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For the Americans, June was feared as the worst month in Afghanistan for fatalities in their longest campaign in history. Now July has overtaken the average loss of two soldiers a day with more than twice that number wounded. In August the trajectory is expected to rise. The US dilemma of fixing Afghanistan is compounded, it turns out, by first fixing Pakistan where, not surprisingly, they have found a tunnel at the end of light. The choice is stark: Pakistan, a failed state with nuclear weapons, or Pakistan a treacherous state which has to be managed.
For the Americans the journey to Afghanistan is in some ways akin to the 15th century Spanish explorer Christopher Columbus. When he left, he didnt know where he was going. When he had reached, he did not know where he had arrived. When he returned, he did not know where hed been. That is the reason most Americans are asking: Where are we, where are we headed and how do we get there. To these there are more questions than answers.
For most Americans, the McChrystal-Petraeus strategy is simply not working. The debate preceding the December review of AfPak strategy is centred on the Biden (US Vice-President) - Peter Galbraith (former UN diplomat in Afghanistan) - Kofer Black and Bruce Reidel (US counter-terrorism experts) and Robert Blackwill (former US Ambassador in India) alternate strategies. The Blackwill Plan is the most radical as it suggests a de facto partition of Afghanistan between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns.
In one way or another the alternate strategies recommend scaling down US forces from 140,000 to 20,000, holding key population centres and relying on air power and drones to marginalise the Afghan Taliban. The strategic shift is one from COIN (counter-insurgency) to counter-terrorism targeting top Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders. The exit plan is linked to this strategy through a more robust Afghanisation of the security sector and a yet uncharted reconciliation process to establish a power-sharing agreement with the Taliban. These are the contours of Plan B which leans heavily on Plan A. As both these are unlikely to work, the US must think of a Plan C but more on that later.
Gen David Petraeus has reiterated that the US strategic objective is to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a platform for terrorism. Neither Plan A nor Plan B foot the bill. What is worse Pakistan, which is the pivotal player in this strategy, has other ideas to keep the fires burning, WikiLeaks notwithstanding. For the Americans, Pakistan is an indispensable ally as 70 per cent of logistics for the US and Nato forces pass through its territory. Afghan Taliban sanctuaries are located on its soil and the ISI has promised to deliver reconcilable Taliban.
Further bad news. The Dutch contingent of Nato has pulled out, the British - like the Americans have also announced that troops will begin pulling out in 2011 and that all troops will be back home by 2014, a deadline US President Barack Obama has not enunciated. Indicating a time-line is the greatest strategic error, giving joy to the Taliban who say: The Americans may have the watches, we have the time.
The ground situation is depressing but not outright bad. Only 29 of the 121 key districts of Afghanistan are under Kabuls control. The training of Afghan security forces is behind schedule. Only 23 per cent of the Army and 12 per cent of police are capable of operating independently. Though salaries have been increased to ensure retention of soldiers, desertion rates are 12 and 17 per cent for the Army and the police. Rogue elements Taliban sympathisers have since 2008 carried out three deadly attacks against their Western trainers and buddies.
Operations against Marja, which Gen McChrystal called a bleeding ulcer, were partially successful. Another American troops surge is expected shortly
but it seems operations are being relaunched in Helmand province as the Taliban have sneaked back. There arent enough boots on the ground to hold ground which has been cleared. And the concept of Government in a box has failed. Some ground reports suggest that the big offensive to liberate Kandahar, the heart and soul of the Taliban, has been postponed indefinitely if not called off altogether.
Where does all this leave India which was seen to have been relegated to the margins after the London and Kabul conferences? Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will get to discuss Indias role in Afghanistan with Mr Obama when he visits Delhi in November. India must work on a Plan C but wriggle its way into Plans A and B to stay relevant by combining with its impressive use of soft power some elements of hard power.
As a regional power and the most direct recipient of the spillover of terrorism from AfPak region, Delhi has legitimate interests in Afghanistan. If Nato can be present astride the Hindukush, India, which shares the mountain ranges, has a more immediate compulsion to be there. Indias interests must never get subsumed by those of the US and Pakistan. While Washington, DC accepts New Delhis security concerns, it does little beyond just that, yielding to Islamabads sensitivities with the gentle remonstration: Pakistan must do more.
The US is hostage to Pakistan in Afghanistan. It is rewarding Islamabad with billions of dollars of hi-tech military equipment for all its duplicity, atoning for the sin of abandoning Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Why does India have to keep paying for acts of omission and commission by the Americans?
India must abandon its reactive and diffident policy and become more assertive about its future role in Afghanistan. It should do more with its surplus hard power and, under a UN flag whenever that happens, deploy troops there. It must also enlarge and diversify its development and capacity-building efforts while ensuring the security of Indian workers. This is Indias second out of area mission after Sri Lanka where four divisions were maintained by sea and air.
New Delhi can prepare alternative frameworks for Plan C: A regional initiative backed by a UN peace-keeping force when insurgency in Afghanistan has been contained and there is some peace to keep. In the meantime, India and Pakistan must talk to each other about sharing strategic depth in Afghanistan. All this and more for Mr Obamas November agenda.
IntelliBriefs: India has a role in Afghanistan
For the Americans the journey to Afghanistan is in some ways akin to the 15th century Spanish explorer Christopher Columbus. When he left, he didnt know where he was going. When he had reached, he did not know where he had arrived. When he returned, he did not know where hed been. That is the reason most Americans are asking: Where are we, where are we headed and how do we get there. To these there are more questions than answers.
For most Americans, the McChrystal-Petraeus strategy is simply not working. The debate preceding the December review of AfPak strategy is centred on the Biden (US Vice-President) - Peter Galbraith (former UN diplomat in Afghanistan) - Kofer Black and Bruce Reidel (US counter-terrorism experts) and Robert Blackwill (former US Ambassador in India) alternate strategies. The Blackwill Plan is the most radical as it suggests a de facto partition of Afghanistan between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns.
In one way or another the alternate strategies recommend scaling down US forces from 140,000 to 20,000, holding key population centres and relying on air power and drones to marginalise the Afghan Taliban. The strategic shift is one from COIN (counter-insurgency) to counter-terrorism targeting top Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders. The exit plan is linked to this strategy through a more robust Afghanisation of the security sector and a yet uncharted reconciliation process to establish a power-sharing agreement with the Taliban. These are the contours of Plan B which leans heavily on Plan A. As both these are unlikely to work, the US must think of a Plan C but more on that later.
Gen David Petraeus has reiterated that the US strategic objective is to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a platform for terrorism. Neither Plan A nor Plan B foot the bill. What is worse Pakistan, which is the pivotal player in this strategy, has other ideas to keep the fires burning, WikiLeaks notwithstanding. For the Americans, Pakistan is an indispensable ally as 70 per cent of logistics for the US and Nato forces pass through its territory. Afghan Taliban sanctuaries are located on its soil and the ISI has promised to deliver reconcilable Taliban.
Further bad news. The Dutch contingent of Nato has pulled out, the British - like the Americans have also announced that troops will begin pulling out in 2011 and that all troops will be back home by 2014, a deadline US President Barack Obama has not enunciated. Indicating a time-line is the greatest strategic error, giving joy to the Taliban who say: The Americans may have the watches, we have the time.
The ground situation is depressing but not outright bad. Only 29 of the 121 key districts of Afghanistan are under Kabuls control. The training of Afghan security forces is behind schedule. Only 23 per cent of the Army and 12 per cent of police are capable of operating independently. Though salaries have been increased to ensure retention of soldiers, desertion rates are 12 and 17 per cent for the Army and the police. Rogue elements Taliban sympathisers have since 2008 carried out three deadly attacks against their Western trainers and buddies.
Operations against Marja, which Gen McChrystal called a bleeding ulcer, were partially successful. Another American troops surge is expected shortly
but it seems operations are being relaunched in Helmand province as the Taliban have sneaked back. There arent enough boots on the ground to hold ground which has been cleared. And the concept of Government in a box has failed. Some ground reports suggest that the big offensive to liberate Kandahar, the heart and soul of the Taliban, has been postponed indefinitely if not called off altogether.
Where does all this leave India which was seen to have been relegated to the margins after the London and Kabul conferences? Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will get to discuss Indias role in Afghanistan with Mr Obama when he visits Delhi in November. India must work on a Plan C but wriggle its way into Plans A and B to stay relevant by combining with its impressive use of soft power some elements of hard power.
As a regional power and the most direct recipient of the spillover of terrorism from AfPak region, Delhi has legitimate interests in Afghanistan. If Nato can be present astride the Hindukush, India, which shares the mountain ranges, has a more immediate compulsion to be there. Indias interests must never get subsumed by those of the US and Pakistan. While Washington, DC accepts New Delhis security concerns, it does little beyond just that, yielding to Islamabads sensitivities with the gentle remonstration: Pakistan must do more.
The US is hostage to Pakistan in Afghanistan. It is rewarding Islamabad with billions of dollars of hi-tech military equipment for all its duplicity, atoning for the sin of abandoning Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Why does India have to keep paying for acts of omission and commission by the Americans?
India must abandon its reactive and diffident policy and become more assertive about its future role in Afghanistan. It should do more with its surplus hard power and, under a UN flag whenever that happens, deploy troops there. It must also enlarge and diversify its development and capacity-building efforts while ensuring the security of Indian workers. This is Indias second out of area mission after Sri Lanka where four divisions were maintained by sea and air.
New Delhi can prepare alternative frameworks for Plan C: A regional initiative backed by a UN peace-keeping force when insurgency in Afghanistan has been contained and there is some peace to keep. In the meantime, India and Pakistan must talk to each other about sharing strategic depth in Afghanistan. All this and more for Mr Obamas November agenda.
IntelliBriefs: India has a role in Afghanistan
