclysmic events of 11 Sep 2001 resulted in a paradigm shift in the strategic and operational approach to warfare. The post-Cold War emphasis on littoral warfare gained further momentum as the Global War on Terror was unleashed by the US led alliance. Tomahawk missiles delivered by American SSNs highlighted the efficacy of underwater capability in achieving joint effect and shaping the outcome on land.
In the decade since, the underwater battle space has assumed even greater strategic, operational and tactical significance. Bilateral and multilateral flashpoints continue to flare up and delineation of maritime boundaries has become increasingly contentious. More navies are now investing in submarines. This region is home to six of the worlds ten overt and covert nuclear powers. Of these, at least four view nuclear weapons as an existential necessity and some of these have an unhealthy non-proliferation record thus aiding and abetting this alarming state of affairs. Development of nuclear weapon capability will necessitate the presence of effective delivery platforms of which submarines remain the most potent. The submarine is and will also remain the most effective second strike platform of the nuclear triad.
At the operational and tactical level, with the focus of operations shifting towards the littoral, sea denial will become the raison detre of many regional navies who do not aspire or cannot afford a sea control capability. The modern SSK submarine is a very sophisticated platform with its standoff weapons, advanced sensors and technological advancements such as Air Independent Propulsion. It is an extremely effective force multiplier and perhaps delivers the most optimum bang for the buck and as a deterrent to even a vastly superior force in the littoral maritime battle space.
The retro fitment of the TLM with a land attack capability on a number of Sindhughosh class submarines has greatly boosted the Navy firepower and littoral warfare capability and the ability to deliver lethal attacks from standoff ranges.
Doctrinal aspects of Submarines in the Maritime Battlespace
The Indian Maritime Doctrine and the strategy document of 2009 broadly outline the contours of the future navy given our maritime interests and geo-strategic imperatives. The importance of the submarine is highlighted in the three dimensional battle space in developing a non-provocative strategic capability and also mentions the suitability of submarines in littoral warfare with their ability to hit the enemy deep inland and thus influence the overall outcome of battle.
The classic concepts of sea control and sea denial are mutually complementary and a potent sub surface element is integral to them. Submarines also provide a certain threshold of capability to make the cost of aggression sufficiently high for a superior aggressor thus providing a degree of deterrence, aided by their relative invulnerability to detection.
Future Force Development
The Indian Navys force development is aimed towards an optimum force capable of delivering maximum effect across the entire spectrum of conflict. Submarine capability would therefore include the following:-.
ν High Speed & Long Endurance at sea.
ν Ability to deliver ordnance at stand off ranges.
ν Effective shallow water operations
ν Second Strike
ν ISR capable
ν Clandestine and Special Operations
ν Effective maritime manoeuvre and speedy redeployment
ν Over-the-Horizon Targeting
The 30 Year Plan
In 1999, a comprehensive 30 Year Plan for Indigenous Submarine Construction was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (the countrys apex decision making body on security matters). This plan envisaged the development of two production lines on which six submarines apiece would be built in collaboration with a foreign submarine builder while the navy would, in the meantime, develop an indigenous submarine design. This would then be built on these two production lines so that by 2030, the Navy would have about 20 or so modern conventional submarines and would be able to maintain this desired force level for the foreseeable future.
Whither the Arm
Notwithstanding the excitement generated by the Arihant and the Chakra and the current decade promising to provide a considerable capability enhancement in the navys subsurface capability reminiscent of the expansion in the 1980s, the current state of the submarine arm is a major cause for concern.
In the next few years the navy would operationalize its nuclear submarine force which is an absolute necessity given the prevailing and emerging regional geopolitical environment. The Arihant will form the strategic vanguard as the sea- borneleg of the nuclear triad and provide an invulnerable second strike capability which in our case is essential given our commitment to No-First-Use. Media reports indicate that up to at least two more of these submarines are already on the anvil and ideally another two should follow to achieve continuous deterrence at sea.However, far too much hype has been generated around the Arihant.
We are already claiming membership of the exclusive nuclear submarine club based on a leased SSN and a SSBN that is yet to go to sea.Building a nuclear submarine is undoubtedly a remarkable achievement, but as the first ever submarine of its kind built in India, she will take a while to overcome her teething troubles which are inevitable and it would take at least three years for her to be deployed as a credible strategic deterrent after she puts to sea for the first time.
The leasing of the Akula II, commissioned as INS Chakra, is important because it not only provides the much needed SSN capability but is also invaluable in understanding the operational, maintenance and logistic complexities of operating such a technologically sophisticated platform. It is likely that its deployment would have to conform to various international restrictive regimes in force but would still add a substantial punch to the navys muscle. However, even if we were to lease more such submarines, it would not address our requirement of a fully operational SSN force for which indigenous construction would be a pre-requisite. It is also unlikely that leasing of such sophisticated technology from another nation would come without any strings attached. There is no capability within the country to build SSNs and needs to be expeditiously developed. It therefore seems unlikely that any more indigenous SSBNs or SSNs will be added in this decade and we should therefore be a little circumspect in evaluating our own capability.
Conventional Submarines.
Notwithstanding the induction of SSNs and SSBNs, it is the SSK which will continue to be the navys most effective weapon platform against a host of likely operational and tactical scenarios in our area of interest in the foreseeable future. The present force level of 14 submarines is getting older by the day and is a cause for grave concern. Even though the submarines have undergone extensive mid-life updates and a fair number have been retrofitted with the TLM, thus packing a powerful punch, it will become increasingly difficult to keep them fit for frontline deployment in adequate numbers. Submarine acquisition in India has always been in fits-and-starts which have led to issues with maintenance, refits, manning and operations.
To obviate this and to ensure a phased replacement and augmentation programme, the 30 Year Plan was promulgated and though still quoted, the extent to which it is being followed both in letter and spirit is debatable. The first part of the plan, designated Project 75 is currently underway with six submarines of the French Scorpene class under construction at MDL, Mumbai. The first of these is likely to be commissioned in 2015 with each of the remaining five following about one year apart. Therefore by the time the Project 75 programme is completed in 2020 ( an optimistic assessment), ten of the older submarines would be over 30 years old and even the last of the present lot over 20 years old. The effect of this on our undersea warfare capability in the emerging regional maritime scenario should ring a bell across the countrys security establishment.
While the delay in Project 75 was perhaps unavoidable due to a host of reasons, the delay in progressing the second phase of the 30 Year plan viz., Project 75(I) should be of utmost concern to the navy. A delay of over two years in issuing the RFP is baffling to say the very least. Considering that there are only four classes of submarines to choose from and the capabilities of all are known, selecting the right one for our requirements surely cannot be all that difficult. Even if the RFP is issued by the end of 2012, it would take at least ten years for the first submarine to enter service leading to a cascading effect on our depleting force levels. In the interim, to arrest the depletion in force levels and augment capability, outright purchase of two of these six submarines is also being considered which would alleviate the situation marginally.
The final phase of the plan, which envisages construction of an indigenous design on each of these two production lines, is in the design phase at present but is unlikely to commence before the end of this decade or till the Project 75(I) is well underway. The 30 year plan is already running at least seven years behind schedule and slipping further by the day. Naval acquisitions are capital-intensive, take time to build and integrate fully with existing platforms in a fully worked-up combat environment. It is thus important that a holistic view is taken of submarine force development to ensure a credible number of modern, well armed, state-of-the-art submarines at all times.
Conclusion
The Indian Navy, by virtue of its size and strategic location in the Indian Ocean is going is going to play an increasingly important role. The maritime posture will be a major determinant in the national security construct. This will necessitate a robust Indian naval presence, of which submarines will constitute a significant element. The Indian Navy has articulated a force level of 160 ships including three aircraft carriers and a proportional number of major surface combatants.
INDIAN NAVAL SUBS – Past, Present and Future | Defence and Security of India
