If you have to build an A-Team with special forces from 5 different countries besides your home coun

[Syed Asif Bukhari]

I Just Ask you one OP your Superior SSG Against in Any War against India

Secondly also State one One Global Op of your SSG beyond Boundaries of Nation

Then I will Put My arguments How Indian SF and SF trained By Us Made Change in outcume of war Lets See Make It Pure Vs Thread


Go through What I Posted
Para SF in Comparison done Such Variety Of Operations in wars Even Beyond our National Terroritory

Let Me give you Glimpse

Operation Khukri was a rescue mission conducted by the 2 PARA (SF) in Sierra Leone, June 2000. About 90 operators commanded by Major (now Lt. Col.) Harinder Sood were airlifted from New Delhi to spearhead the mission to rescue 223 men of the 5/8 Gorkha Rifles who were surrounded and held captive by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels for over 75 days, just 90 Para (SF) forced 2000-5000 members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) divided into 5 battalions to surrender that ultimately led to the liberation of Freetown

Give me source or get lost.

 

[NKVD]

Give me source or get lost.

Well if you are Regular to PDF or A serious Poster you Might Find Data in PDF itself

https://defence.pk/threads/operation-khukri-sierra-leone.428754/

Give me source or get lost.

Also read About
https://defence.pk/threads/operation-jackpot-15th-august-1971.429353/#post-8286959

 

[Manindra]

OK ,SSG is supported by Artillery , Gunships , Drones and Fighter Jets. So , Indians don't have artillery , gunships or fighters . Even Indian SF use tanks directly when a cant area was attacked in Kashmir . So , these are standards of your SF . 2nd , SSGN is branch of Navy . it has nothing to do with SSG of army . by the way , can you provide me combat record of your SF?

I don't think GoI would allow artilllery, gunship or other stuff in civilian area ?
as for combat record

1971 Indo-Pakistan War[edit]
The unit (Para Commandos, Indian Army) first saw action in the 1971 Indo-Pak war, the first six-man assault team was inserted 240 km deep into Indus and Charchao, where they carried out swift lighting raids.The assault team killed 473 and wounded 140 on the Pakistani side, in addition they also destroyed 35mm artillery guns of the Pakistan independent battery and took hostage 18 members of the elite SSG of the Pakistan Army, they also destroyed an airfield. In Bangladesh 2 PARA (airborne), which was a part of 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade carried out India's first airborne assault operation to capture Poongli Bridge in Mymensingh District near Dhaka. Subsequently they were the first unit to enter Dhaka. For this action 2 PARA were given the Battle Honour of Poongli Bridge and Theater Honour Dhaka.[5]

Operation Bluestar 1984[edit]
In 1984 the Para (SF) were involved in Operation Blue Star. They were charged to lead an attack on the Holy Site of Sikh religion the Golden Temple for eviction of Sikh militants in Punjab. 8 members of 1 Para (SF) were given the task of assaulting two areas of the temple, of which one area required divers. However, there were a number of setbacks as a result of inaccurate intelligence on the strength of the militants who were trained by Gen. Shabeg Singh (ex-para sf) himself, operating low light, the conventional manner of the raid and the lack of incentive; all of which resulted in a mission failure. The diver mission was aborted after the first team got bogged down. The commandos achieved their aims after a long gunfight with militants that lasted hours.

Sri Lanka 1987[edit]
Main article: Indian Peace Keeping Force
The late 1980s saw the Para (SF) in action in Sri Lanka, as part of Operation Pawan. However, lack of proper planning by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and insufficient intelligence on the LTTE's whereabouts, led the initial heli-borne assault on Jaffna University on 11 October 1987 to be a tragic failure however it was later because of the efforts of the Para (SF) that led to the capture of the jaffna peninsula, forcing the LTTE militants to take refuge in the forests.

Six soldiers lost their lives in that ill-fated mission, but unlike the Sikh Light Infantry who lost their lives gallantly fighting to the last, the Para (SF) due to their superior training, took refuge under a house, after they got misguided by a youth who offered his service to help the commandos track Prabhakaran by taking them for a wild goose chase. They engaged the enemy for a full 24 hours and picked up all their dead with their weapons after reinforcements arrived next morning.

After the failed assault on Jaffna City, the 10 Para (SF) participated in November 1987 for a heli-borne assault in the town of Moolai, 14 miles to the north-west. More than 200 LTTE guerrillas were killed and an arms depot seized. In order to give the commandos battle experience, 1 Para (SF) was rotated home in early 1988 and replaced by 9 Para (SF).

This battalion was scheduled to return home in June 1988, but the tour of duty was extended due to a planned air assault into the coastal swamps around Mullaittivu. The mission was a great success, in that it located several arms caches. The 9 Para (SF) also provided 12 men for the security of the Indian High Commission in Sri Lanka.

Operation Cactus 1988, Maldives[edit]
Main article: Operation Cactus
With the capture of Maldives, an island nation off the south western coast of India on 3 November 1988 by PLOTE mercenaries, the army turned to the 50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade to carry out an airborne/air transported operation to liberate the country and return power to the legal government. This operation had 6 PARA spearheading the mission. 6 Para flew in on 4 November 1988 in a fleet of IL-76, An-32 and An-12 transport aircraft. One team rescued the president, another took over the airfield and a third rescued Maldivian security personnel besieged in their NSS HQ. Later 7 Para & part of 17 Para Fd Regt were also deployed to the Maldives. When mercenaries tried to escape by sea along with hostages, they were intercepted by the Indian navy. Thus, 6 Para, 17 Para Fd Regt conducted the first ever international intervention by the Indian army without any loss of life.

Kashmiri hostage-taking, July 4, 1995[edit]
Para (SF) took part in hostage rescue mission in 1995. The 1995 Kidnapping of western tourists in Kashmir was an act of kidnapping of six foreign tourists by Al-Faran, an organisation of mainly Pakistani Terrorists, now known as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen from the Liddarwat area of Pahalgam in Anantnag district in south Jammu and Kashmir on July 4, 1995.One hostage was later found beheaded.Later Indian Security forces decided to storm the building to rescue hostages. It was a partially successful operation, since none of hostages were found, but resulted in the death of Abdul Hamid Turki, whom the army identified as the leader of Al-Faran, and four other Al-Faran members.

1999 Kargil War[edit]
Main article: Kargil War
In 1999 nine out of ten Parachute battalions were deployed for OP Vijay in Kargil, which bears testimony to the operational profile of the Regiment. While the Parachute Brigade cleared the Mushkoh Valley intrustions, 5 PARA was actively involved in the forgotten sector Batalik, where it exhibited great courage and tenacity, and was awarded the COAS Unit Citation.

Operation Khukri 2000, Sierra Leone[edit]
Operation Khukri was a rescue mission conducted by the 2 PARA (SF) in Sierra Leone, June 2000. About 90 operators commanded by Major (now Lt. Col.) Harinder Sood were airlifted from New Delhi to spearhead the mission to rescue 223 men of the 5/8 Gorkha Rifles who were surrounded and held captive by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels for over 75 days, just 90 Para (SF) forced 2000-5000 members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) divided into 5 battalions to surrender that ultimately led to the liberation of Freetown

Operation Summer Storm 2009[edit]
On April 11, 2009, the 57 Mountain Division of the Indian Army based in Manipur,Para Commandoes along with the para-military Assam Rifles and State Police, launched a counter insurgency operation, codenamed ‘Operation Summer Storm’ in the Loktak Lake area and adjoining Keibul Lamjao National Park of Bishnupur District, located south of State capital Imphal. This first major mobilisation of troops this year ended on April 21. As the troops began pulling out, the Army spokesperson described the operation as a success, disclosing that 129 militants, all belonging to the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) were killed. The Forces also claimed to have located and destroyed five militant camps during the Operation and seized 10 weapons, including sixty nine AK-series rifles, forty eight rocket launcher, and an unspecified quantity of explosives and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). No militant was arrested. No fatality among the Special Force (SF) personnel or civilians was reported.

Ongoing COIN Operations in J&K and Eastern States[edit]
Paratroopers and Para (SF) have conducted thousands of COIN operations in J&K, Assam and the eastern states in India. Sometime these units work with Rashtriya Rifles (COIN force) in complicated operations. Since the mid-1990s the role of Paratroopers and Para (SF) as a counter terrorism force has increased substantially. They are now actively involved in counter terrorist (CT) and counter insurgency (coin) operations in Kashmir as an essential part of the Home Ministry's decision to conduct pro-active raids against militants in the countryside and mountains. Personnel include Para (SF), Paratroopers (Airborne), NSG and special units of the Rashtriya Rifles - a paramilitary unit created for counter insurgency operations in Kashmir. They may also include MARCOS personnel, many of whom are seconded to the Army for CT operations.

Counter terrorist operation in Samba[edit]
On September 26, 2013 terrorists dressed in Army fatigues stormed a police station and then an Army camp in Jammu region killing 10 people, including an Army officer, in twin 'fidayeen' attacks after they sneaked in from across the border early on Thursday, barely three days ahead of a meeting between Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. The attack was on a police station and the 16 Cavalry unit of the Army in Samba district falls under the jurisdiction of 9 corps, headquartered at Yol Cantonment in Himachal Pradesh. The three heavily armed terrorists, believed to be from Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and who were holed up in the camp of the cavalry armoured unit at Samba for several hours after they barged into the Officers mess, have been killed during a fierce gunfight with 1 Para (SF) of army. The bodies of the three terrorists aged between 16 and 19 are in the custody of the Army[6]

Authorities moved commandos of 1 Para (SF) in helicopters to the shootout site. The Para (SF) commandos first carried out an aerial reconnaissance of the camp before landing there to neutralize the three terrorists. The 1 Para (SF) had identified the exact spot during the aerial recce from where the ffs were returning the army fire. After landing, the commandos started engaging the terrorists in a direct gunfight, but in order to give them an impression that their exact spot of hiding had still not been identified, an abandoned building inside the camp was blasted. This made the terrorists complacent that their hiding spot had not been yet been pin-pointed. They kept on intermittently returning the army fire till all three of them were eliminated. The entire operation from the moment the terrorists entered the camp and till they were gunned down took nearly nine hours to complete. The main worry of the soldiers tasked to eliminate the terrorists was the Army Public School situated some distance from the place where the terrorists had been engaged in a sustained firefight. Army men were worried about the possibility the terrorists moving into the school and taking children and staff as hostage. That is why the exercise to eliminate the terrorists was carried out with extreme caution and patience[7]

Counter insurgency operation in Myanmar 2015[edit]
Main article: 2015 Indian counter-insurgency operation in Myanmar
Based on Precise intelligence inputs, the Indian Air Force and 21 para (SF) carried a cross-border operation along the Indo-Myanmar border and destroyed two Militant camps one each of NSCN (K) and KYKL, along the Indo-Myanmar border. The operations were carried out inside the Myanmar territory along the Nagaland and Manipur border at two locations. One of the locations is near Ukhrul in Manipur. The army attacked two transit camp of the Naga militants.

70 commandos were reportedly involved in the operation. The commandos, equipped with assault rifles, rocket launchers, grenades and night vision goggles, were divided into two groups after they fast roped from Dhruv helicopters just inside the Indian territory near the border with Myanmar. The teams trekked through the thick jungles for at least 105 kilometers before they reached the training camps. Each of the two teams were further divided into two sub-groups. While one was responsible for the direct assault, the second formed an outer ring to prevent any of insurgents from running and escaping. The actual operation (hitting the camp and destroying it) took about 40 minutes. Mi-17 helicopters of the IAF were put on standby, ready to be pressed into service to evacuate the commandos in case anything went wrong In its statement after the operation the Indian Army said it was in communication with Myanmar and that, "There is a history of close cooperation between our two militaries. We look forward to working with them to combat such terrorism.".[8]

Indian Army has claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties (158 reported[8]) on the attackers behind the ambush on Army on June 4, which claimed the lives of 18 Army jawans of 6 Dogra Regiment in Chandel district of Manipur.[9] This has been marked as the biggest attack on Indian Army after Kargil war of 1999.

As I have given you Wikipedia link to save my time, you are free to counter any point which is wrong.

 

[Syed Asif Bukhari]

Give me source or get lost.

no one can digest this absurd stupidity . 90 men forced 2000 terrorist . I cant stop laughing .

Well if you are Regular to PDF or A serious Poster you Might Find Data in PDF itself

https://defence.pk/threads/operation-khukri-sierra-leone.428754/


Also read About
https://defence.pk/threads/operation-jackpot-15th-august-1971.429353/#post-8286959

Was it really 90 men . check information about this operation from Wikipedia
Date 13–16 July 2000
Location Sierra Leone
Result

• Besieged UN Forces extracted
• Freetown successfully defended against RUF attack

Belligerents
UNAMSIL

• India
• United Kingdom
• Ghana
• Nigeria

Revolutionary United Front
Commanders and leaders
Lt. General Nirmal Chand Vij (Director General Military Operations)[1]
Major General V.K. Jetley[2]
Colonel Satish Kumar (Commanding Officer of 5/8 Gurkha Rifles)[3][4]
Group Captain Bijender Singh Siwach[2]
Strength
Approximately 2000-2500 troops

• Ground units and Airborne units
  • 223 troops of 5/8th Gorkha Rifles besieged at Kailahun
  • Approximately six companies of riflemen of the 5/8th Gorkha Rifles at Daru, elements of 14th Mechanised Infantry Battalion
  • One Quick Reaction Company of Mechanised Infantry and Paracommandos
  • 18th Grenadiers
  • QRC of Mechanised Infantry
  • One Company of engineers
  • 2 Para (SF) [5]
  • Several Mortars and one Light Field Gun
• Aircraft
  • 3 Mil Mi-35s
  • 8 Mil Mi-8s
  • 2 HAL Chetaks

 

[Syed Asif Bukhari]

I don't think GoI would allow artilllery, gunship or other stuff in civilian are ?
as for combat record


As I have given you Wikipedia link to save my time, you are free to counter any point which is wrong.

I have checked link you provided about Myanmar OP . its not available . wonder how did you get this info. can you give me source about Kashmiri hostage op ?

Another Operation against Pak in 1971 in Mandhol
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...n-to-change-war-plan/articleshow/27444282.cms
http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/Spring 2011- Final Issue.148-150.pdf
View attachment 303874
View attachment 303875

View attachment 303876

poor man again quoting sub standard article from newspapers.

 

[NKVD]

Was it really 90 men . check information about this operation from Wikipedia
Date 13–16 July 2000
Location Sierra Leone
Result

• Besieged UN Forces extracted
• Freetown successfully defended against RUF attack

Belligerents
UNAMSIL

• India
• United Kingdom
• Ghana
• Nigeria

Revolutionary United Front
Commanders and leaders
Lt. General Nirmal Chand Vij (Director General Military Operations)[1]
Major General V.K. Jetley[2]
Colonel Satish Kumar (Commanding Officer of 5/8 Gurkha Rifles)[3][4]
Group Captain Bijender Singh Siwach[2]
Strength
Approximately 2000-2500 troops

• Ground units and Airborne units
  • 223 troops of 5/8th Gorkha Rifles besieged at Kailahun
  • Approximately six companies of riflemen of the 5/8th Gorkha Rifles at Daru, elements of 14th Mechanised Infantry Battalion
  • One Quick Reaction Company of Mechanised Infantry and Paracommandos
  • 18th Grenadiers
  • QRC of Mechanised Infantry
  • One Company of engineers
  • 2 Para (SF) [5]
  • Several Mortars and one Light Field Gun
• Aircraft
  • 3 Mil Mi-35s
  • 8 Mil Mi-8s
  • 2 HAL Chetaks

Expected From a Fanboy Without Reading Content you Jump the gun
the thread is Positive rating By a Prominent PDF Mod

Read
The role of 2 Para (SF)

The mission was conducted in a classical VUCA environment, in the absence of geographical information, using tourist maps and borrowing equipment from friendly nations. 2 Para (SF) collected valuable intelligence by conducting recce and inserting its commandos for 7 days at a stretch into the camp in disguise, prior to the launch of the operation, to map the area, carryout liaison and collect Intelligence which enabled the planning and execution of what would become one of the most daring commando operation conducted by the Indian Army on foreign soil.

The units at Kailahun were informed of the plan, and constantly kept in touch with the HQ through Satellite Phones. The operational plans were conveyed in Malayalam to overcome RUF monitoring of communications. Since the operation required insertion by helicopters, the two companies at Kailahun were required to fall back 500 metres from the town itself, and secure two helipads.

On 15 Jul 0600h, before first light, 80 commandos from 2 Para (SF) were inserted into the enemy territory by two British Chinook helicopters. The air assault was carried out under adverse conditions, with heavy rain and poor visibility, and without air and arty support which had to be withdrawn at the last minute due to the inclement weather. The flight time of 25 minutes was extended to 50 minutes and the team commander of 2 Para (SF) stuck to his commitment despite the danger of getting day lighted having to fight without external support. 40 Commandos were inserted close to village Jimila (2514), and 34 Commandos were inserted at the Bandajuma track junction (2512), and the balance six commandos were inserted inside the hostage camp to enable the extrication of Military Observers and others. Last minute changes in plan and cancellation of MI-8 helicopters, meant that the young lieutenant of the Special Forces had to personally inform the change in plan and lead the break out column till the centre of the town.

The use of SAS supplied phosphorus grenades by 2 Para (SF) quickly lay waste the camp and denied any UN stores and supplies that would be left behind while the INDBATT companies conducted the breakout from falling into the RUF hands.

In the meanwhile, the 40 Commandos encountering heavy resistance, from the RUF who were mobilised once the surprise was lost, cleared the road axis and successfully secured the town till the town centre of Kailahun. At the same time, the second team, dropped at Bandajuma, split into two groups, while the first secured the track junction, the second, went ahead to clear the axis till Kenewa. With the Chinooks safely taking off with the 11 Mil observers along with their equipment, the 6 commandos, led the break out of IND BATT with their BRDMs in close support behind them and affected a link with the 40 commandos at the town centre amidst fire from all directions.

The move of the IND BATT break out column was secured by the Special Force Commandos both at the Van and the Rear. This ensured that the tired hostages were kept safe from any possible assault from the now active enemy. The IND BATT column thus secured at both ends was now under hot pursuit from the RUF rebels and caught up with the rear of the foot column approximately 5 km south of Kailahun, 2 Para (SF), under the leadership of its second in command, started laying booby traps along the road in the rear to start slowing down the rebel advance. The ensuing fire fight resulted in major losses to the RUF post which they abandoned the chase.

The weather cleared at 9:30 am, and the UN helicopters were now available for providing a much required air support to the advancing column. The RUF Forces reorganised and taking advantage of dense jungle and knowledge of jungle tracks were constantly sniping down the rearguard, making the advance difficult and slow. The Indian MI-35 attack helicopter on the scene provided fire support to the advancing columns, making their advance much swifter. At 945 hours, the attack helicopters were tasked to provide covering fire to the Mi-8 helicopters and one company of 18th Grenadiers, part the INDBATT-2, were airlifted and dropped off north-east of Giehun, where they awaited the arrival of the Kailahun column.

At approximately 10:20, nearly four hours ahead of schedule, 2 para (SF) affected a linkage with the 18th Grenadiers at Giehun (1807), which had landed there at around 10:00. The force commander landed at Geihun to congratulate the SF team commander for an excellent operation.

After the airlift, the column reorganised and advanced towards Pendembu. They were faced with two major roadblocks along the road, the first was an 8-foot-deep ditch, and the second, a 4-foot-deep one, each covered by troops with small arms and RPGs. Continuous sniping and slushy roads hampered the progress, but the column secured the area, and using bridging stores carried in the column and dropped by the MI-8s, the units crossed the bridges, and continued on their way.

Source: https://defence.pk/threads/operation-khukri-sierra-leone.428754/#ixzz47nRiK1eJ

 

[Syed Asif Bukhari]

Expected From a Fanboy Without Reading Content you Jump the gun
the thread is Positive rating By a Prominent PDF Mod

Read
The role of 2 Para (SF)

The mission was conducted in a classical VUCA environment, in the absence of geographical information, using tourist maps and borrowing equipment from friendly nations. 2 Para (SF) collected valuable intelligence by conducting recce and inserting its commandos for 7 days at a stretch into the camp in disguise, prior to the launch of the operation, to map the area, carryout liaison and collect Intelligence which enabled the planning and execution of what would become one of the most daring commando operation conducted by the Indian Army on foreign soil.

The units at Kailahun were informed of the plan, and constantly kept in touch with the HQ through Satellite Phones. The operational plans were conveyed in Malayalam to overcome RUF monitoring of communications. Since the operation required insertion by helicopters, the two companies at Kailahun were required to fall back 500 metres from the town itself, and secure two helipads.

On 15 Jul 0600h, before first light, 80 commandos from 2 Para (SF) were inserted into the enemy territory by two British Chinook helicopters. The air assault was carried out under adverse conditions, with heavy rain and poor visibility, and without air and arty support which had to be withdrawn at the last minute due to the inclement weather. The flight time of 25 minutes was extended to 50 minutes and the team commander of 2 Para (SF) stuck to his commitment despite the danger of getting day lighted having to fight without external support. 40 Commandos were inserted close to village Jimila (2514), and 34 Commandos were inserted at the Bandajuma track junction (2512), and the balance six commandos were inserted inside the hostage camp to enable the extrication of Military Observers and others. Last minute changes in plan and cancellation of MI-8 helicopters, meant that the young lieutenant of the Special Forces had to personally inform the change in plan and lead the break out column till the centre of the town.

The use of SAS supplied phosphorus grenades by 2 Para (SF) quickly lay waste the camp and denied any UN stores and supplies that would be left behind while the INDBATT companies conducted the breakout from falling into the RUF hands.

In the meanwhile, the 40 Commandos encountering heavy resistance, from the RUF who were mobilised once the surprise was lost, cleared the road axis and successfully secured the town till the town centre of Kailahun. At the same time, the second team, dropped at Bandajuma, split into two groups, while the first secured the track junction, the second, went ahead to clear the axis till Kenewa. With the Chinooks safely taking off with the 11 Mil observers along with their equipment, the 6 commandos, led the break out of IND BATT with their BRDMs in close support behind them and affected a link with the 40 commandos at the town centre amidst fire from all directions.

The move of the IND BATT break out column was secured by the Special Force Commandos both at the Van and the Rear. This ensured that the tired hostages were kept safe from any possible assault from the now active enemy. The IND BATT column thus secured at both ends was now under hot pursuit from the RUF rebels and caught up with the rear of the foot column approximately 5 km south of Kailahun, 2 Para (SF), under the leadership of its second in command, started laying booby traps along the road in the rear to start slowing down the rebel advance. The ensuing fire fight resulted in major losses to the RUF post which they abandoned the chase.

The weather cleared at 9:30 am, and the UN helicopters were now available for providing a much required air support to the advancing column. The RUF Forces reorganised and taking advantage of dense jungle and knowledge of jungle tracks were constantly sniping down the rearguard, making the advance difficult and slow. The Indian MI-35 attack helicopter on the scene provided fire support to the advancing columns, making their advance much swifter. At 945 hours, the attack helicopters were tasked to provide covering fire to the Mi-8 helicopters and one company of 18th Grenadiers, part the INDBATT-2, were airlifted and dropped off north-east of Giehun, where they awaited the arrival of the Kailahun column.

At approximately 10:20, nearly four hours ahead of schedule, 2 para (SF) affected a linkage with the 18th Grenadiers at Giehun (1807), which had landed there at around 10:00. The force commander landed at Geihun to congratulate the SF team commander for an excellent operation.

After the airlift, the column reorganised and advanced towards Pendembu. They were faced with two major roadblocks along the road, the first was an 8-foot-deep ditch, and the second, a 4-foot-deep one, each covered by troops with small arms and RPGs. Continuous sniping and slushy roads hampered the progress, but the column secured the area, and using bridging stores carried in the column and dropped by the MI-8s, the units crossed the bridges, and continued on their way.

Source: https://defence.pk/threads/operation-khukri-sierra-leone.428754/#ixzz47nRiK1eJ

bro don't be offended . I have read whole article.

 

[NKVD]

poor man again quoting sub standard article from newspapers.

its Article Written on Fact its Syllabus of Indian Military Academy if Skipped the part

"Chandigarh-based Colonel (retd) K D Pathak was then a captain and second-in-command of the company of 120 men who had carried out the remarkable operation, which made Pakistan change its war doctrine. Operation 'Mandhol' is also part of the curriculum in the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun, where cadets are trained as future officers of the Army."


I get the Part you Not Genuine Poster But Fanboy if want Actual Knowledge
try to Be

bro don't be offended . I have read whole article.

First Its Not a Article its A Historical Document of IAF go through sources
http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/other-unamsil-opkhukri.html
http://usiofindia.org/Article/?ano=609 &pubno=550 &pub=Journal

 

[Syed Asif Bukhari]

its Article Written on Fact its Syllabus of Indian Military Academy if Skipped the part

"Chandigarh-based Colonel (retd) K D Pathak was then a captain and second-in-command of the company of 120 men who had carried out the remarkable operation, which made Pakistan change its war doctrine. Operation 'Mandhol' is also part of the curriculum in the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun, where cadets are trained as future officers of the Army."


I get the Part you Not Genuine Poster But Fanboy if want Actual Knowledge
try to Be

Listen man . I have nothing to do with the syllabus of your army academy . provide me any Wikipedia link just as I have provided.

its Article Written on Fact its Syllabus of Indian Military Academy if Skipped the part

"Chandigarh-based Colonel (retd) K D Pathak was then a captain and second-in-command of the company of 120 men who had carried out the remarkable operation, which made Pakistan change its war doctrine. Operation 'Mandhol' is also part of the curriculum in the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun, where cadets are trained as future officers of the Army."


I get the Part you Not Genuine Poster But Fanboy if want Actual Knowledge
try to Be


First Its Not a Article its A Historical Document of IAF go through sources
http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/other-unamsil-opkhukri.html
http://usiofindia.org/Article/?ano=609 &pubno=550 &pub=Journal

this is what I got about OP Khukhri from Wikipedia and it never says that it was conducted by 90 men. Read it.
Operation Khukri was a unique multinational operation launched in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), involving India, Ghana, Britain and Nigeria. The aim of the operation was to break the two-month-long siege laid by armed cadres of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) around two companies of 5/8th Gorkha Rifles Infantry Battalion Group at Kailahun by effecting a fighting breakout and redeploying them with the main battalion at Daru.[2][6][7]



Contents
[hide]

• 1 Background
• 2 Order of Battle
  • 2.1 RUF Forces
  • 2.2 UNAMSIL Forces
• 3 Plan of Operations
• 4 Battle
  • 4.1 Buildup
  • 4.2 The role of 2 Para (SF)
  • 4.3 Daru Column
  • 4.4 Securing Pendembu
  • 4.5 Helilift Operations
  • 4.6 Move to Daru
• 5 Aftermath
• 6 See also
• 7 External links

Background[edit]
The Indian 5/8th Gorkha Rifles, 14th Mechanised Infantry and elements of the 23rd Mechanised Infantry, together designated as INDBATT-1, had been sent to Sierra Leone to aid the Government in the disarmament of the RUF rebels. Two Rifle Companies had been kept as a Quick Reaction Force. Elements of the 9th Para (SF), were also included.[6]

By mid-April 2000, two of the companies of INDBATT-1 were deployed in Kailahun, while the rest were deployed in Daru. On May 1, some elements of the RUF attacked and overran the KENBATT forces at Makeni. Due to a communication gap, the INDBATT-1 weren't informed, and some of their commanders at Kailahun, were captured the next day at a meeting with the RUF. Within ten days of this, some of the hostages were released due to intense pressure by INDBATT-1 and civilians., however some including the 2IC who had gone to negotiate remained in 'honourable custody', being allowed to return to the base everyday.[6]

The situation worsened and the RUF disarmed 500 Kenyan Peacekeepers, and began advancing towards Freetown. As panic broke out, British troops evacuated the civilian staff at Freetown. The INDBATT-1 QRF was launched to Magburaka, where more Kenyans had been besieged. They made a 180 kilometer advance, pushing back several ambushes, and rescuing the Kenyans. However the situation at Kailahun kept deteriorating, and the two companies of 5/8th Gorkha Rifles remained in their base surrounded by hundreds of RUF rebels of the 1st Brigade.[6]

For 75 days the RUF rebels negotiations were on to release the 2IC and his party which was achieved through Charles Taylor and Liberia. In the meanwhile additional forces ex India were built up to launch operations to seize control over nearly 100 km of jungle track to break the siege at Kailahun.[2]

Order of Battle[edit]
RUF Forces[edit]
The RUF rebels had six Brigades, one of which was deployed in the sector. It consisted of four main battalions, and one Strike Battalion. They were armed with AK-47s, RPGs, APCs, and SAMs. Each battalion was deployed in a particular area:

• 1st Battalion - Mobai
• 2nd Battalion - Kuiva
• 3rd Battalion - Neama
• 4th Battalion - Koindu
• 5th Battalion - Segbwema[6]

UNAMSIL Forces[edit]
Indian:

• INDBATT-1 - 5/8th Gorkha Rifles Battalion and elements of 14th Mechanised Infantry
• QRC - A Quick Reaction Force formed by elements of INDBATT-1, alongside 23 Mechanised Infantry and 9 Para (SF)
• INDMECH QRC - A Mechanised Infantry QRF
• INDENG Coy-2 - A Company of 116 Engineer Regiment
• INDSF Coy - A Team of 2nd Para (SF)
• Indian Aviation Unit - 8 Mil Mi-8s, 3 Mil Mi-35s, 2 HAL Chetaks
• INDBATT-2 - 18th Grenadiers Battalion
• Independent Composite Battery - Mortars 120 mm from 310th Light Regiment, Light Field Gun (105 mm) from 255th Field Regiment[2][6]

Alongside these the Indians had set up a Sector HQ, Surgical HQ, and a Forward Surgical Team.[6]

Other:

• GHANBATT - 2 Infantry Companies of the Ghana Army
• NIBATT - 2 Companies of the Nigerian Army
• RAF Aviation Unit: 2 Chinook Helicopters, 1 C-130
• Elements of D Squadron of the British SAS;[6] These units guided the Aviation units during their tasks[8]

Plan of Operations[edit]
The battle was planned to involve five phases:

• Phase I: Mobilisation of UNAMSIL forces.
• Phase II: Pre-emptive strikes by the helicopters, and breakout by the besieged forces at Kailahun. The UNAMSIL forces were to secure the area for a clear extraction.
• Phase III: Link up of the besieged Kailahun column and Special Forces units at Giehun. 5/8 Gorkha Rifles (Daru column) to secure Pendembu.
• Phase IV: Link up of Daru column and Kailahun column at Pendembu. Extraction to begin by air.
• Phase V: All forces to fall back to Daru.[6]

Battle[edit]
Buildup[edit]
Phase I of the operation was the buildup of forces. Between 13th and 15th, the UNAMSIL forces were assembled at Daru and Kenewa. The IAF and RAF Aviation units were critical in the buildup, especially at Daru, since the area was cut off from the rest of the UN controlled areas. By midnight, 14 July, the buildup was complete.[5][6][9]

The role of 2 Para (SF)[edit]
The mission was conducted in a classical VUCA environment, in the absence of geographical information, using tourist maps and borrowing equipment from friendly nations. 2 Para (SF) collected valuable intelligence by conducting recce and inserting its commandos for 7 days at a stretch into the camp in disguise, prior to the launch of the operation, to map the area, carryout liaison and collect Intelligence which enabled the planning and execution of what would become one of the most daring commando operation conducted by the Indian Army on foreign soil.

The units at Kailahun were informed of the plan, and constantly kept in touch with the HQ through Satellite Phones. The operational plans were conveyed in Malayalam to overcome RUF monitoring of communications. Since the operation required insertion by helicopters, the two companies at Kailahun were required to fall back 500 metres from the town itself, and secure two helipads.[6]

On 15 Jul 0600h, before first light, 80 commandos from 2 Para (SF) were inserted into the enemy territory by two British Chinook helicopters. The air assault was carried out under adverse conditions, with heavy rain and poor visibility, and without air and arty support which had to be withdrawn at the last minute due to the inclement weather. The flight time of 25 minutes was extended to 50 minutes and the team commander of 2 Para (SF) stuck to his commitment despite the danger of getting day lighted having to fight without external support. 40 Commandos were inserted close to village Jimila (2514), and 34 Commandos were inserted at the Bandajuma track junction (2512), and the balance six commandos were inserted inside the hostage camp to enable the extrication of Military Observers and others. Last minute changes in plan and cancellation of MI-8 helicopters, meant that the young lieutenant of the Special Forces had to personally inform the change in plan and lead the break out column till the centre of the town.

The use of SAS supplied phosphorus grenades by 2 Para (SF) quickly lay waste the camp and denied any UN stores and supplies that would be left behind while the INDBATT companies conducted the breakout from falling into the RUF hands.

In the meanwhile, the 40 Commandos encountering heavy resistance, from the RUF who were mobilised once the surprise was lost, cleared the road axis and successfully secured the town till the town centre of Kailahun. At the same time, the second team, dropped at Bandajuma, split into two groups, while the first secured the track junction, the second, went ahead to clear the axis till Kenewa. With the Chinooks safely taking off with the 11 Mil observers along with their equipment, the 6 commandos, led the break out of IND BATT with their BRDMs in close support behind them and affected a link with the 40 commandos at the town centre amidst fire from all directions.

The move of the IND BATT break out column was secured by the Special Force Commandos both at the Van and the Rear. This ensured that the tired hostages were kept safe from any possible assault from the now active enemy. The IND BATT column thus secured at both ends was now under hot pursuit from the RUF rebels and caught up with the rear of the foot column approximately 5 km south of Kailahun, 2 Para (SF), under the leadership of its second in command, started laying booby traps along the road in the rear to start slowing down the rebel advance. The ensuing fire fight resulted in major losses to the RUF post which they abandoned the chase.

The weather cleared at 9:30 am, and the UN helicopters were now available for providing a much required air support to the advancing column. The RUF Forces reorganised and taking advantage of dense jungle and knowledge of jungle tracks were constantly sniping down the rearguard, making the advance difficult and slow. The Indian MI-35 attack helicopter on the scene provided fire support to the advancing columns, making their advance much swifter. At 945 hours, the attack helicopters were tasked to provide covering fire to the Mi-8 helicopters and one company of 18th Grenadiers, part the INDBATT-2, were airlifted and dropped off north-east of Giehun, where they awaited the arrival of the Kailahun column.

At approximately 10:20, nearly four hours ahead of schedule, 2 para (SF) affected a linkage with the 18th Grenadiers at Giehun (1807), which had landed there at around 10:00. The force commander landed at Geihun to congratulate the SF team commander for an excellent operation.

After the airlift, the column reorganised and advanced towards Pendembu. They were faced with two major roadblocks along the road, the first was an 8-foot-deep ditch, and the second, a 4-foot-deep one, each covered by troops with small arms and RPGs. Continuous sniping and slushy roads hampered the progress, but the column secured the area, and using bridging stores carried in the column and dropped by the MI-8s, the units crossed the bridges, and continued on their way.[2][6][9]

Daru Column[edit]
At 06:20, after the extraction of personnel at Kailahun, the INDBATT-2, INDMECH QRC (Mech-2 Company), and the rest of the 5/8th Gorkha Rifles (Mot-2 Company) at Daru, commenced their operations. The 18th Grenadiers, alongside Infantry Fighting Vehicles from the Mech-2, and aided by artillery bombardment, secured a firm base along the road.[6]

Immediately after securing the base, the Daru Column advanced along the road, with Mech-2 Company's IFVs leading the advance. At 08:30, the column came under heavy fire from the north of the road, 500 metres short of Tikono. The IFVs neutralised the enemy and continued. The unit faced heavy resistance at both Bewobu, and Kuiva, but broke through with ease. Though the plan originally called for a physical capture and search of Kuiva, the speed of the advance of the Kailahun column, indicated a possibility of a link-up and evacuation on the same day. So the Daru Column continued to advance quickly to Pendembu. Though the rebels had dug-in positions in the town, they fled in the face of small arms fire by the column, and supporting fire from nearby mortars.[6]

The column continued to move towards Area-3 bridges, suppressing enemy fire with their IFVs, while 9th Para, part of the battalion's QRC, was airlifted from Daru in 3 MI-8s, and secured the bridges in Area 3. Maintaining momentum, the column met up with the QRC forces near the bridges at 1230 hours, and continued onwards to Pendembu.[5][6][9]

Securing Pendembu[edit]
The Daru column and the QRC reached Pendembu, and prepared to assault the town. It was the HQ of the RUF 1st Brigade, and heavily defended. At 1300 hours, an attack helicopter made five passes over the town strafing the defenders, and performed pinpoint engaging of the defenders in their entrenched positions. Meanwhile, the mortars relocated to a location north of the Area 3 bridges. Mot-2 Company was to attack and secure the nearly 300 houses of the town, as well as an air head to the south-west. Mech-2 moved in from the north, and neutralised all the targets, and occupied the northern side of the town. Mot-2 moved up and silenced the enemy positions in the south-west corner, using the IFVs, and then cleared the houses systematically with its riflemen. 4th Platoon of Mot-2, killed several rebels in the south-west pocket, and several more were killed in the armoury, cleared by 6th Platoon. A suitable airhead was established along the Daru-Pendembu road. All units linked up in the south-west corner, and reorganised into defensive positions for the evening.[5][6]

At about 1630 hours, the Daru Column personally led by the Commanding Officer of 5/8 Gurkha Rifles advanced through the jungle to link up with Kailahun column. A link up was established at 1730 hours, and the entire force was gathered back at Pendembu by 1900 hours. The units took up defensive positions around and inside Pendembu. Any attempts by the RUF to counter-attack were thwarted with accurate fire from the troops. The routes used by the RUF for reinforcements were constantly kept under surveillance by the scout helicopter. On two occasions regrouping militia were observed approaching Pendembu by the scout helicopter which directed the Mi-35 to carry out dissuading attacks on them using rockets and guns. Approach paths to the town were shelled by mortars and a 105 mm Light Field Gun throughout the night.[6]

Helilift Operations[edit]
The next day, 16 July, at 700 hours, Mot-2 secured an airhead and also prepared a helipad as well as readjusted the defences to prepare for the forthcoming helilift extraction. At 815 hours, Mil Mi-8 helicopters began arriving to extract the units. In 12 sorties, Mech-1 Company, Mot-1 Company, SF Company, D Company of the 18th Grenadiers, and 2 Platoons of QRC Company were extracted. At 930 hours, 50-60 enemies were spotted to the north of the town and effectively neutralised by the attack helicopters directed by Adjutant-GLO of 5/8GR and MFC grouped with Mech 2 ICVs which also brought down heavy fire. The last MI-8s took off at 1030 hours. The Gurkha battalion pioneers demolished the selected RUF Bunkers, and the RUF ammunition store.[5][6][9]

Move to Daru[edit]
After the last helicopter took of the remaining troops, consisting of Daru Column of 5/8th Gorkha Rifles, D-Company of the 18th Grenadiers, remaining QRC Companies, and the vehicles of the Kailahun Companies, began to make their way back to Daru, with Mot-2 in the lead. Mech-2 was to hold on to the northern edge of town, and then bring up the rear of the column, after a tactical disengagement. The column was constantly supported by one MI-35 helicopter at all times. After neutralising enemies at the bridges, the column reached Kuiva without incident. At Kuiva, the Mi-35 helicopter and the IFVs blind fired on any suspected enemy positions repeatedly to ensure the safety of the column.[5][6]

Despite the firm base being secured by 18th Grenadiers, the columns were ambushed near Kuiva. At 1400 hours, scout helicopters reported that the road between Kuiva and Bewabu had been dug up. The 18th Grenadiers secured the roadblock position, but the column had to be halted as they had stretched over too long a distance. At this time, one of the vehicles was attacked by an RPG. The Mi-35 operating overhead was immediately called upon to engage the ambushing militia. The riflemen and IFVs cleared any remainder ambushing forces. Under the cover of helicopter the column continued to advance towards Daru.[6]

At 1430 hours, near Bewabu, the leading IFVs came across a ditch, covered by heavy small arms fire from higher ground on both sides. The Commanding Officer realised that his troops were in the kill zone. He immediately sent 4 Rifle Platoon to engage the enemy targets. The firefight continued for fifteen minutes, and the MI-35 strafed enemies on both sides of the road. 6 Platoon and INDENG units bridged the gap, and the column immediately set off.[6]

While the 5/8th Gorkha Rifles engaged the enemy at Bewabu, the 18th Grenadiers about six kilometers behind, supported by 2 BMPs from Mech-2, and 2 BRDMs of Mech-1, were engaged by enemy units just short of Kuiva. The units fought the enemy for about ten minutes, and continued to advance. About 500 metres from here, a vehicle carrying ammunition was hit by an RPG. Once again the Mi-35 was called upon and it carried out a strafing run in the direction of attack. No further opposition was encountered after this. The casualty was evacuated by a Chetak.[6]

The convoy continued the rest of the way uneventfully. By 1730 hours, all the units had safely reached Daru.[5][6][9]

Aftermath[edit]
The operation was a complete success. All the besieged forces were evacuated successfully, for no UNAMSIL deaths. The units easily dealt with all ambushes on the way back.[6]

Operation Khukri was not a success simply in tactical terms. It was the worst defeat that the RUF has suffered in recent times, and was a tremendous boost to UNAMSIL morale. The Indian Forces were met with a rapturous welcome, as they marched triumphantly into Daru. The people of Sierra Leone helped build the Khukri War Memorial on the bank of the River Moa.[6]

See also[edit]

• Operation Barras, similar operation to rescue British soldiers

[10]==References==

1. Jump up ^"N C Vij appointed Army Chief". Rediff. Retrieved 16 July 2012.
2. ^ Jump up to: abcdef"Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone". Bharat Rakshak. Retrieved 12 July 2012.
3. Jump up ^"Thread: Indian Army photos". Military Photos. Retrieved 31 July 2012.
4. Jump up ^"Sierra Leone – Barefoot Soldiers for Social Justice, Food Security and Peace". London School of Economics Blogs. Retrieved 16 July 2012.
5. ^ Jump up to: abcdefgh"Operation Khukri (2000)". Special Operations. Shadow Spear. Retrieved 6 August 2012.
6. ^ Jump up to: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxy"Operation Khukri". UN Ops involving the Indian Air Force. Vayu Sena Tripod. Retrieved 13 July 2012.
7. Jump up ^"IAF 2000 Contingent to UNAMSIL". UN Mission. Official Website of the Indian Air Force. Retrieved 19 July 2012.
8. Jump up ^"SAS History: 2000-Present". History of the SAS. Elite UK Forces. Retrieved 15 July 2012.
9. ^ Jump up to: abcde"Op. Khukri - 2000 (INDIAN ARMY)". Military Photos. Retrieved 15 July 2012.
10. Jump up ^Raman,Anil Major, OPERATION KHUKRI - JOINT EXCELLENCE, USI Journal, 2002, http://usiofindia.org/Article/?ano=609 &pubno=550 &pub=Journal

External links[edit]

 

[NKVD]

Listen man . I have nothing to do with the syllabus of your army academy . provide me any Wikipedia link just as I have provided.

WikePedia is just collection of Sources Many Prominent Poster Accuse It that Its Bias
Its Already Provided to you By @Manindra in Post #34

In 1971, the regiment saw numerous actions both in the eastern and western theatres. For the first time in the annals of independent India's history, a para battalion group (2 Para Bn Gp) was dropped at Tangail, which contributed substantially to speeding up the liberation of Bangladesh. Elements of the 2nd Bn became the first Indian troops to enter Dhaka. The Para Commandos proved their professional skills by conducting spectacular lightning raids into Chachro (Sindh, Pakistan) and Mandhol (Jammu and Kashmir). The Regiment earned battle honours Poongli Bridge, Chachro, Mandhol and Defence of Poonch during these operations. While the 51 Para Brigade saw action in Sri Ganganagar in Rajasthan, 50th Parachute Brigade saw action initially in Bangladesh with 2 PARA in the airborne role and 7 PARA as the advance guard and the rest of the brigade in a ground role and then moved to assist its sister brigade in the western sector, thus becoming the only formation to see action on both fronts.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parachute_Regiment_(India)

Also Go through Battle Honor
http://www.indianparachuteregiment.kar.nic.in/theatre_hons.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parachute_Regiment_(India)

 

[Manindra]

I have checked link you provided about Myanmar OP . its not available . wonder how did you get this info. can you give me source about Kashmiri hostage op ?

As I already told you its Wikipedia link so many think said with spice added.
Well Myanmar operation for real but denied by India, Myanmar both.
As for Kashmir operation, its failed operation so, can't find very much writing (I would try to search.)
Well in 1997 two British Journalist claimed that Kidnapping was real but negotiation sabotage by Indian Intelligence to show Pakistani hand in Kashmir Terror. Para Sf allowed to attack when hostages killed (4 hostages not found), so only terrorists got killed without hostage recovery.

 

[Syed Asif Bukhari]

As I already told you its Wikipedia link so many think said with spice added.
Well Myanmar operation for real but denied by India, Myanmar both.
As for Kashmir operation, its failed operation so, can't find very much writing (I would try to search.)
Well in 1997 two British Journalist claimed that Kidnapping was real but negotiation sabotage by Indian Intelligence to show Pakistani hand in Kashmir Terror. Para Sf allowed to attack when hostages killed (4 hostages not found), so only terrorists got killed without hostage recovery.

ok . I understand .solid proof and information is not available about these operations.

 

[NKVD]

this is what I got about OP Khukhri from Wikipedia and it never says that it was conducted by 90 men. Read it.
Operation Khukri was a unique multinational operation launched in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), involving India, Ghana, Britain and Nigeria. The aim of the operation was to break the two-month-long siege laid by armed cadres of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) around two companies of 5/8th Gorkha Rifles Infantry Battalion Group at Kailahun by effecting a fighting breakout and redeploying them with the main battalion at Daru.[2][6][7]

The Operation was conducted By Para SF to break this Siege on 5/8th Gorkha rifles Which was Surrounded By RuF Cadres Read "
The role of 2 Para (SF)"of Op Details

Problem is you Have Not Read the Full Detail that Makes Mis-Informed you just read Few lines and Copy Paste.Just to Win Arguments Which Led to Errors In your Facts

 

[Manindra]

ok . I understand .solid proof and information is not available about these operations.

I don't think I could get any solid proof of operation of Para SF & MARCOS except war

 

[Syed Asif Bukhari]

The Operation was conducted By Para SF to break this Siege on 5/8th Gorkha rifles Which was Surrounded By RuF Cadres Read "
The role of 2 Para (SF)"of Op Details

Problem is you Have Not Read the Full Detail that Makes Mis-Informed you just read Few lines and Copy Paste.Just to Win Arguments Which Led to Errors In your Facts

I have read completely . but you are again and again trolling this thread.no SF on earth can take out 2000man with 90. and article proves it.