Global Trends 2025 - A Transformed World (Report of the NIC)

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PDF Link (Thanks Nitesh) : http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/...=21_11_08_2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf


Global Trends 2025, a new report written by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) ahead of President-elect Barack Obama's inauguration, envisages a future world marked by diminished US power, dwindling resources, and more people.

The NIC, an independent government body, emphasises that its report is not about "crystal-ball gazing" but offers a range of potential futures, including the following key trends.


US DOMINANCE

The US will remain the single most important actor in 2025 but will be less dominant.

It will retain its considerable military advantages, but scientific and technological advances; the use of "irregular warfare tactics" by others; the proliferation of long-range precision weapons; and the growing use of cyber warfare attacks "increasingly will constrict US freedom of action".

The US will still have a role to play as a "much-needed regional balancer" in the Middle East and Asia, despite the recent rise in anti-Americanism.

It will also be expected to play a significant role in using its military power to counter global terrorism, and will be seen as key to finding solutions to climate change.

US policy is likely to be strongly determined by internal developments in a number of key states, particularly China and Russia.


WEST v EAST

The current trend of global wealth and economic power shifting roughly from West to East, described as "without precedent in modern history", will continue.

Brazil, Russia, China and India are picked as countries which might benefit, boosted by rising oil and commodity price rises that have generated windfall profits for the Gulf states and Russia, as well as a shift in manufacturing and some service industries to Asia.

No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia, and none is likely to match their individual global clout.

China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next two decades than any other country. If current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world's second largest economy and its military will play an increasingly important role.

TERRORISM

Terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025, but its appeal could diminish if economic growth continues and youth unemployment is mitigated in the Middle East.

Terrorist groups in 2025 are likely to be a combination of descendants of long-established groups and newly emergent collections of "the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalised".

One of the greatest concerns continues to be that terrorists will use biological agents, or less likely, a nuclear device, to cause mass casualties.

However, al-Qaeda could decay "sooner than people think" due to the group's growing unpopularity in the Muslim world.

"The prospect that al-Qaeda will be among the small number of groups able to transcend the generational timeline is not high, given its harsh ideology, unachievable strategic objectives and inability to become a mass movement."

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The risk of nuclear weapon use over the next 20 years, although remaining very low, is likely to be greater than it is in today.

Ongoing low-intensity clashes between India and Pakistan could lead to broader conflict. The possibility of regime change or collapse in a nuclear weapon state such as North Korea raises questions regarding the ability of weak states to control and secure their nuclear arsenals.

It is not inevitable that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons, but "other countries' worries" about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead them to develop new security arrangements, including getting nuclear weapons themselves.

"Episodes of low-intensity conflict taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established."

"If nuclear weapons are used in the next 15-20 years, the international system will be shocked as it experiences immediate humanitarian, economic, and political-military repercussions."

Significant geopolitical changes could happen as a result, with some states seeking security alliances with existing nuclear powers and others pushing for global nuclear disarmament.

FOOD AND WATER

The World Bank estimates that demand for food will rise by 50% by 2030, as a result of growing world population, rising affluence, and the shift to Western dietary preferences by a larger middle class.

The number of countries which lack access to stable water supplies will rise from 21, with a combined population of 600 million, to 36 countries by 2025 - affecting 1.4 billion people.

With water becoming more scarce in Asia and the Middle East, co-operation on managing changing water resources is likely to become more difficult within and between states.

If world leaders decide that access to energy resources is essential for domestic stability, then, in the worst case, conflict between countries could break out.

AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa will remain the region most vulnerable to economic disruption, population stresses, civil conflict, and political instability.

The region will be a major supplier of the commodities needed to meet increased global demand, but local populations are unlikely to benefit economically. Instead, corrupt or ill-equipped governments could reap the profits.

GLOBAL PANDEMIC

The emergence of a novel, highly transmissible, and virulent human respiratory illness for which there are no adequate countermeasures could initiate a global pandemic.

If such a disease emerges, internal and cross-border tension will become more likely as nations struggle to control the movement of populations fleeing infection or wanting access to resources.

Experts consider highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) strains, such as H5N1, as having the potential to develop, but other pathogens, such as the Sars coronavirus or other influenza strains, could also emerge.

The most likely starting point for a pandemic would be somewhere with a lot of people and close association with animals - such as many parts of China and South-East Asia.

In the worst case, "tens to hundreds of millions of Americans within the US Homeland would become ill and deaths would mount into the tens of millions".

Globally, approximately a third of world's population would become ill and hundreds of millions die.

TECHNOLOGY

The transition from old fuels to new will be slow, as will the development of new technologies which present viable alternatives to fossil fuels or help eliminate food and water problems.

All current technologies are inadequate and new ones will probably not be commercially viable and widespread by 2025.

 

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Although we believe chances are good that
China and India will continue to rise, their
ascent is not guaranteed and will require
overcoming high economic and social
hurdles. Because of this, both countries are
likely to remain inwardly focused and per
capita wealth will lag substantially behind
Western economies throughout the period to
2025 and beyond. Individuals in these
emerging economic powerhouses are likely to
feel still poor in relation to Westerners even
though their collective GDP increasingly will
outdistance those of individual Western
states. For Russia, remaining in the top tier
where it has been since its remarkable
resurgence during the late 1990s and early
part of the 21st century may be extremely
6 National Power scores are the product of an index
combining the weighted factors of GDP, defense
spending, population, and technology. Scores are
calculated by the International Futures computer model
and are expressed as a state’s relative share
(percentage) of all global power.
difficult. Demography is not always destiny,
but diversifying the economy so that Russia
can maintain its standing after the world
transitions away from dependence on fossil
fuel will be central to its long-term prospects.
Europe and Japan also will be confronting
demographic challenges; decisions taken now
are likely to determine their long-term
trajectories.
Although the rise of no other state can equal
the impact of the rise of such populous states
as China and India, other countries with
potentially high-performing economies—Iran,
Indonesia, and Turkey, for example—could
play increasingly important roles on the world
stage and especially for establishing new
patterns in the Muslim world.

 

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India: A Complicated Rise. Over the next
15-20 years, Indian leaders will strive for a
multipolar international system, with New
Delhi as one of the poles and serving as a
political and cultural bridge between a rising
China and the United States. India’s growing
international confidence, derived primarily
from its economic growth and its successful
democratic record, now drives New Delhi
toward partnerships with many countries.
However, these partnerships are aimed at
maximizing India’s autonomy, not at aligning
India with any country or international
coalition.
India probably will continue to enjoy
relatively rapid economic growth. Although
India faces lingering deficiencies in its
domestic infrastructure, skilled labor, and
energy production, we expect the nation’s
rapidly expanding middle class, youthful
population, reduced reliance on agriculture,
and high domestic savings and investment
rates to propel continued economic growth.
India’s impressive economic growth over the
past 15 years has reduced the number of
people living in absolute poverty, but the
growing gap between rich and poor will
become a more important political issue.
We believe Indians will remain strongly
committed to democracy, but the polity could
become more fragmented and fractious, with
national power being shared across successive
political coalitions. Future elections are likely
to be multi-sided affairs yielding awkward
coalitions with unclear mandates. The
general direction of India’s economic
policymaking is unlikely to be reversed, but
the pace and scale of reform will fluctuate.
Regional and ethnic insurgencies that have
plagued India since independence are likely to
persist, but they will not threaten India’s
unity. We assess New Delhi will remain
confident that it can contain the Kashmiri
separatist movement. However, India is
likely to experience heightened violence and
instability in several parts of the country
because of the growing reach of the Maoist
Naxalite movement.
Indian leaders do not see Washington as a
military or economic patron and now believe
the international situation has made such a
benefactor unnecessary. New Delhi will,
however, pursue the benefits of favorable US
ties, partly, too, as a hedge against any
development of hostile ties with China.
Indian policymakers are convinced that US
capital, technology, and goodwill are essential
to India’s continued rise as a global power.
The United States will remain one of India’s
largest export destinations, the key to
international financial institutions such as the
World Bank and foreign commercial lending,
and the largest source of remittances. The
Indian diaspora—composed largely of highly
skilled professionals—will remain a key
element in deepening US-Indian ties. The
Indian market for US goods will grow
substantially as New Delhi reduces
restrictions on trade and investment. India’s
military also will be eager to benefit from
expanded defense ties with Washington.
Indian leaders, however, probably will avoid
ties that could resemble an alliance
relationship.

 

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Future of Democracy: Backsliding More Likely than Another Wave
We remain optimistic about the long-term prospects for greater democratization, but advances
are likely to slow and globalization will subject many recently democratized countries to
increasing social and economic pressures that could undermine liberal institutions.


􀁸 Ironically, economic setbacks could enhance prospects for movement toward pluralism and
greater democratization in China and Russia. The Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy
increasingly rests on its ability to ensure greater material wealth for Chinese society.
Resentment of elite corruption is already on the rise but may overwhelm the regime in event
of a serious economic crisis. The government’s standing in Russia would be similarly
challenged if living standards fell dramatically.


􀁸 Elsewhere surveys have shown democracy having taken root, particularly in Sub-Saharan
Africa and Latin America, where opinion views it positively independent of any material
benefits. Still, nascent democracies have historically been shown to be unstable to the extent
that they lack strong liberal institutions—especially rule of law—which can help support
democracy during economic downturns. Case studies suggest widespread corruption is
especially threatening because it undermines faith in democratic institutions.


􀁸 As we have suggested elsewhere in the text, the better economic performance of many
authoritarian governments could sow doubts among some about democracy as the best form
of government. The surveys we consulted indicated that many East Asians put greater
emphasis on good management, including increasing standards of livings, than democracy.
Elsewhere even in many well-established democracies, surveys show growing frustration
with the current workings of democratic government and questioning among elites over the
ability of democratic governments to take the bold actions necessary to deal rapidly and
effectively with the growing number of transnational challenges.