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Vinay Shankar
Posted online: Wednesday, November 15, 2006 at 0000 hrs IST
It appears that at long last the performance of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) might come under the scanner. It was subjected to some scrutiny after the Kargil war and a few reforms were suggested. Not much was done on those recommendations.
Commenting on the DRDO in isolation, without looking at the higher defence management framework within which it is placed, would perhaps lead to incomplete or even flawed deductions. Besides the services headquarters, the ministry of defence has the defence secretary and three other branches run by secretary-level officers. They are the secretaries, defence production, defence finance and defence R&D. Though they are deemed to be equal in status to the defence secretary, it is the defence secretary who wields the greater authority and who plays the pivotal role. Service chiefs and the other secretaries may interact with the defence minister but all coordination and policy formulation is through the defence secretary.
The point being made is that if the DRDO has not delivered for so many years, the blame must also rest with the higher defence and national security management apparatus to include the political leadership and bureaucrats for having been complicit in the DRDOââ¬â¢s failures. The problems of the DRDO begin from here, in that never has it been really held accountable for its breach of commitments. Occasionally, there may have been the odd adverse comment but beyond that the establishment has continually turned a blind eye to the DRDOââ¬â¢s poor performance.
And this takes us to the next question. Why has our higher defence management not reacted more sharply to the delays and cost overruns of DRDO projects? The part answer is, perhaps, its lack of commitment to the capability requirements that the service chiefs project. It may be contended with some conviction that this absence of serious commitment is the crux of the problem.
National security demands that the countryââ¬â¢s defence forces be of a size and potency that dissuades and deters potential adversaries against adventures like Kargil, or for that matter even the ongoing militancy and terrorism in J&K. The conclusion thus to be drawn is that there must be greater sanctity to the requirements that the defence services project together with accountability of those responsible for implementation of procurement plans.
The issues of self-reliance and indigenous production would acquire a clearer perspective if they were viewed against the backdrop of the capability projections of the three services. Against anticipated budgets, the services put up five-year plans for modernisation, expansion and capability accretion. These are within the framework of the desired service profile to be achieved within 15 years. Once whetted, these profiles must become the collective responsibility of all the departments of the MOD, including defence production and finance. The DRDO then must join the chorus instead of singing a different tune all the time. Having said this, it is also true that there would be slippages.
The difference between good and bad organisations often is that a bad organisation frequently forgets the purpose for which it was created. Having lost sight of why it came into being, its focus gets distorted. This distortion is evident in the DRDOââ¬â¢s workings. Instead of working in concert with the defence forces in ensuring that the services get weapon systems and force multipliers that they need within the desired time frames and without having to compromise on cost and quality, its purpose has been to get more projects, more funds, bigger budgets and grander establishments in the name of indigenous production capability. In its pursuit of self-aggrandisement it has also successfully acquired power and clout over the defence establishment.
Consequently, it manages to push quite a few decisions that are patently irrational. One example is the army being compelled to utilise the Arjun tank chassis for its requirement of self-propelled guns. Now these guns do not need the kind of engine power and protection that a tank must possess. Then again the Arjun chassis is overweight and frightfully expensive, yet the army must go along or get involved in a long-drawn battle that would end up further delaying the induction of these guns. We are today the only so-called modern army in the world, which does not have such guns. The case has been in the pipeline since the early eighties.
There are also examples of some needless development projects that the DRDO has undertaken. The outcome is an indifferent 105 mm ââ¬ËIndianââ¬â¢ field gun (we could have easily kept the ââ¬ËIndianââ¬â¢ out of it), a not-so-reliable family of 5.56 rifles and machine guns, the Pinaka being ordered this year when by the time it reaches the user it would have the dubious distinction of being an almost obsolete system. These are only a few examples.
The compulsions and logic of the DRDO developing long-range missiles or electronic warfare systems are understandable. There are technology denial regimes in place for such systems. Again, there are other technologies where we have no alternative but to vigorously pursue indigenous development. The DRDO thus must concentrate its energies on such projects. Research in growing vegetables, food preservation technologies and the like must be abandoned forthwith.
Some serious in-house introspection and brainstorming is in order. It needs to shed the culture of aping officialdom and the trappings of government. The focus should be on laboratories and workshops. Simultaneously, the DRDO could do well to seek a thorough external audit.
Most of the work currently on the drawing board could be farmed out to the private sector or the defence PSUs. More than half of the current establishment could be slashed. The resources thus generated could be used to focus on core strategic technologies by mobilising the talent needed to conduct such frontier technology research.
An analysis of the comparative achievements of our DRDO with that of other nationââ¬â¢s defence R&D establishments would highlight our dismal performance. It is not that our scientists are not as good or even better than the others. It is just that the system that we have created is not conducive to excellence. We therefore need to change the system, the work ethos and the culture of the DRDO.
The writer was director-general, artillery, during the Kargil conflict
Posted online: Wednesday, November 15, 2006 at 0000 hrs IST
It appears that at long last the performance of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) might come under the scanner. It was subjected to some scrutiny after the Kargil war and a few reforms were suggested. Not much was done on those recommendations.
Commenting on the DRDO in isolation, without looking at the higher defence management framework within which it is placed, would perhaps lead to incomplete or even flawed deductions. Besides the services headquarters, the ministry of defence has the defence secretary and three other branches run by secretary-level officers. They are the secretaries, defence production, defence finance and defence R&D. Though they are deemed to be equal in status to the defence secretary, it is the defence secretary who wields the greater authority and who plays the pivotal role. Service chiefs and the other secretaries may interact with the defence minister but all coordination and policy formulation is through the defence secretary.
The point being made is that if the DRDO has not delivered for so many years, the blame must also rest with the higher defence and national security management apparatus to include the political leadership and bureaucrats for having been complicit in the DRDOââ¬â¢s failures. The problems of the DRDO begin from here, in that never has it been really held accountable for its breach of commitments. Occasionally, there may have been the odd adverse comment but beyond that the establishment has continually turned a blind eye to the DRDOââ¬â¢s poor performance.
And this takes us to the next question. Why has our higher defence management not reacted more sharply to the delays and cost overruns of DRDO projects? The part answer is, perhaps, its lack of commitment to the capability requirements that the service chiefs project. It may be contended with some conviction that this absence of serious commitment is the crux of the problem.
National security demands that the countryââ¬â¢s defence forces be of a size and potency that dissuades and deters potential adversaries against adventures like Kargil, or for that matter even the ongoing militancy and terrorism in J&K. The conclusion thus to be drawn is that there must be greater sanctity to the requirements that the defence services project together with accountability of those responsible for implementation of procurement plans.
The issues of self-reliance and indigenous production would acquire a clearer perspective if they were viewed against the backdrop of the capability projections of the three services. Against anticipated budgets, the services put up five-year plans for modernisation, expansion and capability accretion. These are within the framework of the desired service profile to be achieved within 15 years. Once whetted, these profiles must become the collective responsibility of all the departments of the MOD, including defence production and finance. The DRDO then must join the chorus instead of singing a different tune all the time. Having said this, it is also true that there would be slippages.
The difference between good and bad organisations often is that a bad organisation frequently forgets the purpose for which it was created. Having lost sight of why it came into being, its focus gets distorted. This distortion is evident in the DRDOââ¬â¢s workings. Instead of working in concert with the defence forces in ensuring that the services get weapon systems and force multipliers that they need within the desired time frames and without having to compromise on cost and quality, its purpose has been to get more projects, more funds, bigger budgets and grander establishments in the name of indigenous production capability. In its pursuit of self-aggrandisement it has also successfully acquired power and clout over the defence establishment.
Consequently, it manages to push quite a few decisions that are patently irrational. One example is the army being compelled to utilise the Arjun tank chassis for its requirement of self-propelled guns. Now these guns do not need the kind of engine power and protection that a tank must possess. Then again the Arjun chassis is overweight and frightfully expensive, yet the army must go along or get involved in a long-drawn battle that would end up further delaying the induction of these guns. We are today the only so-called modern army in the world, which does not have such guns. The case has been in the pipeline since the early eighties.
There are also examples of some needless development projects that the DRDO has undertaken. The outcome is an indifferent 105 mm ââ¬ËIndianââ¬â¢ field gun (we could have easily kept the ââ¬ËIndianââ¬â¢ out of it), a not-so-reliable family of 5.56 rifles and machine guns, the Pinaka being ordered this year when by the time it reaches the user it would have the dubious distinction of being an almost obsolete system. These are only a few examples.
The compulsions and logic of the DRDO developing long-range missiles or electronic warfare systems are understandable. There are technology denial regimes in place for such systems. Again, there are other technologies where we have no alternative but to vigorously pursue indigenous development. The DRDO thus must concentrate its energies on such projects. Research in growing vegetables, food preservation technologies and the like must be abandoned forthwith.
Some serious in-house introspection and brainstorming is in order. It needs to shed the culture of aping officialdom and the trappings of government. The focus should be on laboratories and workshops. Simultaneously, the DRDO could do well to seek a thorough external audit.
Most of the work currently on the drawing board could be farmed out to the private sector or the defence PSUs. More than half of the current establishment could be slashed. The resources thus generated could be used to focus on core strategic technologies by mobilising the talent needed to conduct such frontier technology research.
An analysis of the comparative achievements of our DRDO with that of other nationââ¬â¢s defence R&D establishments would highlight our dismal performance. It is not that our scientists are not as good or even better than the others. It is just that the system that we have created is not conducive to excellence. We therefore need to change the system, the work ethos and the culture of the DRDO.
The writer was director-general, artillery, during the Kargil conflict
