batmannow
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Has Uncle Sam run out of patience?
globeandmail.com
Retired major-general / LEWIS MACKENZIE
February 3, 2009 at 12:00 AM EST
As President Barack Obama's visit to Canada draws near, Canadians should realize that how the war in Afghanistan will be conducted on the ground will change little, if at all, under his leadership.
Changes already put in train by the Bush administration following the recommendations of General David Petraeus will continue on schedule. Gen. Petraeus, the new head of U.S. Central Command and responsible for the Iraq and Afghan campaigns, was previously the commander of U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq. As such, he was the architect of the troop "surge" and the concept of paying local tribes in the Sunni communities in Anbar province to become part of the security solution rather than the problem. The dramatic reduction in violence has given the concept some credibility.
In the past few years, it became painfully obvious that most of the 26 NATO member countries were unwilling to honour their obligations under the NATO Charter to provide adequate boots on the ground to defeat the Afghan insurgents. As a result, Gen. Petraeus successfully persuaded the Bush administration to reinforce the U.S. troop contribution to NATO's International Security Assistance Force by some 30,000 troops over the next year. He also proposed to organize local defence committees throughout Afghanistan to assist in providing security to local populations.
The offer to empower local tribal leaders with new responsibilities, funds and resources drew significant criticism from Afghan President Hamid Karzai and a number of NATO countries, including Canada. Concerns were raised that this could create a parallel security apparatus outside the control of Afghanistan's central government and give rise to an even greater number of warlords. A compromise was reached: A few trial defence committees will be established and the concept evaluated.
At this time of heated debate within NATO, Canada finds itself in an awkward position: It has promised a withdrawal from the military mission in Afghanistan in 2011, just as the alliance - or, more accurately, our southern neighbour - is in the process of doubling the size of its troop contribution.
There is little doubt that the current euphoria accompanying the new President into office will make it more difficult for NATO leaders to say no when the inevitable requests for additional troop support are made. Canadian commentators are already speculating that we will be asked to stay in Afghanistan in a combat role after 2011. Mr. Obama could well raise the issue during his visit.
The painful truth is that Canada will not be capable of remaining in Afghanistan in a combat role beyond 2011. Indeed, remaining in such a role until 2011 will present enough of its own problems and challenges.
Our military was slashed and burned during the 1990s when ordered to contribute 27 per cent of its budget toward paying down the national debt, a percentage greater than any other government department. It was impossible to immediately reduce spending by that amount except by dramatically reducing the number of its uniformed personnel. As a result, Canada has an army that can be seated in the old Maple Leaf Gardens with some empty seats left over. Our regular infantry, which does most of the dirty work outside the wire in Afghanistan, is well over a thousand soldiers of all ranks - but still smaller than the Toronto Police Service.
Despite these tiny numbers, by 2011, we will have maintained a battle group (a combat unit of some 1,000 soldiers) in theatre for nearly nine years. The number of soldiers completing multiple tours in Afghanistan (some as many as four to date) and the one-year pretour training and temporary deployments on return to Canada to train recruits have broken parts of the army. Without respite, the remainder will be broken by 2011. This "best little army in the world" needs to be rebuilt. Maintaining the current combat role beyond 2011 would be virtually impossible.
This is not to suggest there would be no Canadian military and paramilitary roles in Afghanistan post-2011. Canada could - and probably will - carry on with numerous enhanced tasks. Our Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team and its infantry company protection force could well remain. There is a crying need for additional instructors for the understaffed NATO teams training the expanding Afghan National Army. The international police currently training the problematic Afghan National Police are short some 3,000 instructors! In concert with expanded diplomatic, governance and development commitment, the Canadian footprint in Afghanistan after 2011 could well total 1,000 compared with the nearly 3,000 in-country today.
On the other hand, Mr. Obama's Afghan policy changes will be clearly evident at the political level. George Bush had weekly video calls with Mr. Karzai, and they had a warm and cordial relationship. Those calls have been cancelled. Vice- President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are on record strongly criticizing Mr. Karzai for not being aggressive enough in eliminating corruption from his government.
While I have had serious disagreements in the past with Mr. Obama's new envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, when he was Bill Clinton's man in the Balkan negotiations, there is no doubt that he gets things done and usually with military force. The new U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan will be retired Lieutenant-General Karl Eikenberry, a former top commander in Afghanistan.
It appears that U.S. patience with NATO's lack of progress in Afghanistan is running out. Barack Obama is about to play political hardball.
Retired major-general Lewis MacKenzie was the first commander of UN peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo.
globeandmail.com
Retired major-general / LEWIS MACKENZIE
February 3, 2009 at 12:00 AM EST
As President Barack Obama's visit to Canada draws near, Canadians should realize that how the war in Afghanistan will be conducted on the ground will change little, if at all, under his leadership.
Changes already put in train by the Bush administration following the recommendations of General David Petraeus will continue on schedule. Gen. Petraeus, the new head of U.S. Central Command and responsible for the Iraq and Afghan campaigns, was previously the commander of U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq. As such, he was the architect of the troop "surge" and the concept of paying local tribes in the Sunni communities in Anbar province to become part of the security solution rather than the problem. The dramatic reduction in violence has given the concept some credibility.
In the past few years, it became painfully obvious that most of the 26 NATO member countries were unwilling to honour their obligations under the NATO Charter to provide adequate boots on the ground to defeat the Afghan insurgents. As a result, Gen. Petraeus successfully persuaded the Bush administration to reinforce the U.S. troop contribution to NATO's International Security Assistance Force by some 30,000 troops over the next year. He also proposed to organize local defence committees throughout Afghanistan to assist in providing security to local populations.
The offer to empower local tribal leaders with new responsibilities, funds and resources drew significant criticism from Afghan President Hamid Karzai and a number of NATO countries, including Canada. Concerns were raised that this could create a parallel security apparatus outside the control of Afghanistan's central government and give rise to an even greater number of warlords. A compromise was reached: A few trial defence committees will be established and the concept evaluated.
At this time of heated debate within NATO, Canada finds itself in an awkward position: It has promised a withdrawal from the military mission in Afghanistan in 2011, just as the alliance - or, more accurately, our southern neighbour - is in the process of doubling the size of its troop contribution.
There is little doubt that the current euphoria accompanying the new President into office will make it more difficult for NATO leaders to say no when the inevitable requests for additional troop support are made. Canadian commentators are already speculating that we will be asked to stay in Afghanistan in a combat role after 2011. Mr. Obama could well raise the issue during his visit.
The painful truth is that Canada will not be capable of remaining in Afghanistan in a combat role beyond 2011. Indeed, remaining in such a role until 2011 will present enough of its own problems and challenges.
Our military was slashed and burned during the 1990s when ordered to contribute 27 per cent of its budget toward paying down the national debt, a percentage greater than any other government department. It was impossible to immediately reduce spending by that amount except by dramatically reducing the number of its uniformed personnel. As a result, Canada has an army that can be seated in the old Maple Leaf Gardens with some empty seats left over. Our regular infantry, which does most of the dirty work outside the wire in Afghanistan, is well over a thousand soldiers of all ranks - but still smaller than the Toronto Police Service.
Despite these tiny numbers, by 2011, we will have maintained a battle group (a combat unit of some 1,000 soldiers) in theatre for nearly nine years. The number of soldiers completing multiple tours in Afghanistan (some as many as four to date) and the one-year pretour training and temporary deployments on return to Canada to train recruits have broken parts of the army. Without respite, the remainder will be broken by 2011. This "best little army in the world" needs to be rebuilt. Maintaining the current combat role beyond 2011 would be virtually impossible.
This is not to suggest there would be no Canadian military and paramilitary roles in Afghanistan post-2011. Canada could - and probably will - carry on with numerous enhanced tasks. Our Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team and its infantry company protection force could well remain. There is a crying need for additional instructors for the understaffed NATO teams training the expanding Afghan National Army. The international police currently training the problematic Afghan National Police are short some 3,000 instructors! In concert with expanded diplomatic, governance and development commitment, the Canadian footprint in Afghanistan after 2011 could well total 1,000 compared with the nearly 3,000 in-country today.
On the other hand, Mr. Obama's Afghan policy changes will be clearly evident at the political level. George Bush had weekly video calls with Mr. Karzai, and they had a warm and cordial relationship. Those calls have been cancelled. Vice- President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are on record strongly criticizing Mr. Karzai for not being aggressive enough in eliminating corruption from his government.
While I have had serious disagreements in the past with Mr. Obama's new envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, when he was Bill Clinton's man in the Balkan negotiations, there is no doubt that he gets things done and usually with military force. The new U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan will be retired Lieutenant-General Karl Eikenberry, a former top commander in Afghanistan.
It appears that U.S. patience with NATO's lack of progress in Afghanistan is running out. Barack Obama is about to play political hardball.
Retired major-general Lewis MacKenzie was the first commander of UN peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo.
