Analysis: Talat Masood
The Taliban phenomenon has thrived in Afghanistan and the tribal belt because it flourishes in underdeveloped and marginalised segments of society
The terrorism challenge facing Pakistan has several dimensions that have been discussed both in the media extensively. Nonetheless, the inherent nature of the conflict and the external factor of US intervention have created a complex dynamic. As if that was not enough, we are also facing a severe economic downslide, which could possibly lead to a meltdown if emergency measures are not adopted. The US-led Friends of Pakistan initiative has pledged ten to fifteen billion dollars and could be considered one positive outcome of President Zardaris visit to the UN.
But if we look at the history of similar commitments, some countries may not honour their pledges, especially when global economy is in such deep trouble. Doubts aside, the flipside of the financial bailout is that Pakistan will further tie its knot to the US and the West and will make its economic and security policies more subservient to their diktat.
The way to overcome the current security and economic and widen the options available to Pakistan is to review and suitably adjust the strategic, political and economic direction.
Pakistan is projected in the United States by think-tanks, the administration and the Pentagon as lacking the military capacity and the political will to fight the war on terror. IT is stated that the Pakistan Army is not sufficiently trained, equipped and most importantly motivated for counterinsurgency operations. Also, elements in the ISI are pursuing a so-called dual policy of hunting with the hounds and running with the hare, although recent changes at the top of the ISI and the military should allay these fears. In addition to other motives, these assumptions form the rationale for intensification of US military incursions in Pakistans tribal belt.
This unilateral American approach does not help in fighting insurgency as it is in conflict with Pakistans policy of selective and integrated use of military power as opposed to heavy reliance on brute force. Moreover, these incursions are a significant distraction, as instead of focusing on the primary threat of combating insurgency, attention turns to protecting our sovereignty from an allys threats. Incursions further fuel anti-Americanism, creating problems for the political government in owning the war against terror.
Furthermore, US policy fails to address the larger problem of Pakistans insecurity. What appears to the US as duality is not necessarily the same when viewed from the prism of Pakistans security establishment. It has been, and remains, Pakistans policy not to take on all militant groups. In its order of priority, it prefers to neutralise elements hostile to the Pakistani state, deal with others later or even use them as assets if needed.
The apparent logic behind this policy has been that the US, India and Afghanistan are not sensitive to or interested in protecting Pakistans national interests. These countries are promoting their own regional designs, mostly by undermining Pakistans interests.
The US is accurately perceived as elevating India to new strategic heights through the civil nuclear deal, defence cooperation and space agreements. Washington is providing enormous economic, military and diplomatic support, as well as disproportionate space in Afghanistan and the region, to India.
Meanwhile, India continues to pursue a scorched earth policy in Kashmir without an eyebrow being raised by the international community. As regards Afghanistan, despite Pakistans leading role in the Afghan Jihad and accommodation of millions of Afghan refugees, Pakistan finds itself accused of not doing enough. It has lost more troops in the war on terror than the 37 NATO countries combined, as President Zardari mentioned in his speech to the UN General Assembly.
The result is our security forces turning a blind eye to the activities of Hekmatyar, Haqqani and others who are supposedly hurting American and Afghan interests, but are not necessarily Pakistans enemies. Ironically, similar parallels exist in American and Afghan behaviour towards certain militant groups operating in our tribal belt. India, and even the US, has been blamed for supporting dissidents in Balochistan. This sharp divergence in perception and support of proxies has given rise to mutual distrust and is by default strengthening the Taliban and other militants.
Pakistans interests demand that it does not allow the Taliban or any other obscurantist militant group to hold territory and destroy the socio-economic and political structure of the state. And this, of course, it is trying to do, though success is still some distance away. But Pakistan is not wary of the Afghan Taliban despite the face that their resurgence directly impacts the tribal belt. Obsession with India, and now with the US, should not blind us to the fact that terrorism and insurgency are seriously endangering the integrity of the federation.
The argument that the western border became volatile after 9/11, when we joined the US as a frontline state, does not hold on close scrutiny. We had neglected FATA since the creation of Pakistan, and allowed it to fester during and after the Afghan Jihad while supporting the Taliban with grandiose designs of Pan-Islamism and strategic depth. As long as militant activity in the tribal belt was directed outwards, it never attracted our attention. And when these militants turned inwards, we were caught napping. The highly aggressive and unilateral US policy has aggravated the challenge.
Clearly, stabilisation of Afghanistan and peaceful borders are in Pakistans interest. This implies that the efforts of the Afghan government with the support of the international community should succeed. Pakistans policy of ignoring the presence of certain groups in FATA, which are supporting the Afghan Taliban, has to be revised. Not only does it create rifts between the two countries, it also promotes militancy within Pakistan.
The US, too, cannot continue to ignore Pakistans vital interests if it seeks genuine cooperation. Pressurising a country of 160 million people without a quid pro quo does not work. Only a more equitable policy in the region will succeed. Washington should use its influence and that of the international community to prevail on India to find a durable solution to Kashmir and other issues that bedevil the Pak-India relationship.
For Afghanistan and Pakistan to have stable long-term cooperative relations, formal acceptance of the Durand Line as international boundary is a prerequisite. Additionally, there is an urgent need to improve the conditions of Afghanistans politically and economically deprived Pashtun community. The Taliban phenomenon has thrived in Afghanistan and the tribal belt because it flourishes in underdeveloped and marginalised segments of society.
Relying essentially on military force to defeat them has not worked before, and will not succeed now. A subtle combination of limited force, engagement with the people and economic development is key to stabilisation.
The US should cease cross-border raids, and instead work closely to build up Pakistans economic and military capacity. It is equally important for the US and the West to dispel the impression that the war on terror is directed against Islam. Resolution of these critical issues through harmonisation of national interests can secure a peaceful future for the region.
The writer is a retired Lieutenant General of the Pakistan Army. He can be reached at talat@comsats.net.pk
The Taliban phenomenon has thrived in Afghanistan and the tribal belt because it flourishes in underdeveloped and marginalised segments of society
The terrorism challenge facing Pakistan has several dimensions that have been discussed both in the media extensively. Nonetheless, the inherent nature of the conflict and the external factor of US intervention have created a complex dynamic. As if that was not enough, we are also facing a severe economic downslide, which could possibly lead to a meltdown if emergency measures are not adopted. The US-led Friends of Pakistan initiative has pledged ten to fifteen billion dollars and could be considered one positive outcome of President Zardaris visit to the UN.
But if we look at the history of similar commitments, some countries may not honour their pledges, especially when global economy is in such deep trouble. Doubts aside, the flipside of the financial bailout is that Pakistan will further tie its knot to the US and the West and will make its economic and security policies more subservient to their diktat.
The way to overcome the current security and economic and widen the options available to Pakistan is to review and suitably adjust the strategic, political and economic direction.
Pakistan is projected in the United States by think-tanks, the administration and the Pentagon as lacking the military capacity and the political will to fight the war on terror. IT is stated that the Pakistan Army is not sufficiently trained, equipped and most importantly motivated for counterinsurgency operations. Also, elements in the ISI are pursuing a so-called dual policy of hunting with the hounds and running with the hare, although recent changes at the top of the ISI and the military should allay these fears. In addition to other motives, these assumptions form the rationale for intensification of US military incursions in Pakistans tribal belt.
This unilateral American approach does not help in fighting insurgency as it is in conflict with Pakistans policy of selective and integrated use of military power as opposed to heavy reliance on brute force. Moreover, these incursions are a significant distraction, as instead of focusing on the primary threat of combating insurgency, attention turns to protecting our sovereignty from an allys threats. Incursions further fuel anti-Americanism, creating problems for the political government in owning the war against terror.
Furthermore, US policy fails to address the larger problem of Pakistans insecurity. What appears to the US as duality is not necessarily the same when viewed from the prism of Pakistans security establishment. It has been, and remains, Pakistans policy not to take on all militant groups. In its order of priority, it prefers to neutralise elements hostile to the Pakistani state, deal with others later or even use them as assets if needed.
The apparent logic behind this policy has been that the US, India and Afghanistan are not sensitive to or interested in protecting Pakistans national interests. These countries are promoting their own regional designs, mostly by undermining Pakistans interests.
The US is accurately perceived as elevating India to new strategic heights through the civil nuclear deal, defence cooperation and space agreements. Washington is providing enormous economic, military and diplomatic support, as well as disproportionate space in Afghanistan and the region, to India.
Meanwhile, India continues to pursue a scorched earth policy in Kashmir without an eyebrow being raised by the international community. As regards Afghanistan, despite Pakistans leading role in the Afghan Jihad and accommodation of millions of Afghan refugees, Pakistan finds itself accused of not doing enough. It has lost more troops in the war on terror than the 37 NATO countries combined, as President Zardari mentioned in his speech to the UN General Assembly.
The result is our security forces turning a blind eye to the activities of Hekmatyar, Haqqani and others who are supposedly hurting American and Afghan interests, but are not necessarily Pakistans enemies. Ironically, similar parallels exist in American and Afghan behaviour towards certain militant groups operating in our tribal belt. India, and even the US, has been blamed for supporting dissidents in Balochistan. This sharp divergence in perception and support of proxies has given rise to mutual distrust and is by default strengthening the Taliban and other militants.
Pakistans interests demand that it does not allow the Taliban or any other obscurantist militant group to hold territory and destroy the socio-economic and political structure of the state. And this, of course, it is trying to do, though success is still some distance away. But Pakistan is not wary of the Afghan Taliban despite the face that their resurgence directly impacts the tribal belt. Obsession with India, and now with the US, should not blind us to the fact that terrorism and insurgency are seriously endangering the integrity of the federation.
The argument that the western border became volatile after 9/11, when we joined the US as a frontline state, does not hold on close scrutiny. We had neglected FATA since the creation of Pakistan, and allowed it to fester during and after the Afghan Jihad while supporting the Taliban with grandiose designs of Pan-Islamism and strategic depth. As long as militant activity in the tribal belt was directed outwards, it never attracted our attention. And when these militants turned inwards, we were caught napping. The highly aggressive and unilateral US policy has aggravated the challenge.
Clearly, stabilisation of Afghanistan and peaceful borders are in Pakistans interest. This implies that the efforts of the Afghan government with the support of the international community should succeed. Pakistans policy of ignoring the presence of certain groups in FATA, which are supporting the Afghan Taliban, has to be revised. Not only does it create rifts between the two countries, it also promotes militancy within Pakistan.
The US, too, cannot continue to ignore Pakistans vital interests if it seeks genuine cooperation. Pressurising a country of 160 million people without a quid pro quo does not work. Only a more equitable policy in the region will succeed. Washington should use its influence and that of the international community to prevail on India to find a durable solution to Kashmir and other issues that bedevil the Pak-India relationship.
For Afghanistan and Pakistan to have stable long-term cooperative relations, formal acceptance of the Durand Line as international boundary is a prerequisite. Additionally, there is an urgent need to improve the conditions of Afghanistans politically and economically deprived Pashtun community. The Taliban phenomenon has thrived in Afghanistan and the tribal belt because it flourishes in underdeveloped and marginalised segments of society.
Relying essentially on military force to defeat them has not worked before, and will not succeed now. A subtle combination of limited force, engagement with the people and economic development is key to stabilisation.
The US should cease cross-border raids, and instead work closely to build up Pakistans economic and military capacity. It is equally important for the US and the West to dispel the impression that the war on terror is directed against Islam. Resolution of these critical issues through harmonisation of national interests can secure a peaceful future for the region.
The writer is a retired Lieutenant General of the Pakistan Army. He can be reached at talat@comsats.net.pk
