India Pursues Scandinavian Partnerships to Join Arctic Race
View attachment c789366062f6e4bc53a8c550405093a4.png
Indian President Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Norway in mid-October, the first by an Indian head of state, was a signal of India’s rising profile in the Arctic. Mukherjee signed 13 agreements with Norway, including one exploring avenues for joint military research between India’s Defense Research and Development Organization and Norway’s Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, known as FFI.
Mukherjee also visited neighboring Finland, where he signed an additional 19 agreements, on everything from civilian nuclear cooperation to education and fishing. But the trip, coming a year after India gained observer status in the Arctic Council—an intergovernmental forum that includes eight member countries that border the Arctic and deals primarily with environmental treaties—was really about the North Pole and Indian efforts to gain a foothold there by building partnerships with Scandinavia.
Unlike Antarctica, the Arctic is not considered a global commons—that is, part of the Earth’s collective natural resources—and instead has become the site of competition as different countries race to claim its riches, including an estimated 25 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and natural gas, along with massive mineral deposits. India is eager to mark its strategic presence in this contested region and join the Arctic race. Given its geographic distance from the North Pole, India favors a multilateral approach that involves working in concert with Scandinavian countries, as it seeks to balance other major powers, like the United States and Russia, which have direct access to the area. For the small countries in the region, India therefore seems like a natural ally in the Arctic game and one that could help bring Russia around as a partner rather than an adversary. India is also offering Scandinavian companies an important opportunity for favorable techno-economic partnerships that China perhaps no longer affords.
The voyage of a Chinese icebreaker through the Arctic last year created a sense of urgency in New Delhi to move beyond mere “scientific” interests, such as climate change research in the North Pole—India has operated the Himadri research station is Norway’s Svalbard archipelago since 2008. As the deals with Norway and Finland make clear, India is now looking to move toward weapons co-development programs with specific companies in Scandinavia that have strengths in military electronics and land vehicles, but need India’s scale to remain competitive.
There are other signs that India is setting itself up for more strategic engagement in the Arctic through Arctic Council members. India’s just-retired air force chief was appointed ambassador to Norway earlier this year. Last year a former Indian naval chief became high commissioner to Canada. It is clear that India wishes to understand the region through a strategic intelligence prism, since it may well have to provide a security component to its joint interests with countries in Scandinavia.
While these moves seem designed to boost cooperation with Scandinavian countries, which increasingly find themselves at odds with Russia over North Pole access and resources, a growing Indian presence in the Arctic could also help reduce such tensions. In the Arctic, after all, Russia is also offering India new offshore oil concessions. These new discoveries afford a chance for more cooperation between major Russian oil companies and Norway’s Statoil, which has the highest technical expertise for such fields, with India rounding off the investment trio. Finland, for its part, is looking for India to help mend its traditionally close Russia ties, which have soured amid the Ukraine crisis.
The civilian nuclear deal between India and Finland shows how energy cooperation between India and regional countries also has a nuclear dimension. That deal focused on enhancing safety, and both Norway and Finland are believed to be in favor of India’s entry into the multinational Nuclear Suppliers Group, which safeguards nuclear materials and controls exports. Norway is also interested in thorium-based nuclear energy, an area in which India has progressed in recent years.
Cooperation in clean technologies is also on the table. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “smart cities” agenda is drawing the interest of small- and medium-sized Scandinavia enterprises that have innovative solutions in waste management and grey-water recycling. They see India as a natural market for sustainable technologies and design. Indian companies, meanwhile, are looking to collaborate with their Scandinavia counterparts on green energy initiatives that are central to Modi’s “Make in India” manufacturing campaign. Finland, in particular, is keen to forge industrial alliances with India for several large infrastructure projects.
That push may also see Norway’s huge sovereign wealth fund increase its investments in India’s ports, shipping and hydrocarbon sectors. While regulatory woes such as retrospective taxation dented India’s image as an investment destination under former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government, Modi’s government is looking to promote India as a leading international investment destination, with attractive, business-friendly policies.
An India getting its economic act together and open to cooperation on sustainable energy solutions is an obvious draw for Scandinavian countries whose innovative companies, such as Nokia, have been weakened by alliances between U.S. and Chinese entities. Meanwhile, Modi’s ambitious economic agenda means that India’s demand for resources will grow, with a concurrent need to raise its global power-projection capability. Those heightened stakes, coupled with Norway and Finland’s need for a powerful backer that also wants to keep the Arctic open for all, explain why both countries support India’s bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.
For the Arctic, interests run both ways. Norway is warming up to India at the same time as its ties with China have gone into a deep freeze. Despite China’s larger economy, Oslo sees India as a far more benign, and perhaps more reliable, collaborator in the North Pole. And for New Delhi, newfound Scandinavian support is key to managing discontent and mitigating potential conflict over a future Arctic resource race.
View attachment c789366062f6e4bc53a8c550405093a4.png
Indian President Pranab Mukherjee’s visit to Norway in mid-October, the first by an Indian head of state, was a signal of India’s rising profile in the Arctic. Mukherjee signed 13 agreements with Norway, including one exploring avenues for joint military research between India’s Defense Research and Development Organization and Norway’s Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, known as FFI.
Mukherjee also visited neighboring Finland, where he signed an additional 19 agreements, on everything from civilian nuclear cooperation to education and fishing. But the trip, coming a year after India gained observer status in the Arctic Council—an intergovernmental forum that includes eight member countries that border the Arctic and deals primarily with environmental treaties—was really about the North Pole and Indian efforts to gain a foothold there by building partnerships with Scandinavia.
Unlike Antarctica, the Arctic is not considered a global commons—that is, part of the Earth’s collective natural resources—and instead has become the site of competition as different countries race to claim its riches, including an estimated 25 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and natural gas, along with massive mineral deposits. India is eager to mark its strategic presence in this contested region and join the Arctic race. Given its geographic distance from the North Pole, India favors a multilateral approach that involves working in concert with Scandinavian countries, as it seeks to balance other major powers, like the United States and Russia, which have direct access to the area. For the small countries in the region, India therefore seems like a natural ally in the Arctic game and one that could help bring Russia around as a partner rather than an adversary. India is also offering Scandinavian companies an important opportunity for favorable techno-economic partnerships that China perhaps no longer affords.
The voyage of a Chinese icebreaker through the Arctic last year created a sense of urgency in New Delhi to move beyond mere “scientific” interests, such as climate change research in the North Pole—India has operated the Himadri research station is Norway’s Svalbard archipelago since 2008. As the deals with Norway and Finland make clear, India is now looking to move toward weapons co-development programs with specific companies in Scandinavia that have strengths in military electronics and land vehicles, but need India’s scale to remain competitive.
There are other signs that India is setting itself up for more strategic engagement in the Arctic through Arctic Council members. India’s just-retired air force chief was appointed ambassador to Norway earlier this year. Last year a former Indian naval chief became high commissioner to Canada. It is clear that India wishes to understand the region through a strategic intelligence prism, since it may well have to provide a security component to its joint interests with countries in Scandinavia.
While these moves seem designed to boost cooperation with Scandinavian countries, which increasingly find themselves at odds with Russia over North Pole access and resources, a growing Indian presence in the Arctic could also help reduce such tensions. In the Arctic, after all, Russia is also offering India new offshore oil concessions. These new discoveries afford a chance for more cooperation between major Russian oil companies and Norway’s Statoil, which has the highest technical expertise for such fields, with India rounding off the investment trio. Finland, for its part, is looking for India to help mend its traditionally close Russia ties, which have soured amid the Ukraine crisis.
The civilian nuclear deal between India and Finland shows how energy cooperation between India and regional countries also has a nuclear dimension. That deal focused on enhancing safety, and both Norway and Finland are believed to be in favor of India’s entry into the multinational Nuclear Suppliers Group, which safeguards nuclear materials and controls exports. Norway is also interested in thorium-based nuclear energy, an area in which India has progressed in recent years.
Cooperation in clean technologies is also on the table. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “smart cities” agenda is drawing the interest of small- and medium-sized Scandinavia enterprises that have innovative solutions in waste management and grey-water recycling. They see India as a natural market for sustainable technologies and design. Indian companies, meanwhile, are looking to collaborate with their Scandinavia counterparts on green energy initiatives that are central to Modi’s “Make in India” manufacturing campaign. Finland, in particular, is keen to forge industrial alliances with India for several large infrastructure projects.
That push may also see Norway’s huge sovereign wealth fund increase its investments in India’s ports, shipping and hydrocarbon sectors. While regulatory woes such as retrospective taxation dented India’s image as an investment destination under former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government, Modi’s government is looking to promote India as a leading international investment destination, with attractive, business-friendly policies.
An India getting its economic act together and open to cooperation on sustainable energy solutions is an obvious draw for Scandinavian countries whose innovative companies, such as Nokia, have been weakened by alliances between U.S. and Chinese entities. Meanwhile, Modi’s ambitious economic agenda means that India’s demand for resources will grow, with a concurrent need to raise its global power-projection capability. Those heightened stakes, coupled with Norway and Finland’s need for a powerful backer that also wants to keep the Arctic open for all, explain why both countries support India’s bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council.
For the Arctic, interests run both ways. Norway is warming up to India at the same time as its ties with China have gone into a deep freeze. Despite China’s larger economy, Oslo sees India as a far more benign, and perhaps more reliable, collaborator in the North Pole. And for New Delhi, newfound Scandinavian support is key to managing discontent and mitigating potential conflict over a future Arctic resource race.