Deception of nuclear ‘no first use’

[RadioactiveFriends]

Sandy Berger would turn in his grave and be utterly disappointed that Bruce Riedel had used his obituary to perjure against Pakistan. In a previous article, ‘Riedel’s mythmaking and Pakistan’, we discussed how Riedel was pointing towards the flaws of the US department of state. This time he is pointing towards the flaws of the US’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and how easily the US’ National Security Advisor (NSA) can play with the mind of the US president. With former CIA official like Bruce still on wheels, it is no wonder the US is stuck in so many problems in so many countries.


It seems like no coincidence that days after Barkha Dutt revealed the Indian side in her book, Riedel revealed his side. When Sandy Berger’s obituary surfaced, international and Indian media outlets went berserk taking snipes at Pakistan. Bruce’s spark spurred the media into action on how Pakistan was ready to use nuclear weapons during the Kargil War, which is far from the truth.


Interestingly, the fact is that Pakistani and Indian nuclear capabilities were not fully operational during the Kargil War. This has been stated by General Musharraf, General Kidwai and even the former Indian foreign minister, Jaswant Singh. These persons are primary sources, not the CIA’s Bruce Riedel and a person who is no more alive to confirm or deny what is being said about him.


According to Barkha Dutt, President Clinton sent Anthony Zinni, the commander-in-chief of the US central command, to Pakistan. There, Zinni warned General Musharaf to pull back troops, otherwise nuclear annihilation would be perpetrated against Pakistan by India. All the way India had been threatening Pakistan with use of nuclear weapons. Yet the CIA, in its top-secret daily brief, wrote that Pakistan was preparing its nuclear weapons for deployment and possible use! In our opinion, Riedel’s story is rather ordinary because everyone knows that Pakistan has neither confirmed nor denied having a nuclear first use policy since the inception of its nuclear weapon programme. What amazes us is that Burkha Datt’s revelation of possible Indian nuclear first use did not trigger any debate in the global arena. If what Datt says is true - which we believe it is - then India and its apologists are lying through their teeth in efforts to make others believe that India has a policy of no first use (NFU).


While NFU has an assured innate fascination for strategists, it is a flawed idea. First, nuclear deterrence can only be established when there is considerable threat of nuclear escalation during any crisis. Second, NFU is a dangerous deception and there is no assurance that even a country that has given such a pledge will not use nuclear weapons once in a crisis. The NFU constraint in India’s nuclear doctrine is just a pretense to win western support for greater access to civil nuclear technology. If India were such a great proponent of NFU, it would not have doubted the Chinese NFU pledge.


Pakistan’s ambiguity towards NFU is more realistic and close to the concept of deterrence. Most nuclear weapons’ states reject the idea of NFU but India and China accepted this notion only at the declaratory level. Pakistan has no reason to feel apologetic about its ambiguity. NFU is a duplicitous policy rather than reliable obligation asserted by realists that first-use posture is mandatory when your survival is at stake.


Genuine first use of nuclear weapons cannot be utterly eradicated by a declaratory policy of NFU. Meanwhile, outstanding vagueness and flattering uncertainty of NFU would perhaps have some deleterious impact on deterrence.


When India revised its nuclear doctrine in 2002 there was pressure building up by many hawks within the National Security Advisory Board for the abandonment of NFU by the Indian government. The board, headed by C V Ranganathan, recommended that “India must consider withdrawing from this commitment as the other nuclear weapons’ states have not accepted this policy.”


The Indian draft of the nuclear doctrine of 1999 advocated first use of nuclear weapons against countries allied to nuclear states. It will not be a coincidence if India abandons its NFU commitment against Pakistan and China in the near future. Contrary to the Indian NFU policy, some analysts are contemplating an alarming shift in Indian strategic thinking from a strict NFU policy.

Writers : Ahsan Ali Zahid & Hasan Ehtisham
@DailyTimes

 

[Andy Sandy]

“No first use” is the outgrowth of such insensible dynamics, a doctrine that gets the strategists more excited than members of the public.

In one way, the Pakistani position of First Use of nuclear weapons is the more honest one. No first use policies reflect the acceptable hypocrisy of good manners, rather than the authentic appreciation for bad manners.

 

[Hyder404]

first-use posture is mandatory when your survival is at stake.

Something doesn't sounds right their? How could you survive if humanity is destroyed once and for all? Mind you its not a concrete bomb.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

Quite a loony piece of writing by Messrs.Zahid and Ehtesham. Are they sufficiently intellectually challenged to understand that a FU policy is pursued by Strategic and Military Pygymies!
China has a NFU policy; while North Korea has a FU policy. One is a Power State while the other is a Pariah State; hence the difference in policies. FU policies have to be touted by under-developed Bonsai States and by Perpetually Paranoid Generals. Stable Power States do not need to resort to such acts; which is simply akin to a dog that resorts to indiscriminate barking just in order to keep any perceived aggressor at bay.
Are these writers, citizens of a state like North Korea; that their only hope of survival is predicated on a FU policy?
Now, if Somalia goes nuclear; will it be likely to pursue a NFU or FU policy ?

 

[BABA AGHORI]

Something doesn't sounds right their? How could you survive if humanity is destroyed once and for all? Mind you its not a concrete bomb.

He mean to say, if our survival is at stake, we will make sure it's not only us whose survival would be at stake.

 

[SQ8]

Quite a loony piece of writing by Messrs.Zahid and Ehtesham. Are they sufficiently intellectually challenged to understand that a FU policy is pursued by Strategic and Military Pygymies!
China has a NFU policy; while North Korea has a FU policy. One is a Power State while the other is a Pariah State; hence the difference in policies. FU policies have to be touted by under-developed Bonsai States and by Perpetually Paranoid Generals. Stable Power States do not need to resort to such acts; which is simply akin to a dog that resorts to indiscriminate barking just in order to keep any perceived aggressor at bay.
Are these writers, citizens of a state like North Korea; that their only hope of survival is predicated on a FU policy?
Now, if Somalia goes nuclear; will it be likely to pursue a NFU or FU policy ?

Throughout the cold war, both sides had an oscillating NFU policy that would likely be FU for NATO. A Europe which was a fairly stable collection of democratic states . But I find it odd that if Pakistan decides to go FU it is the pariah?

 

[Capt.Popeye]

Throughout the cold war, both sides had an oscillating NFU policy that would likely be FU for NATO. A Europe which was a fairly stable collection of democratic states . But I find it odd that if Pakistan decides to go FU it is the pariah?

Is Paksitan a pariah; though it is undoubtedly a Bonsai State.
Now @Oscar, the Cold War poers oscillated between those policies; because they were both Bonsai States in terms of handling Nuclear Capabilities....... nothing to do with democracy and all that. Therefore they were Bonsai States without being Pariah States.

 

[kṣamā]

If India's NFU is faux then it is of great concern to few of our neighbours. This not only means we have conventional upper hand but also nuclear one.

 

[Shotgunner51]

@Martian2 Let's explore the NFU/FU doctrine in relation to nuclear stockpile. What are the respective sizes of thermonuclear deterrance for various countries as per NTI?

 

[SQ8]

Is Paksitan a pariah; though it is undoubtedly a Bonsai State.

Bonsai it may be, but when it comes to the overall stability of the state it is was earlier and is still today to an extent tied to the military's strength. However, the policy of FU or NFU in this case has little to do with the strength of the state and more to do with the military's gauging of its capability in defending the frontiers.

Considering the rather long drawn out(and clearly stagnant) fascination the hawks in India's leadership(regardless of who is in power) has with the foundations laid out by I.Gandhi on a "lasting lesson" and the general superiority in the desert it enjoys have made it a requirement. This fear keeps propagating on its own(in part thanks to a very jingoistic Indian media) and allows the justification of a FU regardless of whether in terms of operational preparedness and realism it will ever come to bear.

If India's NFU is faux then it is of great concern to few of our neighbours. This not only means we have conventional upper hand but also nuclear one.

No, all it means is that the region is closer to nuclear warfare than we thought. Only a jingoistic mindset would derive any superiority in nuclear weapons deployment capability from it.

 

[Zarvan]

Sandy Berger would turn in his grave and be utterly disappointed that Bruce Riedel had used his obituary to perjure against Pakistan. In a previous article, ‘Riedel’s mythmaking and Pakistan’, we discussed how Riedel was pointing towards the flaws of the US department of state. This time he is pointing towards the flaws of the US’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and how easily the US’ National Security Advisor (NSA) can play with the mind of the US president. With former CIA official like Bruce still on wheels, it is no wonder the US is stuck in so many problems in so many countries.


It seems like no coincidence that days after Barkha Dutt revealed the Indian side in her book, Riedel revealed his side. When Sandy Berger’s obituary surfaced, international and Indian media outlets went berserk taking snipes at Pakistan. Bruce’s spark spurred the media into action on how Pakistan was ready to use nuclear weapons during the Kargil War, which is far from the truth.


Interestingly, the fact is that Pakistani and Indian nuclear capabilities were not fully operational during the Kargil War. This has been stated by General Musharraf, General Kidwai and even the former Indian foreign minister, Jaswant Singh. These persons are primary sources, not the CIA’s Bruce Riedel and a person who is no more alive to confirm or deny what is being said about him.


According to Barkha Dutt, President Clinton sent Anthony Zinni, the commander-in-chief of the US central command, to Pakistan. There, Zinni warned General Musharaf to pull back troops, otherwise nuclear annihilation would be perpetrated against Pakistan by India. All the way India had been threatening Pakistan with use of nuclear weapons. Yet the CIA, in its top-secret daily brief, wrote that Pakistan was preparing its nuclear weapons for deployment and possible use! In our opinion, Riedel’s story is rather ordinary because everyone knows that Pakistan has neither confirmed nor denied having a nuclear first use policy since the inception of its nuclear weapon programme. What amazes us is that Burkha Datt’s revelation of possible Indian nuclear first use did not trigger any debate in the global arena. If what Datt says is true - which we believe it is - then India and its apologists are lying through their teeth in efforts to make others believe that India has a policy of no first use (NFU).


While NFU has an assured innate fascination for strategists, it is a flawed idea. First, nuclear deterrence can only be established when there is considerable threat of nuclear escalation during any crisis. Second, NFU is a dangerous deception and there is no assurance that even a country that has given such a pledge will not use nuclear weapons once in a crisis. The NFU constraint in India’s nuclear doctrine is just a pretense to win western support for greater access to civil nuclear technology. If India were such a great proponent of NFU, it would not have doubted the Chinese NFU pledge.


Pakistan’s ambiguity towards NFU is more realistic and close to the concept of deterrence. Most nuclear weapons’ states reject the idea of NFU but India and China accepted this notion only at the declaratory level. Pakistan has no reason to feel apologetic about its ambiguity. NFU is a duplicitous policy rather than reliable obligation asserted by realists that first-use posture is mandatory when your survival is at stake.


Genuine first use of nuclear weapons cannot be utterly eradicated by a declaratory policy of NFU. Meanwhile, outstanding vagueness and flattering uncertainty of NFU would perhaps have some deleterious impact on deterrence.


When India revised its nuclear doctrine in 2002 there was pressure building up by many hawks within the National Security Advisory Board for the abandonment of NFU by the Indian government. The board, headed by C V Ranganathan, recommended that “India must consider withdrawing from this commitment as the other nuclear weapons’ states have not accepted this policy.”


The Indian draft of the nuclear doctrine of 1999 advocated first use of nuclear weapons against countries allied to nuclear states. It will not be a coincidence if India abandons its NFU commitment against Pakistan and China in the near future. Contrary to the Indian NFU policy, some analysts are contemplating an alarming shift in Indian strategic thinking from a strict NFU policy.

Writers : Ahsan Ali Zahid & Hasan Ehtisham
@DailyTimes

As far as I know what my research says it's simple Pakistan would try to do best in conventional war but if things go wrong in conventional war than GOD bless India because we are not going to.

 

[Spectre]

Bonsai it may be, but when it comes to the overall stability of the state it is was earlier and is still today to an extent tied to the military's strength. However, the policy of FU or NFU in this case has little to do with the strength of the state and more to do with the military's gauging of its capability in defending the frontiers.

Considering the rather long drawn out(and clearly stagnant) fascination the hawks in India's leadership(regardless of who is in power) has with the foundations laid out by I.Gandhi on a "lasting lesson" and the general superiority in the desert it enjoys have made it a requirement. This fear keeps propagating on its own(in part thanks to a very jingoistic Indian media) and allows the justification of a FU regardless of whether in terms of operational preparedness and realism it will ever come to bear.


No, all it means is that the region is closer to nuclear warfare than we thought. Only a jingoistic mindset would derive any superiority in nuclear weapons deployment capability from it.

If only Pakistan could punch in it's own weight class life would have been so much easier for everyone but no it has to constantly be a maverick, do things none expected nor was logically possible with the resources it had.

It is this Icarus like nature of Pakistan which makes it so dangerous and instils fear and loathing in India which has been an habitual underachiever.

@Oscar - Have you ever stopped to consider what drives the core Indian psychology with respect to Pakistan which is reflected in all it's doctrines? It is vary sense of admiration mixed with envy and gloating at the same time. We would like Pakistan to be our Nepal or it's errant cousin Sri-Lanka but refuses to oblige us.

Now as for NFU or FU - these are strategic mind-games, India retains the option for all out nuclear retaliation in event of Nuclear attack on it's assets irrespective of the degree of attack which makes it inevitable that Pakistan would like it's first punch to knock India down, India knows this and in this age of global satellite coverage it would never let Pakistan land it's first punch resulting in invalidation of NFU.

But in deterrence sphere it works beautifully to discourage the use of tactical weapons as Pakistan knows the cost will be too high and unless it is ready to use the strategic nukes and risk annihilation it might as well grin and bear it.

So you see NFU serves its purpose of maintaining peace and at the same time leaving option open for limited skirmishes for balancing purposes but when push comes to serve it is just a voluntary declaration not worth the piece of paper it is written on.

Regards

As far as I know what my research says it's simple Pakistan would try to do best in conventional war but if things go wrong in conventional war than GOD bless India because we are not going to.

Sadly things will go wrong in conventional war for Pakistan given the huge disparity in resources b/w us, there is no if and but to it and still Pakistan has to bear the losses for the alternative is unimaginable. If Pakistan could have fought it would have to the end in previous alterations but always it chose to cut down it losses and appeal to the Global Community for cessation of hostilities.

This gives me hope that there is a future yet for our next generation. Now if Taliban or Mullahs got their hands on the nukes or come to the power - I will shift over-seas.

 

[Martian2]

@Martian2 Let's explore the NFU/FU doctrine in relation to nuclear stockpile. What are the respective sizes of thermonuclear deterrance for various countries as per NTI?

About ten years ago, NTI (ie. Nuclear Threat Initiative) said the Chinese thermonuclear arsenal was 294 megatons. Obviously, China has built a lot more thermonuclear weapons over the last ten years (e.g. DF-31, DF-31A, JL-2, DF-5B, and DF-41).

Prior to the reductions in the New START treaty, NTI estimated the Russian thermonuclear arsenal between 600 to 1,200 megatons.

The US thermonuclear arsenal was estimated at 570 megatons.

However, the US SIOP plan calls for a simultaneous strike on Russia and China. This means the US only has 285 megatons to hit China.

NTI estimated the Indian atomic arsenal at one megaton.
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Here are the new NTI thermonuclear links:

Nuclear Disarmament Russia | Articles | NTI Analysis | NTI
Nuclear Disarmament China | Articles | NTI Analysis | NTI
Nuclear Disarmament United States | Articles | NTI Analysis | NTI

Here is the NTI atomic link:

Nuclear Disarmament India | Articles | NTI Analysis | NTI

 

[Spectre]

About ten years ago, NTI (ie. Nuclear Threat Initiative) said the Chinese thermonuclear arsenal was 294 megatons. Obviously, China has built a lot more thermonuclear weapons over the last ten years (e.g. DF-31, DF-31A, JL-2, DF-5B, and DF-41).

Prior to the reductions in the New START treaty, NTI estimated the Russian thermonuclear arsenal between 600 to 1,200 megatons.

The US thermonuclear arsenal was estimated at 570 megatons.

However, the US SIOP plan calls for a simultaneous strike on Russia and China. This means the US only has 285 megatons to hit China.

NTI estimated the Indian atomic arsenal at one megaton.

Can you provide the links?

AFAIK as I know China does not produce any more new nuclear weapons by a self imposed moratorium. US and Russia have similar stances.

Only growing nuclear arsenals are with India and Pakistan which is understandable as they achieved the capability just 17 years back.

 

[Shotgunner51]

About ten years ago, NTI (ie. Nuclear Threat Initiative) said the Chinese thermonuclear arsenal was 294 megatons. Obviously, China has built a lot more thermonuclear weapons over the last ten years (e.g. DF-31, DF-31A, JL-2, DF-5B, and DF-41).

Prior to the reductions in the New START treaty, NTI estimated the Russian thermonuclear arsenal between 600 to 1,200 megatons.

The US thermonuclear arsenal was estimated at 570 megatons.

However, the US SIOP plan calls for a simultaneous strike on Russia and China. This means the US only has 285 megatons to hit China.

NTI estimated the Indian atomic arsenal at one megaton.
----------

The NTI links for the world's five thermonuclear powers are here: China's 294 megatons of thermonuclear deterrence

Thanks bro. How about Pakistan? I suggest we check NTI for consistent comparison.