pakistani342
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Professor Weinbaum is a giant. His prescription(s) must be sound. However, one must wonder if his prescriptions are akin to advising moderation to a habitual glutton.
Professor Weinbaum's prescriptions have been offered, as he aptly states for the past 12 years, to Pakistan and Afghanistan -- however they have found no takers. One would think that this will result in a search for out of the box ideas, or at least a search for an understanding or a restatement of the underlying problem in a manner which at the very least leads to a satisfactory understanding on why his prescriptions have failed or found no takers.
For example, the medical profession which is a bastion of conservative thought (and thus moves at a snail's pace) has to its credit come up with "gastric band" for patients who, well, cannot say no to the gravy. It is time that the the Vulcans of foreign policy try to devise similarly imaginative cures -- with special emphasis being on *similarly*; for example the balkanization of Pakistan and/or Afghanistan would probably not fit the bill -- similarly, solving Kashmir to solve Afghanistan/Pakistan might be suitable only in some parallel universe.
Stephen Cohen has correctly pointed out the dominance of the "if" word in discourse related to Pakistan: "if Pakistan this" or "if Pakistan that" or "just if Pakistan fill in the blank". A realistic measure of the Pakistani state's "if power" is the fact that in the last two decades, successive administrations (both civilian and military) have not been able to broaden Pakistan's tax base. Yet, pundits of all cast and creed find it a perfectly productive use of their energies to ask Pakistan to "take a chance on Afghanistan and its people" - two entities who have been consistently hostile and ungrateful to the Pakistani state and Pakistani people.
It is worth noting that the Pakistani people do remember, even if Professor Weinbaum does not, that:
a. Afghanistan was the only state to oppose the entry of Pakistan into the United Nations in 1947
b. Afghanistan lent support to Pashtun separates long before Pakistan responded in kind
c. Afghanistan lent support to Baluch separates long before Pakistan responded in kind
d. Afghanistan sent troops to invade the tribal areas of Pakistan long before Pakistani malfeasance in Afghanistan
e. Afghans, through the breadth and depth of their society have racist attitudes towards Pakistanis (there is no reciprocal equivalent in Pakistani society -- a quick sampling on social media will turn up sufficient evidence)
f. Even the purported Pakistani proxies, the Afghan Taliban refused to recognize the Durand line
Mullah Zaeef, the Afghan Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan had this to say about Pakistanis (quote from his Memoir): "Pakistanis can get milk even from a bull. They have two tongues in one mouth, and two faces on one head ..."
g. This Afghan hostility towards Pakistanis exists today despite the Pakistani people hosting the Afghans in their home for 30 years -- hosting at one point, in excess of six million Afghans (roughly 1 in 4 Afghans at one point in time) and despite some imagined common affinities that Professor Weinbaum cites
h. Over 50,000 Afghans cross into Pakistan daily at two border posts however Pakistanis cannot easily get visas to Afghanistan, have difficulty setting up businesses and as several Indian authors have quipped: have to pretend to be Indians to escape harassment
i. A significant percentage of the Pakistanis who languish in Afghan jails on (get this): visa violations -- yet there are close to 3 million Afghans still in Pakistan who live, work, study and set up businesses
I suspect the Pakistani people understand better than Professor Weinbaum that Afghans have proven hostile to the Pakistani people, time and again and it is for good reason that the Pakistanis are reluctant to take the plunge down newer rabbit holes.
It might behoove the International community to think of solutions to the Afghan/Pakistan quagmire that have a chance at success despite the following invariants:
1. The Pakistani deep state will not change its Afghan posture in the near term (next decade)
2. The upcoming Presidential elections in Afghanistan will be no more legitimate than the last elections
3. The Pakistani Army which is a relatively well disciplined and equipped force has not been able to defeat the Pakistani Taliban - The Afghan security forces will fare proportionally poorly - given that they are poorly motivated, equipped, trained, wracked with drug addiction
4. Afghans will continue to be hostile to Pakistan and Pakistanis in the near term (next generation or two)
5. The effects of the failure of the Pakistani state will be commensurate with her size: a population of 180 million, a nuclear arsenal of 100 weapons
6. The effects of the failure of the Afghan state will also be commensurate with her size: a population of 30 million and not much else.
original article here, excerpts below:
...
No country aside from Afghanistan has more to lose than Pakistan from the coming departure of international forces. All post-2014 scenarios seem dark for Pakistan should the challenged Afghan state begin to unravel. In a protracted civil war, a reluctant Pakistan stands a good chance of being drawn into the conflict along with other regional powers. Taliban gains leading to a radical Islamic regime in all or most of Afghanistan, while once welcomed by Pakistan, may now result in empowering Pakistan's own militant extremists. Intensified fighting across the border is certain to push millions of new refugees into a Pakistan unprepared and unwilling to absorb them. Prospects that a successfully negotiated political agreement might some time soon avert these outcomes seem dim.
...
And yet, Pakistan does have one policy option that can result in a brighter scenario for itself and its Afghan neighbor. ... Pakistan of its long-term national security interests, recognizing that they are best served when there is a stable, peaceful, prospering and, yes, independent Afghanistan. ...
...
.... Almost regardless of their political disposition, Afghans view their neighbor as overbearing and covetous, blaming it for much of the country's problems. Building trust is bound to be a slow process.
... But Pakistan has advantages that come with geographical proximity, overlapping cultural and ethnic affinities, and established economic ties. It also has a relative abundance of human capital available with which to help strengthen the Afghan state.
...
To begin, Pakistan could agree to open the long denied trans-country routes that block India's trade with Afghanistan. Afghanistan's critical dependence on road links to the port of Karachi could be better secured and border impediments removed. Existing training programs in Pakistan for Afghan civil servants could be greatly expanded. Pakistan can do more to allay Afghans' beliefs that it is obstructing a peace deal with the Taliban and assure them that it has no plans to divide Afghan territory ethnically. Pakistan can also help secure Afghan presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled in 2014 and 2015, respectively, by using its not inconsiderable influence to limit Taliban interference. It could also place additional troops at the border to reduce infiltration, much as it did during elections in 2004 and 2005. Although largely symbolic, Pakistan might even propose a non-aggression pact. But all these trust-building actions would pale against a decision by Pakistan to withdraw its patronage of the Afghan Taliban. Simply put, it must be willing to evict, if not arrest, Afghan Taliban fighters and their leaders on its soil.
...
Admittedly this will be hard. It will incur risks for Pakistan, particularly inviting a backlash not just from Afghan Taliban in the country, but also from their Pakistani allies. Afghans may be driven into open alliance with Pakistani insurgents and other extremist groups against the state. Yet this is a fight that Pakistan must eventually undertake. It cannot continue trying to differentiate between good and bad militants and expect the country's endemic violence to end. Delay has only made the task more difficult. If there is to be a reckoning, Pakistan may find that dismantling the Afghan Taliban offers a less difficult first step toward eliminating all of the militant groups that are currently or will inevitably be challenging the Pakistani state.
....
Pakistan has much to gain from a strategic reappraisal. Aside from possibly avoiding an Afghan civil war and its consequences, Pakistan could expect to enlist Afghan efforts to deny Pakistan's Taliban insurgents the safe haven they have found across the border. Pakistan could feel confident that the Baloch rebellion is not being fueled from the Afghan side of the border and that India does not overplay its hand once NATO forces leave. More broadly, Pakistan should have less reason to fear India's role in Afghanistan. A stabilized, secure Afghanistan would find it unnecessary to look to India to provide a counterweight to Pakistan or worry Pakistan by maintaining an oversized army.
....
Building confidence between the two countries could also perhaps permanently defuse their long-standing dispute over the Durand Line that separates them. With improved security in Afghanistan, new life could be breathed into plans to construct a gas pipeline from the fields in Turkmenistan. A growing Afghan economy would open up new markets for Pakistani goods and services and improve opportunities for investment. And Pakistan's dreams of using Afghanistan as a road bridge to Central Asia to extend its commerce and political influence might finally become a reality.
Without reciprocating Afghan policies, friendly overtures by Pakistan cannot be sustained. But it is Pakistan's initiatives that will drive any embrace. More than any external power, its actions will determine whether the present Afghan state can succeed against the current odds. And through assisting its struggling neighbor, Pakistan may help secure its own future.
....
Professor Weinbaum's prescriptions have been offered, as he aptly states for the past 12 years, to Pakistan and Afghanistan -- however they have found no takers. One would think that this will result in a search for out of the box ideas, or at least a search for an understanding or a restatement of the underlying problem in a manner which at the very least leads to a satisfactory understanding on why his prescriptions have failed or found no takers.
For example, the medical profession which is a bastion of conservative thought (and thus moves at a snail's pace) has to its credit come up with "gastric band" for patients who, well, cannot say no to the gravy. It is time that the the Vulcans of foreign policy try to devise similarly imaginative cures -- with special emphasis being on *similarly*; for example the balkanization of Pakistan and/or Afghanistan would probably not fit the bill -- similarly, solving Kashmir to solve Afghanistan/Pakistan might be suitable only in some parallel universe.
Stephen Cohen has correctly pointed out the dominance of the "if" word in discourse related to Pakistan: "if Pakistan this" or "if Pakistan that" or "just if Pakistan fill in the blank". A realistic measure of the Pakistani state's "if power" is the fact that in the last two decades, successive administrations (both civilian and military) have not been able to broaden Pakistan's tax base. Yet, pundits of all cast and creed find it a perfectly productive use of their energies to ask Pakistan to "take a chance on Afghanistan and its people" - two entities who have been consistently hostile and ungrateful to the Pakistani state and Pakistani people.
It is worth noting that the Pakistani people do remember, even if Professor Weinbaum does not, that:
a. Afghanistan was the only state to oppose the entry of Pakistan into the United Nations in 1947
b. Afghanistan lent support to Pashtun separates long before Pakistan responded in kind
c. Afghanistan lent support to Baluch separates long before Pakistan responded in kind
d. Afghanistan sent troops to invade the tribal areas of Pakistan long before Pakistani malfeasance in Afghanistan
e. Afghans, through the breadth and depth of their society have racist attitudes towards Pakistanis (there is no reciprocal equivalent in Pakistani society -- a quick sampling on social media will turn up sufficient evidence)
f. Even the purported Pakistani proxies, the Afghan Taliban refused to recognize the Durand line
Mullah Zaeef, the Afghan Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan had this to say about Pakistanis (quote from his Memoir): "Pakistanis can get milk even from a bull. They have two tongues in one mouth, and two faces on one head ..."
g. This Afghan hostility towards Pakistanis exists today despite the Pakistani people hosting the Afghans in their home for 30 years -- hosting at one point, in excess of six million Afghans (roughly 1 in 4 Afghans at one point in time) and despite some imagined common affinities that Professor Weinbaum cites
h. Over 50,000 Afghans cross into Pakistan daily at two border posts however Pakistanis cannot easily get visas to Afghanistan, have difficulty setting up businesses and as several Indian authors have quipped: have to pretend to be Indians to escape harassment
i. A significant percentage of the Pakistanis who languish in Afghan jails on (get this): visa violations -- yet there are close to 3 million Afghans still in Pakistan who live, work, study and set up businesses
I suspect the Pakistani people understand better than Professor Weinbaum that Afghans have proven hostile to the Pakistani people, time and again and it is for good reason that the Pakistanis are reluctant to take the plunge down newer rabbit holes.
It might behoove the International community to think of solutions to the Afghan/Pakistan quagmire that have a chance at success despite the following invariants:
1. The Pakistani deep state will not change its Afghan posture in the near term (next decade)
2. The upcoming Presidential elections in Afghanistan will be no more legitimate than the last elections
3. The Pakistani Army which is a relatively well disciplined and equipped force has not been able to defeat the Pakistani Taliban - The Afghan security forces will fare proportionally poorly - given that they are poorly motivated, equipped, trained, wracked with drug addiction
4. Afghans will continue to be hostile to Pakistan and Pakistanis in the near term (next generation or two)
5. The effects of the failure of the Pakistani state will be commensurate with her size: a population of 180 million, a nuclear arsenal of 100 weapons
6. The effects of the failure of the Afghan state will also be commensurate with her size: a population of 30 million and not much else.
original article here, excerpts below:
...
No country aside from Afghanistan has more to lose than Pakistan from the coming departure of international forces. All post-2014 scenarios seem dark for Pakistan should the challenged Afghan state begin to unravel. In a protracted civil war, a reluctant Pakistan stands a good chance of being drawn into the conflict along with other regional powers. Taliban gains leading to a radical Islamic regime in all or most of Afghanistan, while once welcomed by Pakistan, may now result in empowering Pakistan's own militant extremists. Intensified fighting across the border is certain to push millions of new refugees into a Pakistan unprepared and unwilling to absorb them. Prospects that a successfully negotiated political agreement might some time soon avert these outcomes seem dim.
...
And yet, Pakistan does have one policy option that can result in a brighter scenario for itself and its Afghan neighbor. ... Pakistan of its long-term national security interests, recognizing that they are best served when there is a stable, peaceful, prospering and, yes, independent Afghanistan. ...
...
.... Almost regardless of their political disposition, Afghans view their neighbor as overbearing and covetous, blaming it for much of the country's problems. Building trust is bound to be a slow process.
... But Pakistan has advantages that come with geographical proximity, overlapping cultural and ethnic affinities, and established economic ties. It also has a relative abundance of human capital available with which to help strengthen the Afghan state.
...
To begin, Pakistan could agree to open the long denied trans-country routes that block India's trade with Afghanistan. Afghanistan's critical dependence on road links to the port of Karachi could be better secured and border impediments removed. Existing training programs in Pakistan for Afghan civil servants could be greatly expanded. Pakistan can do more to allay Afghans' beliefs that it is obstructing a peace deal with the Taliban and assure them that it has no plans to divide Afghan territory ethnically. Pakistan can also help secure Afghan presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled in 2014 and 2015, respectively, by using its not inconsiderable influence to limit Taliban interference. It could also place additional troops at the border to reduce infiltration, much as it did during elections in 2004 and 2005. Although largely symbolic, Pakistan might even propose a non-aggression pact. But all these trust-building actions would pale against a decision by Pakistan to withdraw its patronage of the Afghan Taliban. Simply put, it must be willing to evict, if not arrest, Afghan Taliban fighters and their leaders on its soil.
...
Admittedly this will be hard. It will incur risks for Pakistan, particularly inviting a backlash not just from Afghan Taliban in the country, but also from their Pakistani allies. Afghans may be driven into open alliance with Pakistani insurgents and other extremist groups against the state. Yet this is a fight that Pakistan must eventually undertake. It cannot continue trying to differentiate between good and bad militants and expect the country's endemic violence to end. Delay has only made the task more difficult. If there is to be a reckoning, Pakistan may find that dismantling the Afghan Taliban offers a less difficult first step toward eliminating all of the militant groups that are currently or will inevitably be challenging the Pakistani state.
....
Pakistan has much to gain from a strategic reappraisal. Aside from possibly avoiding an Afghan civil war and its consequences, Pakistan could expect to enlist Afghan efforts to deny Pakistan's Taliban insurgents the safe haven they have found across the border. Pakistan could feel confident that the Baloch rebellion is not being fueled from the Afghan side of the border and that India does not overplay its hand once NATO forces leave. More broadly, Pakistan should have less reason to fear India's role in Afghanistan. A stabilized, secure Afghanistan would find it unnecessary to look to India to provide a counterweight to Pakistan or worry Pakistan by maintaining an oversized army.
....
Building confidence between the two countries could also perhaps permanently defuse their long-standing dispute over the Durand Line that separates them. With improved security in Afghanistan, new life could be breathed into plans to construct a gas pipeline from the fields in Turkmenistan. A growing Afghan economy would open up new markets for Pakistani goods and services and improve opportunities for investment. And Pakistan's dreams of using Afghanistan as a road bridge to Central Asia to extend its commerce and political influence might finally become a reality.
Without reciprocating Afghan policies, friendly overtures by Pakistan cannot be sustained. But it is Pakistan's initiatives that will drive any embrace. More than any external power, its actions will determine whether the present Afghan state can succeed against the current odds. And through assisting its struggling neighbor, Pakistan may help secure its own future.
....
