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Hawaldar Lalak Jan (NH)

VisionHawk

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Lalak Jan 'Dohat' (1967 - 1999)
32 yrs, Havaldar Major, 12 Northern Light Infantry (NLI)
Nishan-e-Haider (1999)
Pakistan


by Nasir M. Khan

Background
In 1984, India occupied the Pakistani posts at Siachen glacier. These posts had been vacated due to winters and snowing in the northern areas of Pakistan. India had in fact violated the Line of Control (LOC) in order to capture these posts. Pakistan's efforts to take these areas back from Indian possession turned out to be futile, and a war was fought in the worst possible circumstances for 15 years without any significant reward to either side.

The Indians posted an entire Division at Siachen Glacier. The ammunition and food was supplied to this division through the Srinagar-Leh Highway, the road joining the area of Leh (Siachen) with the capital of Jammu and Kashmir, Srinagar. The area surrounding the road was mountainous, with Tiger Hill being the peak that offered the best view of the entire northern area, providing those who were on it with a terrific aerial advantage. The Indian had previously used this peak to attack some defensive positions of Pakistan from time to time. Tiger Hill, located in the associated sectors of Batalik, Kargil and Drass, provided and aerial view of the Srinagar-Leh Highway. In September 1998, the posts had been vacated by India as part of a routine winter exercise, they were to reoccupy them in the summers.

In May 1999, a small sized Indian force of 4 men going along the Srinagar-Leh Highway lost contact with the rest of the army. A section, comprising 12 men was sent on the same road to locate the MIAs (Missing In Action). These 12 men also became MIA.

A small force (1200 men) of the Pakistan Army had occupied the vacated Indian posts, and were planning to hold on for sometime so that the Division at Siachen would have no other option but to retreat, due to the lack of ammunition and food supplies.

The Indians launched a full fledged attack on the small band of Pakistan Army soldiers.

Main Achievement
Tiger Hill had been occupied by 11 men of 12 NLI (Northern Light Infantry) unit of the Pakistan Army. One of these men was Subedar Sikander, the person who was responsible, with 10 other men, to hold back India's offensive long enough to force the Division at Siachen to retreat. His 2IC (Second in Command) was Havaldar Major Lalak "Blizzard" Jan (Blizzard = Dohat in local language).

Lalak Jan was one of the best in the NLI as far as mountain navigation was concerned, in addition to being one of the best, if not the best, rifleman.

The 10 men of 12 NLI were told by Subedar Sikander to change their positions while firing back at the attacking Indian forces. As the men followed the orders, the managed to bluff the Indians into believing that the size of the force was much more than 11.

On 1st of July, 1999, the 18 Grenadiers Battalion (India) launched a fierce attack on Tiger Hill by virtue of artillary shelling of the occupied bunkers. Subedar Sikandar placed his men in such positions that they managed to repulse the attack without any loss of life on their own part. It is not known how many men were lost by the 18 Grenadiers Battalion.

On the morning of 2nd July 1999, amidst the mist, the 18 Grenadiers launched another attack on Tiger Hills. Subedar Sikandar ordered his men to retreat to a secret bunker. Once the men were safe, he ordered Lalak Jan to descend Tiger Hill, and amidst the Indian Artillery shelling plant the landmines in the area in front of the Indians. The impossibility of the task was realized by all, but the Subedar insisted that the army has sent them down to fight, and that they would have to complete this task if they were to make a dent in the Indian offensive. Planting the landmines was the only way for them to damage the Indian armor and artillery, as none of the 11 men of 12 NLI had any heavy weaponry. The Subedar insisted that the mist would help Lalak Jan as well, and the Indians would not be expecting it either.

Accepting the daunting task, Lalak Jan descended Tiger Hills amidst the mist. The remaining men gave him as fierce a cover as possible to distract the Indians. Lalak Jan used his natural mountaineering ability to the fullest in the snow clad area and planted the landmines in such a manner that the Indians would encounter them in case they tried to move forward towards the hill.

Lalak Jan returned, having successfully planted the mines as ordered.

The trap was now set. All that the men required to do now was to lure the Indians into it. Subedar Sikandar told his men to gradually reduce the firing to a standstill.

About two hours after firing ceased from the Pakistan side, the Indians thought that they had managed to clear the area of the insurgents. Hence they began to move forward. The landmines reeked havoc with their initial forward movements. The Indians suffered heavy casualties, however, as they have not publicized this incident, the exact amount of damage is not known. The damage was in any case, severe enough that 18 Grenadiers did not attack Tiger Hills for at least 3 to 4 more days, until they were supported by another Indian Unit, 8 Sikh.

On 6th July, both 18 Grenadiers and 8 Sikh attacked Tiger Hills in the fiercest of Tiger Hill battles or the Kargil Operation. This time Chemical weapons were also used. Some of the Indian soldiers launched an attack from the steeper side of the hill. The NLI was not expecting an attack from this side. The NLI fought this battle at a heavy cost. 7 of the 11 men were killed, including Subedar Sikander. The Indians had managed to destroy a number of the Tiger Hill bunkers by either a hand to hand fight or by dropping a grenade into it.

Only Lalak Jan and 3 other men remained. The onslaught of the Indians was continuing and they were rapidly advancing towards capturing the hill. Lalak Jan, who was now the senior most person around, placed his men in strategic positions, at least two to three per person, and told them to fire without staying in one position. These four men, pitted against an enemy much superior in number and weaponry, managed to repulse the Indian onslaught by sheer courage and determination.

On 7th July 1999, 18 Grenadiers and 8 Sikh launched yet another offensive. This was a successful attack. 2 of Lalak Jan's men were killed. Lalak Jan and his only other remaining comrade in arms, Bakhmal Jan were both seriously injured. Not giving up, Lalak Jan got hold of an LMG and while Bakhmal Jan provided him with the ammunition, the two men kept trying to repulse the Indian attack. Lalak jan's left arm had been rendered useless as he had received a bullet in it. Bakhmal Jan, unable to sustain his injuries, died while supplying the ammunition to Lalak Jan.

From there on, in one of the most stunning demonstrations of determination, Lalak Jan held up the two units of the Indian Army for four complete hours. The Indian offensive finally slowed down and they descended Tiger Hills. The reason for this is not known, perhaps they thought that they could shell the bunker in which Lalak Jan was positioned.

After the Indian offensive had subsided, reinforcements (5 to 6 men) were sent to Tiger Hill under Captain Amer. When he saw the condition of Lalak Jan he told him to go back to the base camp as his arm was in no condition to be used. Lalak Jan told the captain that he did not want to die on a hospital bed, but would rather die in the battlefield. He told his Captain that he should not worry about the arm.

While this was going on at the hill, the Indians started shelling from a secret bunker in an adjacent hill. By that time the command of the handful of troops at Tiger Hill had been taken up by Captain Amer. He realized that the fire was coming from a secret bunker and also directed fire towards it, but the effort was in vain. The exact reason for the failure of this fire by the Pakistanis is not known. It could have been because of one of three reasons 1) The secret bunker was very well designed and protected by the Indians 2) the fire was not directed properly or 3) the bunker was not in the range of the light weaponry possessed by the Pakistanis atop Tiger Hill.

There was only one way left to counter the secret Indian bunker; it had to be blown up from a closer range.

When the injured Lalak Jan volunteered for the mission, his plea was immediately rejected by the captain, who was of the opinion that he would do it himself. However, Lalak Jan persuaded him, giving him his previous landmine installation experience coupled with his mountaineering skills as the explanation.

The Captain agreed.

Lalak Jan put a bag of explosives on his back, and while shouldering an AK-47 descended Tiger Hills for the second time amidst heavy Indian shelling. Managing to avoid being seen by the Indian forces, and utilising his knowledge of the hills to take cover, he located the secret bunker and threw the explosives inside the bunker.

The bunker, which was also an ammunition dump, blew up in what was probably the biggest blast of the entire Kargil Operation. Lalak Jan managed to take cover, but the Indian Army lost 19 to 20 men inside and nearby the bunker. The other Indian soldiers saw Lalk Jan and opened fire on him. Surrounded from all sides by Indian fire, Lalak Jan tried to resist and returned fire.

This effort was in vain, and Lalak Jan was killed when a number of bullets burst through his chest.

Contrary to what most writers have said on the topic in Pakistan, it is my own knowledge that the Indians did manage to capture Tiger Hills in the next attack. The loss of Tiger Hills was perhaps the biggest setback in the entire Kargil Operation, as after that other victories came for the Indians and they managed to get hold of perhaps the strategically most important peak from whether they could keep an eye on most of the offensives in the region.

On 15th of September 1999, the commanding officer of 12 NLI sent 2 commando forces to Tiger Hills to recover the body of Lalak Jan. The two forces were called 'Ababeel' and 'Uqaab'. Ababeel provided the fire cover while Uqaab went into the destroyed enemy bunker to retrieve the body of Lalak Jan.

When his body was found, Lalak Jan had his AK-47 clinched to his chest. The Government of Pakistan awarded him Nishan-e-Haider, the country's highest award for extraordinary gallantry.
 
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The Havaldar Major who was left alone to fight and faced bravely 1400 men from 2 Indian units . :army:
 
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Originally posted by VisionHawk@Jan 13 2006, 09:22 PM
The Havaldar Major who was left alone to fight and faced bravely 1400 men from 2 Indian units . :army:
[post=5343]Quoted post[/post]​

Great peice of information, it really impressed me, though i dont like you statement above. It should be:

Havaldor Major completed his task even with the threat of many Indian soldiers. :)

Although a same thing, but realistic.
 
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On 15th of September 1999, the commanding officer of 12 NLI sent 2 commando forces to Tiger Hills to recover the body of Lalak Jan. The two forces were called 'Ababeel' and 'Uqaab'. Ababeel provided the fire cover while Uqaab went into the destroyed enemy bunker to retrieve the body of Lalak Jan.

When his body was found, Lalak Jan had his AK-47 clinched to his chest. The Government of Pakistan awarded him Nishan-e-Haider, the country's highest award for extraordinary gallantry.
A slight contrdiction in facts. The Indian Army had buried all unclaimed NLI troops with full military honours on the Kargil heights, so if body had not been sent back to his unit then in all probability the soldier was buried by 18 Grenadiers.
 
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A slight contrdiction in facts. The Indian Army had buried all unclaimed NLI troops with full military honours on the Kargil heights, so if body had not been sent back to his unit then in all probability the soldier was buried by 18 Grenadiers
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In the same way Pakistani NLI soldiers also buried several Indian troops who were left behind by Indian soldiers according to one Pakistani soldier one evening Indians attacked Pakistani posts with full force but were met by firm resistance and were forced to retreat leaving behind several of their soldiers 3 days passed but no one came to pick them up and bury them after which Pakistani authorities contacted the indains to pick them up and bury them as the dead bodies were getting roten and their terrible smell was everywhere it was after that Indians came and picked them up. :flag:
 
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Originally posted by sword9@Mar 17 2006, 04:04 PM
A slight contrdiction in facts. The Indian Army had buried all unclaimed NLI troops with full military honours on the Kargil heights, so if body had not been sent back to his unit then in all probability the soldier was buried by 18 Grenadiers.
[post=7175]Quoted post[/post]​
Maybe no one saw it. The place was pretty inhospitable. So its unlikely the Indians would do that, for just one Pakistani Soldier. Pakistan is different. For the PA, though, its a case of "everyone comes back."
 
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Originally posted by VisionHawk@Mar 24 2006, 06:40 PM
In the same way Pakistani NLI soldiers also buried several Indian troops....
No Indians were buried by PA soldiers, and never have been since 1947.
.....who were left behind by Indian soldiers according to one Pakistani soldier one evening Indians attacked Pakistani posts with full force but were met by firm resistance and were forced to retreat leaving behind several of their soldiers 3 days passed but no one came  to pick them up and bury them after which Pakistani authorities contacted the indains to pick them up and bury them as the dead bodies were getting roten and their terrible smell was everywhere it was after that Indians came and picked them up.
Believe me no such offer was given. Even if it was given we would'nt have taken the offer - since there was no trust after the Lt. S Kalia, incident.
Initially when we did not know who was sitting on the heights and probing patrols were being sent. These incidents happened. Many men had fallen few feet away from NLI tenches/ bunkers. They were not left as you say, but you will agree that it is rather difficult to pull back a fallen buddy in the face of withering machine gun fire.

This was true in the case of 18 Grenadiers who had launched their initial attacks without any arty support. It was only after their 2IC was killed that the gravity of the situation was realised. After arty was used, Tiger Hill fell in subsequent attacks.
 
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Originally posted by sparten@Mar 25 2006, 10:46 PM
Maybe no one saw it. The place was pretty inhospitable. So its unlikely the Indians would do that, for just one Pakistani Soldier. Pakistan is different. For the PA, though, its a case of "everyone comes back."
[post=7765]Quoted post[/post]​
Spartan,
I am the last one to insult a man in uniform, even if he is an adversary. I point I wanted to make was that actual citations or unit accounts should be posted as far as possible. Such stories as posted above have so mush of exaggerations that it takes away the valour desplayed by the soldier or officer.

However, capturing Tiger Hill was difficult for us. It was plain blood and guts.

The story above has many false claims that you can judge for yourself. The examples are as follows:
Planting the landmines was the only way for them to damage the Indian armor and artillery, as none of the 11 men of 12 NLI had any heavy weaponry.
Indian armour and arty advancing on steep cliffs - this is ridicules.
Besides all mine laying is done much before, when defences are occupied. If this was not done then the concerned coy commander is a wanting in his duty.
This time Chemical weapons were also used.
No chemical weapons were ever used. Proof is in the fact that our own troops did not wear chemical warfare suits.
While this was going on at the hill, the Indians started shelling from a secret bunker in an adjacent hill. By that time the command of the handful of troops at Tiger Hill had been taken up by Captain Amer. He realized that the fire was coming from a secret bunker and also directed fire towards it, but the effort was in vain. The exact reason for the failure of this fire by the Pakistanis is not known. It could have been because of one of three reasons 1) The secret bunker was very well designed and protected by the Indians 2) the fire was not directed properly or 3) the bunker was not in the range of the light weaponry possessed by the Pakistanis atop Tiger Hill.
There were no secret bunkers directing fire on Lalak Jan and his men. The OP would have been behind some rock.
The author does not realise the 'time and distance' when he says "on another hill", those who have climed mountains will know what i am talking about.
 
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sword9 is correct spartan. Please do not post such exaggerated accounts, reading which even Lalak Jan would've felt hurt. Such pieces of writing lose their main objective (honoring the brave) and begin turning in to fairy tales, legends, myths, etc.
 
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Sid,
Thank you for understanding my point of view. There are many of your brave hearts, and we hear little mention of them. I don't remember their units off hand but I can give the locations where they fought:
- Hill sector 1971
- Fazilka

I will add name and units as I get time.
 
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Originally posted by sword9@Mar 28 2006, 10:03 AM
Sid,
Thank you for understanding my point of view. There are many of your brave hearts, and we hear little mention of them. I don't remember their units off hand but I can give the locations where they fought:
- Hill sector 1971
- Fazilka

I will add name and units as I get time.
[post=7942]Quoted post[/post]​


please if everyone of u had to insult the brave people without supporting it with valid links and information i mean classified info thn its better to close it.

[Mod Edit: What? How is sword9 insulting the brave? He is actually commending them! One thing professional armies first and foremost teach their soldiers, is to RESPECT the soldiers from the opposing side. After all, they are also someone's sons, husbands, brothers, fathers who have put much at stake to fight for their country, for what they believe in. Now I expect you to edit what you wrote in this post]
 
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Some of PA's best fought battles.
Battle of Hilli - PA 205 Brigade (ex 16 Div) with was up against 4 Indian Brigades and the defensive battle fought by them is the fine example of defensive battle topic of study.
Orbats:
205 Brigade - Brig Tajjamal Hussain Malik (now Maj Gen. retd)
4 FF
13 FF
Field Regt; Mortar Battery; Tank Sqdn; Elements R&S Bn

Three major battle were fought by the above force against the following Indian units:
1st battle - 2 Infantry battalions + armour (strength ?).
2nd & 3rd battles - 4 Brigades + armour.

Does anyone here have any info on 4 FF and their battle account? They were like a wall.
 
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Some of PA's best fought battles.
Battle of Hilli - PA 205 Brigade (ex 16 Div) with was up against 4 Indian Brigades and the defensive battle fought by them is the fine example of defensive battle topic of study.
Orbats:
205 Brigade - Brig Tajjamal Hussain Malik (now Maj Gen. retd)
4 FF
13 FF
Field Regt; Mortar Battery; Tank Sqdn; Elements R&S Bn

Three major battle were fought by the above force against the following Indian units:
1st battle - 2 Infantry battalions + armour (strength ?).
2nd & 3rd battles - 4 Brigades + armour.

Does anyone here have any info on 4 FF and their battle account? They were like a wall.

Add to the list the defence of [FONT=arial, helvetica]Saidpur-Rangpur-Dinajpur in EP by 26FF "sherdils" commanded by Lt. Col Hakeem Arshad Qureshi. None of the positions under the control of 26FF were lost to the Indians until the surrender in EP. [/FONT]
 
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