Indian Air Force News & Discussions
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The Indian Air Force's (IAF's) Su-30MKI multirole fighter fleet is plagued by frequent "engine failure-in-air and engine-related problems" and poor operational serviceability, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar told parliament on 17 March.
Five twin-engine Su-30MKIs have crashed since the platform began to enter service in 1997.
Parrikar said between January 2013 and December 2014 the IAF had recorded technical problems with 35 Saturn AL-31FP engines that power the licence-built Su-30MKIs. The problems were related to faulty bearings and low-pressure oil.
He said metal fatigue caused these bearings, which are incorporated to reduce friction between the fighter's moving parts, to chip or fragment and the resulting particles contaminated the oil flow.
Of 69 Su-30MKI engine failures investigated since 2012, the minister said "33 were due to finding [metal] chips in the oil, 11 due to vibration in the engine, and 8 because of low pressure of lubricating oil".
He did not provide any explanation for the remaining 17 engine-related problems, but Parrikar said that the engine's original equipment manufacturer (OEM) had "offered nine modifications or technological improvements in the production of new aero-engines and during overhaul of engines".
These included "better lubrication, better fitment of bearings, and better quality of oil".
All these measures, the minister stated, had been incorporated into 25 AL-31FP engines that Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) had since licence-built at its Koraput plant in eastern India.
As a result, engine maintenance and overhaul, which had been taking place after 500 flying hours, now took place after 900 hours.
The IAF operates 200 Su-30MKIs, but of these only 110 or 55% were operationally available due to poor serviceability, Parrikar said, adding that this would increase to 70% by the end of 2015.
Parrikar also said that efforts were afoot to secure the return of around 10 of 40 IAF Antonov An-32 military transporters that are stranded in Ukraine where they were undergoing an upgrade. Around 30 An-32s, which were upgraded to An-32RE levels in Ukraine under an INR19.67 billion (USD313.3 million) agreement inked in 2009, had returned home by 2014.
The upgrade, aimed at increasing the An-32's operational lifespan from 25 to 40 years, includes advanced avionics, cockpit layout modifications, noise and vibration reductions, and improving serviceability.
The IAF's Base Repair Depot at Kanpur in northern India has been similarly retrofitting a further 65 An-32s.
Meanwhile, Parrikar said that the long awaited decision on the IAF acquiring 126 Dassault Rafale fighters could not be "endless" and would be expedited.
He said that the Contract Negotiation Committee, which has been negotiating with Dassault over the purchase since January 2012, is expected to submit its report in March, following which a "final decision" will be taken on the deal.
Indian foreign secretary S Jaishankar is visiting Paris later this month to finalise details of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit in April. The Rafale deal is likely to feature prominently in talks with the French government.
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Su-30MKI, modified by aviaraketu BrahMos-A, began flight tests
The army and the military-industrial complex
March 19, 6:58 UTC + 3
Works on modernization of the second aircraft continues, it will be ready this year
Langkawi / Malaysia / 19 March. / TASS /. In India, began flight tests of the first multi-purpose fighter Su-30MKI, modified the aircraft carrier aviation winged supersonic missile BrahMos-A.This was at the salon korr.TASS LIMA-2015 on Thursday the head of the Russian-Indian joint venture BrahMos Aerospace Sudhir Mishra.
"Flight testing of the first modified by a missile BrahMos-A Su-30MKI begun. The upgrading of the second aircraft continue and it will be ready this year," - said Mishra.
According to him, the second plane is needed as a backup to ensure the continuity of the flight test, which is scheduled for completion this year.
© Marina Lystseva / TASS
The first Su-30MKI, armed with a missile BrahMos, solemnly handed over to the Indian Air Force
The head of BrahMos Aerospace explained that samolet- carrier made several key changes, in particular by redistributing the load on the bearing elements of a fighter. At the same time a lot of aircraft variant BrahMos-A was decreased by half a ton, and length - about half a meter.
Flight tests, which include several stages, will evaluate the result of over two years of joint work of Indian and Russian experts. As a part of the Indian Air Force in the media missiles BrahMos-A at the production facilities will be modified HAL Corporation 42 fighter, not counting the first two experimental machines.
For the purchase of 200 missiles BrahMos-A Su-30MKI allocated $ 1.1 billion - the decision was approved by the cabinet committee on security in October 2012.
The army and the military-industrial complex
March 19, 6:58 UTC + 3
Works on modernization of the second aircraft continues, it will be ready this year
Langkawi / Malaysia / 19 March. / TASS /. In India, began flight tests of the first multi-purpose fighter Su-30MKI, modified the aircraft carrier aviation winged supersonic missile BrahMos-A.This was at the salon korr.TASS LIMA-2015 on Thursday the head of the Russian-Indian joint venture BrahMos Aerospace Sudhir Mishra.
"Flight testing of the first modified by a missile BrahMos-A Su-30MKI begun. The upgrading of the second aircraft continue and it will be ready this year," - said Mishra.
According to him, the second plane is needed as a backup to ensure the continuity of the flight test, which is scheduled for completion this year.
© Marina Lystseva / TASS
The first Su-30MKI, armed with a missile BrahMos, solemnly handed over to the Indian Air Force
The head of BrahMos Aerospace explained that samolet- carrier made several key changes, in particular by redistributing the load on the bearing elements of a fighter. At the same time a lot of aircraft variant BrahMos-A was decreased by half a ton, and length - about half a meter.
Flight tests, which include several stages, will evaluate the result of over two years of joint work of Indian and Russian experts. As a part of the Indian Air Force in the media missiles BrahMos-A at the production facilities will be modified HAL Corporation 42 fighter, not counting the first two experimental machines.
For the purchase of 200 missiles BrahMos-A Su-30MKI allocated $ 1.1 billion - the decision was approved by the cabinet committee on security in October 2012.
Hindustani78
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Ministry of Defence
20-March, 2015 18:13 IST
Student Interaction Drive by IAF – Guardians of the Sky-III
A Student Interaction Drive commenced on 20 March 2015. The drive wasflagged off by Air Officer-in-Charge Personnel, Air Marshal S Neelakantan on 20 March 2015 at New Delhi. The drive is one amongst many activities undertaken by the Indian Air Force (IAF) to connect to the youth and create an awareness about induction into the IAF Officers cadre. It aims to motivate the youth to join the mission and be an elite part of the Indian Air Force family. While flagging off, Air Marshal Neelakantan said “ attracting the best talent for a premier force is one of the key challenges, as this ultimately shapes up our nation’s security capabilities”
Young Indian Air Force Officers in IAF rally, Gypsies along with support staff and vehicles were flagged off from New Delhi covering 13 cities including Delhi, Jaipur, Kota, Udaipur, Palanpur, Ahmedabad, Rajkot, Bhavnagar, Vadodara, Surat, Vapi, Mumbai and Pune. The drive would be Flagged-in in Pune on 22 April 2015.
The interaction drive aims to target various educational institutes in these cities where a multi disciplinary group of IAF Officers would interact with students providing them with details of career opportunities in the IAF and address their queries. The IAF adventure team, also a part of the contingent will conduct Para-Sailing activities at the institute premises. Students will also get an opportunity to visit IAF bases at certain places. This will provide a great opportunity to the students to experience glimpses of IAF’s adventurous life and also get to know avenues available to them as IAF Officers.
The Air Officer-in-Charge Personnel (AOP), Air Headquarters, Air Marshal S. Neelakantan flagging off the team involved in Student Interaction Drive to 13 Indian cities, conducted by the Indian Air Force, in New Delhi on March 20, 2015.
The Air Officer-in-Charge Personnel (AOP), Air Headquarters, Air Marshal S. Neelakantan with the team involved in the Student Interaction Drive during flag off ceremony, conducted by the Indian Air Force, in New Delhi on March 20, 2015.
20-March, 2015 18:13 IST
Student Interaction Drive by IAF – Guardians of the Sky-III
A Student Interaction Drive commenced on 20 March 2015. The drive wasflagged off by Air Officer-in-Charge Personnel, Air Marshal S Neelakantan on 20 March 2015 at New Delhi. The drive is one amongst many activities undertaken by the Indian Air Force (IAF) to connect to the youth and create an awareness about induction into the IAF Officers cadre. It aims to motivate the youth to join the mission and be an elite part of the Indian Air Force family. While flagging off, Air Marshal Neelakantan said “ attracting the best talent for a premier force is one of the key challenges, as this ultimately shapes up our nation’s security capabilities”
Young Indian Air Force Officers in IAF rally, Gypsies along with support staff and vehicles were flagged off from New Delhi covering 13 cities including Delhi, Jaipur, Kota, Udaipur, Palanpur, Ahmedabad, Rajkot, Bhavnagar, Vadodara, Surat, Vapi, Mumbai and Pune. The drive would be Flagged-in in Pune on 22 April 2015.
The interaction drive aims to target various educational institutes in these cities where a multi disciplinary group of IAF Officers would interact with students providing them with details of career opportunities in the IAF and address their queries. The IAF adventure team, also a part of the contingent will conduct Para-Sailing activities at the institute premises. Students will also get an opportunity to visit IAF bases at certain places. This will provide a great opportunity to the students to experience glimpses of IAF’s adventurous life and also get to know avenues available to them as IAF Officers.
The Air Officer-in-Charge Personnel (AOP), Air Headquarters, Air Marshal S. Neelakantan flagging off the team involved in Student Interaction Drive to 13 Indian cities, conducted by the Indian Air Force, in New Delhi on March 20, 2015.
The Air Officer-in-Charge Personnel (AOP), Air Headquarters, Air Marshal S. Neelakantan with the team involved in the Student Interaction Drive during flag off ceremony, conducted by the Indian Air Force, in New Delhi on March 20, 2015.
PARIKRAMA
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Well Saurav has listed out Features above of Super Sukhoi-30MKI, We have nothing to add more .
Aeronautical engineers will be able to explain this concept better
This is very Interesting concept , IAF doesn’t operate long range Bombers but Concept looks very similar to B-2 Bomber dimensions
Courtesy Saurav Chordia
Hindustani78
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Amid stalled fighter projects, upgraded Mirage cheers IAF - The Times of India
The force will get its first two upgraded Mirage-2000 fighters with new avionics and weapons this week.
The defence ministry says France will hand over the two "almost new" Mirage fighters to the project management teams of IAF and Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) on March 25. "Our teams are in Istres to take the delivery. The next two jets will be upgraded by HAL in India with French assistance," said an official.
The remaining 47 Mirages, which were first inducted by India in the mid-1980s, will then be progressively souped up by HAL with technology transfer from France under the overall Rs 17,547 crore programme finalized in 2011-2012.
"The upgraded Mirages have been stripped down and virtually re-built with state-of-the-art avionics, radars, mission computers, glass cockpits, helmet-mounted displays, electronic warfare suites and long-range missiles. IAF will be able to operate them for another 15-20 years," the official added.
India has gone in for a mix of upgrades and inductions like Sukhoi-30MKIs - IAF has till now inducted 200 of the 272 Russian fighters contracted for over $12 billion -- to maintain its operational readiness against China and Pakistan.
But it continues to take a big hit with the delay in new fighter projects, even as the obsolete MiG fleets are being progressively retired. As reported earlier by TOI, both the $20 billion MMRCA (medium multi-role combat aircraft) project for 126 French Rafale fighters and the $25 billion one for 127 Russian FGFA (fifth-generation fighter aircraft) are still nowhere near being clinched.
"The indigenous Tejas light combat aircraft project is also running years behind schedule. Numbers do eventually matter. IAF should ideally have 44 fighter squadrons, instead of the 34 it is currently has," said an officer.
The Mirage upgrade project, under which India has inked two separate contracts, itself has faced flak for being so expensive. The first upgrade programme was finalized at Rs 10,947 crore with French companies Dassault Aviation (aircraft manufacturer) and Thales (weapons systems integrator) in July 2011.
The second Rs 6,600 crore contract for 490 advanced fire-and-forget MICA (interception and aerial combat missiles) systems to arm the Mirages was finalized with French armament major MBDA in early-2012.
In effect, each upgraded Mirage will cost Rs 345 crore. This when the last batch of Mirages bought by India in 2000 cost Rs 133 crore apiece. Moreover, it will take HAL almost a decade to upgrade all the fighters.
The force will get its first two upgraded Mirage-2000 fighters with new avionics and weapons this week.
The defence ministry says France will hand over the two "almost new" Mirage fighters to the project management teams of IAF and Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) on March 25. "Our teams are in Istres to take the delivery. The next two jets will be upgraded by HAL in India with French assistance," said an official.
The remaining 47 Mirages, which were first inducted by India in the mid-1980s, will then be progressively souped up by HAL with technology transfer from France under the overall Rs 17,547 crore programme finalized in 2011-2012.
"The upgraded Mirages have been stripped down and virtually re-built with state-of-the-art avionics, radars, mission computers, glass cockpits, helmet-mounted displays, electronic warfare suites and long-range missiles. IAF will be able to operate them for another 15-20 years," the official added.
India has gone in for a mix of upgrades and inductions like Sukhoi-30MKIs - IAF has till now inducted 200 of the 272 Russian fighters contracted for over $12 billion -- to maintain its operational readiness against China and Pakistan.
But it continues to take a big hit with the delay in new fighter projects, even as the obsolete MiG fleets are being progressively retired. As reported earlier by TOI, both the $20 billion MMRCA (medium multi-role combat aircraft) project for 126 French Rafale fighters and the $25 billion one for 127 Russian FGFA (fifth-generation fighter aircraft) are still nowhere near being clinched.
"The indigenous Tejas light combat aircraft project is also running years behind schedule. Numbers do eventually matter. IAF should ideally have 44 fighter squadrons, instead of the 34 it is currently has," said an officer.
The Mirage upgrade project, under which India has inked two separate contracts, itself has faced flak for being so expensive. The first upgrade programme was finalized at Rs 10,947 crore with French companies Dassault Aviation (aircraft manufacturer) and Thales (weapons systems integrator) in July 2011.
The second Rs 6,600 crore contract for 490 advanced fire-and-forget MICA (interception and aerial combat missiles) systems to arm the Mirages was finalized with French armament major MBDA in early-2012.
In effect, each upgraded Mirage will cost Rs 345 crore. This when the last batch of Mirages bought by India in 2000 cost Rs 133 crore apiece. Moreover, it will take HAL almost a decade to upgrade all the fighters.
Major Shaitan Singh
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Rare photo of the Westland Wapiti biplane flying over Delhi in the 1930s for what became the Indian Air Force.
sancho
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Yes, to cover the same logistical roles below the MTA, just as our Avro replacement would do, below the MTA.
Russia is planing with:
IL 476
AN70
MTA
IL112
We should plan in a similar way with:
C17
A400 / C2
MTA / C130J
C295
Afaik the IL112 was not allowed to participate in the Avro replacement, since it's not developed yet.
Agent_47
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Russia is out from AN70.They seems desperate to kick start MTA
An-70 aircraft is latest casualty of Russia-Ukraine fallout | Russia Beyond The Headlines
How is AN70 compared to A400 ?
Can confirm these statements ?
Last edited:
migflug
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Vijainder K Thakur
The Indian Air Force (IAF) spends the most money from among the three services to procure weapon systems from abroad, prompting the media and analysts to fault the service for not being supportive of DRDO and HAL's efforts to indigenously develop military aircraft and missiles.
The new government is determined to significantly reduce the value of military hardware orders placed on foreign vendors. According to the Indian government, during the period 2011-12 to 2013-14, the expenditure on Capital acquisition in respect of orders placed on Indian vendors and foreign vendors was 53.9% and 46.1% respectively.
Raksha Mantri (RM) Manohar Parrikar in a MoD special feature released to commemorate the Republic Day says, "Achieving self-reliance and reducing dependence on foreign countries in defence is a necessity today rather than a choice, both for strategic and economic reasons."
That is as clear an articulation of government policy as you can ever get from a politician!
Is the IAF Enfeebling the Nation with its Foreign Exchange Extravagance?
The IAF spends substantially more foreign exchange (FE) for importing weapons than the Indian Navy (IN) or the Indian Army (IA). Over the past three financial years, the IAF has placed orders worth Rs 55406.60 crore on foreign vendors, the IN has placed orders worth Rs 25454.85 crore, and the IA, worth Rs 2998.74 crore.
One good reason why the IAF spends more FE is because its capital acquisition spending is more than the IN's or the IA's. Long term average capital spending of the IAF roughly equals that of the IN and IA combined!
The IAF's operational capability is more heavily dependent on the number and quality of its capital assets - aircraft, radars, missiles, and electronics - than is the case with the IN and the IA. Because IAF spends more on capital acquisitions, it spends proportionately more FE. In plain speak, the Air Marshals aren't any more enamored with foreign weapons than the Admirals and Generals! That point having been made, as the biggest FE spender, the IAF needs to lead the way in reducing dependence on foreign weapon systems. But that is easier said than done!
Can the IAF Reduce its Dependence on Foreign Weapons?
The short and truthful, but politically unpalatable, answer is - No! If the IAF could reduce its dependence on foreign weapons, it would do so without anyone's bidding, simply to get more mileage from its budget.
The IAF doesn't want foreign weapons, it needsthem. For example, it needs the Rafael’s qualitative edge to address the threat posed by the growing number of PLAAF J-11B (Su-27 rip-off) and its J-15 (Su-30 rip-off) fighters.
If the IAF could get the Rafale from HAL, with support levels matching those of Dassault, it would gleefully place orders on HAL.
War fighters like to be armed with lethal, preferably most lethal, weapons; because they want to survive! They want to live long, like you and I, have and raise children, nurture the children to adulthood, grow in their own careers; and during their sunset years retire to their villages and hometowns and admire mango blossoms. Can you grudge them that desire?
As long as his weapon is lethal, a soldier doesn't care where it comes from - Israel or Ishapore!
IAF warfighters have a job to do, a job assigned to them by the nation through an act of Parliament. Roughly the job is to safeguard the territorial integrity of the nation and help the IN and the IA do the same.
Any task assignment must be packaged with the means to effectively perform the task. The means would change over time in synch with technical advances and changes in the scope of the task.
The IAF needs aircraft, missiles and radars to perform its task. What types and quantity - is decided by the MoD.
The IAF's weapon procurement works roughly as follows:
With time, the usefulness of an existing weapon system starts to erode, usually due to technical obsolescence, prompting the IAF to look for replacement or upgrade, keeping in mind current and future technological trends and threat perceptions
The IAF then proposes replacement / upgrade in consonance with the current 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), the current 5-year Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP) and the current Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP).
MoD reviews an IAF proposal taking inputs from DRDO on technology trends and indigenous capability. MoD then either rejects the IAF proposal or accords it Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) clearing the way for procurement.
According AoN is a process that is part objective and part subjective. There are always alternatives. To use a new buzz phrase, you could say AoN is accorded after AoA - Analysis of Alternatives!
An important point needs to made here - In order to ensure that defense preparedness is not compromised, AoA must not be influenced by sourcing. IAF's alternatives must be assessed in terms of current and future threats.
The helplessness of the IAF at the start of the Kargil war can largely be attributed to the IAF being ill equipped to address the threat. Scrounging on weapon acquisitions can cost dearly during war. Our AFs must be equipped to deter aggression, not fight it!
To reiterate - the IAF cannot reduce its dependence on foreign weapon systems. Not by itself. The effort to reduce the IAF's dependence in import must come largely from the Indian industry - - public and private sector. The industry must be able to offer the IAF most of what it needs to address the perceived threat.
Limitations of Democracy, Voluntary Enrollment, and Weaker Economy
It is sometimes postulated that the IAF could blunt the quantitative edge of the PLAAF by inducting large number of indigenous aircraft, giving Indian industry the order quantities required to step up investments in defense R&D.
There are two reasons why this would not work.
Firstly, military enrollment in India is voluntary, and the raucous nature of Indian democracy makes conscription unthinkable. Matching the PLAAF quantitatively would be impossible for want of sufficient capable volunteers.
Secondly, there needs to be at least one success story that prompts the IAF to consider quantitative matching. At least one indigenous fighter that can take on the PLAAF J-11s. Tejas LCA is too limited in range and weapon load, not to mention maneuverability, to be an effective counter.
China is years ahead of India in aviation technology. It is also a much larger economy. The IAF's only hope for blunting the PLAAF edge lies in procuring game changing weapons that the PLAAF cannot procure for geopolitical reasons. Such weapons will not be domestically available for many decades. That is a truth we must reconcile to. India is fortunate that it has good ties with the west as well as Russia. Voluntarily ceding the advantage of these would be perilous.
IAF and HAL
Going by the size of the Indian economy and the market that it represents, India should have a thriving military and civil aviation industry. Some would suggest that we do have a thriving aviation industry in HAL, which for the civil sector manufactures Dornier Do-228 and overhauls Dornier and Avro-748. For the military sector, HAL integrates Su-30MKI, Hawk AJT and Tejas LCA; and overhauls Su-30MKI, MiG-21 variants, MiG-29, MiG-27, Jaguars, Hawk AJT and Mirage 2000.
HAL has been in the military aviation space since the 1950s. It has license manufactured many fighter aircraft of Russian and western origin, imbibed a lot of technology, and ceremonially handed out many dividend cheques to the RM of the day. What it has never done well, however, is design and develop aircraft to meet the IAF's requirements. It designed and developed the Marut for the IAF in the late fifties - early sixties but the project got derailed for want of a suitable power plant. Following the winding down of the Marut project, HAL lost its design expertise completely and is now struggling to develop an aircraft as basic as a jet trainer.
In the case of the Marut, the IAF was also dissatisfied with HAL's workmanship and support for the aircraft, which had a high accident rate despite being twin engined.
Indeed, dissatisfaction with HAL's production standards, support, and work culture runs rampant in the IAF at all levels. It's not something that is confined to senior IAF leadership.
Military aviation is unforgiving and technical failures often lead to fatalities. With a ship or tank, a peacetime material failure usually doesn't go beyond causing inconvenience and embarrassment, but failure on a fighter jet can cause bad things to happen. Each accident is talked about across all units in the IAF. While human error is something that aviators learn to live with, accidents attributed to material failures are more difficult to forgive.
The IAF's lack of enthusiasm for Tejas LCA, an aircraft that lacks punch and range, is further aggravated by the IAF's distrust of HAL manufacturing and delivery promises. The IAF’s reservations are completely justified. For example, HAL's projected production timelines for the initial lot Tejas LCAs made to IOC standards have slipped dramatically and inexplicably.
The IAF is convinced, and with good reason, that a public sector undertaking like HAL cannot meet its aircraft requirements - present or future. In its view, the remedy lies in nursing the private sector to an extent where it can compete with HAL. But IAF's attempt to bring in the private sector with the Avro replacement project has so far been frustrated by HAL and MoD bureaucrats.
HAL's total domination of the domestic aviation industry with MoD connivance is not good for the country. HAL has failed to offer the IAF viable domestic alternatives for over 50 years. If the government is serious about the IAF procuring its aircraft from within India it has to level the playing field for the private sector by trusting it and treating it on par with HAL and ADA.
IAF's Lack of Involvement in its HAL Projects
There has been some criticism of the IAF over its failure to get the most out of HAL and DRDO, both its sister organizations under MoD. The IN's full satisfaction with warships made by public sector dockyards and DRDO weapon systems fitted on these ships is cited as an example of what can be achieved through close cooperation between government agencies.
The criticism is largely true. In the past, IAF' leadership failed to take ownership of its projects with HAL and DRDO. To begin with, the IAF did involve itself with both the organizations, deputing senior officers to lead projects and participate in management. Four IAF Chiefs - Aspy Merwan Engineer (1960-1964), Pratap Chandra Lal (1969-1973), Om Prakash Mehra (1973-1976) and Lakshman Mohan Katre (1984-1985) - were deputed to HAL management on their way to the top. Many senior IAF officers served with these organization post retirement.
However, IAF participation in HAL management was frustrated by the prevalent work culture in the organization. Attempts to push Air Force projects failed, and the proclivity of HAL to inflate claims and fudge figures dismayed the IAF.
The IAF's involvement steadily waned and the MoD's apathy allowed an estrangement to creep in, which has now grown to an extent where the IAF leadership looks upon HAL as an evil that it has to live with! The estrangement has hurt the IAF more than HAL and it would be in IAF's interest to get involved again.
The IN's aggressive steering of the LCA Navy project is a case in point. The Navy is more upbeat about the LCA than the Air Force because the IN is exercising full control over its project. This is evident from the IN's decision to ask ADA to substantially redesign LCA Navy Mk-2, and develop it independently of the IAF's Tejas LCA Mk-2.
The Navy redesign involves midsection broadening of the fuselage with wing roots moving outwards; the landing gear has also been shifted outwards simplifying its engineering and considerably reducing its weight.
Broadening of the fuselage also adds to internal fuel capacity and reduces supersonic drag through better area ruling.
The extent of the IN's involvement in LCA Navy Mk-2 project will ensure the success of the project - NO doubt about it!
IAF's Proclivity to Ask for the Moon
Talking on the sidelines of India today conclave 2015, RM Manohar Parrikar expressed his dismay over last minute changes in AFs SQRs (Staff Qualitative Requirements), resulting in indigenous weapon systems development delays.
Parrikar also said sometimes AFs' weapon system SQRs seems right out of ” Marvel comic Movies."
A lot of last minute changes in SQRs can be attributed to changes in threat perception as a result of inordinate delay in project fruition. For example, the technology for jamming IR seekers has advanced to an extent where an ATGM fitted with a conical seeker has no chance of hitting its target tank. The ATGM would need an Imaging Infrared (IIR) seeker to discriminate between defensive flares fired to confuse the missile and the target tank. So, a last minute request for an IIR seeker on the Nag ATGM, which has been under development since the early 90s, isn't bizarre.
However, the RM's remarks on "Marvel comic movies" like SQRs has a ring of truth in the case of the IAF. For example, atleast some of the responsibility for delay in the PMF/FGFA project must rest with the service.
IAF and Perspective Multi-role Fighter (PMF)
The IAF wanted the PMF, which is based on the single seat Russian T-50 stealth fighter currently under development, to be a twin seat aircraft. However, countries that have built stealth fighters - US, Russia or China - have all opted for a single seat configuration, for the simple reason that the RCS of a twin seater would necessarily be greater than that of a single seater. The IAF pushed long and hard for a twinseater, citing pilot workload. The fact is - sensor fusion, a defining feature of fifth generation fighters, is the way around excessive pilot workload, not a second seat!
Ironically, one of the arguments advanced in pushing for the Rafale, despite French intransigence on price and warranty, is that the Rafale features sensor fusion which facilitates single pilot operation, while the Su-30MKI's lack of sensor fusion mandates a WSO (Weapon System Operator), pushing up aircrew training costs!
If sensor fusion obviates the need for a WSO in the Rafale, why not in the PMF?
The IAF reportedly also has reservations about the PMF's AL-41F1 engines, AESA radar, Low Observability (LO), weapons carriage system and maintainability! The reservations are surprising because IAF pilots have not yet evaluated the T-50, which is still under development and won't be inducted into the Russian air force till 2016! Somewhat akin to a judge announcing a verdict well before closing arguments!
IAF and Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA)
The AMCA project similarly appears stalled faced with the IAF's quest for the state-of-the-art.
ADA is all set to roll with the AMCA project, but the IAF isn't impressed with the aircraft's current feature set. The service has drawn up very detailed and ambitious PQSRs which include all aspect stealth, super-maneuverability through thrust vectoring, and twin seat variant.
ADA has designed the AMCA for frontal stealth only, lacking technology for shaped nozzles. The IAF's desire for all aspect stealth is bonafide in view of Chinese investments in counter stealth technology. However, except for the F-22 Raptor, no other stealth fighter features all aspect stealth.
The IAF's requirement for super-maneuverability through thrust vectoring is also difficult to understand. (Super maneuverability can come from high power/weight ratio, thrust vectoring, or a combination of the two.) One reason why the IAF chose the Rafale over other MMRCA competitors is because the French fighter, which has no thrust vectoring, is even more maneuverable than the Su-30MKI at high speeds. Typically, the outcome of an air-to-air engagement is determined within 40-sec of its start when the aircraft are still at high speed. Why then is the IAF not satisfied with high power to weight ratio based super maneuverability in the AMCA?
ADA is confident that it can redesign the AMCA for all aspect stealth, twin-seats and thrust vectoring, but points out that these capabilities would push up costs and stretch timelines. (Thrust vectoring would be conditional to Russian willingness to transfer the technology.)
In view of the differences between ADA and the IAF, it may be a while before AMCA staff requirements are finalized.
ADA is in the process of responding to the IAF PSQRs with feature wise cost and time implications. In the meantime, the clock is ticking. The AMCA has remained a concept since a scale model of the aircraft was first displayed during Aero India 2009!
Hopefully, the IAF will challenge ADA with realistic performance and timeline requirements, not doom the project by asking for the moon as it sometimes tends to do.
Make Haste - Slowly!
The current government has unambiguously articulated the need to reduce dependence on foreign weapons to ensure the long term security of the nation. MoD, HAL, private sector defense firms, and the IAF have to work in cohesion to meet the nation's aspiration, without compromising defense preparedness.
MoD needs to facilitate greater private sector involvement in military aviation. In the interim, the IAF needs to emulate the IN and take forceful ownership of its projects with HAL and DRDO.
Fighter aircraft design and development expertise acquired by ADA and other DRDO labs needs to be nurtured and leveraged through projects such as the LCA Navy Mk-2 redesign; and challenged through projects such as the AMCA.
AMCA needs to be accorded top priority, but the IAF needs to keep its SQRs modest, just as the Russians have done with the T-50, and the Chinese with the J-20 and J-31.
HAL needs to independently enhance its military aircraft design and development capability, for competition and synergy with ADA. To nudge HAL to focus on in-house development, MoD needs to put a stop to future license production. If the IAF needs foreign aircraft, it should buy them with a logistics package as is the case with the C-17 and C-130J. License production for over 50 years has not helped HAL develop independent design and development capability. It has kept HAL a generation behind current technology, by forcing it to focus on replicating old technology.
Despite the above listed efforts, it may take another 10 to 15 years for the military aviation industrial base in India to rise to levels where the IAF is not forced to look elsewhere for its fighters and missiles. Till then, the IAF must continue to procure its aircraft and weapons from the best sources available, even if that means continued dependence on imports. If measures to reduce reliance on imported arms are in place and kicking, our dependence on imports will eventually reduce.
By V.K.Thakur (Ex-IAF)
The Indian Air Force (IAF) spends the most money from among the three services to procure weapon systems from abroad, prompting the media and analysts to fault the service for not being supportive of DRDO and HAL's efforts to indigenously develop military aircraft and missiles.
The new government is determined to significantly reduce the value of military hardware orders placed on foreign vendors. According to the Indian government, during the period 2011-12 to 2013-14, the expenditure on Capital acquisition in respect of orders placed on Indian vendors and foreign vendors was 53.9% and 46.1% respectively.
Raksha Mantri (RM) Manohar Parrikar in a MoD special feature released to commemorate the Republic Day says, "Achieving self-reliance and reducing dependence on foreign countries in defence is a necessity today rather than a choice, both for strategic and economic reasons."
That is as clear an articulation of government policy as you can ever get from a politician!
Is the IAF Enfeebling the Nation with its Foreign Exchange Extravagance?
The IAF spends substantially more foreign exchange (FE) for importing weapons than the Indian Navy (IN) or the Indian Army (IA). Over the past three financial years, the IAF has placed orders worth Rs 55406.60 crore on foreign vendors, the IN has placed orders worth Rs 25454.85 crore, and the IA, worth Rs 2998.74 crore.
One good reason why the IAF spends more FE is because its capital acquisition spending is more than the IN's or the IA's. Long term average capital spending of the IAF roughly equals that of the IN and IA combined!
The IAF's operational capability is more heavily dependent on the number and quality of its capital assets - aircraft, radars, missiles, and electronics - than is the case with the IN and the IA. Because IAF spends more on capital acquisitions, it spends proportionately more FE. In plain speak, the Air Marshals aren't any more enamored with foreign weapons than the Admirals and Generals! That point having been made, as the biggest FE spender, the IAF needs to lead the way in reducing dependence on foreign weapon systems. But that is easier said than done!
Can the IAF Reduce its Dependence on Foreign Weapons?
The short and truthful, but politically unpalatable, answer is - No! If the IAF could reduce its dependence on foreign weapons, it would do so without anyone's bidding, simply to get more mileage from its budget.
The IAF doesn't want foreign weapons, it needsthem. For example, it needs the Rafael’s qualitative edge to address the threat posed by the growing number of PLAAF J-11B (Su-27 rip-off) and its J-15 (Su-30 rip-off) fighters.
If the IAF could get the Rafale from HAL, with support levels matching those of Dassault, it would gleefully place orders on HAL.
War fighters like to be armed with lethal, preferably most lethal, weapons; because they want to survive! They want to live long, like you and I, have and raise children, nurture the children to adulthood, grow in their own careers; and during their sunset years retire to their villages and hometowns and admire mango blossoms. Can you grudge them that desire?
As long as his weapon is lethal, a soldier doesn't care where it comes from - Israel or Ishapore!
IAF warfighters have a job to do, a job assigned to them by the nation through an act of Parliament. Roughly the job is to safeguard the territorial integrity of the nation and help the IN and the IA do the same.
Any task assignment must be packaged with the means to effectively perform the task. The means would change over time in synch with technical advances and changes in the scope of the task.
The IAF needs aircraft, missiles and radars to perform its task. What types and quantity - is decided by the MoD.
The IAF's weapon procurement works roughly as follows:
With time, the usefulness of an existing weapon system starts to erode, usually due to technical obsolescence, prompting the IAF to look for replacement or upgrade, keeping in mind current and future technological trends and threat perceptions
The IAF then proposes replacement / upgrade in consonance with the current 15-year Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), the current 5-year Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP) and the current Annual Acquisition Plan (AAP).
MoD reviews an IAF proposal taking inputs from DRDO on technology trends and indigenous capability. MoD then either rejects the IAF proposal or accords it Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) clearing the way for procurement.
According AoN is a process that is part objective and part subjective. There are always alternatives. To use a new buzz phrase, you could say AoN is accorded after AoA - Analysis of Alternatives!
An important point needs to made here - In order to ensure that defense preparedness is not compromised, AoA must not be influenced by sourcing. IAF's alternatives must be assessed in terms of current and future threats.
The helplessness of the IAF at the start of the Kargil war can largely be attributed to the IAF being ill equipped to address the threat. Scrounging on weapon acquisitions can cost dearly during war. Our AFs must be equipped to deter aggression, not fight it!
To reiterate - the IAF cannot reduce its dependence on foreign weapon systems. Not by itself. The effort to reduce the IAF's dependence in import must come largely from the Indian industry - - public and private sector. The industry must be able to offer the IAF most of what it needs to address the perceived threat.
Limitations of Democracy, Voluntary Enrollment, and Weaker Economy
It is sometimes postulated that the IAF could blunt the quantitative edge of the PLAAF by inducting large number of indigenous aircraft, giving Indian industry the order quantities required to step up investments in defense R&D.
There are two reasons why this would not work.
Firstly, military enrollment in India is voluntary, and the raucous nature of Indian democracy makes conscription unthinkable. Matching the PLAAF quantitatively would be impossible for want of sufficient capable volunteers.
Secondly, there needs to be at least one success story that prompts the IAF to consider quantitative matching. At least one indigenous fighter that can take on the PLAAF J-11s. Tejas LCA is too limited in range and weapon load, not to mention maneuverability, to be an effective counter.
China is years ahead of India in aviation technology. It is also a much larger economy. The IAF's only hope for blunting the PLAAF edge lies in procuring game changing weapons that the PLAAF cannot procure for geopolitical reasons. Such weapons will not be domestically available for many decades. That is a truth we must reconcile to. India is fortunate that it has good ties with the west as well as Russia. Voluntarily ceding the advantage of these would be perilous.
IAF and HAL
Going by the size of the Indian economy and the market that it represents, India should have a thriving military and civil aviation industry. Some would suggest that we do have a thriving aviation industry in HAL, which for the civil sector manufactures Dornier Do-228 and overhauls Dornier and Avro-748. For the military sector, HAL integrates Su-30MKI, Hawk AJT and Tejas LCA; and overhauls Su-30MKI, MiG-21 variants, MiG-29, MiG-27, Jaguars, Hawk AJT and Mirage 2000.
HAL has been in the military aviation space since the 1950s. It has license manufactured many fighter aircraft of Russian and western origin, imbibed a lot of technology, and ceremonially handed out many dividend cheques to the RM of the day. What it has never done well, however, is design and develop aircraft to meet the IAF's requirements. It designed and developed the Marut for the IAF in the late fifties - early sixties but the project got derailed for want of a suitable power plant. Following the winding down of the Marut project, HAL lost its design expertise completely and is now struggling to develop an aircraft as basic as a jet trainer.
In the case of the Marut, the IAF was also dissatisfied with HAL's workmanship and support for the aircraft, which had a high accident rate despite being twin engined.
Indeed, dissatisfaction with HAL's production standards, support, and work culture runs rampant in the IAF at all levels. It's not something that is confined to senior IAF leadership.
Military aviation is unforgiving and technical failures often lead to fatalities. With a ship or tank, a peacetime material failure usually doesn't go beyond causing inconvenience and embarrassment, but failure on a fighter jet can cause bad things to happen. Each accident is talked about across all units in the IAF. While human error is something that aviators learn to live with, accidents attributed to material failures are more difficult to forgive.
The IAF's lack of enthusiasm for Tejas LCA, an aircraft that lacks punch and range, is further aggravated by the IAF's distrust of HAL manufacturing and delivery promises. The IAF’s reservations are completely justified. For example, HAL's projected production timelines for the initial lot Tejas LCAs made to IOC standards have slipped dramatically and inexplicably.
The IAF is convinced, and with good reason, that a public sector undertaking like HAL cannot meet its aircraft requirements - present or future. In its view, the remedy lies in nursing the private sector to an extent where it can compete with HAL. But IAF's attempt to bring in the private sector with the Avro replacement project has so far been frustrated by HAL and MoD bureaucrats.
HAL's total domination of the domestic aviation industry with MoD connivance is not good for the country. HAL has failed to offer the IAF viable domestic alternatives for over 50 years. If the government is serious about the IAF procuring its aircraft from within India it has to level the playing field for the private sector by trusting it and treating it on par with HAL and ADA.
IAF's Lack of Involvement in its HAL Projects
There has been some criticism of the IAF over its failure to get the most out of HAL and DRDO, both its sister organizations under MoD. The IN's full satisfaction with warships made by public sector dockyards and DRDO weapon systems fitted on these ships is cited as an example of what can be achieved through close cooperation between government agencies.
The criticism is largely true. In the past, IAF' leadership failed to take ownership of its projects with HAL and DRDO. To begin with, the IAF did involve itself with both the organizations, deputing senior officers to lead projects and participate in management. Four IAF Chiefs - Aspy Merwan Engineer (1960-1964), Pratap Chandra Lal (1969-1973), Om Prakash Mehra (1973-1976) and Lakshman Mohan Katre (1984-1985) - were deputed to HAL management on their way to the top. Many senior IAF officers served with these organization post retirement.
However, IAF participation in HAL management was frustrated by the prevalent work culture in the organization. Attempts to push Air Force projects failed, and the proclivity of HAL to inflate claims and fudge figures dismayed the IAF.
The IAF's involvement steadily waned and the MoD's apathy allowed an estrangement to creep in, which has now grown to an extent where the IAF leadership looks upon HAL as an evil that it has to live with! The estrangement has hurt the IAF more than HAL and it would be in IAF's interest to get involved again.
The IN's aggressive steering of the LCA Navy project is a case in point. The Navy is more upbeat about the LCA than the Air Force because the IN is exercising full control over its project. This is evident from the IN's decision to ask ADA to substantially redesign LCA Navy Mk-2, and develop it independently of the IAF's Tejas LCA Mk-2.
The Navy redesign involves midsection broadening of the fuselage with wing roots moving outwards; the landing gear has also been shifted outwards simplifying its engineering and considerably reducing its weight.
Broadening of the fuselage also adds to internal fuel capacity and reduces supersonic drag through better area ruling.
The extent of the IN's involvement in LCA Navy Mk-2 project will ensure the success of the project - NO doubt about it!
IAF's Proclivity to Ask for the Moon
Talking on the sidelines of India today conclave 2015, RM Manohar Parrikar expressed his dismay over last minute changes in AFs SQRs (Staff Qualitative Requirements), resulting in indigenous weapon systems development delays.
Parrikar also said sometimes AFs' weapon system SQRs seems right out of ” Marvel comic Movies."
A lot of last minute changes in SQRs can be attributed to changes in threat perception as a result of inordinate delay in project fruition. For example, the technology for jamming IR seekers has advanced to an extent where an ATGM fitted with a conical seeker has no chance of hitting its target tank. The ATGM would need an Imaging Infrared (IIR) seeker to discriminate between defensive flares fired to confuse the missile and the target tank. So, a last minute request for an IIR seeker on the Nag ATGM, which has been under development since the early 90s, isn't bizarre.
However, the RM's remarks on "Marvel comic movies" like SQRs has a ring of truth in the case of the IAF. For example, atleast some of the responsibility for delay in the PMF/FGFA project must rest with the service.
IAF and Perspective Multi-role Fighter (PMF)
The IAF wanted the PMF, which is based on the single seat Russian T-50 stealth fighter currently under development, to be a twin seat aircraft. However, countries that have built stealth fighters - US, Russia or China - have all opted for a single seat configuration, for the simple reason that the RCS of a twin seater would necessarily be greater than that of a single seater. The IAF pushed long and hard for a twinseater, citing pilot workload. The fact is - sensor fusion, a defining feature of fifth generation fighters, is the way around excessive pilot workload, not a second seat!
Ironically, one of the arguments advanced in pushing for the Rafale, despite French intransigence on price and warranty, is that the Rafale features sensor fusion which facilitates single pilot operation, while the Su-30MKI's lack of sensor fusion mandates a WSO (Weapon System Operator), pushing up aircrew training costs!
If sensor fusion obviates the need for a WSO in the Rafale, why not in the PMF?
The IAF reportedly also has reservations about the PMF's AL-41F1 engines, AESA radar, Low Observability (LO), weapons carriage system and maintainability! The reservations are surprising because IAF pilots have not yet evaluated the T-50, which is still under development and won't be inducted into the Russian air force till 2016! Somewhat akin to a judge announcing a verdict well before closing arguments!
IAF and Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA)
The AMCA project similarly appears stalled faced with the IAF's quest for the state-of-the-art.
ADA is all set to roll with the AMCA project, but the IAF isn't impressed with the aircraft's current feature set. The service has drawn up very detailed and ambitious PQSRs which include all aspect stealth, super-maneuverability through thrust vectoring, and twin seat variant.
ADA has designed the AMCA for frontal stealth only, lacking technology for shaped nozzles. The IAF's desire for all aspect stealth is bonafide in view of Chinese investments in counter stealth technology. However, except for the F-22 Raptor, no other stealth fighter features all aspect stealth.
The IAF's requirement for super-maneuverability through thrust vectoring is also difficult to understand. (Super maneuverability can come from high power/weight ratio, thrust vectoring, or a combination of the two.) One reason why the IAF chose the Rafale over other MMRCA competitors is because the French fighter, which has no thrust vectoring, is even more maneuverable than the Su-30MKI at high speeds. Typically, the outcome of an air-to-air engagement is determined within 40-sec of its start when the aircraft are still at high speed. Why then is the IAF not satisfied with high power to weight ratio based super maneuverability in the AMCA?
ADA is confident that it can redesign the AMCA for all aspect stealth, twin-seats and thrust vectoring, but points out that these capabilities would push up costs and stretch timelines. (Thrust vectoring would be conditional to Russian willingness to transfer the technology.)
In view of the differences between ADA and the IAF, it may be a while before AMCA staff requirements are finalized.
ADA is in the process of responding to the IAF PSQRs with feature wise cost and time implications. In the meantime, the clock is ticking. The AMCA has remained a concept since a scale model of the aircraft was first displayed during Aero India 2009!
Hopefully, the IAF will challenge ADA with realistic performance and timeline requirements, not doom the project by asking for the moon as it sometimes tends to do.
Make Haste - Slowly!
The current government has unambiguously articulated the need to reduce dependence on foreign weapons to ensure the long term security of the nation. MoD, HAL, private sector defense firms, and the IAF have to work in cohesion to meet the nation's aspiration, without compromising defense preparedness.
MoD needs to facilitate greater private sector involvement in military aviation. In the interim, the IAF needs to emulate the IN and take forceful ownership of its projects with HAL and DRDO.
Fighter aircraft design and development expertise acquired by ADA and other DRDO labs needs to be nurtured and leveraged through projects such as the LCA Navy Mk-2 redesign; and challenged through projects such as the AMCA.
AMCA needs to be accorded top priority, but the IAF needs to keep its SQRs modest, just as the Russians have done with the T-50, and the Chinese with the J-20 and J-31.
HAL needs to independently enhance its military aircraft design and development capability, for competition and synergy with ADA. To nudge HAL to focus on in-house development, MoD needs to put a stop to future license production. If the IAF needs foreign aircraft, it should buy them with a logistics package as is the case with the C-17 and C-130J. License production for over 50 years has not helped HAL develop independent design and development capability. It has kept HAL a generation behind current technology, by forcing it to focus on replicating old technology.
Despite the above listed efforts, it may take another 10 to 15 years for the military aviation industrial base in India to rise to levels where the IAF is not forced to look elsewhere for its fighters and missiles. Till then, the IAF must continue to procure its aircraft and weapons from the best sources available, even if that means continued dependence on imports. If measures to reduce reliance on imported arms are in place and kicking, our dependence on imports will eventually reduce.
By V.K.Thakur (Ex-IAF)
