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http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1837772,001301790001.htm
India fails to convince NSG: US arms control body
Indo-Asian News Service
Washington, November 7, 2006
An American arms control association claims that India has failed to address all the concerns and questions raised by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) members on the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal.
Indian officials made their case on October 12 when the 45-member group met in Vienna for a regular Consultative Group meeting to assess worldwide nuclear developments, said Arms Control Today (ACT), a publication of the Washington-based Arms Control Association.
The confidential presentation, which reportedly stressed India's need for nuclear energy and determination not to cap its nuclear weapons sector, did not assuage all the concerns of critics and sceptics, it said citing two NSG member officials.
Suppliers also failed at the October meeting to align on two additional proposals. One calls for criteria to govern exports of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies, both of which can be used to produce nuclear fuel or fissile material for nuclear bombs.
The other would block nuclear trade with a country unless it had enacted an additional protocol delegating the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) greater powers to uncover illicit activity, an article in the November issue of the journal said.
Suppliers conducted no vote on the US-India initiative, it said. The group, which operates by consensus, typically makes decisions at a once-a-year plenary; the next one is scheduled for April in South Africa.
Much remains unsettled about the US-India deal, so the NSG may not face an April decision, it suggested. Congress has not passed legislation changing the US law to authorise full civilian nuclear trade with India.
In addition, the IAEA and New Delhi have not started negotiations on the duration and scope of the agency's oversight because India is balking at the notion of permanent IAEA safeguards for its entire civilian nuclear sector, ACT said.
Moreover, US and Indian negotiators have not completed the so-called 123 agreement, which codifies the terms of US nuclear trade with a foreign state. Such an agreement is required by section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Negotiators first met in June but have not reconvened. New Delhi has been waiting for Congress to pass a final bill on the deal, which could occur in November or December.
The NSG, ACT said, convened two days after North Korea announced its first nuclear test and authorised an October 12 statement urging all countries to "exercise extreme vigilance" to prevent trade that might benefit Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programme.
The NSG's origins go back to another test: India's 1974 nuclear blast, which used plutonium produced by a Canadian-supplied reactor using US-origin heavy water designated for peaceful purposes. Several countries formed the group the following year to enact stricter export standards.
In 1992, at US instigation, the NSG adopted a rule applying to all but the five recognized nuclear-weapon states - China, France, Russia, Britain and the US - under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The dictate said that, for other countries to enjoy full nuclear trade, they must open up their entire nuclear enterprises to the IAEA, which is charged with enforcing safeguard agreements.
India, which has never signed the NPT, refused, resulting in NSG members significantly limiting exports to India. The IAEA safeguards agreements help verify that countries do not exploit civilian nuclear facilities, materials, and technologies to build bombs.
As part of their July 2005 initiative to expand nuclear trade, Washington and New Delhi are seeking to persuade the NSG to exempt India from the 1992 rule. Several group members, including France, Russia, South Africa, and the UK, have expressed their support, the magazine noted.
Some suppliers, however, worry that exempting India might send the wrong signal to other countries that have accepted the NPT basic bargain of forswearing nuclear weapons in return for full civilian nuclear trade.
They contend that some states might reconsider their restraint if India is granted the same trade privileges while retaining and possibly expanding its nuclear arsenal.
India fails to convince NSG: US arms control body
Indo-Asian News Service
Washington, November 7, 2006
An American arms control association claims that India has failed to address all the concerns and questions raised by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) members on the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal.
Indian officials made their case on October 12 when the 45-member group met in Vienna for a regular Consultative Group meeting to assess worldwide nuclear developments, said Arms Control Today (ACT), a publication of the Washington-based Arms Control Association.
The confidential presentation, which reportedly stressed India's need for nuclear energy and determination not to cap its nuclear weapons sector, did not assuage all the concerns of critics and sceptics, it said citing two NSG member officials.
Suppliers also failed at the October meeting to align on two additional proposals. One calls for criteria to govern exports of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies, both of which can be used to produce nuclear fuel or fissile material for nuclear bombs.
The other would block nuclear trade with a country unless it had enacted an additional protocol delegating the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) greater powers to uncover illicit activity, an article in the November issue of the journal said.
Suppliers conducted no vote on the US-India initiative, it said. The group, which operates by consensus, typically makes decisions at a once-a-year plenary; the next one is scheduled for April in South Africa.
Much remains unsettled about the US-India deal, so the NSG may not face an April decision, it suggested. Congress has not passed legislation changing the US law to authorise full civilian nuclear trade with India.
In addition, the IAEA and New Delhi have not started negotiations on the duration and scope of the agency's oversight because India is balking at the notion of permanent IAEA safeguards for its entire civilian nuclear sector, ACT said.
Moreover, US and Indian negotiators have not completed the so-called 123 agreement, which codifies the terms of US nuclear trade with a foreign state. Such an agreement is required by section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Negotiators first met in June but have not reconvened. New Delhi has been waiting for Congress to pass a final bill on the deal, which could occur in November or December.
The NSG, ACT said, convened two days after North Korea announced its first nuclear test and authorised an October 12 statement urging all countries to "exercise extreme vigilance" to prevent trade that might benefit Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programme.
The NSG's origins go back to another test: India's 1974 nuclear blast, which used plutonium produced by a Canadian-supplied reactor using US-origin heavy water designated for peaceful purposes. Several countries formed the group the following year to enact stricter export standards.
In 1992, at US instigation, the NSG adopted a rule applying to all but the five recognized nuclear-weapon states - China, France, Russia, Britain and the US - under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The dictate said that, for other countries to enjoy full nuclear trade, they must open up their entire nuclear enterprises to the IAEA, which is charged with enforcing safeguard agreements.
India, which has never signed the NPT, refused, resulting in NSG members significantly limiting exports to India. The IAEA safeguards agreements help verify that countries do not exploit civilian nuclear facilities, materials, and technologies to build bombs.
As part of their July 2005 initiative to expand nuclear trade, Washington and New Delhi are seeking to persuade the NSG to exempt India from the 1992 rule. Several group members, including France, Russia, South Africa, and the UK, have expressed their support, the magazine noted.
Some suppliers, however, worry that exempting India might send the wrong signal to other countries that have accepted the NPT basic bargain of forswearing nuclear weapons in return for full civilian nuclear trade.
They contend that some states might reconsider their restraint if India is granted the same trade privileges while retaining and possibly expanding its nuclear arsenal.
