Experimental Stealthy LCA MK-1?

[SR-91]

Longtime Critic of LCA-Tejas program former Professor of IIT Kanpur Prodyut das in his latest report has made a case to develop Experimental Stealthy LCA MK-1 airframe for research purpose prior to commencement of India’s AMCA Stealth project.

Report prepared by das suggest converting the last six airframes to an LCA Stealth model incorporating the stealth features. six airframes can be built to an “experimental” rather than a “combat” standard to be used for testing Stealth coating currently been developed for AMCA Project.

since it will Experimental airframes then internal weapons bay need not be capable of handling all the weapons planned for use or the stress levels need not go to 9 g etc. The idea is to give everyone –designers, planners, operators much needed “hands on” stealth experience. Because the aircraft is based on a “proven” design a first flight by early 2018 and completion of field testing by early 2020 is expected particularly given the confident enthusiasm being proclaimed for the AMCA project.

These aircraft according to him will explore the following:

i) Stealth effectiveness
ii) Stealth maintainability, particularly in humid and dusty conditions
iii) Manufacturing and airframe ageing effects on stealth deterioration.
iv) Problems of stealth in LLXC profiles.

According to das Since only three countries are in stealth technology it would be arrogant to presume Indian scientist “know stealth”. to make a case for Experimental Stealthy LCA MK-1 he shows a sketch for the possible adaptation of the LCA Mk1 to an LCA Stealth Research Vehicle.

According to his research changes to the fuselage will allow some of the problems mentioned above show up in actual conditions. Similarly should be the approach to developing Sensor fusion. Sensor fusion has applicability even in ordinary strike sorties and so has priority over supercruise. The capability can be developed using a flight of Embraer145s or Dornier228s. These are roomy aircraft and will allow much space for a “breadboard” approach and will confirm the technology and its bugs before final packaging.

CABS and team would be an obvious resource given the work they have turned in on the Embraer AWACS. The obvious advantages of using a proven platform are that the testing is not held up whilst the platform itself is getting rid of its sinuses as happened with the LCA.

Experimental Stealthy LCA MK-1? | idrw.org

 

[al_asad_al_mulk]

Warplanes: India And The Tejas Tragedy
April 30, 2013: Despite enormous political pressure in India to get the locally made LCA (Light Combat Aircraft or "Tejas") jet fighter into production, the government has quietly delayed that for at least two more years. Production was supposed to begin at the end of 2012, but the number of technical problems with the LCA was too great to clear up in time for production to start then. Many essential electronic items are not functioning properly or reliably. The prototypes that are flying are maintenance nightmares, and after each test flight it takes several days to get the aircraft in shape to fly again. The managers of this government financed project tried to keep the problems quiet while they were quickly and quietly fixed but failed at both these tasks.

This was not the first major failure for the LCA. Earlier this year India admitted defeat and dropped plans to use the locally developed Kaveri engine in the LCA. After 24 years and over $600 million the Kaveri was unable to achieve the necessary performance or reliability goals required. The government plans to see if the Kaveri can be used in a combat UAV that is being developed locally but that aircraft is not expected to fly for another five years or more.

The LCA developers saw this coming and several years ago ordered 99 American F414 jet engines for $8.1 million each. These were to be used for the first LCAs being mass produced. At that point it was still believed that eventually most of the LCAs were to be powered by the Kaveri engine, which has been in development hell for over two decades. The F414s were to substitute only until the Kaveri was ready.

The failure of the Kaveri project is just one of many examples of how the Indian defense procurement bureaucracy misfires. Efforts to fix the mess even led to calling in foreign experts (from the U.S., Israel, and other Western nations). For example, three years ago India made arrangements with French engine manufacturer Snecma to provide technical assistance for the Kaveri design and manufacturing problems. Critics in the Indian air force asserted that help from Snecma would not save the ill-fated Kaveri program. But the government apparently believed that it was necessary for India to acquire the ability to design and build world class jet engines, whatever the cost. Only a few nations can do this and India wants to be one of them, soon, no matter what obstacles are encountered. Despite decades of effort, the Kaveri never quite made it to mass production. Now the government will continue funding development of jet engine design and manufacturing capability, but with some unspecified changes.

There is much to be learned from the Kaveri debacle. When work began on the Kaveri, in the mid-1980s, it was believed that the LCA would be ready for flight testing by 1990. A long list of technical delays put off that first flight until 2001. Corners had to be cut to make this happen, for the LCA was originally designed to use the Indian built Kaveri engine and the engine was never ready.

For all this, India only plans to buy 200-300 LCAs, mainly to replace its aging MiG-21s, plus more if the navy finds the LCA works on carriers. Export prospects are dim, given all the competition out there (especially for cheap, second-hand F-16s). The delays have led the air force to look around for a hundred or so new aircraft (or even used F-16s) to fill the gap between elderly MiG-21s falling apart and the arrival of the new LCAs. However, two decades down the road the replacement for the LCA will probably be a more competitive and timely aircraft.
Warplanes: India And The Tejas Tragedy



Government Auditor Faults Tejas Light Combat Aircraft Project, Says it Fails to Meet Air Force's Needs
NEW DELHI: India's Tejas Light Combat Aircraft project, in the works for over three decades, came under severe criticism from the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) on Friday, which said the Mark-I version has several shortcomings and does not meet IAF specifications.

Not only that, Indian Air Force (IAF) would be "constrained" to induct the fighter LCA without availability of a trainer model, thereby "adversely impacting pilot training", the audit body said in a report tabled in Parliament.


The CAG noted that it was due to the delay in the manufacture and supply of LCA that IAF had to go for alternative temporary measures such as upgrading its MIG BIS, MiG-29, Jaguar, and Mirage aircraft at a cost of Rs. 20,037 crore and revise the phasing out of MiG-21s.

Listing the shortcomings, the CAG said that the LCA Mark-I fails to meet the electronic warfare capabilities sought by IAF as the Self-Protection Jammer could not be fitted on the aircraft due to space constraints.

Also, it said that the Radar Warning Receiver/Counter Measure Dispensing System fitted on the aircraft had raised performance concerns which are yet to be overcome (January 2015).

The LCA Mark-I, which got Initial Operational Clearance in December, 2013, significantly falls short (20 permanent waivers/33 temporary concessions) in meeting the Air Staff Requirement (ASR), the CAG said, adding that that has led to reduced operational capabilities and survivability and, consequently, its operational employability.

It added that the shortcomings in the Mark-I (increased weight, reduced internal fuel capacity, non-compliance of fuel system protection, pilot protection from front, reduced speed) are expected to be overcome in the Mark-II model.

"LCA Mark-I does not meet the ASR. The deficiencies are now expected to be met in LCA Mark-II by December 2018," the CAG said.

While DRDO has always showcased LCA, christened Tejas, as an indigenously-developed aircraft and the indigenous content of the LCA was estimated by ADA to be 70 per cent, the CAG said it "actually worked out to about 35 per cent" as of January this year.

Systems such as Kaveri engine, Multi-Mode Radar, Radome, Multi-Functional Display System and Flight Control System Actuators taken up for indigenous development could not be developed successfully, resulting in LCA's continued dependence on the import of these systems, CAG said.

IAF had proposed in the early 1980s that a new aircraft be developed to replace the MiG-21 fleet, manufactured during 1966 and 1987, after its phasing out in the 1990s.

The project for indigenous design and development of LCA was sanctioned in 1983 at a cost of Rs. 560 crore, which was enhanced from time to time up to Rs. 10,397.11 crore.

The government in June, 1984, constituted an Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) as a dedicated institution for the management of the LCA project.

IAF had issued Air Staff Requirement (ASR) in October, 1985, envisaging a light-weight multi-mission fighter with contemporary air combat and offensive air support capabilities and excellent manoeuvrability for close air combat at low and medium altitudes.

The projected requirement was for 220 Light Combat Aircraft (200 Fighters, 20 trainers) to be inducted by 1994.

However, LCA could only achieve Initial Operational Clearance in December, 2013, as against the earlier scheduled date of December, 2005.

The Full Operational Clearance (FOC), which was scheduled to be completed by December, 2008, is now slated to be achieved by December this year although experts said even that could be delayed.

The CAG added that ADA's decision regarding the advance building of two prototypes from Full-Scale Engineering Development (FSED) Phase-II to FSED Phase-I so as to utilise its savings on the grounds of accelerating the development process of LCA had failed to yield the desired results.

This, the report said, was because preponed prototypes were deficient in terms of critical onboard systems (Multi- Mode Radar, Self-Protection Jammer, Radar Warning Receiver) and led to ADA using the Limited Series Production (LSP) aircraft (meant for IAF use) towards flight testing/evaluation of these critical on board systems.

"This was in contravention of the Cabinet approval (November, 2001) for phased development of the prototypes in FSED Phase-II after Technical Demonstrators had been built and flight tested for 210 hours," CAG said.

Talking about lack of trainer aircraft, the audit body said that IAF was in the interim using an upgraded Full Mission Simulator (FMS) at ADA for pilot training, pending supply of an FMS by HAL at the LCA operating base.

It said that the long gestation period led to a change of weapon systems on LCA, necessitating the acquisition of new ones.

"That led to design changes on the aircraft, coupled with delay in integrating R-73E missile with Multi-Mode Radar/ Helmet Mounted Display and Sight. Delayed identification (December, 2009) of Beyond Visual Range Missiles also contributed to the delays in achieving IOC/FOC by LCA," the report said.
Government Auditor Faults Tejas Light Combat Aircraft Project, Says it Fails to Meet Air Force's Needs

Rs 1,500 cr more for combat aircraft Tejas as HAL fails to meet targets
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has allocated an additional Rs 1,500 crore to the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme, boosting its projected Rs 14,047 crore budget. The additional amount will be spent on a production line for Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) to build 20 fighters that Indian Air Force (IAF) has ordered for its first Tejas squadron. The IAF has also promised another order for 20 more Tejas for its second squadron. Once the improved Mark II Tejas is developed, the IAF will field 6-7 Tejas squadrons (120-140 fighters).

This need for additional money arises from the inability of HAL, a public sector aerospace monopoly, to establish a production line that can build at least eight Tejas fighters a year. The production line that HAL set up two years ago on the priceless real estate that it holds in the heart of Bangalore has not yet produced a single Tejas fighter.

Briefing Business Standard the Director of the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), P Subramanyam, who runs the LCA programme, explains that nobody realised that setting up a production line was a technology by itself. So far, ADA and HAL have built only prototypes and limited-series Tejas aircraft, producing individual parts one-by-one like a tailor making a suit. When HAL graduated to a standardised production line, it encountered serious difficulties.

“ADA and HAL have realised that creating a production line needs major effort… That realisation has come,” says Subramanyam.

So serious are the difficulties that ADA and HAL approached foreign aircraft manufacturers last year — including Eurofighter GmbH, which builds the Typhoon. The proposal to appoint a foreign consultant for the Tejas production line remains alive in the MoD.

Senior IAF officers express frustration that HAL has failed to set up a Tejas assembly line, though its primary activity for the preceding decades has been to build foreign aircraft on an assembly line under licence.

Air Marshal Pranab K Barbora, who retired as the IAF vice-chief two years ago, summarises the Air Force’s viewpoint: “HAL’s assembly line expertise is outdated by at least three decades. They have done nothing to upgrade their technology. Setting up a modern assembly line for the Tejas is far beyond HAL’s capabilities.”

Barbora says this is why the IAF lobbied hard to post a serving air marshal as HAL chief. Instead, the MoD appointed RK Tyagi, who has no experience in aeronautical development or manufacture.

Contacted repeatedly for comments, Tyagi did not respond to the calls.

ADA is defending HAL, with Subramanyam insisting that HAL would build the first 20 Tejas within two-and-a-half to three years. By then the fighter would have obtained final operational clearance (FOC) in its flight-testing programme and production can begin of the next 20 Tejas (which must be built to FOC standards).

This, says Subramanyam, will take another two-and-a-half years, i.e., be completed in 2018. By then, the Tejas Mark II will be tested and ready, and can enter series production.

What the ADA chief does not explain is: How will HAL, which cannot yet build even two Tejas fighters per year, build 20 fighters over the next three years?

The annual general meeting on Friday of ADA (which is a registered society under the MoD) was also clouded by delays in flight-testing, which Business Standard has reported, will delay the initial operational clearance (IOC) of the Tejas until mid-2013 at the earliest.

For the IAF, which contemplates dangerously depleted squadron numbers, the big question is: When will the first two Tejas squadrons become operational?

Going by the lack of energy in HAL — which is struggling to build the last two limited series fighters and the first two series production Tejas — the IAF might have a longer wait than it is comfortable with.
Rs 1,500 cr more for combat aircraft Tejas as HAL fails to meet targets | Business Standard News

 

[halupridol]

Last chance aircraft

 

[Indian Patriot]

Stealth LCA, ROFLOL!!!

 

[hunter_hunted]

It is already a stealth aircraft. No modification required .......

 

[IND151]

It is already a stealth aircraft. No modification required .......

Joking right?

On Topic- such experiment should be conducted............

 

[GURU DUTT]

It is already a stealth aircraft. No modification required .......

thats right just like any PAF trained pilot sitting even in a F-7 or MirageIII can defete any IAF pilot is MKI, M2K , Mig29 or even Rafale even if IAF has 3:1 superiority in numbers

 

[Indian Patriot]

Joking right?

On Topic- such experiment should be conducted............

He is not joking. LCA is so much stealth that it is already invisible in the skies, it is invisible because that f**** piece of sh1t cannot fly in combat time.

Thanks to DRDO and PSU bhakts in PDF and real life India will keep producing such MONUMENTAL failures like INSAS, Pinaka, Arjun, LCA etc.

 

[Srinivas]

Tejas has the right kind of airframe and other features to make it a stealthy one !

 

[Indian Patriot]

Tejas has the right kind of airframe and other features to make it a stealthy one !

 

[Srinivas]

Tejas use high percentage of com[posites, add the technology gained by PAK-FA and the technologies being developed for AMCA.

India will get a potent stealth interceptor which will give a big challenge to the other airforces in this region.

 

[Kompromat]

It will require a COMPLETE redesign.

 

[Argon Prime]

It will require a COMPLETE redesign.

At last a sensible post.I'm quite surprised though,that it came from a guy who,just the other day, was propagating to slaughter Indian civilians on an industrial scale!!

 

[Peaceful Civilian]

It will require a COMPLETE redesign.

I already mentioned them in few posts. They should Start it from scratch. But it will take many years and IAF don't have time for LCA for such redesign of light aircraft.
They should continue to import the fighters, they have money. Hence no issue as long as it give extra teeth and big punch against opponents.

 

[Kompromat]

That is a given, that is what enemies do.

At last a sensible post.I'm quite surprised though,that it came from a guy who,just the other day, was propagating to slaughter Indian civilians on an industrial scale!!