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India will have to hard sell itself to the US
New Delhi will have to exercise its diplomatic muscles to ensure that Pakistan militarys adroit efforts to ingratiate itself with US policymakers encounter some serious hurdles.
AN acrimonious and expensive presidential election has just concluded in the US. It was marked with considerable incivility with both parties resorting to attacks, mostly through their surrogates. It was also a costly election expenses amounting to nearly $6 billion. As the Obama Administration gears up for a second term, it is seeking to put aside much of the rancour that characterised the campaign and to tackle the most pressing problems confronting the nation.
Even though the immediate focus of the administration will be to avoid, what is popularly referred to as the fiscal cliff (the yawning budget gap), it will also have to devote much attention to critical questions of foreign and security policy. One of these will inevitably deal with the critical question of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Despite the withdrawal of forces, it is widely believed that the US will maintain a small, but lethal force in Afghanistan.
That said, it will, in all likelihood, count on regional powers such as India to step up to the plate to help maintain some semblance of stability in the country. As it seeks to do so, it will, almost without question, face some pushback from Pakistans military establishment. Quite belatedly, the Obama Administration, like its predecessor, came to the realisation that regardless of a change of guard within the Pakistan military, its duplicitous behaviour had not come to an end, otherwise it would have alerted Rawalpindi about its plans to carry out the strike that led to Obama bin Ladens death.
The administration, to ensure that the Pakistan military does not undermine its efforts to stabilise Afghanistan, will no doubt open some discussions with it. To insinuate itself into the good graces of the US, it will quite deftly highlight its putative sacrifices in the quest to terminate terrorist networks on Pakistans soil, promise increased cooperation and may even deliver a few wanted individuals to demonstrate its bona fides.
In turn, there are some in US policy circles, who thanks to their long association with Pakistan, will again fall prey to these blandishments. They will underscore the seemingly renewed cooperation and apparent reasonableness of the military and argue forcefully on its behalf. They will, among other matters, also suggest that the weapons spigot be reopened for Pakistan; its concerns about the Kashmir dispute given consideration yet again; and some pressure exerted on India to make suitable concessions.
This scenario is far from chimerical and Indias policymakers would be wise to be cognisant of its likely emergence. How might they then forestall such a possibility? Among other matters it will entail bolstering ongoing discussions with the US, speeding up agreements that remain in abeyance and moving forward with defence contracts. It will also involve proffering meaningful, viable and forward-looking ideas about how India can play a practical role in Afghanistan as the US thins out its military presence.
Beyond these efforts, New Delhi will have to exercise its diplomatic muscles to ensure that Pakistan militarys adroit efforts to ingratiate itself with US policymakers encounter some serious hurdles. This may require Indias foreign policy apparatus to ensure that its views are adequately and forcefully represented, not only at Foggy Bottom, but also Capitol Hill. Attempting to fend off the revival of a US-Pakistan security relationship for the ostensible purpose of combating terror in Pakistan and its environs will prove to be a fools errand. It must instead be the goal of Indian diplomacy to ensure that such a nexus is not forged in the first place. Accomplishing this end will necessitate a full court press effort to remind key policymakers, members of Congress and the attentive public in Washington, DC, that Pakistans military establishment has consistently dissembled about its dalliance with terror, that appeasing it with periodic rewards has produced few meaningful results and that it is not about to change its behaviour.
None of this will be easy. Indian policymaking, especially when it has involved the US, except on rare occasions, has been both timid and hesitant. It has also been held hostage to the memories of the Cold War when the two sides were frequently at odds. Instead of remaining trapped in a time warp, New Delhi has to recognise that it has a distinct opportunity to forge a more robust, reliable and significant relationship with the US, based on shared regional and even global security concerns. These interests clearly intersect in Afghanistan. A failure to seize this moment will constitute the squandering of a vital opportunity to build a more secure region.
New Delhi will have to exercise its diplomatic muscles to ensure that Pakistan militarys adroit efforts to ingratiate itself with US policymakers encounter some serious hurdles.
AN acrimonious and expensive presidential election has just concluded in the US. It was marked with considerable incivility with both parties resorting to attacks, mostly through their surrogates. It was also a costly election expenses amounting to nearly $6 billion. As the Obama Administration gears up for a second term, it is seeking to put aside much of the rancour that characterised the campaign and to tackle the most pressing problems confronting the nation.
Even though the immediate focus of the administration will be to avoid, what is popularly referred to as the fiscal cliff (the yawning budget gap), it will also have to devote much attention to critical questions of foreign and security policy. One of these will inevitably deal with the critical question of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Despite the withdrawal of forces, it is widely believed that the US will maintain a small, but lethal force in Afghanistan.
That said, it will, in all likelihood, count on regional powers such as India to step up to the plate to help maintain some semblance of stability in the country. As it seeks to do so, it will, almost without question, face some pushback from Pakistans military establishment. Quite belatedly, the Obama Administration, like its predecessor, came to the realisation that regardless of a change of guard within the Pakistan military, its duplicitous behaviour had not come to an end, otherwise it would have alerted Rawalpindi about its plans to carry out the strike that led to Obama bin Ladens death.
The administration, to ensure that the Pakistan military does not undermine its efforts to stabilise Afghanistan, will no doubt open some discussions with it. To insinuate itself into the good graces of the US, it will quite deftly highlight its putative sacrifices in the quest to terminate terrorist networks on Pakistans soil, promise increased cooperation and may even deliver a few wanted individuals to demonstrate its bona fides.
In turn, there are some in US policy circles, who thanks to their long association with Pakistan, will again fall prey to these blandishments. They will underscore the seemingly renewed cooperation and apparent reasonableness of the military and argue forcefully on its behalf. They will, among other matters, also suggest that the weapons spigot be reopened for Pakistan; its concerns about the Kashmir dispute given consideration yet again; and some pressure exerted on India to make suitable concessions.
This scenario is far from chimerical and Indias policymakers would be wise to be cognisant of its likely emergence. How might they then forestall such a possibility? Among other matters it will entail bolstering ongoing discussions with the US, speeding up agreements that remain in abeyance and moving forward with defence contracts. It will also involve proffering meaningful, viable and forward-looking ideas about how India can play a practical role in Afghanistan as the US thins out its military presence.
Beyond these efforts, New Delhi will have to exercise its diplomatic muscles to ensure that Pakistan militarys adroit efforts to ingratiate itself with US policymakers encounter some serious hurdles. This may require Indias foreign policy apparatus to ensure that its views are adequately and forcefully represented, not only at Foggy Bottom, but also Capitol Hill. Attempting to fend off the revival of a US-Pakistan security relationship for the ostensible purpose of combating terror in Pakistan and its environs will prove to be a fools errand. It must instead be the goal of Indian diplomacy to ensure that such a nexus is not forged in the first place. Accomplishing this end will necessitate a full court press effort to remind key policymakers, members of Congress and the attentive public in Washington, DC, that Pakistans military establishment has consistently dissembled about its dalliance with terror, that appeasing it with periodic rewards has produced few meaningful results and that it is not about to change its behaviour.
None of this will be easy. Indian policymaking, especially when it has involved the US, except on rare occasions, has been both timid and hesitant. It has also been held hostage to the memories of the Cold War when the two sides were frequently at odds. Instead of remaining trapped in a time warp, New Delhi has to recognise that it has a distinct opportunity to forge a more robust, reliable and significant relationship with the US, based on shared regional and even global security concerns. These interests clearly intersect in Afghanistan. A failure to seize this moment will constitute the squandering of a vital opportunity to build a more secure region.
