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Debt Is Roaring Back in China

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Successwill

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For almost two years, the question has lingered over China’s market-roiling crackdown on financial leverage: How much pain can the country’s policy makers stomach?

Evidence is mounting that their limit has been reached. From bank loans to trust-product issuance to margin-trading accounts at stock brokerages, leverage in China is rising nearly everywhere you look.

While seasonal effects explain some of the gains, analysts say the trend has staying power as authorities shift their focus from containing the nation’s $34 trillion debt pile to shoring up the weakest economic expansion since 2009.

“Deleveraging is dead,” said Alicia Garcia Herrero, chief Asia Pacific economist at Natixis SA in Hong Kong.

The question now is whether China’s attempt to create a healthier mix of financing -- fewer shadow banks, longer debt maturities -- will prove successful. Premier Li Keqiang underscored the challenge last week, warning of risks from sharp increases in short-term debt after China’s credit growth surged to a record in January.

“Chinese regulators are now trying to walk a fine line by allowing credit to flow back into the private sector without returning to the old pattern of rapid and unsustainable credit growth,” said Nicholas Borst, a China research director at Seafarer Capital Partners LLC in Larkspur, California.

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Even after accounting for seasonal distortions, China’s leverage indicators have been surprisingly strong in 2019:

  • New yuan loans jumped by a record 3.23 trillion yuan ($481 billion) in January, exceeding estimates
  • Shadow financing rose for the first time in 11 months; interbank borrowing climbed to a six-month high
  • More than 1,800 new trust products have been sold so far this year, the fastest start since at least 2008, according to Use Trust
  • Banks issued 22 percent more wealth-management products in January than the year-earlier period, according to PY Standard
  • Margin debt in China’s stock market surged over the past two weeks at the fastest pace since 2015
It’s a stark turnaround after a nearly two-year anti-leverage drive that sank Chinese stocks, restrained economic growth, triggered record bond defaults, and pummeled the nation’s gargantuan shadow-banking industry.

In the latest sign of the government’s evolving stance, a quarterly policy report published by the People’s Bank of China on Thursday watered down language on the campaign to curb excess credit, removing a reference to deleveraging and adding wording on “stabilizing the macro leverage ratio.”

“China has shelved deleveraging activities almost entirely to support the economy,” said Iris Pang, a Hong Kong-based economist at ING Bank NV.

The PBOC and the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission didn’t respond to faxed requests for comment.

China’s total debt will rise relative to gross domestic product this year, after a flat 2017 and a decline in 2018, Wang Tao, head of China economic research at UBS Group AG in Hong Kong, predicted in a report this month.

While Wang cautioned that “re-leveraging” may increase concerns about China’s commitment to ensuring financial stability, investors have so far cheered the prospect of easier credit conditions.

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Yields on lower-rated Chinese corporate bonds have dropped in 2019 and the nation’s stock market -- one of the world’s worst performers last year -- has soared (thanks also to signs of progress in trade negotiations with the U.S.). The small-cap ChiNext Index entered a bull market on Friday.

“In 2018, it was the double whammy from the deleveraging campaign and the trade war,” said Larry Hu, head of China economics at Macquarie Securities Ltd. in Hong Kong. “In 2019, it could be the interplay between softening growth and more supportive policy.”
 




Why China's Bonds Are Defaulting at a Record Pace


Chinese companies are facing a reality check after years of ramping up debt. A deleveraging campaign that President Xi Jinping began in 2016 to curb risks in the nation’s financial markets has cracked down on shadow banking and tightened rules on asset management. As a result, firms are having a tougher time raising new funds to repay existing debt, leading to a record number of bond defaults and government moves to try to alleviate the liquidity crunch. The worsening economic climate isn’t helping.



1. How big is the problem?
It’s big, with the potential to worsen. More than 12 billion yuan ($1.8 billion) of local note defaults took place in the first two months of 2019, including four private and 12 public offerings, according to Bloomberg-compiled data. The tally last year was a record 120 billion yuan, more than quadruple the 2017 amount. Failures from private sector firms, which accounted for more than 90 percent of total defaults last year, are still the trend. Some 4.8 trillion yuan of bonds will mature in the final 10 months of 2019. To make things worse, many companies may be living on borrowed time: Cash flow deficit for non-financial firms is at the highest level in six years.



2. Why are bond issuers defaulting?
It’s that liquidity crunch, mainly. Investors and banks, which historically have favored state-backed borrowers, are still reluctant to extend credit to smaller, private companies. Although yields for AA- rated firms, considered junk level in China, have fallen from a 3 1/2-year high in September, they are still well above the three-year average, illustrating the risk aversion.



3. Where are defaults hitting hardest?
The last time they peaked, in 2016, most of the failures were in industries with excess capacity including coal and steel. This time, a wide range are seeing delinquencies. Oil firm CEFC Shanghai International Group Ltd. and coal miner Wintime Energy Co. were the biggest defaulters in 2018, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. This year, China Minsheng Investment Group Corp., a conglomerate with a wide range of assets including property, aviation and health care, came under pressure from its $34 billion debt pile. It missed payment on a 3 billion yuan note due Jan. 29 before making good on it about two weeks later.



4. How did we get here?
Chinese companies have been piling on debt for at least a decade, ever since the leadership team under Xi’s predecessor went on a borrowing binge in response to the global financial crisis. That kept China’s economy chugging but at a cost. The corporate debt to GDP ratio surged to a record 160 percent at the end of 2017, from 101 percent 10 years earlier. Xi and his lieutenants vowed in 2016 to rein in excessive corporate borrowing and financial market leverage in an effort to reduce the risk to the economy. The government issued directives on how money is to be loaned and managed, with a particular goal of curbing China’s $10 trillion ecosystem of unregulated lending known as shadow banking.

5. What’s the impact of rising defaults?
financial reporting after some defaulters, such as Kangde Xin Composite Material Group Co. and Reward Science and Technology Industry Group Co., had earlier reported a sizable amount of cash on their balance sheets.

6. Has the government stepped in?
Yes, while stopping short (so far) of an outright bailout. Since July last year, officials have injected liquidity into the financial markets through measures such as cutting banks’ required reserve ratios. They’ve also pressured creditors to negotiate with beleaguered borrowers. Regulators have offeredbanks cash and asked them to lend more to help small firms as recently as February. The challenge will be encouraging market-driven efforts to resolve corporate debt issues without reinforcing the old image of a state-dominated financial system.

7. How does bankruptcy work in China?
In the current process, troubled companies get up to nine months from when the court accepts a bankruptcy reorganization filing to agree on a restructuring plan with all parties. If they fail they can be declared bankrupt, triggering liquidation. Concerns exist about the government’s heavy involvement in major restructuring cases and the reluctance of banks to pursue court-supervised plans because they don’t want to bear losses. In practice, the process can be much longer and foreign investors have had limited enforcement rights on some state-owned assets, according to Pacific Investment Management Co.

The Reference Shelf

What would an incompetent occupier of West Kurdistan know about finances? Didn't you bend the knee to Trump when the lira dropped like Turkish sex workers in Berlin?

Shut up you big mouth 50 kilo.
 
But why Turkey keeps coming back to China begging for money?

its called borrowing you moron. This is a win-win opportunity for both parts. This is how things stack up between countries. If you are not willing to make money you just dont get in the deal. Feel free to miss the opportunity. Thats your stupidity.

As if you wont get the money back.

Turkey doesnt need china to sustain the economy just like we didnt from the dawn of time
 
its called borrowing you moron. This is a win-win opportunity for both parts. This is how things stack up between countries. If you are not willing to make money you just dont get in the deal. Feel free to miss the opportunity. Thats your stupidity.

As if you wont get the money back.

Turkey doesnt need china to sustain the economy just like we didnt from the dawn of time
Ok, so based on what you claim China already went bankrupt, there's supposed to be no money in China, next couple of months after you run out of money again, please go to someone else.
 
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