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Indian Economy Crises - Updated, News & Discussion

India’s shadow banking crisis raises spectre of contagion
Financial groups such as Indiabulls see shares fall as crisis grows
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Workers at an Indiabulls Real Estate project in Mumbai. A liquidity crunch in India's non-bank financial sector could also threaten the country's banks and real-estate sector © Bloomberg
At the turn of the millennium, a group of entrepreneurs in their twenties banded together in a cramped office near a New Delhi bus terminal to start what they hoped would be India’s answer to Charles Schwab.

Almost two decades later, founder Sameer Gehlaut — the son of a politician and army officer, once dubbed India’s youngest billionaire — and longtime executive Gagan Banga have more than achieved their dream, turning their company Indiabulls into one of the country’s most prominent financial groups.

Today, Indiabulls comprises a non-bank financial company, or shadow bank, with $17bn in assets and a real-estate developer. It has thrown its weight behind eye-catching projects such as the construction of India’s tallest buildingand the Mandarin Hotel in Mayfair. “They came out of nowhere,” said one Mumbai-based executive.

But the group’s success has been overshadowed in recent months by a growing crisis in India’s shadow banks, whose problems investors and analysts increasingly fear could spark contagion among conventional banks and real-estate companies and cause a broader financial crisis.

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Shares of Indiabulls Housing Finance have fallen about 50 per cent since late September after the central bank blocked an attempted merger with a local bank, cutting off an important source of financing. A court, meanwhile, also agreed to hear a lawsuit alleging that Indiabulls misused funds — claims the company strenuously denies.

“We took on the big daddies of that time,” Mr Banga said, referring to the company’s rise. “It’s not the first time that we’ve been hurt.”

The woes at Indiabulls come only a year after the collapse of another shadow bank, IL&FS, sparked panic known as India’s “Lehman moment”. With the funding crunch since spreading to many of India’s 10,000-odd NBFCs — which are broadly less regulated than conventional banks — analysts say last year’s scare may not be a one-off.

You could almost take the Big Short, change the American names to Indian names, change Wall Street to Dalal Street, and you have got the best description of the NBFC crisis in our country

Saurabh Mukherjea, founder of Marcellus Investment Managers
A Reserve Bank of India report estimated that the failure of the largest NBFCs or housing finance companies could cause defaults in up to two banks. Nervousness about the financial sector rose this month after the RBI, responding to troubles at a small co-operative bank, issued a statement that the “Indian banking system is safe and stable and there is no need to panic”.

“It’s only a matter of time, if things are not resolved, that we’ll start to see bigger defaults in the sector,” said Saswata Guha, Fitch’s head of financial institutions in India. “There’s a risk of contagion which may flow through [NBFCs] and also banks. It’s very hard to say how this will unravel.”

Some say the problems in India’s financial companies, many of which lent heavily to real estate, echo the collapse of the housing bubble that contributed to the 2008 US financial crisis.

“You could almost take the Big Short, change the American names to Indian names, change Wall Street to Dalal Street, and you have got the best description of the NBFC crisis in our country,” said Saurabh Mukherjea, founder of Marcellus Investment Managers.

Start-up shadow banks such as Indiabulls grew to play a crucial role in India’s fast-growing economy over the past decade, coming to account for a fifth of new credit for everything from car purchases to education and luxury real-estate development.

Many borrowed cheaply from traditional banks and booming mutual funds on a short-term basis while financing long-term projects. But the scare following AAA-rated IL&FS’s defaults in September 2018 prompted the traditional institutions that fuelled the NBFCs’ rise to curtail funding sharply.

Between August 2018 to September this year mutual funds cut their exposure to the sector by around 30 per cent to Rs2.9tn ($41bn), according to Credit Suisse, and exposure to Indiabulls fell 86 per cent over the same period.

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Another big shadow bank, Dewan Housing Finance, meanwhile, is negotiating with creditors after its rating was downgraded to default in June because it missed interest payments. Its stock has lost 97 per cent since its pre-IL&FS peak.

As a result, shadow banks have slashed their own lending by about a third, according to the Finance Industry Development Council, prompting a severe credit crunch that has hurt everything from car to housing sales. Authorities have announced a $10bn recapitalisation of public-sector banks designed to get liquidity flowing again.

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Moody’s, which downgraded its outlook on Indiabulls’ rating to negative, cited concerns about its ability to continue accessing funding and its governance standards.

Indiabulls said the Moody’s downgrade was due to a “difference in opinion” and that it had built up a cash pool of about $2.5bn, which would cover its debt repayments for the next year. It said the lawsuit, filed by the Citizens Whistle Blower Forum, contained “distorted and fabricated facts”.

Mr Banga, who like Mr Gehlaut is from a military family, said the accusations of wrongdoing were simply a backlash towards outsiders who had broken into a corporate oligopoly of dynastic business families.

“Unless you’re part of a large conglomerate today you’re being hammered for no rhyme or reason,” he said. “It is very easy to target someone whose parents or grandparents have not been around for hundreds of years.”
 
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Hard Times: How do we know India is facing an economic slowdown – not just a temporary speedbump?
Narendra Modi’s government has put tremendous effort and time into convincing Indians that nothing is wrong with the Indian economy.
Rohan VenkataramakrishnanNov 05, 2019 · 09:00 am
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Illustration: Nithya Subramanian
Last week, Mukesh Ambani, India’s richest man, announced something that has been obvious to anyone observing the Indian economy: that there is a slowdown. Ambani tried to soften the blow, calling it a “slight” slowdow, and insisting that it is “temporary”. But he acknowledged it nevertheless.

Is India’s economy in slowdown? It is amazing – and yet not entirely surprising – that this can even be a question for some. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has put tremendous effort and time into convincing the Indian public that nothing is wrong with the Indian economy.

The government has claimed that India’s is still one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies. That an auto industry slump is just the result of millennials moving from car ownership to Uber and Ola. That growth-rate maths does not matter because that did not help “Einstein discover gravity”. Even that three movies doing well at the box office prove that there is no slowdown.

Above all, the government has sought to confuse the wider public on this account, and to fall back on its tried and tested tactic of insisting that any criticism is politically motivated.

But this much is clear: the Indian economy is slowing down massively.

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How do we know this?
The methodology to calculate India’s Gross Domestic Product and its growth rate was updated in 2015. Ever since this change in the formula, there have been credible questions from economists all over the world about whether it is throwing out accurate figures.

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Among those raising questions has been Arvind Subramanian, Modi’s own former Chief Economic Adviser, who wrote in a paper that the GDP growth rates might be inflated by as much as 2.5 percentage points.

The government has pushed back against all of these questions, insisting that all criticism is political rather than economic.

Here’s the thing, though: You don’t need to look at contested alternate calculations to see India’s growth slowdown. It is there in the official figures, the ones endorsed by Modi and his finance ministry.

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In the first quarter of Financial Year 2019-2020 (which goes from April-March), the GDP growth came down to 5%, below the 5.8% of the previous quarter and the 5.7% expected by analysts. That is five straight quarters of declining growth, as well as a six-year low.

If you actually believed the criticism of the GDP calculating methodology, some may argue that the true growth number is lower. But, the fact is, you don’t need to go to alternate calculations to see the economy is in a funk. The government’s own numbers are saying so.

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Why is this even debatable?
Maybe the most important thing to know about this current crisis for the Indian economy is that it has come despite relatively low inflation. That means prices of items, whether staples or luxury items, haven’t been going up. Instead, the slowdown has made itself apparent in a lack of growth, particularly of wages, of sales and, by inference, of demand.

Put differently, the indicators that reveal India is in slowdown are things like the following: income levels have remained stagnant. Sales of consumer items like two-wheelers and cars have fallen off a cliff. Farmers are notching up major losses. Investment levels have dropped massively. Banks aren’t handing out loans. Real-estate firms are facing collapse. Households are borrowing more and dipping into their savings.

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Take any of these data-points separately and it might be easy to convince yourself that it is an individual problem. That it is just you who hasn’t got a raise or has unsold inventory or has to postpone buying a car, which may not be true for everyone. This is unlike inflation, when it is clear that prices have risen for everyone.

But data and its interpretation, ultimately, can be contested. Which is exactly what the government has done. Take the precipitous drop in car sales this year. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman argued that it had to do with millennials preferring car-sharing apps like Uber and Ola instead of car ownership, and so did not a slowdown. The argument sounds compelling and so will convince a section of the people, even though the nation’s largest car manufacturer dismissed it altogether.

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Now add the economic events of the last few years: demonetisation, a very complex Goods and Services Tax and a government tax regime aimed at putting the squeeze on everyone. Each of these came with a moral argument insisting that anyone critical was in favour of corruption, as well as a massive amount of government

Finally, there was the huge mandate for the Bharatiya Janata Party to return to power in the Lok Sabha polls. All of this put together may explain why people are susceptible to the argument that the pain they are facing is not shared universally.

But the data – including uncontested, government statistics – on this is clear: The slowdown is real, and it is affecting everyone.

Could it be linked to a global slowdown?
There is no doubt that the Indian economy is linked to international conditions. The global economy is currently facing significant headwinds, with many economists believing it could soon lapse into recession. This is partly aided by the global trade war between China and the United States, as well as a belief that some of the monetary policy levers used over the last decade may have had unintended consequences.

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But insisting that this is solely responsible for India’s economic woes is a facile argument that ignores actual conditions.

India has in the past been able to chart a different path from the global economy, with an example coming as recently as the worldwide economic crash of 2008. Although India too felt the hit of the crash, it rebounded very quickly afterwards, while the rest of the world took half a decade to climb out of the morass.

Moreover, Modi came to power with extremely benign conditions five years ago. Yet rather than build on it, just as the economy was starting to grow, he introduced demonetisation and a badly designed Goods and Services Tax. This twin shock is now generally blamed for ensuring India would go into a slowdown, even though data will show that the slowing had begun even before demonetisation.

Or, as former Chief Economic Adviser Raghuram Rajan puts it:

“There’s an attempt to say this is because of the outside. The world is slowing. Well, the world actually was growing more slowly in the earlier period. Sometimes we want to pin it on oil. Oil is actually cheaper now than it was in the earlier period when we were growing strongly. Of course, sometimes we want to pin it on trade. Trade has been relatively weak in both periods. I think looking to the outside, to blame the outside for what’s going on is probably wrong.

What is probably a better explanation is really, this is a consequence of not having invested. For nearly 15 years or probably, since the global financial crisis not having picked up the pace of investment, that’s one. And the second is the lack of reform; of significant reform over the same period and both those have combined with, these are acts of omission in some sense, with acts of commission. The sequence of Demonetisation and the goods and services tax essentially was a straw that seems to have broken the Indian economy’s back.”

But isn’t India growing much faster than everyone else?
Growth is, by itself, not a good indicator of how robust an economy. That is because the growth rate is a reflection of how small or large the economy was in the first place, and how much it has changed since then.

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India’s economy is still much smaller than that of some of the world’s major economies. So though a 6% growth rate might sound extremely fast when compared to the 2% numbers being notched by the developed world, it actually means India will continue to remain tiny in comparison.

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As the Economist points out, “[China] is still adding the equivalent of a quarter of India’s economy every year. If India were to sustain its GDP growth per person of 7%—about its average for the past two decades—to 2030, it would barely have got to where China is today. And even that may prove ambitious.”

Could it be cyclical? Is a recovery around the corner?
One argument from those who acknowledge that there is a slowdown is an insistence that this is a cyclical problem, and not a structural one.

A cyclical slowdown assumes it is something like a seasonal phenomenon, where the business cycle has natural peaks and troughs and India just has to wait for the wheel to turn, and demand to return – helped by one or two-measures aimed at kickstarting the cycle.

A structural slowdown, however, is a reflection of something deeper. This would mean that certain fundamental conditions of the economy are responsible for the slowdown, and no quick fixes will resolve the problem. Ending such a slide will mean having to carry out genuine reform.

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The government has argued that the current conditions are more cyclical than structural. Others have pointed out that, in fact, India has seen investment falling since 2011 – with no sign of the wheel turning.

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The answer, however, for many is: It’s both. In other words, while current conditions – particularly the inability or unwillingness of banks to lend and policy uncertainty – may be responsible for the immediate slide, the downturn also reflects much deeper, structural problems that cannot be resolved through a short-term stimulus package.

Here’s the Reserve Bank of India’s Annual Report for 2018-19.

“A decomposition of various seasonally adjusted indicators of economic activity, aggregate and sectoral, into trend and cyclical components suggests the recent deceleration could be in the nature of a soft patch mutating into a cyclical downswing, rather than a deep structural slowdown,” the report says. “Nonetheless, there are still structural issues in land, labour, agricultural marketing and the like, which need to be addressed.”

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For now, however, most analysts are expecting growth to remain subdued this year and few are expecting a return to an 8% level anytime soon.

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So what caused it – and how do we fix it?
Answering both of those questions is a key part of the Hard Times series, in which we hope to both demystify all that is happening in the economy and also engage with thinking about what needs to be done to climb out of this hole.

Click here to sign up for our special newsletter to get the ‘Hard Times’ series directly delivered to your mailbox.
Support our journalism by subscribing to Scroll+. We welcome your comments atletters@scroll.in.
 
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India's slowing economy takes deadly turn, but Modi is in denial
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© AFP ‘Tax terrorism’ is driving Indians to despair. Photo: AFP
  • Growth is falling, unemployment is rising, banks are being battered and people hounded for tax are killing themselves
  • Something is up in India’s economy, if only the prime minister would admit it
When Vodafone Chief executive Nick Read told reporters in London this month the company might have to shut up shop in India, the response from New Delhi was swift and unequivocal.

Almost as soon as Read had finished his press conference – in which he alluded to two lawsuits that have left the company owing US$55 million due to changes in spectrum licensing laws – media reports were relaying the Indian government’s “displeasure and disapproval” of Read’s “tone and tenor”.

Just 24 hours later, Read had apologised to the Indian government, blaming the media for misquoting him and claiming he remained “invested in India”.

Ironically, as this was playing out, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was attending a summit of the developing BRICS economies in Brazil, where he touted India as the “world’s most open, investment-friendly economy”.

© Reuters Narendra Modi with other leaders of the BRICS countries at a summit in Brasilia. Photo: Reuters
The two episodes, say critics, illustrate either myopia or outright denial on New Delhi’s part over the economic challenges headed its way. Just as danger signs are emerging in its economy – with early forecasts suggesting growth in the second quarter may have been as low as 4.2 per cent, the lowest since 2012 – many are wondering if the government’s attitude towards the business sector is making matters worse.

This week, former prime minister Manmohan Singh, a Cambridge-educated economist, wrote in The Hindu newspaper that “a climate of fear and mistrust” was impeding economic growth.

“Many industrialists tell me that they live in fear of harassment by government authorities. Bankers are reluctant to make new loans, for fear of retribution. Entrepreneurs are hesitant to put up fresh projects … Technology start-ups, an important new engine of economic growth and jobs, seem to live under a shadow of constant surveillance and deep suspicion. Policymakers in government and other institutions are scared to speak the truth or engage in intellectually honest policy discussions.”

© Reuters India’s former prime minister Manmohan Singh. Photo: Reuters
RED FLAGS, ALL AROUND

Singh’s concerns about the economy are reflected not only in falling GDP growth. Rural consumption has plummeted by 8.8 per cent, the sharpest drop in more than four decades, while in manufacturing – one of India’s largest employers – growth is flatlining and was just 0.6 per cent last quarter.

Most global ratings agencies have downgraded their predictions for India’s growth in the next two quarters to less than 5 per cent. Such a figure might be enviable to some countries, but in India it is a cause for concern. The country’s annual GDP growth rate has averaged above 6 per cent for the past 70 years and hit an all-time high of more than 11 per cent in the first quarter of 2010.

With many companies turning to cost-cutting measures, the spectre of mass lay-offs looms large. More than 110 power plants have shut since August, with operators citing lack of demand, while at least six major automobile plants have been forced to halt production due to low sales.

Investor sentiment is grim. Credit growth is falling and business confidence is at a six-year low.

So far, the government’s steps to address the problems have been far from reassuring. It has rolled back key tax proposals – such as a surcharge on foreign and domestic portfolio investors and a tax on start-ups – after criticism and has been mocked for the explanations it has offered for the slowdown, such as when Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman blamed poor car sales on millennials using Uber rather than buying their own vehicles.

© AFP India’s Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman has been mocked for blaming poor car sales on millennials using Uber rather than buying their own vehicles. Photo: AFP
Economist and author Vivek Kaul says the government inaction is worrying. “The first step towards solving the problem is to accept it. Sadly, there has been no acceptance by the government that the economy is flailing, despite there being clear signs of a slowdown.”

One of the fundamental problems, Kaul says, is the lack of investment, a factor that may in part be caused by a lack of credible data regarding key economic indicators. On various occasions, the Modi government has discredited its own data when it showed unpleasant facts. In February this year, it junked its own report showing unemployment was at 6 per cent, a 45-year high, and rising, while last week, it distanced itself from another government report that showed rural consumption at a four-decade low.

“These things don’t augur well for the country’s investor-friendliness,” says Kaul. “Credible data is important [to] foreign investors.”

‘THE CLEAN-UP’

The Indian government says it is engaged in a “clean-up” of the economy. In cracking down on a mounting pile of bad loans, it is pursuing the heads of some private banks and seeking the extradition of former employees who have caused massive losses before leaving the country.

But the clean-up has also meant India’s banking sector has taken a tumble. Banks have registered huge losses and major names such as the Punjab Maharashtra Cooperative Bank have gone bust. Others are on the verge of collapse. As a result, credit flows have come to a grinding stop.

© AFP Indians demonstrate against Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s demonetisation drive. Photo: AFP
Modi came to power in 2014 on the mandate of providing a “corruption-free” and “decisive” government that promised to act against economic offenders. However, this doctrine also drove it to demonetise 86 per cent of India’s cash in circulation in 2016, a step that proved disastrous for the economy, leading to 5 million job losses and an estimated 2 per cent drop in economic growth.

Still, even critics accept it is not all Modi’s fault. “Much of this mess has been inherited from the previous Singh-led coalition government. Action against [bank sector] offenders was necessary and welcome,” says Sucheta Dalal, the founder of the NGO Moneylife Foundation.

What the government is guilty of, says Dalal, is conflating its clean-up with what she and many others call “tax terrorism”. She recalls various taxpayers seeking Moneylife’s help who are being pursued over tax matters they thought had been settled up to a decade ago.

“The problem is, the government treats all of us as criminals and tax offenders. This criminalisation is particularly bad and expensive to deal with for smaller businesses and industries because of the hefty legal costs,” Dalal says.

© AFP Indian labourers carry clay bricks to a kiln in Farakka. The construction industry is among India’s biggest employers. Photo: AFP
(UN) EASE OF DOING BUSINESS

The effects can be devastating. In July, VG Siddhartha, a celebrated businessman who founded the Cafe Coffee Day chain, jumped into a river outside Bangalore. In his suicide note, Siddhartha blamed harassment by tax officials.

Various media commentators blamed the death on Modi’s government for “harassment” and “terrorism” on tax matters. Other, similar, cases have been reported and many more do not come to the public’s attention as many victims are too scared to speak out.

Making matters worse is the corruption that still permeates all levels of society. While the government claims to have cracked down on the problem – and India this year jumped 14 places in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business ratings to finish at 63 – the truth is that running a business remains a costly affair, largely due to the bribes that must be paid to government officials.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Mumbai, where the city government has said businesses can apply for licences online so as to leave no scope for corruption by officials.

“But officials told us that if we apply online, our permissions will be delayed by many months. The same officials are, however, happy to issue us the permits if we pay a bribe,” says one businessman trying to set up a restaurant.

That leaves the government with another problem: deciding whether to prioritise efforts to boost growth or clamp down on corruption.

“The government must realise that while the clean-up is good, it is far more important for it to improve the economy. There has been a complete failure of the administration in managing financial policy and that needs to be corrected immediately,” Dalal says.

Otherwise, critics warn, mounting unemployment could turn a financial tragedy into a human one. ■
 
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More gloom for Indian economy: Core sector shrinks 5.8 per cent
Economists see no immediate prospect of recovery unless the government pumps money into the system.
sensex_traders_Reuters_12pic.jpg

For representational purposes (File Photo | Reuters)

By Express News Service
NEW DELHI: The economic slowdown is showing no sign of abatement, as the output of eight core infrastructure industries shrank 5.8 per cent in October, their worst performance in a decade, with six of the eight sectors contracting, and experts see no silver lining.

Government data released on Friday reveals that coal production fell steeply, by 17.6 per cent, crude oil by 5.1 per cent, and natural gas by 5.7 per cent.

Production of cement contracted by 7.7 per cent, of steel by 1.6 per cent, and of electricity by 12.4 per cent, mainly due to sluggish economic activity.

Even growth in the output of refinery products slowed down to 0.4 per cent in October as against 1.3 per cent in the same period last year.

The only sector that posted growth in October was fertilizers, where production increased by 11.8 per cent year-on-year.

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The eight core sectors had expanded by 4.8 per cent in October 2018.

During the April-October period, the growth of core industries fell to 0.2 per cent against 5.4 per cent in the year-ago period. This is the third month in a row when the core infrastructure sector has contracted. The output of the eight core infrastructure industries had contracted by 5.1 per cent in September.

“Economic growth may have slowed but there is no recession, there can be no recession,” Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman had said in the Rajya Sabha earlier this week.

However, economists see no immediate sign of recovery, unless the government pumps money into the system.

“With the just-released index of eight core industries falling 5.8 per cent in October, bottoming out of growth could be further down the road and recovery is unlikely to be V-shaped as consumer demand, credit supply and risk appetite remain lacklustre,” said Sreejith Balasubramanian, economist, IDFC.

The recovery, they claim, will depend on government support.

“Growth in the second half of the year could remain evasive unless the government pumps in more stimulus and continues its growth push through the fiscal year. The grind is going to be slow and heavily dependent on fiscal support to come out of the current growth recession,” said Rajni Thakur, economist, RBL Bank.

Meanwhile, the market benchmark BSE Sensex tumbled 336 points on Friday as investors turned jittery ahead of the release of GDP data.

Commenting on the data, ICRA Ltd said based on the unfavourable performance of the core sector, the contraction in the IIP appears set to deepen in October 2019.

“The sharp worsening in the performance of electricity generation and cement in October 2019 offset the sequential improvements in refinery production, fertilisers and coal, resulting in an even deeper contraction of the core sector output in that month,” it said in a statement.
 
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More gloom for Indian economy: Core sector shrinks 5.8 per cent
Economists see no immediate prospect of recovery unless the government pumps money into the system.
sensex_traders_Reuters_12pic.jpg

For representational purposes (File Photo | Reuters)

By Express News Service
NEW DELHI: The economic slowdown is showing no sign of abatement, as the output of eight core infrastructure industries shrank 5.8 per cent in October, their worst performance in a decade, with six of the eight sectors contracting, and experts see no silver lining.

Government data released on Friday reveals that coal production fell steeply, by 17.6 per cent, crude oil by 5.1 per cent, and natural gas by 5.7 per cent.

Production of cement contracted by 7.7 per cent, of steel by 1.6 per cent, and of electricity by 12.4 per cent, mainly due to sluggish economic activity.

Even growth in the output of refinery products slowed down to 0.4 per cent in October as against 1.3 per cent in the same period last year.

The only sector that posted growth in October was fertilizers, where production increased by 11.8 per cent year-on-year.

MORE.PNG


The eight core sectors had expanded by 4.8 per cent in October 2018.

During the April-October period, the growth of core industries fell to 0.2 per cent against 5.4 per cent in the year-ago period. This is the third month in a row when the core infrastructure sector has contracted. The output of the eight core infrastructure industries had contracted by 5.1 per cent in September.

“Economic growth may have slowed but there is no recession, there can be no recession,” Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman had said in the Rajya Sabha earlier this week.

However, economists see no immediate sign of recovery, unless the government pumps money into the system.

“With the just-released index of eight core industries falling 5.8 per cent in October, bottoming out of growth could be further down the road and recovery is unlikely to be V-shaped as consumer demand, credit supply and risk appetite remain lacklustre,” said Sreejith Balasubramanian, economist, IDFC.

The recovery, they claim, will depend on government support.

“Growth in the second half of the year could remain evasive unless the government pumps in more stimulus and continues its growth push through the fiscal year. The grind is going to be slow and heavily dependent on fiscal support to come out of the current growth recession,” said Rajni Thakur, economist, RBL Bank.

Meanwhile, the market benchmark BSE Sensex tumbled 336 points on Friday as investors turned jittery ahead of the release of GDP data.

Commenting on the data, ICRA Ltd said based on the unfavourable performance of the core sector, the contraction in the IIP appears set to deepen in October 2019.

“The sharp worsening in the performance of electricity generation and cement in October 2019 offset the sequential improvements in refinery production, fertilisers and coal, resulting in an even deeper contraction of the core sector output in that month,” it said in a statement.
#FakeNewj
 
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The miracle growth was only reserved for China.

LOL at India. The American and European nations combined their efforts and tried their level best to assist India as a counterweight to China, but the results are visible for everyone.
 
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The boycotts are working. Pakistan was a multi billion dollar market for Indian goods, modi ruined that.

I needed to buy brake discs. I was about to buy eicher products, but read its Indian brand. So no thank you, spent extra for non indian brand.

https://www.eurocarparts.com/eicher
 
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China should immediately takeover India and show them how it's done.
 
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Why India is staring at a middle-income trap
For India, there are few things more important than our challenge of becoming rich before we become old. We know, from historical experience, that the only way out of mass poverty is to obtain modest rates of growth of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) that are sustained for many decades. As an example, if per capita GDP grows at 4% per year, there is one doubling every 18 years. Per capita GDP would then go up by eight times in 50 years, and at the end of this, we would have graduated beyond middle income.

The early rhetoric about economic development viewed an underdeveloped country as a child. Growth was inevitable. It was only a matter of putting in a few auxiliary actions which helped and enabled that process. In this world view, we run the risk of thinking that progress is inevitable, that progress involves steel mills, and we can save everyone the time and trouble by having state-run steel mills.

We now know that there is no inevitability about the rise of a country into the ranks of a prosperous democracy. There are only four countries which were poor in 1945 that are now prosperous democracies: South Korea, Taiwan, Chile and Israel. In all those countries, growth came as a result of improvements in state capability.

A prominent measure of state capability, in a globally comparable data set, is available for the 1996–2012 period. By this measure, state capability has risen in only a few countries over this period, and state capability in India declined in this period. Our institutional capacity got worse in a period of strong GDP growth. We do wrong in equating GDP growth with improvement in the foundations for GDP growth.

Based on the Indian experience, we can conjecture a mechanism through which higher GDP growth caused reduced state capacity. When bigger rupee values are at stake, private persons have more to gain by undermining state institutions. The resources that are brought to bear to attack the working of state institutions are larger when GDP is higher.

We vividly saw this in India in the period after 2005 when the country was starting to reap remarkable success by private sector firms. The prospective gains from subverting state institutions were suddenly larger and we got bigger investments into attacks on institutions. State apparatus that used to work when million-rupee bribes were offered broke down when the offers went to billions of rupees.

Perhaps India’s growth of 1979–2011 was not adequately grounded in the required institutional capacity to be a prosperous liberal democracy, and perhaps this has something to do with the difficulties that have been seen after 2011.

The growth model of 1991–2011 has not carried forward into the following years. Private “under implementation" investment projects rose from ₹10 trillion in 2006 to ₹50 trillion in 2011. After that, there has been a decline in nominal terms to ₹40 trillion in mid-2019. The share of non-workers in the working-age population stands at 60.43% in April–June 2019. These statistics illustrate the difficulties that have arisen in the post-2011 period.

Middle-income trap

In many other countries, the phenomenon of a “middle-income trap" has been observed. At the early stages of development, the simple mobilization of labour and capital suffices to escape from abject poverty. But once the minimal market economy is in place, a different level of institutional quality is required. The maturation of firms and the government creates the need for complex contracts, contract enforcement, economic regulation, and institutions that intermediate and channel the conflicts between social groups.

When a middle-income country seeks to rise to a mature market economy, and institutional capacity is weak, growth stalls. Long years ago, we made a tryst with destiny, and we must find our way out of these dark woods. The most important question in Indian economics and policymaking today is that of diagnosing and addressing the sources of underperformance that have arisen from 2011 onward. A phenomenon of this size cannot just come about owing to some events. There is a need for a conceptual framework in understanding what happened, and then, in changing it.

Our key submission is that a lot of government intervention, and the licence-permit-inspector raj remains in place. The early dawn of economic freedom that was promised in 1991 has not evolved into a mature market economy. Private persons are beset with government intervention. The instincts of central planning are alive and well among policymakers. There is a great deal of arbitrary power in the hands of the government. Extensive interference in the economy by the government, the policy risk associated with future interventions, and the fear of how arbitrary power in the hands of the government will be used have led to a loss of confidence in the private sector.

State capacity deficit

When India was a small economy, the GDP was small, and the gains from violating rules were also relatively small. The tenfold growth in the size of the economy created new opportunities to obtain wealth. The gains from violating rules went up sharply. Large resources were brought to bear upon subverting state institutions.

The foundations of state institutions in terms of the rule of law, and checks and balances were always weak. This combination of an amplified effort by private persons to subvert institutions, coupled with low state capacity, has resulted in a decline of institutional quality.

Addressing these problems requires going to the foundations. Why do we require state intervention? Why is state capacity low? How should state organizations be constructed so as to cater to a gradual improvement of state capacity? What is the right approach to public policy when state capacity is low? These are the most important questions of Indian economics today.

Economic thinkers of the previous decades tended to focus on economics more narrowly, on issues such as the green revolution or heavy industry or trade liberalization. Now, we need to more explicitly locate ourselves in the intersection of politics and the economy. To make sustained economic growth possible, we require the republic.

The founding energy of liberal democracy is the pursuit of freedom, of people being masters of their own fate. We need to shift away from notions of a developmental state, where big initiatives originate from the government, towards a philosophy of respect for the self-organizing system that is a free society. We need to rely far more on private negotiations, private contracts and civil society solutions, rather than turning to the government to solve problems. The state should be the last resort in resolving difficulties, not the first.

Intervening in social systems is a messy business, and very often, things go wrong. The Indian landscape is littered with outcomes that are the opposite of what was intended. APMCs (agricultural produce market committees) were not intended to create entrenched power in the hands of traders. Land ceiling Acts were not intended to create shortages of real estate and high prices for real estate. Bank nationalization was not intended to hamper growth, stability and inclusion.

Every now and then, we hear proposals in India to hold state coercion intact and make life easier for private persons by setting up “single-window approval". There are two problems with this approach. First, we do not make the Gestapo nicer by setting up a pleasant front desk. Single-window systems do not solve the problem of state coercion, and the threat of raids and punishments, including possibly criminal sanctions.

Second, in the absence of deeper reform, it is hard to build single-window systems that overcome a maze of restrictions. Many or most enthusiastic announcements of single-window systems fail to work out in practice.

We must go deeper. We reform by whittling down and correcting state intervention, not putting a user interface on it. The reform required in the early 1990s was not a single-window system governing IPO (initial public offering) approvals, it was the abolition of the office of the Controller of Capital Issues. The reform required in trade liberalization was not a single-window system for import approvals, it was the removal of trade barriers. Our problem in India is inappropriate state coercion that limits cross-border activities and this is not solved by a single-window system governing approvals for cross-border activities.

A template for reform

But India can and must change. There are many elements through which the scope of state intervention can be reduced.

Can some of the work of regulation be pushed down to private firms? Consider the problem of regulating taxis. One possibility lies in setting up a bureaucratic machinery that engages with each taxi driver. Another pathway lies in contracting out this regulation to private taxi companies. Aggregation business models, such as Airbnb, have an incentive to utilize customer feedback and supervisory staff to improve the quality of their customer experience. In general, this is an easier path for the construction of state capacity as the number of transactions is reduced.

Does modern technology make it possible to remove the market failure? Sometimes, there are clever solutions through which a market failure can be eliminated. Consider the electromagnetic spectrum.

At first blush, we think that the use of spectrum is rival: one person communicating at a certain frequency precludes others from using it. The state is then needed in establishing property rights to spectrum. This requires creating a bureaucratic machinery which auctions spectrum and polices for violations.

However, there is an alternative methodology, which is used in cordless phones or Wi-Fi, where intelligent devices establish a self-organizing system through which the spectrum is shared. Intelligence at each device coupled with healthy protocols makes sharing of spectrum possible. Such technologies convert spectrum from rival to non-rival. Once this is feasible, the need for government control of spectrum allocation is removed. This is an attractive path, particularly under conditions of low state capacity. All that the state needs to do is to say that certain frequencies are available for unlicensed use and back this up with rules for fair play by devices as has been done by the US Federal Communications Commission.

In recent years, there has been a debate in India about the V-band and the E-band, where the department of telecommunications has a choice between making it unlicensed spectrum or auctioning it off to private persons. We would favour the former: a non-state solution is generally superior, particularly under conditions of low state capacity.

Do traditional community solutions work well? Nobel Prize-winning economist Elinor Ostrom has reminded us of the remarkable outcomes through some traditional community arrangements. Those wielding state power should respect the possibilities for purely decentralized solutions that allocate common goods without requiring a bureaucratic apparatus to spring up.

Do we have the state capacity? There are many elements of market failure which are legitimate areas for state intervention, and such state intervention is being done in mature market economies. But in India, we have much less state capacity, so certain areas of work are outside our budget constraint and should be dropped.

Ultimately, a complex modern economy only works when it is a self-organizing system. It has to have the creative efforts of a large number of individuals.

Building the republic, then, is about the policy institutions which shape the incentives of each person and help intermediate the interactions between individuals. Building these institutions is a slow and complex problem. In the short run, it is always possible to obtain GDP growth without solving these deeper problems. We would all do well to shift focus from the numbers for GDP growth to focusing on the state of health of state institutions.

The only way to run the 50-year marathon is through building institutions. Sustained improvement in institutional quality is hard, but it is the only way to obtain sustained GDP growth.

Extracted with permission from In Service of the Republic: The Art and Science of Economic Policy, by Vijay Kelkar and Ajay Shah.

Vijay Kelkar is chairman and Ajay Shah is professor at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy.
 
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