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I Believe that Russias Only Real Strategic Partner is India
Andrey Frolov
Interview with Vyacheslav Trubnikov, member of the governing board of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Army General Vyacheslav Trubnikov is a member of the Governing Board of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Joined the KGB in 1967, and served in the First Main Directorate (foreign intelligence). Head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in 1996-2000. Appointed as first deputy foreign minister in 2000. Awarded the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in 2001. Russian ambassador to India in 2004-2009.
Q: What was the role played by the various Russian government agencies in formulating Russian foreign policy in the late 1990s and early 2000s?
A: The various government agencies each play their different roles. Naturally, the main agency in charge of Russian foreign policy is the Foreign Ministry. It formulates and implements the Russian policies on the international arena. The Russian President formulates and approves the main principles and objectives of Russian foreign policy. Of course, an important supporting role is played by the economic agencies and institutions which oversee economic ties with foreign countries, including the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Economic Development, and other agencies such as Rossotrudnichestvo (Russian Cooperation).
The key role is played by the President and the Foreign Ministry. In addition, the Foreign Ministrys remit includes coordination of the activities of all the other government agencies on the international arena.
Q: It is often said that compared to Soviet times the role of the Foreign Ministry has greatly diminished, and the Presidential Administration has a greater say in foreign policy matters.
A: When we make comparisons with Soviet times, it must be taken into account that in those days the main coordinating role in Soviet foreign policy belonged to the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Foreign Ministry played second fiddle in formulating guidelines and instructions for other government agencies. That role primarily belonged to the International Department, which worked to fairly high professional standards. There is a widespread opinion that the top Communist Party officials were prone to making erratic and arbitrary decisions but that opinion is not entirely correct. Coordination was very professional, and we never had various Soviet ministries and government agencies contradicting each other on the international arena; they all spoke with one voice.
Back in those days, neither did we have, for example, chiefs of General Staff making foreign policy statements that would have been seen as an intrusion into another agencys remit, i.e. the Foreign Ministrys remit. In Soviet days there was a very clear separation of responsibilities, and everyone always toed the lines drawn by the Politburo. I am not glorifying that system, but nevertheless it was quite effective. I think that these days, the role that used to be played by the Politburo is now being played by the Presidential Administration. But there is no point trying to draw direct parallels. The Presidential Administration uses different methods compared to the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
That is why it would not be entirely correct to say that the Foreign Ministry is playing a lesser role these days. The ministrys main focus is implementing the countrys foreign policy course as opposed to formulating any new foreign policy objectives or principles. In any event, all the proposals formulated by the Foreign Ministry are subject to the Presidents approval.
Q: What, then, is your opinion of the statement made by the former Russian ambassador to Libya, Vladimir Chamov, after the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution on Libya in 2011? Was that a one-off event, or an indicator of the existing diversity of opinions within the Russian Foreign Ministry?
A: It is important to understand that just like every other ambassador, Vladimir Chamov was appointed by the President, and therefore he had the right of addressing the President directly. It is a different matter, of course, that he used that right to voice an opinion which ran counter to the foreign policy course pursued by the Foreign Ministry. In such a situation an ambassador must reconcile his views with the position of principle adopted by the Russian foreign policy makers. I believe that such statements must be agreed, one way or another, with the top Foreign Ministry officials. If the ambassadors views are not supported by the top Foreign Ministry officials, he must pursue the political course set by the ministry - but he still has the right to express his own opinion to the President of the country. In their policy decisions ambassadors must abide by the instructions they receive from Moscow.
For example, when I was appointed ambassador to India shortly before Vladimir Putins visit to that country (in December 2004), there was a meeting with the top Foreign Ministry officials. When the President was announcing my appointment to the Foreign Ministry, he said in no uncertain terms at that meeting that Ambassador Trubnikov has the right to write not only to the top Foreign Ministry officials, but also directly to the President.
I believe that in the case of Libya the ambassador essentially contravened the Russian position at the UN Security Council which had already been approved by the President. Therefore he was not merely voicing a different opinion or an alternative proposal - he essentially started to argue with the countrys leadership. Had he expressed his point of view in a timely fashion, I believe that it would have been taken into account.
Q: Do you think it likely that some of the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) might take action as a coalition in the event of a destabilization in Central Asia following the withdrawal of the bulk of American forces from Afghanistan after 2014?
A: Obviously, the SCO counterterrorism center has done some contingency planning for possible terrorist attacks. That is why they hold various maneuvers and exercises. As for the extent to which the current composition of the SCO enables the counterterrorism center to conduct operations in the member states, that depends on some very important details. These details are being addressed, and to a certain extent these questions have been addressed by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
I think that the CSTO has a lot more instruments to stabilize the situation if it starts to deteriorate following the U.S. pullout from Afghanistan in 2014, because the CSTO has already worked on these issues and has done a lot of planning. I am talking about the modalities of foreign troop presence on the territory of this or another country, about compensation for any damage, etc. All these issues must be addressed beforehand, i.e. the basis and the mandate for troop deployment; compensation to be paid by the SCO for possible casualties among the citizens of the country in which the troops are deployed, or among the troops themselves; compensation for possible damage to the environment, etc.
As far as I am aware, at present the SCO does not have any detailed plans for participation in efforts to stabilize the situation in its member states - not in publically available sources, anyway. In contrast, the CSTO works on such plans on a continuous and systemic basis. The CSTOs planning for possible events in Central Asia is much more detailed, and its experience in this area continues to grow.
Q: What is your opinion about the proposed international Arms Trade Treaty? What would be the consequences of the adoption of that treaty for arms trade and defense industry cooperation between Russia and India?
A: It depends on whether Russia signs up to that treaty. If it does, the country will obviously be bound by certain commitments as part of that treaty, just like all the other countries that sign up. I think it would be very difficult to secure the support of defense industry companies for some general clichés which would essentially negate the principle of free competition in foreign markets.
Personally, I do not believe that the international community and the global defense industry are ready to sign an international treaty that all the parties could live with. We are still far from identifying solutions even in such narrow segments as anti-personnel mines, small arms and light weapons, etc. The progress achieved so far in these areas gives little reason for optimism that we can reach an agreement any time soon.
Besides, let us not forget about the arms importers. Those countries also have their own views about the conduct of the exporters. I think they also want to maintain free competition. This enables them to buy quality weaponry at lower prices from the competing suppliers.
So I believe it is way too early to speak about any possible consequences of such a treaty being signed for the arms trade and defense industry cooperation between Russia and India.
Q: How likely do you think India and the United States are to become close military-political partners? In recent years the two countries have stepped up security contacts. There have also been security consultations between the United States, Japan, India, etc.
A: In the early 2000s, after the 9/11 attacks and the launch of the campaign in Afghanistan, the focus of Americas partnership with South Asian countries shifted from Pakistan to India. That principle is well in line with Americas hedging strategy on China.
The Americans interpret that strategy as hedging risks, but the word hedge also has another meaning, so hedging can also mean to build a hedge, or a fence, or a cordon around China. Of course, the United States wants to involve India in that strategy.
But the priority of Indias foreign policy has always been to ensure the countrys own security and to protect its own national interests using its own resources and partnership with tried-and-tested, reliable partners, such as the Soviet Union. It is no coincidence that in 1971 the two countries signed a peace, friendship and cooperation treaty, which included Soviet participation in providing Indias security. As a result, the 1971 conflict over Bangladesh between India and Pakistan was resolved in Indias favor, because the treaty prevented third countries from intervening in that conflict.
Even though India regularly participates in joint naval maneuvers with Australia, Japan, the United States and the Philippines, there is always the proviso that this participation aims to protect Indias national security interests on the high seas and is not directed against any third countries.
Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that, thanks to energetic efforts by the Americans, their military-political cooperation with India is now aiming to establish strategic partnership between the two countries. That course has been declared by both countries - but for now it is limited to sporadic participation in multilateral military exercises or in traditional bilateral military exchanges, which have existed for decades.
It is also obvious that the two countries have stepped up military and technical cooperation, which is in line with Indias strategy of diversifying its sources of weaponry, equipping it armed forces with the most advanced hardware, and acquiring cost-effective weapons technologies.
This is why our tried and tested principle which India has always liked i.e. a good balance between the price and the quality of our weaponry is now shifting towards greater quality, as the Indians are now prepared to pay higher prices. Of course, sales of American military transports to India are not in Russian interests. Before the Indian contracts for the Lockheed C-130J Hercules transports and the Boeing P-8I Poseidon patrol aircraft, the Soviet Union and Russia had that market to themselves. Indian military transport aviation used to operate only Il-76 and An-32 aircraft; these days things are different.
To conclude this analysis of Indian-American cooperation, one thing is obvious: over the past two decades the Americans have been systemically filling certain niches in Indias foreign policy setup. In the meantime, Russia has had to plug the gaps in our cooperation with that country, which is very close to us. These gaps appeared while Russia was preoccupied with establishing closer relations with the West.
Q: Would it therefore be safe to say that Russia has lost the [Indian] market of military-transport aviation, for reasons which included delays with the signing of the MTA program?
A: I dont think so. The thing is, those were not unreasonable delays. Speaking of the MTA program, these are extremely important issues for India. The Indians want to build their military and technical cooperation with foreign countries according to modern principles, through joint R&D projects, as well as joint manufacturing, fitting out and marketing. The Indians say to us, You tell us that you are offering us the very latest aircraft - how come you dont have these aircraft in service in your own country? We want you to sell us the kind of weaponry that your own armed forces are using and are happy with. We dont want to buy half-baked hardware. We want well-polished systems, along with the technology for making them.
In the case of MTA we are talking not even about joint manufacturing but about joint development. In other words, this means participation at the R&D stage, when the Indians have the opportunity to acquire Russian technologies and then use them in local manufacturing. The Indian Foreign Ministry has its own department in the MoD; that department is in charge of buying weapons, and it dictates the terms of the contracts. Sometimes the Finance Ministry refuses to approve contracts which do not include the transfer of technology for the weapons systems being sold. It is important to the Indians to receive the production technology rather than just a flying prototype.
This is why I think that the Su-30MKI fighter program, which involves joint production, is a good example of cooperation. That is the kind of cooperation that India is happy with, because it also includes the training of specialists. Or take another project, the BrahMos cruise missile. It is an excellent missile; it has sea-based and ground-based versions; the air-launched version is now in development. The Indians are asking Russia to facilitate this process. And in these situations the delays are sometimes caused by Russia, whereupon the Indians try to find solutions elsewhere. They have a project to build a hypersonic missile using the BrahMos design.
Q: Will this be their own independent project?
A: I dont think so. BrahMos is a joint enterprise, with 50-50 participation, so the Russian companies will have to be involved. But the Indian companies are very actively involved in that project, too.
Q: How serious do you think is the danger of India shifting the focus of its military and technical cooperation to the United States, for political motives?
A: This is not going to happen. India does not have any political motives for such a shift. India has a purely pragmatic approach; it wants to receive the very best weaponry at the lowest possible price. It is no coincidence that the deal of the century, the fighter contract, has been awarded to Rafale rather than, say, the F-16, F/A-18, Eurofighter or Russias own MiG-35. The Indians have a choice, and they are diversifying for motives which are not political. They are led purely by pragmatic considerations and by the pursuit of their national interests.
Q: But Rafale is not a very polished aircraft, either?
A: That does not matter. The French have promised to transfer the technology.
Q: Is there a possibility of serious foreign policy disagreements between Russia and India? And if there is, how can that affect military and technical cooperation between the two countries?
A: Speaking of military and technical cooperation, the Indians are not really led by any political motives. They are led by pragmatic considerations; they want their weapons contracts to meet the criteria which I have already outlined.
As for possible foreign policy differences between the two countries, I believe that India is Russias only genuine strategic partner. We have never had any conflicts; neither do we have a common border. And the main principles of our two countries foreign policy are either identical or very close.
We both believe in the supremacy of the UN in international politics, and we both uphold the principles of international law. Russia understands Indias aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council but we also believe that reformatting the Security Council alone would hardly make much sense. We should avoid dividing the UN. We should think about reforming it and about the role an enlarged Security Council would play if it gains new permanent members with the same set of prerogatives that exist now, including the right of veto.
In other words, we may have different interpretations; we may have different views of some international problems, but we never come into conflict. We do not have any potential sources of conflict, and I dont believe that any such sources will appear in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, we are now pursuing closer international cooperation, including cooperation in the China-India-Russia format and in the BRICS format, so we are gaining more common ground.
Q: What are the main risks for Russian-Indian military and technical cooperation in the medium time frame? What measures do you think must be taken to secure Russias current role and place in the Indian and other defense markets?
A: First of all, we must continue to meet the Indians main requirement, i.e. to cooperate in developing new weapons systems. In that sense, BrahMos is an excellent example for our cooperation now and in the future. We must produce military hardware which involves bilateral cooperation at every stage of its lifecycle, from R&D to the supply of components, manufacturing and marketing. In addition, the products we offer to the Indians must be the products which have already been tested in our own armed forces. The time when we proudly said that even our own army doesnt have the kind of weapons we are offering is long in the past. The Indians dont need such weapons.
Speaking of the risks, let us return to Russias failure to win the contract for 126 fighters; Russia was unable to meet Indias requirements for that contract. Let us also think about how we can meet the requirement for placing orders with Indian companies, about awarding up to 30 per cent of subcontracts to the Indians, and about the so-called offset arrangements. In the already mentioned fighter contract, such arrangements accounted for 50 per cent of the value of the contract. How could Russia meet 5bn dollars worth of such requirements?
The Indian contract for the Admiral Gorshkov, the former Russian aircraft-carrying cruiser, is an example of an unsuccessful contract. To a certain extent, it has spoiled the climate of our relations in military and technical cooperation. I am talking about the delays with the delivery date, and the uncertainty over the final price of the upgrades (which has grown from 800m dollars to between 2bn and 3bn dollars). The Indians are prepared to pay that kind of money, but they want the ship, which they will use as the flagship of their Eastern Fleet, to be delivered as soon as possible. The Indians already have everything ready for that ship, including the infrastructure and the crew. Our constant delays have poisoned the climate of military and technical cooperation far worse than the delays with the MTA program.
Q: Have there been any precedents of Russia refusing to sell to India some weapons systems? If so, what were the reasons?
A: I am not aware of any such precedents. Russia and India have a clear understanding of what kind of weapons we cannot sell them for example, in view of the fact that India is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A moratorium alone is not enough. There are some lines that Russia cannot cross owing to its international commitments. The Indians are aware of it, and they are not making any provocative requests. But as far as I know Russia has agreed to sell everything the Indians have actually asked for.
For example, we were aware that the Indians were developing a naval propulsion reactor for their nuclear submarine but Russia would not have been able to supply such a reactor to them because we are bound by international commitments. Nevertheless, we have provided some degree of assistance. By the way, I was present at the launch of that submarine I had to delay by several days my departure from the post of the Russian ambassador to India so as to be able to attend the ceremony.
Q: What can you say about the delivery of the Nerpa nuclear submarine, from the point of view of Russias international commitments?
A: This is a lease arrangement; it is allowed by Russias international commitments because the Indians have no access to the technology of the nuclear propulsion reactor installed on that submarine. In addition, they are bound by the commitment not to equip the sub with nuclear missiles. The submarine itself can carry such missiles, but we have supplied it in strict compliance with the requirements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In other words, Russia abides by all the international agreements, which is especially obvious against the backdrop of the signing of the peaceful nuclear energy cooperation agreement (the so-called 123 Agreement) between India and the United States.
Andrey Frolov
Interview with Vyacheslav Trubnikov, member of the governing board of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Army General Vyacheslav Trubnikov is a member of the Governing Board of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Joined the KGB in 1967, and served in the First Main Directorate (foreign intelligence). Head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in 1996-2000. Appointed as first deputy foreign minister in 2000. Awarded the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in 2001. Russian ambassador to India in 2004-2009.
Q: What was the role played by the various Russian government agencies in formulating Russian foreign policy in the late 1990s and early 2000s?
A: The various government agencies each play their different roles. Naturally, the main agency in charge of Russian foreign policy is the Foreign Ministry. It formulates and implements the Russian policies on the international arena. The Russian President formulates and approves the main principles and objectives of Russian foreign policy. Of course, an important supporting role is played by the economic agencies and institutions which oversee economic ties with foreign countries, including the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Economic Development, and other agencies such as Rossotrudnichestvo (Russian Cooperation).
The key role is played by the President and the Foreign Ministry. In addition, the Foreign Ministrys remit includes coordination of the activities of all the other government agencies on the international arena.
Q: It is often said that compared to Soviet times the role of the Foreign Ministry has greatly diminished, and the Presidential Administration has a greater say in foreign policy matters.
A: When we make comparisons with Soviet times, it must be taken into account that in those days the main coordinating role in Soviet foreign policy belonged to the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Foreign Ministry played second fiddle in formulating guidelines and instructions for other government agencies. That role primarily belonged to the International Department, which worked to fairly high professional standards. There is a widespread opinion that the top Communist Party officials were prone to making erratic and arbitrary decisions but that opinion is not entirely correct. Coordination was very professional, and we never had various Soviet ministries and government agencies contradicting each other on the international arena; they all spoke with one voice.
Back in those days, neither did we have, for example, chiefs of General Staff making foreign policy statements that would have been seen as an intrusion into another agencys remit, i.e. the Foreign Ministrys remit. In Soviet days there was a very clear separation of responsibilities, and everyone always toed the lines drawn by the Politburo. I am not glorifying that system, but nevertheless it was quite effective. I think that these days, the role that used to be played by the Politburo is now being played by the Presidential Administration. But there is no point trying to draw direct parallels. The Presidential Administration uses different methods compared to the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
That is why it would not be entirely correct to say that the Foreign Ministry is playing a lesser role these days. The ministrys main focus is implementing the countrys foreign policy course as opposed to formulating any new foreign policy objectives or principles. In any event, all the proposals formulated by the Foreign Ministry are subject to the Presidents approval.
Q: What, then, is your opinion of the statement made by the former Russian ambassador to Libya, Vladimir Chamov, after the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution on Libya in 2011? Was that a one-off event, or an indicator of the existing diversity of opinions within the Russian Foreign Ministry?
A: It is important to understand that just like every other ambassador, Vladimir Chamov was appointed by the President, and therefore he had the right of addressing the President directly. It is a different matter, of course, that he used that right to voice an opinion which ran counter to the foreign policy course pursued by the Foreign Ministry. In such a situation an ambassador must reconcile his views with the position of principle adopted by the Russian foreign policy makers. I believe that such statements must be agreed, one way or another, with the top Foreign Ministry officials. If the ambassadors views are not supported by the top Foreign Ministry officials, he must pursue the political course set by the ministry - but he still has the right to express his own opinion to the President of the country. In their policy decisions ambassadors must abide by the instructions they receive from Moscow.
For example, when I was appointed ambassador to India shortly before Vladimir Putins visit to that country (in December 2004), there was a meeting with the top Foreign Ministry officials. When the President was announcing my appointment to the Foreign Ministry, he said in no uncertain terms at that meeting that Ambassador Trubnikov has the right to write not only to the top Foreign Ministry officials, but also directly to the President.
I believe that in the case of Libya the ambassador essentially contravened the Russian position at the UN Security Council which had already been approved by the President. Therefore he was not merely voicing a different opinion or an alternative proposal - he essentially started to argue with the countrys leadership. Had he expressed his point of view in a timely fashion, I believe that it would have been taken into account.
Q: Do you think it likely that some of the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) might take action as a coalition in the event of a destabilization in Central Asia following the withdrawal of the bulk of American forces from Afghanistan after 2014?
A: Obviously, the SCO counterterrorism center has done some contingency planning for possible terrorist attacks. That is why they hold various maneuvers and exercises. As for the extent to which the current composition of the SCO enables the counterterrorism center to conduct operations in the member states, that depends on some very important details. These details are being addressed, and to a certain extent these questions have been addressed by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
I think that the CSTO has a lot more instruments to stabilize the situation if it starts to deteriorate following the U.S. pullout from Afghanistan in 2014, because the CSTO has already worked on these issues and has done a lot of planning. I am talking about the modalities of foreign troop presence on the territory of this or another country, about compensation for any damage, etc. All these issues must be addressed beforehand, i.e. the basis and the mandate for troop deployment; compensation to be paid by the SCO for possible casualties among the citizens of the country in which the troops are deployed, or among the troops themselves; compensation for possible damage to the environment, etc.
As far as I am aware, at present the SCO does not have any detailed plans for participation in efforts to stabilize the situation in its member states - not in publically available sources, anyway. In contrast, the CSTO works on such plans on a continuous and systemic basis. The CSTOs planning for possible events in Central Asia is much more detailed, and its experience in this area continues to grow.
Q: What is your opinion about the proposed international Arms Trade Treaty? What would be the consequences of the adoption of that treaty for arms trade and defense industry cooperation between Russia and India?
A: It depends on whether Russia signs up to that treaty. If it does, the country will obviously be bound by certain commitments as part of that treaty, just like all the other countries that sign up. I think it would be very difficult to secure the support of defense industry companies for some general clichés which would essentially negate the principle of free competition in foreign markets.
Personally, I do not believe that the international community and the global defense industry are ready to sign an international treaty that all the parties could live with. We are still far from identifying solutions even in such narrow segments as anti-personnel mines, small arms and light weapons, etc. The progress achieved so far in these areas gives little reason for optimism that we can reach an agreement any time soon.
Besides, let us not forget about the arms importers. Those countries also have their own views about the conduct of the exporters. I think they also want to maintain free competition. This enables them to buy quality weaponry at lower prices from the competing suppliers.
So I believe it is way too early to speak about any possible consequences of such a treaty being signed for the arms trade and defense industry cooperation between Russia and India.
Q: How likely do you think India and the United States are to become close military-political partners? In recent years the two countries have stepped up security contacts. There have also been security consultations between the United States, Japan, India, etc.
A: In the early 2000s, after the 9/11 attacks and the launch of the campaign in Afghanistan, the focus of Americas partnership with South Asian countries shifted from Pakistan to India. That principle is well in line with Americas hedging strategy on China.
The Americans interpret that strategy as hedging risks, but the word hedge also has another meaning, so hedging can also mean to build a hedge, or a fence, or a cordon around China. Of course, the United States wants to involve India in that strategy.
But the priority of Indias foreign policy has always been to ensure the countrys own security and to protect its own national interests using its own resources and partnership with tried-and-tested, reliable partners, such as the Soviet Union. It is no coincidence that in 1971 the two countries signed a peace, friendship and cooperation treaty, which included Soviet participation in providing Indias security. As a result, the 1971 conflict over Bangladesh between India and Pakistan was resolved in Indias favor, because the treaty prevented third countries from intervening in that conflict.
Even though India regularly participates in joint naval maneuvers with Australia, Japan, the United States and the Philippines, there is always the proviso that this participation aims to protect Indias national security interests on the high seas and is not directed against any third countries.
Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that, thanks to energetic efforts by the Americans, their military-political cooperation with India is now aiming to establish strategic partnership between the two countries. That course has been declared by both countries - but for now it is limited to sporadic participation in multilateral military exercises or in traditional bilateral military exchanges, which have existed for decades.
It is also obvious that the two countries have stepped up military and technical cooperation, which is in line with Indias strategy of diversifying its sources of weaponry, equipping it armed forces with the most advanced hardware, and acquiring cost-effective weapons technologies.
This is why our tried and tested principle which India has always liked i.e. a good balance between the price and the quality of our weaponry is now shifting towards greater quality, as the Indians are now prepared to pay higher prices. Of course, sales of American military transports to India are not in Russian interests. Before the Indian contracts for the Lockheed C-130J Hercules transports and the Boeing P-8I Poseidon patrol aircraft, the Soviet Union and Russia had that market to themselves. Indian military transport aviation used to operate only Il-76 and An-32 aircraft; these days things are different.
To conclude this analysis of Indian-American cooperation, one thing is obvious: over the past two decades the Americans have been systemically filling certain niches in Indias foreign policy setup. In the meantime, Russia has had to plug the gaps in our cooperation with that country, which is very close to us. These gaps appeared while Russia was preoccupied with establishing closer relations with the West.
Q: Would it therefore be safe to say that Russia has lost the [Indian] market of military-transport aviation, for reasons which included delays with the signing of the MTA program?
A: I dont think so. The thing is, those were not unreasonable delays. Speaking of the MTA program, these are extremely important issues for India. The Indians want to build their military and technical cooperation with foreign countries according to modern principles, through joint R&D projects, as well as joint manufacturing, fitting out and marketing. The Indians say to us, You tell us that you are offering us the very latest aircraft - how come you dont have these aircraft in service in your own country? We want you to sell us the kind of weaponry that your own armed forces are using and are happy with. We dont want to buy half-baked hardware. We want well-polished systems, along with the technology for making them.
In the case of MTA we are talking not even about joint manufacturing but about joint development. In other words, this means participation at the R&D stage, when the Indians have the opportunity to acquire Russian technologies and then use them in local manufacturing. The Indian Foreign Ministry has its own department in the MoD; that department is in charge of buying weapons, and it dictates the terms of the contracts. Sometimes the Finance Ministry refuses to approve contracts which do not include the transfer of technology for the weapons systems being sold. It is important to the Indians to receive the production technology rather than just a flying prototype.
This is why I think that the Su-30MKI fighter program, which involves joint production, is a good example of cooperation. That is the kind of cooperation that India is happy with, because it also includes the training of specialists. Or take another project, the BrahMos cruise missile. It is an excellent missile; it has sea-based and ground-based versions; the air-launched version is now in development. The Indians are asking Russia to facilitate this process. And in these situations the delays are sometimes caused by Russia, whereupon the Indians try to find solutions elsewhere. They have a project to build a hypersonic missile using the BrahMos design.
Q: Will this be their own independent project?
A: I dont think so. BrahMos is a joint enterprise, with 50-50 participation, so the Russian companies will have to be involved. But the Indian companies are very actively involved in that project, too.
Q: How serious do you think is the danger of India shifting the focus of its military and technical cooperation to the United States, for political motives?
A: This is not going to happen. India does not have any political motives for such a shift. India has a purely pragmatic approach; it wants to receive the very best weaponry at the lowest possible price. It is no coincidence that the deal of the century, the fighter contract, has been awarded to Rafale rather than, say, the F-16, F/A-18, Eurofighter or Russias own MiG-35. The Indians have a choice, and they are diversifying for motives which are not political. They are led purely by pragmatic considerations and by the pursuit of their national interests.
Q: But Rafale is not a very polished aircraft, either?
A: That does not matter. The French have promised to transfer the technology.
Q: Is there a possibility of serious foreign policy disagreements between Russia and India? And if there is, how can that affect military and technical cooperation between the two countries?
A: Speaking of military and technical cooperation, the Indians are not really led by any political motives. They are led by pragmatic considerations; they want their weapons contracts to meet the criteria which I have already outlined.
As for possible foreign policy differences between the two countries, I believe that India is Russias only genuine strategic partner. We have never had any conflicts; neither do we have a common border. And the main principles of our two countries foreign policy are either identical or very close.
We both believe in the supremacy of the UN in international politics, and we both uphold the principles of international law. Russia understands Indias aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council but we also believe that reformatting the Security Council alone would hardly make much sense. We should avoid dividing the UN. We should think about reforming it and about the role an enlarged Security Council would play if it gains new permanent members with the same set of prerogatives that exist now, including the right of veto.
In other words, we may have different interpretations; we may have different views of some international problems, but we never come into conflict. We do not have any potential sources of conflict, and I dont believe that any such sources will appear in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, we are now pursuing closer international cooperation, including cooperation in the China-India-Russia format and in the BRICS format, so we are gaining more common ground.
Q: What are the main risks for Russian-Indian military and technical cooperation in the medium time frame? What measures do you think must be taken to secure Russias current role and place in the Indian and other defense markets?
A: First of all, we must continue to meet the Indians main requirement, i.e. to cooperate in developing new weapons systems. In that sense, BrahMos is an excellent example for our cooperation now and in the future. We must produce military hardware which involves bilateral cooperation at every stage of its lifecycle, from R&D to the supply of components, manufacturing and marketing. In addition, the products we offer to the Indians must be the products which have already been tested in our own armed forces. The time when we proudly said that even our own army doesnt have the kind of weapons we are offering is long in the past. The Indians dont need such weapons.
Speaking of the risks, let us return to Russias failure to win the contract for 126 fighters; Russia was unable to meet Indias requirements for that contract. Let us also think about how we can meet the requirement for placing orders with Indian companies, about awarding up to 30 per cent of subcontracts to the Indians, and about the so-called offset arrangements. In the already mentioned fighter contract, such arrangements accounted for 50 per cent of the value of the contract. How could Russia meet 5bn dollars worth of such requirements?
The Indian contract for the Admiral Gorshkov, the former Russian aircraft-carrying cruiser, is an example of an unsuccessful contract. To a certain extent, it has spoiled the climate of our relations in military and technical cooperation. I am talking about the delays with the delivery date, and the uncertainty over the final price of the upgrades (which has grown from 800m dollars to between 2bn and 3bn dollars). The Indians are prepared to pay that kind of money, but they want the ship, which they will use as the flagship of their Eastern Fleet, to be delivered as soon as possible. The Indians already have everything ready for that ship, including the infrastructure and the crew. Our constant delays have poisoned the climate of military and technical cooperation far worse than the delays with the MTA program.
Q: Have there been any precedents of Russia refusing to sell to India some weapons systems? If so, what were the reasons?
A: I am not aware of any such precedents. Russia and India have a clear understanding of what kind of weapons we cannot sell them for example, in view of the fact that India is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A moratorium alone is not enough. There are some lines that Russia cannot cross owing to its international commitments. The Indians are aware of it, and they are not making any provocative requests. But as far as I know Russia has agreed to sell everything the Indians have actually asked for.
For example, we were aware that the Indians were developing a naval propulsion reactor for their nuclear submarine but Russia would not have been able to supply such a reactor to them because we are bound by international commitments. Nevertheless, we have provided some degree of assistance. By the way, I was present at the launch of that submarine I had to delay by several days my departure from the post of the Russian ambassador to India so as to be able to attend the ceremony.
Q: What can you say about the delivery of the Nerpa nuclear submarine, from the point of view of Russias international commitments?
A: This is a lease arrangement; it is allowed by Russias international commitments because the Indians have no access to the technology of the nuclear propulsion reactor installed on that submarine. In addition, they are bound by the commitment not to equip the sub with nuclear missiles. The submarine itself can carry such missiles, but we have supplied it in strict compliance with the requirements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In other words, Russia abides by all the international agreements, which is especially obvious against the backdrop of the signing of the peaceful nuclear energy cooperation agreement (the so-called 123 Agreement) between India and the United States.
