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Impact of Kargil Conflict 1999 on Pakistan’s Current Security Perspective
Global Village Space |
Zeeshan Shahid Khan |
Background
Taking the Indian Army totally by surprise, Pakistani troops crossed over the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir in early 1999 and managed to occupy heights from where they could effectively interdict the Indian Main Supply Route (MSR) to Siachen, an area claimed by Pakistan and occupied by the Indian Army in a similar manner. The reasons for Pakistan’s prosecution of the Kargil Conflict lie embedded in the Kashmir dispute, unresolved despite a number of UN resolutions. The deep-rooted hostility between the two countries since the creation of Pakistan has led them to a number of conflicts: in 1948 mujahideen from the tribal areas of Pakistan liberated a part of Kashmir, while Pakistan Army under the command of a British Chief refused to defend Kashmir against the onslaught of Indian Army; in 1965 Pakistan initiated a failed infiltration into Kashmir which resulted in the stalemated 1965 War; in 1971 India sponsored insurgency in the then East Pakistan, trained and armed guerilla separatists and then invaded Pakistan and dismembered it – the world kept quiet; in 1984 India occupied Siachen in violation of the Simla Agreement – the world kept quiet; Pakistan’s support to the indigenous liberation struggle of Kashmiris was brought under tremendous global pressure branding Pakistan as ‘a state sponsoring terrorism’ and Pakistan was forced to pull out it’s backing. These events created a typical mindset in Pakistan, particularly in the Pakistan Army, which led to the Kargil venture. Some add to it the ambitiousness of the then military commander, General Pervez Musharraf. The idea was not original and had been presented by the army in the 1980s and 1990s to the political leadership of the country (Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto), to force the Indians to pull out of Siachen, but the plans had been shelved for fear of escalation to an all-out war. Some analysts believe that the blueprint of the attack was reactivated soon after Pervez Musharraf was appointed Chief of Army Staff in October 1998.
Read more: A glimpse of the past: Was Pakistan ready to respond to respond to India’s overt nuclearization?
Chronology of Events
A brief summary is:-
Autumn 98 Pakistan takes the decision to launch a limited military operation in Kargil.
Feb 99 Pakistan commences infiltration across the LOC.
3 May 99 Indian shepherds report Pakistani intrusion.
10 May 99 Indian Army confirms the presence of Pakistani troops and initiates the move of additional troops from Kashmir Valley.
26-28 May 99 IAF launches air strikes against Pakistan’s intrusion and loses two jet aircraft’s and one MI 17.
1 June 99 Pakistan intensifies interdiction of the highway.
5 June 99 Indian Army releases documents recovered from Pakistani soldiers confirming Pakistan’s involvement.
6 June 99 Indian Army offensive in Kargil opens up.
15 June 99 U.S. President asks Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull out from Kargil.
20 June 99 Pakistan Army posts start falling under repeated Indian attacks.
4 July 99 Features overlooking the highway are lost to the Indians.
5 July 99 Nawaz Sharif announces Pakistani army’s withdrawal from Kargil following his meeting with Clinton.
11 July 99 Pakistan Army begins to pull out.
26 July 99 Kargil conflict officially comes to an end. Indian Army announces complete eviction of Pakistani intruders.
Read more: Pakistan based Terror Groups will Target India and Afghanistan, warns US spymaster
Pakistan’s Initiative
Pakistan’s military aim for carrying out the intrusions was to cut the MSR for Siachen, thereby causing a logistics collapse and forcing the Indians to pull out of Siachen, an area occupied in violation of the Simla Agreement between Pakistan and India.
The area that witnessed the infiltration and fighting is a 160 km long stretch of ridges overlooking the only road linking Srinagar and Leh, which was the MSR for Siachen. The military outposts on the ridges overlooking the highway were generally around 16,000 feet high, with a few as high as 18,000 feet. It was a common practice for both sides to vacate border posts in some of the harshest areas during winters since heavy snowfall makes the extremely rugged area almost impassable. The plan was based on early reoccupation of their posts, preempting the Indians, and passing through vacant Indian posts cut the MSR over Srinagar – Zoji La – Kargil – Leh Highway. Zoji La pass, at over 11,500 feet, remains closed during winters and normally opens by the end of May or beginning of June, after which the Indian Army commences its logistics dumping for Siachen.
The plan was kept secret by the Army Chief and only four senior officers were in the know of it, the Army Chief, Chief of General Staff, Commander 10 Corps, and Commander Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA). The Military Operations Directorate was also not into the loop. Even the commanders of Pakistan Navy and Air Force were not aware. Pakistan Army also undertook certain steps to maintain an element of surprise. No new units were inducted into FCNA; artillery units, which were inducted during the heavy exchange of fire from July to September 98, were not de-inducted; there was no movement of reserve formations or units into FCNA until after the commencement of Indian operations; no new administrative bases were created; logistic lines of communication were behind ridgelines and in the nullahs well hidden from Indian observation.
Read more: Pakistan: No option but to hit back at India & its Afghan proxy
During February 1999, earlier than usual, the Pakistan Army began to re-occupy the posts it had abandoned on its side of the LOC in the Kargil region, and also sent forces to occupy some vacant posts on the Indian side of the LOC and areas beyond these, from where traffic on the highway could be interdicted. Pakistani intrusions took place in the heights of the lower Mushkoh Valley, along the Marpo La ridgeline in Dras, in Kaksar near Kargil, in the Batalik sector east of the Indus River, on the heights above of the Chorbatla sector and in the Turtok sector south of the Siachen area. In all 140-plus posts, encompassing approximately 130-200 sq kms were occupied by Pakistani troops in a spate of two months. General Musharraf claims that 800 sq. kms of Indian-held territory was occupied.
Read full article:
Impact of Kargil Conflict 1999 on Pakistan’s Current Security Perspective
Global Village Space |
Zeeshan Shahid Khan |
Background
Taking the Indian Army totally by surprise, Pakistani troops crossed over the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir in early 1999 and managed to occupy heights from where they could effectively interdict the Indian Main Supply Route (MSR) to Siachen, an area claimed by Pakistan and occupied by the Indian Army in a similar manner. The reasons for Pakistan’s prosecution of the Kargil Conflict lie embedded in the Kashmir dispute, unresolved despite a number of UN resolutions. The deep-rooted hostility between the two countries since the creation of Pakistan has led them to a number of conflicts: in 1948 mujahideen from the tribal areas of Pakistan liberated a part of Kashmir, while Pakistan Army under the command of a British Chief refused to defend Kashmir against the onslaught of Indian Army; in 1965 Pakistan initiated a failed infiltration into Kashmir which resulted in the stalemated 1965 War; in 1971 India sponsored insurgency in the then East Pakistan, trained and armed guerilla separatists and then invaded Pakistan and dismembered it – the world kept quiet; in 1984 India occupied Siachen in violation of the Simla Agreement – the world kept quiet; Pakistan’s support to the indigenous liberation struggle of Kashmiris was brought under tremendous global pressure branding Pakistan as ‘a state sponsoring terrorism’ and Pakistan was forced to pull out it’s backing. These events created a typical mindset in Pakistan, particularly in the Pakistan Army, which led to the Kargil venture. Some add to it the ambitiousness of the then military commander, General Pervez Musharraf. The idea was not original and had been presented by the army in the 1980s and 1990s to the political leadership of the country (Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto), to force the Indians to pull out of Siachen, but the plans had been shelved for fear of escalation to an all-out war. Some analysts believe that the blueprint of the attack was reactivated soon after Pervez Musharraf was appointed Chief of Army Staff in October 1998.
Read more: A glimpse of the past: Was Pakistan ready to respond to respond to India’s overt nuclearization?
Chronology of Events
A brief summary is:-
Autumn 98 Pakistan takes the decision to launch a limited military operation in Kargil.
Feb 99 Pakistan commences infiltration across the LOC.
3 May 99 Indian shepherds report Pakistani intrusion.
10 May 99 Indian Army confirms the presence of Pakistani troops and initiates the move of additional troops from Kashmir Valley.
26-28 May 99 IAF launches air strikes against Pakistan’s intrusion and loses two jet aircraft’s and one MI 17.
1 June 99 Pakistan intensifies interdiction of the highway.
5 June 99 Indian Army releases documents recovered from Pakistani soldiers confirming Pakistan’s involvement.
6 June 99 Indian Army offensive in Kargil opens up.
15 June 99 U.S. President asks Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull out from Kargil.
20 June 99 Pakistan Army posts start falling under repeated Indian attacks.
4 July 99 Features overlooking the highway are lost to the Indians.
5 July 99 Nawaz Sharif announces Pakistani army’s withdrawal from Kargil following his meeting with Clinton.
11 July 99 Pakistan Army begins to pull out.
26 July 99 Kargil conflict officially comes to an end. Indian Army announces complete eviction of Pakistani intruders.
Read more: Pakistan based Terror Groups will Target India and Afghanistan, warns US spymaster
Pakistan’s Initiative
Pakistan’s military aim for carrying out the intrusions was to cut the MSR for Siachen, thereby causing a logistics collapse and forcing the Indians to pull out of Siachen, an area occupied in violation of the Simla Agreement between Pakistan and India.
The area that witnessed the infiltration and fighting is a 160 km long stretch of ridges overlooking the only road linking Srinagar and Leh, which was the MSR for Siachen. The military outposts on the ridges overlooking the highway were generally around 16,000 feet high, with a few as high as 18,000 feet. It was a common practice for both sides to vacate border posts in some of the harshest areas during winters since heavy snowfall makes the extremely rugged area almost impassable. The plan was based on early reoccupation of their posts, preempting the Indians, and passing through vacant Indian posts cut the MSR over Srinagar – Zoji La – Kargil – Leh Highway. Zoji La pass, at over 11,500 feet, remains closed during winters and normally opens by the end of May or beginning of June, after which the Indian Army commences its logistics dumping for Siachen.
The plan was kept secret by the Army Chief and only four senior officers were in the know of it, the Army Chief, Chief of General Staff, Commander 10 Corps, and Commander Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA). The Military Operations Directorate was also not into the loop. Even the commanders of Pakistan Navy and Air Force were not aware. Pakistan Army also undertook certain steps to maintain an element of surprise. No new units were inducted into FCNA; artillery units, which were inducted during the heavy exchange of fire from July to September 98, were not de-inducted; there was no movement of reserve formations or units into FCNA until after the commencement of Indian operations; no new administrative bases were created; logistic lines of communication were behind ridgelines and in the nullahs well hidden from Indian observation.
Read more: Pakistan: No option but to hit back at India & its Afghan proxy
During February 1999, earlier than usual, the Pakistan Army began to re-occupy the posts it had abandoned on its side of the LOC in the Kargil region, and also sent forces to occupy some vacant posts on the Indian side of the LOC and areas beyond these, from where traffic on the highway could be interdicted. Pakistani intrusions took place in the heights of the lower Mushkoh Valley, along the Marpo La ridgeline in Dras, in Kaksar near Kargil, in the Batalik sector east of the Indus River, on the heights above of the Chorbatla sector and in the Turtok sector south of the Siachen area. In all 140-plus posts, encompassing approximately 130-200 sq kms were occupied by Pakistani troops in a spate of two months. General Musharraf claims that 800 sq. kms of Indian-held territory was occupied.
Read full article:
Impact of Kargil Conflict 1999 on Pakistan’s Current Security Perspective
