Empty Boasts Aside the West Has No Real Defense Against Russia's Doomsday Torpedo

[TaiShang]

Empty Boasts Aside the West Has No Real Defense Against Russia's Doomsday Torpedo

It would be like looking for a needle in the haystack -- and even if it is detected near the coast by this time it will have sped up to high velocity at which counter-torpedos wouldn't be able to catch up

Mikhail Khodarenok
US and British navies could counter Russia’s nuclear-powered autonomous torpedo, Poseidon, by using undersea sensors and anti-submarine aircraft, writes Covert Shores website. But is this really a viable tactic?

The development of the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), originally known as ‘Status-6’, was first mentioned in November 2015. Western media later dubbed the submarine drone a doomsday weapon.

On March 1, 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin officially confirmed the weapon’s existence in his annual address to the Federal Assembly.

“We have developed unmanned submersible vehicles that can move at great depths – I would say extreme depths – intercontinentally, at a speed multiple times higher than the speed of submarines, cutting-edge torpedoes and all kinds of surface vessels,” said Putin.

It is reported that the main goal of the torpedo is to deliver a thermonuclear warhead to enemy shores in order to destroy important coastal infrastructure and industrial objects, as well as ensure massive damage to the enemy’s territory by subjecting vast areas to radioactive tsunamis and other devastating consequences of a nuclear explosion.

New up to date mega article on #Russia Poseidon (Status-6 / Skif / KANYON) Intercontinental Nuclear-Powered Nuclear-Armed Autonomous Torpedo. https://t.co/aY5qi8dA6g illustration with person for scale: pic.twitter.com/JnTTjRrWEj

— H I Sutton (@CovertShores)
July 24, 2018


Another potential use for the Poseidon torpedo is to strike US aircraft carrier battle groups.

On December 8, 2016, US intelligence reported that, on November 27, Russia had conducted a test of a nuclear-powered UUV, launched from a B-90 Sarov-class submarine. In February, the Pentagon officially added Status-6 to Russia’s nuclear triad by mentioning it in the US Nuclear Posture Review.

At present, the technical specifications of Poseidon torpedoes are classified information. So far, it is known that the UUV is over 19 meters in length and almost two meters in width. Earlier, it was assumed that Poseidon would be equipped with a 100-megaton thermonuclear warhead that could obliterate entire coastal cities and cause destruction further inland, triggering tsunamis laden with radioactive fallout.

However, according to the latest information, the power of the Poseidon’s warhead is just two megatons. But this does not change much. This amount of nuclear material is still enough to destroy large coastal cities, naval bases and cause a tsunami.

In addition, a warhead of this class could easily wipe out any carrier strike group of the US Navy.

According to some reports, Poseidon can develop speeds up to 70 knots, which is faster than any US nuclear submarine or anti-ship torpedo. The operational depth of the Poseidon is more than a thousand meters, which also significantly exceeds the capabilities of US submarines.

According to Covert Shores, the new Russian UUV can be located with the help of Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV).

ACTUV drone is a DARPA-financed US project to develop an unmanned ship designed to detect and track enemy submarines with the help of sonars. It is assumed that the vessel will not be equipped with weapons of any kind and will be used solely for reconnaissance purposes – however, this may change in the future.

Sea floor sensor networks, including sonar buoys could also be deployed by maritime patrol aircraft, such as Boeing’s P-8 Poseidon, to locate the Russian UUV, according to Covert Shores.

“Strangely enough, Covert Shores doesn’t mention the SOSUS system,” Rear Admiral Arkady Syroezhko, ex-chief of the autonomous vehicles program of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of Russia’s Armed Forces, told Gazeta.ru.

SOSUS is the US sound surveillance system for detecting and identifying submarines. It should be noted, however, that this system will be deployed only on the frontiers – for example, in the GIUK (Greenland, Iceland, and the UK) gap, along the North Cape – Medvezhy Island line, in the Denmark Strait, and in a couple of other places. So it would be a mistake to believe that the SOSUS system is deployed in all parts of the global ocean. In the Pacific, for instance, it is hardly used at all.

Syroezhko believes that, when it comes to tracking underwater objects, the key thing is to select the right location for the tracking system. But it’s very difficult to determine where Poseidon might appear, given its almost unlimited range and high speed.

Also, according to Syroezhko, tracking Poseidon is only half the battle. To destroy the UUV, you need to have a permanent and combat-ready counter system, which means having forces and equipment on constant alert and ready for deployment. But the US doesn’t have such a system yet. To deploy such a system would require substantial financial resources — even for the US.

As for the capabilities of our hypothetical enemies to destroy the Poseidon, they are extremely limited.

https://russia-insider.com/en/empty...ense-against-russias-doomsday-torpedo/ri24390

***

This is why I think the US military industrial complex is corrupt to the bone. They plunder so much money but still are easily outdone through cheaper asymmetrical weaponry by smarter powers.

 

[khansaheeb]

Not another Doomsday weapon

 

[Super Falcon]

This is i was thinking of few years back in cold war russia had such weapons

 

[TaiShang]

Not another Doomsday weapon

Western media usually likes to exaggerate and seek fancy titles.

Of course, in Russian parlance, this is just a relatively cheap defensive weapon against expensive platforms.

 

[LeGenD]

Russia's greatest weapon in current times: propaganda

Western media usually likes to exaggerate and seek fancy titles.

Of course, in Russian parlance, this is just a relatively cheap defensive weapon against expensive platforms.

IUSS have both fixed and mobile platforms, and their coverage is enormous. Their is no need to spread them in every ocean; just key locations where Russian forces are most active and are most likely to pass through. However, IUSS is set to regain massive coverage: https://thediplomat.com/2016/11/us-navy-upgrading-undersea-sub-detecting-sensor-network/

Problem is that IUSS advances will put Russian SLBM fleet at great risk. USN would be in the position to track and kill them ASAP.

Poseidon sounds good in theory but it is very risky and slow method to deliver payload to enemy territory. ICBM remains the best method for this task.

A country with a huge ICBM force, should feel confident in its abilities because it have sheer numbers. Russia is acting like a paranoid child instead.

Russia's greatest fear is that its MAD with US will eventually diminish at some point in the future; disparity in military spending too vast. Therefore, desperate measures like Poseidon.

American MDS advances are damaging Russian psyche. This is just the beginning. Stay tuned.

 

[TaiShang]

Russia's Skillful Strategy Is Fast Turning the Black Sea Into Its 'Mare Nostrum'. The West Has No Answer

Western bellicosity is no substitute for its lack of focus or a coherent strategy to match Russia's

Nikolas Gvosdev
Thu, Aug 9, 2018 |

On May 16, Russian President Vladimir Putin inaugurated the Kerch Strait bridge, linking the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian mainland, seven months ahead of schedule. In doing so, he signaled Russia’s determination to reshape the geopolitical and geo-economic balance of the Black Sea region, despite Western sanctions. Although Moscow is in no position to dominate the Baltic Sea, its efforts to turn the Black Sea into a mare nostrum are bearing fruit.

Over the past several years, the Kremlin has mastered the Baltic feint: By engaging in aerial and maritime provocations in a region highly monitored by the West, Russia is able to entrench its position in the Black Sea without notice. While most U.S. strategists worry about the Suwalki Gap on the Polish-Lithuanian border as a potential Russian invasion route into Central Europe, it is Russia’s buildup in the Black Sea that should concern policymakers. By using the Black Sea as a springboard, Russia can project power beyond its immediate surroundings — into the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean — and strengthen its reemergence as a great power.

In 1856 Russia was humbled in the region by Western aggression, there's little chance of that today

John Kerry once quipped that Russian foreign policy hearkens back to the 19th century. But in this instance, Putin and his team have reached back a century further, borrowing from the illustrious Prince Gregory Potemkin.

A favorite of Catherine the Great, Potemkin engineered Russia’s first annexation of Crimea and served as the first governor-general of “New Russia” (Novorossiia) — territories that today comprise southeastern Ukraine. He championed the view that Russia’s destiny lay to its south and advocated accordingly for expansion into the Balkans, Caucasus, and northern Middle East. Catherine’s so-called “Greek Project” — a plot to extend Russian control around the Black Sea by dismantling the Ottoman Empire and supplanting it by restoring what was once known as Byzantium in its place as a Russian puppet state — was a product of Potemkin’s bold machinations.


Potemkin’s Greek project presupposed continued enmity between the Russian and Ottoman Empires. In the mid-19th century, however, Nicholas I and his foreign minister, Karl Nesselrode, tried to flip the script. Abandoning the Potemkin approach, they sought to cultivate a friendship with the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II and thereby drive the Ottomans from their traditional partnership with Western European powers. Their approach succeeded, and in 1833, the two parties signed the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. In return for acceding to Russian strategic demands — chief among which was granting the Russian navy access to the Mediterranean — the Sultan received the full support of the Russian Empire in his fight against internal opponents.

Unfortunately for Nicholas, however, one short-term treaty could not lead to the Ottoman Empire’s permanent realignment, especially given the previous century’s record of hostility. After Mahmud’s death, his son Abdulmejid I turned back to the British and French to resist further Russian encroachment. What happened next is well-known: Russia suffered a devastating loss in the Crimean War that limited the march of Russian power toward the Mediterranean.

Were the two contemporaries, Putin’s recent efforts would have garnered much support from Potemkin. The president’s predilection to use the Black Sea resort town of Sochi as a de facto capital (it is Putin’s preferred location for bilateral summits with world leaders and events such as the Syrian People’s Congress) elevates Russia’s south to the importance that Potemkin envisaged.

Potemkin would, of course, also have applauded what Russia considers to be the second annexation of Crimea in 2014. This has enabled Moscow to deny rival powers access to the Black Sea basin in the event of a military conflict. Indeed, key elements of Russia’s soft power offensive today — shoring up pro-Russian parties in countries like Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, maintaining the strategic partnership with Armenia, and trying to pull Georgia closer to the Russian orbit — preserve Potemkin’s 250-year-old legacy.

At the same time, Putin has embarked on Nicholas I’s strategy with considerable success. Although the tsar’s outreach to Sultan Mahmud proved ephemeral, Putin appears to be enjoying better luck in forging a strategic partnership with Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This partnership of convenience has survived several hurdles, including the crisis that erupted after Turkish fighters shot down a Russian jet on the Turkey-Syria border in 2015.


Yes, Turkey does not recognize Russia’s claim to Crimea, and the two countries have continuing differences over Syria, but Erdogan is willing to compartmentalize those disagreements to secure benefits for Turkey in other areas — whether obtaining S-400 air defense systems or nuclear power plants. Ultimately, Moscow seeks to incentivize Ankara not to oppose Russia’s resurgence in the Black Sea region in return for concrete boosts to Turkish prosperity, which Erdogan needs to sustain his domestic political position.

The undesirable alternative would see Ankara return to its traditional Ottoman-era and Cold War position of aiding the West and blocking Russian ambitions. Luckily, Russia has several carrots to offer its partner. These include collaboration on discrete issues in Syria as well as energy infrastructure.

Significantly, although still a formal member of NATO, Turkey has accepted this de facto strategic partnership. As with the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi centuries before, Turkey’s acquiescence to Moscow’s courtship has helped secure Russia’s position in the Black Sea, enable Russian access to the Mediterranean, and facilitate Russia’s energy deliveries westward, allowing the Kremlin to retain its implements of influence.

This resurgence of Russian military capabilities in the Black Sea challenges the West’s default strategy in the region since the Soviet Union’s collapse: the inexorable expansion of Euro-Atlantic institutions to encompass the entire Black Sea littoral and contain Russia within its then-limited northeastern coast. Expansion fatigue combined with political instability in Europe’s southern periphery has taken the wind out of the sails of the West’s project.

At the same time, Russia’s actions against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 expanded Moscow’s control of the Black Sea coastline by detaching Abkhazia from Georgia and seizing Crimea. There is no appetite, particularly in Europe, for the heavy lifting necessary to bring the rest of the Black Sea littoral states into NATO and the European Union. Meanwhile, Russia has taken the lead in presenting itself as the best arbiter for pressing regional issues — from resolving the legal status of the Caspian Sea to ending the Syrian civil war. Moscow’s message is clear: Black Sea countries do not need the United States to get involved.

The signature Western initiative in the region that remains is the Southern Energy Corridor — a project to develop the necessary infrastructure linkages and security relationships to allow Eurasian natural gas to reach Western consumers without having to pass through Russian-controlled territory. The linchpin state in this effort is Azerbaijan, which not only possesses its own major gas reserves but also serves as a key transit hub connecting Central Asia to Europe.

Yet, even here, Russia has adapted its approach. The ham-handed Russian attempt during the 1990s to force Azerbaijan to forego the “Main Export Route” from Baku to Ceyhan, Turkey, has been replaced by a more accommodating approach. Moscow no longer seeks to block, but rather to co-opt.

Russia’s TurkStream pipeline, currently under construction to connect the Russian mainland with European Turkey, will provide the basis for Russia to supply gas not only to Turkey but to Southern Europe as a whole. It will help extend Russian influence in places like Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary — and even to Italy, where a new government may be much less inclined to support continued sanctions on Moscow. At the same time, Russia may also work with Azerbaijan by supplying the country with gas, and thus indirectly join the Southern Energy Corridor project. This would undermine the strategic rationale of a project that was supposed to lessen Russian energy influence in southern and central Europe.

Ironically, given the U.S. identification of Russia as a major adversary, the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal may have unintentionally strengthened Russia’s position in the Black Sea. The Southern Energy Corridor, if it is to be successful in reducing Russian influence, requires a greater volume of gas than Azerbaijan alone can provide.

As U.S. sanctions snap back on Tehran, a Caspian settlement becomes much less likely. Iran’s acceptance of the sea’s delineation rested in part on being able to set up joint projects with other Caspian littoral states. There is no indication that the Trump administration is interested in issuing waivers for any such projects. With no settlement, another part of the West’s Southern Energy Corridor strategy — the construction of a trans-Caspian pipeline to bring Turkmenistan’s vast natural gas reserves westward — will likely fall by the wayside.

Other efforts to use the Southern Corridor to its full extent, either by having Turkmenistan swap gas with Iran or for Iranian gas to be piped westward, are also out. Therefore, either Russia’s TurkStream will fill in the gaps, or Russia itself will become a participant in the Southern Corridor and, in either event, Russia’s influence will not be lessened.

Two years ago, I noted that “Russia is making its bid to be the arbiter of the Black Sea basin.” Many American analysts admitted Russia’s growing military capabilities, but hoped that energy dynamics would move against Russian influence, but Moscow has learned to take advantage of these trends to support its political goals, at a time when the United States lacks a coherent strategy. Today, Russia is closer than ever to achieving its goal of becoming the dominant power in the Black Sea.

Source: War On The Rock

 

[LeGenD]

@TaiShang

Nice share - the second article. Informative.

Black Sea is Russian backyard so WEST cannot do much there. Turkey - supposedly a NATO member - let the WEST down there. Turkey is the latest Russian poodle in the making.

 

[TaiShang]

@TaiShang

Nice share - the second article. Informative.

Black Sea is Russian backyard so WEST cannot do much there. Turkey - supposedly a NATO member - let the WEST down there. Turkey is the latest Russian poodle in the making.

Sadly, Turkey could be a one of the equals. But they managed their foreign policy so badly, now, be it in the East or in the West, they can only act as a poodle. I guess neither Russia-China nor US-EU will take Turkey as real allies.

Turkey is a prime example of how a foreign policy should not be.