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Editorial: Two-pronged policy against Taliban
Pakistans Taliban policy in Swat is now clearly two-pronged: it is confronting the militants in the Malakand Division, having effectively blocked their advance in Lower Dir and Buner; and it is talking to the TNSMs Sufi Muhammad for the establishment of qazi courts in Swat and other districts in exchange for the laying down of arms by the Taliban. For many the policy is understandably risky. But it is different from the earlier policy of letting the Taliban of Fazlullah take territory in violation of agreements while the government implemented the sharia in cooperation with Sufi Muhammad.
The qazi courts approach failed, as predicted by many when it was embarked upon, but its failure brought with it a public disenchantment with Sufi Muhammads ability or intent to deliver on his promises. The country was divided over the qazi courts between the conservative opinion that didnt mind the sharia courts and thought they would bring quick and cheap justice to the people; and liberals who thought there was a barely concealed negation of the state of Pakistan and its sharia laws in Nizam-e-Adl which otherwise looked harmless in its text. When Sufi Muhammad began to talk about Pakistans legal system as a kind of gloss to what he was envisaging for Swat, he lost a lot of support and helped bridge the conservative-liberal divide in the country.
Thats when the army moved in. Given the new opinion environment, it was able to share more of its information about warlord Fazlullah without fearing a negative backlash: it made public that Fazlullah was caught talking on the phone planning a violation of the Sufi Muhammad accord on the Taliban quitting Buner. The shock produced by the fact that the Taliban were actually planning to stay on in Buner after they had announced their departure, broke the tendency among Pakistanis to take the Taliban on trust. (This will help taking more realistically the deceitful battlefield statements made by the warlord Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan.) On the other hand, the disclosure raised the credibility of the Pakistan army despite a steadily eroding belief among the victim populations that it will come to their help and then stay on.
The gradually dominant presence of the army in parts of Malakand has affected the unfolding of the process of qazi courts. Before the army decided to move in, this process was going on under the diktat of Sufi Muhammad who developed the habit of issuing a steady stream of adverse commentary on how the NWFP government was handling the job. He had made it clear that the qazis unacceptable to him on a personal basis would not be acceptable in Malakand.
Sufi Muhammad also supplied legal interpretations of Darul Qaza (Appeals Court) and Darul Darul Qaza (Higher Appeals Court) when he said that they would be separated from the constitutionally empowered judiciary of Pakistan. He lost support even among the heretofore supportive clergy in Pakistan when he termed democracy un-Islamic. It now develops after the military action that the NWFP government is quite assertive in setting up Darul Qaza with its constitutional linkages and will insist on selecting the qazis under its jurisdiction.
One lesson that has emerged from the operation in Swat is that the army has to move in an environment of civilian consensus or it will risk internal lack of cohesion as it fights its own people. (Once it was in Dir and Buner, it was able to reveal that not all the Taliban were our own people and that there were aliens busy fighting the war of dispossessing Pakistan of its territory.) Once it has taken root, terrorism is not easy to dislodge.
The state needs to pay heed to the relationship of coercion which the terrorist develops with the victim population on the basis of intimidation. The army therefore goes in among people who will not show loyalty to it in the initial phase. The logic of military action will succeed only if the army stays on and doesnt retreat from the theatre of war. It cannot allow the civilian government to negotiate with the terrorists in a military vacuum and then assume that it has given primacy to political solutions.
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan
Pakistans Taliban policy in Swat is now clearly two-pronged: it is confronting the militants in the Malakand Division, having effectively blocked their advance in Lower Dir and Buner; and it is talking to the TNSMs Sufi Muhammad for the establishment of qazi courts in Swat and other districts in exchange for the laying down of arms by the Taliban. For many the policy is understandably risky. But it is different from the earlier policy of letting the Taliban of Fazlullah take territory in violation of agreements while the government implemented the sharia in cooperation with Sufi Muhammad.
The qazi courts approach failed, as predicted by many when it was embarked upon, but its failure brought with it a public disenchantment with Sufi Muhammads ability or intent to deliver on his promises. The country was divided over the qazi courts between the conservative opinion that didnt mind the sharia courts and thought they would bring quick and cheap justice to the people; and liberals who thought there was a barely concealed negation of the state of Pakistan and its sharia laws in Nizam-e-Adl which otherwise looked harmless in its text. When Sufi Muhammad began to talk about Pakistans legal system as a kind of gloss to what he was envisaging for Swat, he lost a lot of support and helped bridge the conservative-liberal divide in the country.
Thats when the army moved in. Given the new opinion environment, it was able to share more of its information about warlord Fazlullah without fearing a negative backlash: it made public that Fazlullah was caught talking on the phone planning a violation of the Sufi Muhammad accord on the Taliban quitting Buner. The shock produced by the fact that the Taliban were actually planning to stay on in Buner after they had announced their departure, broke the tendency among Pakistanis to take the Taliban on trust. (This will help taking more realistically the deceitful battlefield statements made by the warlord Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan.) On the other hand, the disclosure raised the credibility of the Pakistan army despite a steadily eroding belief among the victim populations that it will come to their help and then stay on.
The gradually dominant presence of the army in parts of Malakand has affected the unfolding of the process of qazi courts. Before the army decided to move in, this process was going on under the diktat of Sufi Muhammad who developed the habit of issuing a steady stream of adverse commentary on how the NWFP government was handling the job. He had made it clear that the qazis unacceptable to him on a personal basis would not be acceptable in Malakand.
Sufi Muhammad also supplied legal interpretations of Darul Qaza (Appeals Court) and Darul Darul Qaza (Higher Appeals Court) when he said that they would be separated from the constitutionally empowered judiciary of Pakistan. He lost support even among the heretofore supportive clergy in Pakistan when he termed democracy un-Islamic. It now develops after the military action that the NWFP government is quite assertive in setting up Darul Qaza with its constitutional linkages and will insist on selecting the qazis under its jurisdiction.
One lesson that has emerged from the operation in Swat is that the army has to move in an environment of civilian consensus or it will risk internal lack of cohesion as it fights its own people. (Once it was in Dir and Buner, it was able to reveal that not all the Taliban were our own people and that there were aliens busy fighting the war of dispossessing Pakistan of its territory.) Once it has taken root, terrorism is not easy to dislodge.
The state needs to pay heed to the relationship of coercion which the terrorist develops with the victim population on the basis of intimidation. The army therefore goes in among people who will not show loyalty to it in the initial phase. The logic of military action will succeed only if the army stays on and doesnt retreat from the theatre of war. It cannot allow the civilian government to negotiate with the terrorists in a military vacuum and then assume that it has given primacy to political solutions.
Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan