BanglaBhoot
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The Indian Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor left Bangladesh after a warm and successful 6-day visit. It is a prompt return visit by the Indian army chief after 6-day visit of Bangladesh Army Chief General Moeen U. Ahmed in India last February. Dr. S. Kapila, a geo-strategic analyst belonging to South Asia Analysis Group and presumably linked with the Research and Analysis Wing (intelligence body RAW) under the Prime Minister of India, characterised the promptness of the return visit to Bangladesh by the Indian army chief as a diplomatic message.
The essence of the message, according to Dr. Kapila, is that "India (as a rising regional and potential global power) is investing in building substantive relationship with Bangladesh." He noted that this was a visit by an Indian army chief for "military to military contact" after a lapse of seven years.
The last visit was in 2001. "All Indian Army chiefs routinely visit a number of foreign countries once during their tenure of office as part of high-level military to military contacts supplementing other Indian foreign initiatives." General Kapoor's Bangladesh visit followed closely the recent Foreign Secretary-level talks in New Delhi between Bangladesh and India. Dr. Kapoor therefore considers this visit particularly significant and also significant from the Indian paint of view is that "succeeding the visit of Indian Army chief would be joint discussions between the Home Secretaries of India and Bangladesh to sort out issues of border incidents and infiltration."
He did not mention the transit demand of India through Bangladesh, but since it was on priority agenda for India at the foreign secretaries-level meeting, inclusion of the issue was indeed implied. Elaborating on the impasse of conventional Indian positions with relation to Bangladesh, Dr. Kapila noted: "General Deepak Kapoor could then be left free to discuss, explore and suggest newer and deeper initiatives to further the 'ushering in a new era of close cooperation in Bangladesh-India military cooperation' as highlighted by the Bangladesh Army Chief during his visit to India in February, 2008."
Dr. Kapila interpreted the quoted overture of the Bangladesh Army chief and also the Foreign Office responses of the Caretaker Government of Bangladesh as a welcome change from the Indian point of view, "to more nuanced policy approaches to India" than earlier governments. He further noted: "India's policy establishment needs to factor-in its strategic and political calculus the centrality of Bangladesh Army chief and the Bangladesh Army in Bangladesh's policy establishment and governance." Dr. Kapila took credit for identifying earlier in his analyses that: "Bangladesh-India strategic partnership is an idea and a strategic imperative whose time has come to be implemented by both countries. In South Asia, in terms of relative stability, Bangladesh offers more promising (dividends) than Pakistan.
Bangladesh, therefore, deserves a higher priority than Pakistan in terms of strategic and political effort by India's political establishment, diplomats and the strategic communityt. (Bangladesh's) war of liberation itself was a strategic partnership between Bangladesh liberation stalwarts and the Indian nation state."
So far so good, and the Indian Army Chief's visit was not much of a departure from the dotted lines of policy analysis by Dr. Kapoor from the Indian point of view.
But Dr. Kapoor somehow wishfully concluded that there are "pointed indicators" from the Bangladesh side that a new "Bangladesh trend to craft its relationship with India based on strategic realities rather than pan-Islamism". By pan-Islamism, Dr. Kapila meant the active membership and involvement of Bangladesh in the organisation of Islamic countries.
A Bangladeshi former diplomat knowledgeable in the evolution of strategic thinking and current developments of strategic partnerships of all kinds questioned the validity of that finding of Dr. Kapila. He noted that 70 per cent of Bangladesh's foreign exchange remittances come from Islamic countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Scope of manpower exports of Bangladesh is highest in these countries and there are hardly any hiccups in the relationship of Bangladesh with other OIC member states. Relationship with India, on the other hand, is handicapped by barbed-wire fences and trigger-happy BSF "head-hunters" along the Bangladesh border, not to speak of long-standing disputes and distrust accruing over water sharing and border delineation problems over the years.
Bangladesh draws strength from its membership of OIC in the international order. India, on the other hand, has yet to offer relatively favourable access to its domestic market for Bangladeshi goods.
The Bangladesh diplomat, however, recognised on the strength of his own private information from sources in Bangladesh mission in India, that General Kapoor was more pragmatic and persuasive in his approach than his predecessors or his counterparts in the Indian security establishment with regard to Bangladesh. He said he understood from his sources that General Kapoor was invited last month to a meeting of the Indian Cabinet Committee of National Security. The Cabinet committee was considering a special report from the Research and Analysis Wing about troubles in Northeast India.
The report suggested that Bangladesh should be pressurised to hunt and hand over Northeast Indian separatists hiding in its territory. If Bangladesh does not cooperate, India should back Chakma malcontents in Bangladesh and stir up tramples in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. When asked for his opinion, General Kapoor is said to have outright rejected the suggestion. He is said to have pointed out that India was maintaining military-to-military contact and cooperative with China and Myanmar, and engaging in joint military exercises with them. In the national interest of India itself, better military-to-military relationship with Bangladesh should be cultivated so that the rear ground of India in any event of war in the north remains friendly and free from aggravation.
The New Nation - Internet Edition
The Indian Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor left Bangladesh after a warm and successful 6-day visit. It is a prompt return visit by the Indian army chief after 6-day visit of Bangladesh Army Chief General Moeen U. Ahmed in India last February. Dr. S. Kapila, a geo-strategic analyst belonging to South Asia Analysis Group and presumably linked with the Research and Analysis Wing (intelligence body RAW) under the Prime Minister of India, characterised the promptness of the return visit to Bangladesh by the Indian army chief as a diplomatic message.
The essence of the message, according to Dr. Kapila, is that "India (as a rising regional and potential global power) is investing in building substantive relationship with Bangladesh." He noted that this was a visit by an Indian army chief for "military to military contact" after a lapse of seven years.
The last visit was in 2001. "All Indian Army chiefs routinely visit a number of foreign countries once during their tenure of office as part of high-level military to military contacts supplementing other Indian foreign initiatives." General Kapoor's Bangladesh visit followed closely the recent Foreign Secretary-level talks in New Delhi between Bangladesh and India. Dr. Kapoor therefore considers this visit particularly significant and also significant from the Indian paint of view is that "succeeding the visit of Indian Army chief would be joint discussions between the Home Secretaries of India and Bangladesh to sort out issues of border incidents and infiltration."
He did not mention the transit demand of India through Bangladesh, but since it was on priority agenda for India at the foreign secretaries-level meeting, inclusion of the issue was indeed implied. Elaborating on the impasse of conventional Indian positions with relation to Bangladesh, Dr. Kapila noted: "General Deepak Kapoor could then be left free to discuss, explore and suggest newer and deeper initiatives to further the 'ushering in a new era of close cooperation in Bangladesh-India military cooperation' as highlighted by the Bangladesh Army Chief during his visit to India in February, 2008."
Dr. Kapila interpreted the quoted overture of the Bangladesh Army chief and also the Foreign Office responses of the Caretaker Government of Bangladesh as a welcome change from the Indian point of view, "to more nuanced policy approaches to India" than earlier governments. He further noted: "India's policy establishment needs to factor-in its strategic and political calculus the centrality of Bangladesh Army chief and the Bangladesh Army in Bangladesh's policy establishment and governance." Dr. Kapila took credit for identifying earlier in his analyses that: "Bangladesh-India strategic partnership is an idea and a strategic imperative whose time has come to be implemented by both countries. In South Asia, in terms of relative stability, Bangladesh offers more promising (dividends) than Pakistan.
Bangladesh, therefore, deserves a higher priority than Pakistan in terms of strategic and political effort by India's political establishment, diplomats and the strategic communityt. (Bangladesh's) war of liberation itself was a strategic partnership between Bangladesh liberation stalwarts and the Indian nation state."
So far so good, and the Indian Army Chief's visit was not much of a departure from the dotted lines of policy analysis by Dr. Kapoor from the Indian point of view.
But Dr. Kapoor somehow wishfully concluded that there are "pointed indicators" from the Bangladesh side that a new "Bangladesh trend to craft its relationship with India based on strategic realities rather than pan-Islamism". By pan-Islamism, Dr. Kapila meant the active membership and involvement of Bangladesh in the organisation of Islamic countries.
A Bangladeshi former diplomat knowledgeable in the evolution of strategic thinking and current developments of strategic partnerships of all kinds questioned the validity of that finding of Dr. Kapila. He noted that 70 per cent of Bangladesh's foreign exchange remittances come from Islamic countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Scope of manpower exports of Bangladesh is highest in these countries and there are hardly any hiccups in the relationship of Bangladesh with other OIC member states. Relationship with India, on the other hand, is handicapped by barbed-wire fences and trigger-happy BSF "head-hunters" along the Bangladesh border, not to speak of long-standing disputes and distrust accruing over water sharing and border delineation problems over the years.
Bangladesh draws strength from its membership of OIC in the international order. India, on the other hand, has yet to offer relatively favourable access to its domestic market for Bangladeshi goods.
The Bangladesh diplomat, however, recognised on the strength of his own private information from sources in Bangladesh mission in India, that General Kapoor was more pragmatic and persuasive in his approach than his predecessors or his counterparts in the Indian security establishment with regard to Bangladesh. He said he understood from his sources that General Kapoor was invited last month to a meeting of the Indian Cabinet Committee of National Security. The Cabinet committee was considering a special report from the Research and Analysis Wing about troubles in Northeast India.
The report suggested that Bangladesh should be pressurised to hunt and hand over Northeast Indian separatists hiding in its territory. If Bangladesh does not cooperate, India should back Chakma malcontents in Bangladesh and stir up tramples in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. When asked for his opinion, General Kapoor is said to have outright rejected the suggestion. He is said to have pointed out that India was maintaining military-to-military contact and cooperative with China and Myanmar, and engaging in joint military exercises with them. In the national interest of India itself, better military-to-military relationship with Bangladesh should be cultivated so that the rear ground of India in any event of war in the north remains friendly and free from aggravation.
The New Nation - Internet Edition
