A Humble Expectation from Pak Army's New Leadership
The primary goal for Pakistans military is to defend the geographic boundaries of our motherland against any aggression particularly from India. That includes getting the occupied state of J&K liberated from illegal Indian occupation. I dont know if any realistically workable/achievable plan was ever made by any of our previous army chiefs for achieving that goal. Going by our past 75 years history, it apparently seems that our military strategy is re-active in its nature. We mainly focus on countering the aggressive Indians moves without having a plan for how to pro-actively and pre-emptively act for not only foiling Indian moves but also, and rather more importantly, exploiting (and creating whenever possible) opportunities to advance our goal of liberating Indian occupied J&K.
We need to admit that Indians (regardless whoever is running the government) seem to follow a well thought-out, coherent, and consistent policy of striking Pakistan at any and every opportunity that comes their way. Our recent history (post 1947) is indeed indicative of the fact that Indians committed aggression against Pakistan only when Pak military gets embroiled in domestic political crisis (mostly self-made) and examples of that being the Indian occupation of Rann of Kutch in mid-1965, attack on Lahore in the darkness of night on September 1965, attack on East Pakistan in 1971, Siachen occupation in 1984, etc.
Given that background, if we have a curious look at the events of Feb 2019 (Indian aggression just out of the blue) and August 2019 (illegal Indian annexation of occupied territory of J&K in defiance of related UN resolutions), we can clearly see all the required elements were indeed present inviting the Indian aggression.
For last ten or so years, many of our generals seem to be engaged more in domestic affairs (installing/removing governments, minting new idols for us emotional Pakistanis to worship, and demolishing previously made ones) with unparalleled focus. The goal of getting Indian occupied J&K liberated was apparently put on the back burner if not abandoned totally. More than that Indians could also see how much a disaster the IK government proved to be for Pakistan at both the domestic and diplomatic fronts.
With Pakistans military deeply and fully pre-occupied with its apparently favorite game, i.e. playing domestic politics, and diplomatic disaster that Pakistan found itself in then under Imran Khans idiotic leadership, why Indians would wait for any other more opportune time? And for what? So, by targeting a non-disputed area deep inside Pakistan proper with a number of smart bombs was not a small feat that Indians tried to achieve. They were probably sure that Pakistans military wouldn't be in a position to militarily respond to the Indian aggression. If at all, Pakistan would only resort to diplomatic hue and cry and wouldnt be able to achieve much after the Imran Khan government had already disgruntled two of Pakistans closest allies, namely China and Saudi Arabia. Indians probably had already ensured, through their diplomatic juggling, that any unrest at the diplomatic front remains only up to a certain desired level. Specifically, Indians wanted to involve international community to some level but not so much that would divert the world focus onto the root cause of all that animosity, i.e. the dispute of illegally Indian occupied J&K. This attack by IAF on Pakistan proper, it seems, was meant to intimidate Pakistan and to gauge Pakistans probable military response to a subsequent strategic Indian move. A weak response from Pakistan side, however, came in as Operation Swift Retort launched next day that surprised Indians and sent shockwaves through diplomatic world but for no gain for Pakistan.
That world communitys engagement up to a desired level was a pre-requisite for next Indian move that came in on 5 August 2019 when India annexed Indian occupied state of J&K. That annexation was clearly in violation of related UN resolutions, and all bilateral and international agreements that Indians had signed in the past. What options Pakistan had to respond to a clearly illegal Indian action? Diplomacy? With Gen. Bajwa, ever busy to clear the diplomatic mess repeatedly created by Imran Khan, IKs government was incapable of doing much to counter/undo the Indian move. A military action? Not possible. Our military under the command of Gen. Bajwa, with internal grouping and fragmentation, was deeply involved in domestic political brinkmanship and absolutely in no position of launching any military action against India. With world community already sick and tired with bickering of two atomic powers (the latest episode being in Feb. 2019), atmosphere was not conducive for any military adventure on Pakistans part. But most crucial factor was of our own making. We foolishly exposed our scare and cowardice by not raising the price for Indians for their naked aggression against Pakistan in Feb. 2019. Pakistan had the capability and a full chance of shooting down at least quite a few of Indian war planes during Operation Swift Retort. That would have called Indias bluff and disappoint Indians for quite some time. Had that happened, they would have certainly had second thoughts about their annexation of Indian occupied J&K. But that coward policy of utmost restraint, known as Bajwa doctrine, was trumpeted as a great success and an icon of wisdom at that time. How could the world community allow us raise the ante in August 2019 after we showed utmost restraint when we were actually attacked by Indians only a few months ago?
It seems that either we really have no plans for exploiting any opportunity that comes our way (towards ultimately liberating the Indian occupied state of J&K) or, if we have one, it is utterly unrealistic that gets no chance of execution (that would be at least visible to us Pakistanis). After foolishly missing a golden opportunity to push Indians back in 1962, we sadly have apparently missed another one during the recent Galwan crisis between China and India.
Indians, on the other hand, seem to be following and advancing a well-articulated plan slowly bit-by-bit but steadily and consistently across many Indian governments. Their every step or move, in fact, is the next in line according to their plan. They always move to the next step whenever they find an opportune time because of either our mistakes/failures or their ability to create one.
We, as a nation, are very unfortunate that we havent had any visionary army chief. It is worth pondering on how many of our previous army chiefs were desiring and struggling to get an extension in their tenure and, in many cases, resorting to destabilizing actions, to say the minimum, to realize that selfish desire. Was it the lust of power that forced them to seek an extension? Was it the greed of perks and privileges that never got quenched? Or was it a genuinely grave situation that indeed required a continuity of the command? I honestly feel that the root cause was a failure on their part in setting a set of realistic professional and national goals at the start of their tenure. Most of our army chiefs were wandering around aimlessly or for petty goals (mostly revolving around domestic politics) and towards the end of three years, a chief would find himself without any worth mentioning achievement. He would then think if I get one, two, or three additional years, I would be able to do this and that and still retiring with the same zero-achievement even at the end of extended tenure. No wonders most of our army chiefs were found running behind personal goals rather than making any serious (and visible) effort towards a national goal (which was apparently never set in any case, it seems).
An ideal army chief for Pakistan (and lets hope Gen. Asim Munir proves to be one) would start with chalking out a realistic plan, with all its details, scenarios, actions, means, resources, etc.) aimed at achieving our long term national goals. These goals, of course, include safeguarding our territorial integrity at any price and foiling enemy attempts to harm Pakistan (through, for example, espionage, sabotage, etc.) As mentioned earlier, it includes liberating the state of J&K from illegal Indian occupation too. That master plan, if I could call it, may not be fully achievable in a single army chiefs tenure. But every army chief would follow it consistently and steadily and at the end of three-year tenure, every army chief would have something to give him a pride and internal satisfaction for (and being content with) whatever he was able to contribute, regardless how minute that contribution could be, towards achieving the national goals exactly according to the oath that he took. The next army chief then resumes the work at the same point in the plan where the previous chief stopped No one can then really abuse a retiring army chief by calling him Mir Jafar.
The primary goal for Pakistans military is to defend the geographic boundaries of our motherland against any aggression particularly from India. That includes getting the occupied state of J&K liberated from illegal Indian occupation. I dont know if any realistically workable/achievable plan was ever made by any of our previous army chiefs for achieving that goal. Going by our past 75 years history, it apparently seems that our military strategy is re-active in its nature. We mainly focus on countering the aggressive Indians moves without having a plan for how to pro-actively and pre-emptively act for not only foiling Indian moves but also, and rather more importantly, exploiting (and creating whenever possible) opportunities to advance our goal of liberating Indian occupied J&K.
We need to admit that Indians (regardless whoever is running the government) seem to follow a well thought-out, coherent, and consistent policy of striking Pakistan at any and every opportunity that comes their way. Our recent history (post 1947) is indeed indicative of the fact that Indians committed aggression against Pakistan only when Pak military gets embroiled in domestic political crisis (mostly self-made) and examples of that being the Indian occupation of Rann of Kutch in mid-1965, attack on Lahore in the darkness of night on September 1965, attack on East Pakistan in 1971, Siachen occupation in 1984, etc.
Given that background, if we have a curious look at the events of Feb 2019 (Indian aggression just out of the blue) and August 2019 (illegal Indian annexation of occupied territory of J&K in defiance of related UN resolutions), we can clearly see all the required elements were indeed present inviting the Indian aggression.
For last ten or so years, many of our generals seem to be engaged more in domestic affairs (installing/removing governments, minting new idols for us emotional Pakistanis to worship, and demolishing previously made ones) with unparalleled focus. The goal of getting Indian occupied J&K liberated was apparently put on the back burner if not abandoned totally. More than that Indians could also see how much a disaster the IK government proved to be for Pakistan at both the domestic and diplomatic fronts.
With Pakistans military deeply and fully pre-occupied with its apparently favorite game, i.e. playing domestic politics, and diplomatic disaster that Pakistan found itself in then under Imran Khans idiotic leadership, why Indians would wait for any other more opportune time? And for what? So, by targeting a non-disputed area deep inside Pakistan proper with a number of smart bombs was not a small feat that Indians tried to achieve. They were probably sure that Pakistans military wouldn't be in a position to militarily respond to the Indian aggression. If at all, Pakistan would only resort to diplomatic hue and cry and wouldnt be able to achieve much after the Imran Khan government had already disgruntled two of Pakistans closest allies, namely China and Saudi Arabia. Indians probably had already ensured, through their diplomatic juggling, that any unrest at the diplomatic front remains only up to a certain desired level. Specifically, Indians wanted to involve international community to some level but not so much that would divert the world focus onto the root cause of all that animosity, i.e. the dispute of illegally Indian occupied J&K. This attack by IAF on Pakistan proper, it seems, was meant to intimidate Pakistan and to gauge Pakistans probable military response to a subsequent strategic Indian move. A weak response from Pakistan side, however, came in as Operation Swift Retort launched next day that surprised Indians and sent shockwaves through diplomatic world but for no gain for Pakistan.
That world communitys engagement up to a desired level was a pre-requisite for next Indian move that came in on 5 August 2019 when India annexed Indian occupied state of J&K. That annexation was clearly in violation of related UN resolutions, and all bilateral and international agreements that Indians had signed in the past. What options Pakistan had to respond to a clearly illegal Indian action? Diplomacy? With Gen. Bajwa, ever busy to clear the diplomatic mess repeatedly created by Imran Khan, IKs government was incapable of doing much to counter/undo the Indian move. A military action? Not possible. Our military under the command of Gen. Bajwa, with internal grouping and fragmentation, was deeply involved in domestic political brinkmanship and absolutely in no position of launching any military action against India. With world community already sick and tired with bickering of two atomic powers (the latest episode being in Feb. 2019), atmosphere was not conducive for any military adventure on Pakistans part. But most crucial factor was of our own making. We foolishly exposed our scare and cowardice by not raising the price for Indians for their naked aggression against Pakistan in Feb. 2019. Pakistan had the capability and a full chance of shooting down at least quite a few of Indian war planes during Operation Swift Retort. That would have called Indias bluff and disappoint Indians for quite some time. Had that happened, they would have certainly had second thoughts about their annexation of Indian occupied J&K. But that coward policy of utmost restraint, known as Bajwa doctrine, was trumpeted as a great success and an icon of wisdom at that time. How could the world community allow us raise the ante in August 2019 after we showed utmost restraint when we were actually attacked by Indians only a few months ago?
It seems that either we really have no plans for exploiting any opportunity that comes our way (towards ultimately liberating the Indian occupied state of J&K) or, if we have one, it is utterly unrealistic that gets no chance of execution (that would be at least visible to us Pakistanis). After foolishly missing a golden opportunity to push Indians back in 1962, we sadly have apparently missed another one during the recent Galwan crisis between China and India.
Indians, on the other hand, seem to be following and advancing a well-articulated plan slowly bit-by-bit but steadily and consistently across many Indian governments. Their every step or move, in fact, is the next in line according to their plan. They always move to the next step whenever they find an opportune time because of either our mistakes/failures or their ability to create one.
We, as a nation, are very unfortunate that we havent had any visionary army chief. It is worth pondering on how many of our previous army chiefs were desiring and struggling to get an extension in their tenure and, in many cases, resorting to destabilizing actions, to say the minimum, to realize that selfish desire. Was it the lust of power that forced them to seek an extension? Was it the greed of perks and privileges that never got quenched? Or was it a genuinely grave situation that indeed required a continuity of the command? I honestly feel that the root cause was a failure on their part in setting a set of realistic professional and national goals at the start of their tenure. Most of our army chiefs were wandering around aimlessly or for petty goals (mostly revolving around domestic politics) and towards the end of three years, a chief would find himself without any worth mentioning achievement. He would then think if I get one, two, or three additional years, I would be able to do this and that and still retiring with the same zero-achievement even at the end of extended tenure. No wonders most of our army chiefs were found running behind personal goals rather than making any serious (and visible) effort towards a national goal (which was apparently never set in any case, it seems).
An ideal army chief for Pakistan (and lets hope Gen. Asim Munir proves to be one) would start with chalking out a realistic plan, with all its details, scenarios, actions, means, resources, etc.) aimed at achieving our long term national goals. These goals, of course, include safeguarding our territorial integrity at any price and foiling enemy attempts to harm Pakistan (through, for example, espionage, sabotage, etc.) As mentioned earlier, it includes liberating the state of J&K from illegal Indian occupation too. That master plan, if I could call it, may not be fully achievable in a single army chiefs tenure. But every army chief would follow it consistently and steadily and at the end of three-year tenure, every army chief would have something to give him a pride and internal satisfaction for (and being content with) whatever he was able to contribute, regardless how minute that contribution could be, towards achieving the national goals exactly according to the oath that he took. The next army chief then resumes the work at the same point in the plan where the previous chief stopped No one can then really abuse a retiring army chief by calling him Mir Jafar.
