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A startling revelation that Hindustan wanted to invade Bangladesh in 1975 to install there her own choice government appears in a new book The Bangladesh Military Coup and the CIA Link by B Z Khasru editor Capital Express New York, to be published shortly.
When Gen Ziaur Rahman emerged as a virtual ruler in Bandladesh following several bloody coups in 1975, he informed United States of an impending Hindustani invasion of Bangladesh. New Delhi, the book says, wanted to install government of her choice in Dhaka.
The invasion fear spiraled so high that Gen Zia made a radio call to his nation to be ready to confront the attack. It was an intense moment for the people of Bangladesh.
The public mood in Dhaka reflected a total reversal of the sentiment at the end of the Bangladesh war in 1971 when the sentiment was explicitly anti-Pakistani and secular. Following the November 1975 events, the attitude turned explicitly pro-Pakistani, pro-Islamic, pro-American and pro-West says an excerpt of the book.
This public mood in Dhaka reflected a total reversal of the sentiment at the end of the Bangladesh war in 1971 when the sentiment was explicitly anti-Pakistani and secular. Following the November 1975 events, the attitude turned explicitly pro-Pakistani, pro-Islamic, pro-American and pro-West.
In order to blunt the invasion, Gen Ziaur Rahman sent his acting foreign secretary Mr Nazrul Islam to seek US support to discourage New Delhi. Islam was to request that America convey Bangladeshs feelings regarding the possible Indian move to China and Pakistan so that they could mobilize support from the Muslim countries. Accordingly, Islam asked Irving G. Cheslaw, U.S. Chargé dAffaires in Dhaka, for support to checkmate any Indian invasion.
As Islam talked with Cheslaw in Dhaka, the U.S. consul general in Kolkata discussed the events in Bangladesh with Ashok Gupta, West Bengal chief secretary, and Gen. J.F. R. Jacob, Eastern Command deputy chief, at a Soviet reception. Gupta described the Bangladesh situation as worrisome. Fighting was still going on there, and Dhakas air was thick with anti-Indian slogans, says the excerpt. Meanwhile Mahbubul Alam Chashi, principal secretary to Bangladesh President A. M. Sayem, telephoned Davis E. Boster, U.S. ambassador in Dhaka, to seek assurance from the United States with respect to any external threat.
Boster informed the State Department that although Chashis formulation was vague, what he clearly had in mind was assurance from us that we would help deter India from intervening in the current situation.
Responding to Bangladeshs request, the State Department instructed the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka on 8 November 1975 to deliver a message pledging American support. The message said the Bangladesh governments requests for our support during this unsettled period have received urgent and careful attention in Washington. We support the independence of Bangladesh and want to carry on the close and cooperative relations we have had with previous governments in Dacca. We will continue to be sympathetic to Bangladeshs needs and concerns.
On 8 November, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the U.S. ambassador in New Delhi to meet with External Affairs Minister Y.B. Chavan or Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh to seek a high-level Indian assessment of the situation in Bangladesh and convey the message that the United States supported an independent Bangladesh.
Singh assured the American that New Delhi had no intention of interfering in Bangladesh affairs. How Bangladesh ran its government was its affair. But if its policies created problems or hurt Indian interests, then India must express its concern. He believed Zia knew of Indias views.
Zia panicked for the second time on the night of 23 November when he feared India was about to attack Bangladesh. At 0:30 a.m., he went on the radio appealing for the nations unity in this fatefulhour.
The military regime took the threat so seriously that it sent a secret envoy to Pakistan to seek Prime Minister Z. A. Bhuttos help to fend off the Indian attack.
India wanted to invade Bangladesh in 1975
When Gen Ziaur Rahman emerged as a virtual ruler in Bandladesh following several bloody coups in 1975, he informed United States of an impending Hindustani invasion of Bangladesh. New Delhi, the book says, wanted to install government of her choice in Dhaka.
The invasion fear spiraled so high that Gen Zia made a radio call to his nation to be ready to confront the attack. It was an intense moment for the people of Bangladesh.
The public mood in Dhaka reflected a total reversal of the sentiment at the end of the Bangladesh war in 1971 when the sentiment was explicitly anti-Pakistani and secular. Following the November 1975 events, the attitude turned explicitly pro-Pakistani, pro-Islamic, pro-American and pro-West says an excerpt of the book.
This public mood in Dhaka reflected a total reversal of the sentiment at the end of the Bangladesh war in 1971 when the sentiment was explicitly anti-Pakistani and secular. Following the November 1975 events, the attitude turned explicitly pro-Pakistani, pro-Islamic, pro-American and pro-West.
In order to blunt the invasion, Gen Ziaur Rahman sent his acting foreign secretary Mr Nazrul Islam to seek US support to discourage New Delhi. Islam was to request that America convey Bangladeshs feelings regarding the possible Indian move to China and Pakistan so that they could mobilize support from the Muslim countries. Accordingly, Islam asked Irving G. Cheslaw, U.S. Chargé dAffaires in Dhaka, for support to checkmate any Indian invasion.
As Islam talked with Cheslaw in Dhaka, the U.S. consul general in Kolkata discussed the events in Bangladesh with Ashok Gupta, West Bengal chief secretary, and Gen. J.F. R. Jacob, Eastern Command deputy chief, at a Soviet reception. Gupta described the Bangladesh situation as worrisome. Fighting was still going on there, and Dhakas air was thick with anti-Indian slogans, says the excerpt. Meanwhile Mahbubul Alam Chashi, principal secretary to Bangladesh President A. M. Sayem, telephoned Davis E. Boster, U.S. ambassador in Dhaka, to seek assurance from the United States with respect to any external threat.
Boster informed the State Department that although Chashis formulation was vague, what he clearly had in mind was assurance from us that we would help deter India from intervening in the current situation.
Responding to Bangladeshs request, the State Department instructed the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka on 8 November 1975 to deliver a message pledging American support. The message said the Bangladesh governments requests for our support during this unsettled period have received urgent and careful attention in Washington. We support the independence of Bangladesh and want to carry on the close and cooperative relations we have had with previous governments in Dacca. We will continue to be sympathetic to Bangladeshs needs and concerns.
On 8 November, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the U.S. ambassador in New Delhi to meet with External Affairs Minister Y.B. Chavan or Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh to seek a high-level Indian assessment of the situation in Bangladesh and convey the message that the United States supported an independent Bangladesh.
Singh assured the American that New Delhi had no intention of interfering in Bangladesh affairs. How Bangladesh ran its government was its affair. But if its policies created problems or hurt Indian interests, then India must express its concern. He believed Zia knew of Indias views.
Zia panicked for the second time on the night of 23 November when he feared India was about to attack Bangladesh. At 0:30 a.m., he went on the radio appealing for the nations unity in this fatefulhour.
The military regime took the threat so seriously that it sent a secret envoy to Pakistan to seek Prime Minister Z. A. Bhuttos help to fend off the Indian attack.
India wanted to invade Bangladesh in 1975
