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INTERVIEW/ Daniel Russel: U.S. hopes China will agree to Japan’s call for dialogue on Senkaku issue
July 05, 2014
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN
The top Asia policymaker in the Obama administration said he believes that the watchword for territorial disputes in East Asia should be “restraint.”
In a recent interview with The Asahi Shimbun, Daniel Russel, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, explained that the statement by President Barack Obama that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty would be applied to the Senkaku Islands is not a threat. Instead, it creates the “diplomatic and political space” for Japan and China to engage in negotiations, Russel said.
He praised Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s call for dialogue and crisis prevention mechanisms as “very constructive,” adding that “it would be highly desirable if the Chinese side would respond favorably to that initiative.”
Commenting on the recent Chinese action over a major dispute with Vietnam in the South China Sea, Russel pointed out that it is a question of judgment.
“Is it a good idea for China to suddenly deploy this oil rig in waters that the Vietnamese consider to be their exclusive economic zone?” he asked.
He categorically denied the view that the United States is trying to contain China through its rebalance policy.
“No country, no major power, has done more to facilitate the emergence of a prosperous and stable China than the United States,” he said.
As for the current status of Japan-U.S. relations, Russel said, “We are in a very good place,” and welcomed the decision by the Abe administration to relax Japan’s self-imposed restriction on the exercise of the right to collective self-defense.
“We expect it will be a positive factor and advance the interests of the United States by having the effect of enabling Japan to become an even more active contributor to stability in the region,” he said.
Excerpts from his interview follow:
* * *
Question: How do you assess the current status of Japan-U.S. relations?
Russel: As someone who has been involved personally and deeply in Japan and in Japan-U.S. relations (through) my entire career, it feels like we are in a very good place. This is an important time, obviously, not only in Asia, but globally. The benefit that accrues to the United States for having a friend and partner like Japan is immense.
Q: Now in Tokyo one of the most controversial issues is the relaxation of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. At first, can you clarify the position of the U.S. government on this issue?
A: The effort to change Japan’s interpretation (of the Constitution) to allow for the exercise of (the right to) collective self-defense, which is a recognized right in the United Nations Charter, is a Japanese effort, not an American effort. We are not pushing Japan to do things that the Japanese people are not comfortable with.
We welcome it and we support it. But we respect the right of Japan, through its governmental processes, to make the determination of what exactly that’s going to look like and how they’re going to implement a decision that is Japan’s to take.
Q: Is it fair to say that the U.S. government regards this relaxation of self-imposed restrictions as a positive factor in terms of enhancing the alliance?
A: We expect it will be a positive factor and advance the interests of the United States, by having the effect of enabling Japan to become an even more active contributor to stability in the region. Building out the already formidable U.S.-Japan security partnership is in the best interests of the United States, Japan and the countries of the region.
Q: Prime Minister Abe repeatedly said that he wanted to make the Cabinet decision on this initiative in time for the review of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Last October, both governments agreed to complete that review by the end of this year. This deadline has worked as a strong driver for the Japanese government to make the decision on the right to collective self-defense issue. Can you give me your sense on this time frame issue?
A: Here’s the way to look at it. Both the United States and Japan believe that the time has come to revise our Defense Guidelines to make the alliance more effective and more relevant to the challenges of the 21st century.
Last October, I went to Tokyo with Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to attend the Security Consultative Committee, or the two-plus-two meeting, and they decided (with their Japanese counterparts) that they would work to complete the Guidelines review in the course of 2014. But I wouldn’t overstate the significance of a particular time frame. The important thing is doing it right.
The fact that there is open discussion of the right to collective self-defense issue in Japan ensures that, when an ultimate decision is made, it will be understood and it will be supported, in the first instance, by the Japanese people, which is the most important thing, but, in the second instance, that it will be understood and, one hopes, supported in the region as well.
Q: As for the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa Prefecture, both Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima and the mayor of Ginowan, which currently hosts the base, have been requesting a termination of base operations within five years as part of the relocation deal. Is there any possibility at all that the U.S. government will accept and act on this request?
A: We are always open to steps that we can take to minimize the impact of base operations on people who live nearby, and we have been the champions in urging for an expeditious process to begin construction of the replacement facility at Henoko (of Nago city in northern Okinawa Prefecture).
But let’s not forget what the purpose of the bases and the mission of U.S. Forces Japan are. It is to protect Japan, to defend Japan and to keep the peace. We are unwilling to trade steps that would ameliorate local concerns for the security of Japan. We are seeking to achieve both ends, and that’s why we have taken a number of steps with regard to land return, with regard to the environment, with regard to noise mitigation and so on. But it is also why we believe that it’s essential that the Marines continue to operate.
Q: The Japanese government has just decided to lift some of its sanctions on North Korea in return for the start of the investigation into the abductees issue by North Korean authorities. Do you have any concern about this decision? Do you think it could undermine the position of the other member states of the Six Party talks, including the United States, to resolve the missile and nuclear issues?
A: We deeply empathize with the families of abductee victims, and understand fully why this is a priority for so many Japanese people and for the Japanese government.
There is no fundamental contradiction between each of us seeking to protect and defend the interests of our citizens, and pursuing those pending humanitarian issues and, on the other hand, our close coordination on the nuclear and missile programs.
I am confident that Japan will pursue this issue in a way that is responsible, both toward the abductees’ families and toward its partners in the denuclearization effort.
LESSON NOT LOST
Q: Japan recently invited Sergei Naryshkin, speaker of the Lower House of the Russian Duma, on whom the U.S. government imposed a travel ban as part of the sanctions against Russia regarding its annexation of Crimea. This is just one recent example of Japan’s approach to Russia, which is a bit different from that of the United States. How much of a disturbing element could this kind of difference be for the bilateral alliance relationship between the United States and Japan?
A: There are, and can be, and should be, variations in how individual countries respond. That’s fine as long as they are responding along the same basic lines, and as long as they are manifesting unity of policy and unity of purpose.
The Japanese government clearly recognizes that the unity in the international community will ultimately be one of the factors that convinces Russia that it must adjust its behavior and stop the challenge to international law and values.
I have a high degree of confidence that the Japanese government also recognizes that unity in this issue also has significant implications for the Asia-Pacific region. There are abundant analogies that can be drawn between Russia’s behavior and the threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity, much closer to home for Japan. That lesson has not been lost on the Japanese government, and we’re counting on them.
Q: I was surprised to hear Obama mention, when he visited Japan, that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty would be applied to the Senkaku Islands. The article stipulates the U.S. commitment to defend Japan. I know that it was not a new statement for the U.S. government but, coming from the president, it creates totally different political and diplomatic dynamics. What made the U.S. government decide to do that?
A: In April, we found ourselves in the final planning stages for President Obama’s visit, and I think it is probably fair to say that there were, notwithstanding the many statements by Cabinet officials and below, plenty of people in Japan, including in the media, who still seemed to question whether or not this was in fact the authoritative U.S. position. It’s also conceivable that there were people outside of Japan who might have harbored some doubt.
Q: With regard to the actions by China in the South China Sea, you made a statement in a recent teleconference with the media, “China should remove the oil rig.” I wonder if you also have any specific advice to China regarding the Senkaku issue.
A: Well, I have specific advice that applies in all such cases, which is that the watchword here is “restraint.”
Let me say, in the first instance, with regard to Article 5 and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, statements such as the one that the president made, clearly and unequivocally reaffirming our commitment, are not threats. These statements create the diplomatic and political space that ensures that Japan and China, or any protagonist on a territorial issue, understands that the only acceptable vehicle for resolving these issues is a peaceful vehicle.
It can be a diplomatic channel, which is everybody’s first choice. It can entail recourse to an international legal mechanism, as the Philippines case showed. But it should not be through the use of force, the threat of force or coercion.
The principle of restraint, which is frankly a matter of common sense, directly applies in the East China Sea.
I think that Prime Minister Abe’s call for dialogue, and his call for practical mechanisms that will help prevent incidents or manage incidents so that they don’t escalate, is very constructive. I think it would be highly desirable if the Chinese side would respond favorably to that initiative.
Things like hotlines, (and) things like professional military-to-military agreements on handling unplanned incidents, all help hedge against a crisis. Let’s not forget that we’re in the 21st century, where the extraordinary interdependence among countries means that “your pain is my pain.” There is every reason for China and Japan, I believe, to look for political and diplomatic ways to either manage their differences in the East China Sea or shelve their differences.
Q: When Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine last December, the U.S. government issued a statement that it was disappointed. Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard University criticized Abe’s handling of these history-related issues for putting “nationalistic wrapping paper” on the defense and alliance policy package. Does it really make it harder for the U.S. government to work on the alliance management when the prime minister takes actions that make neighboring countries uncomfortable?
A: Well, let me put it this way. When a good friend of Japan, like Joe Nye, criticizes the prime minister of Japan, my job doesn’t get easier.
But regardless of what individual pundits are saying, the key thing to remember when asking ourselves about the alliance, and the effect that domestic policies or political actions have on it, is that the strength of Japan in economic, diplomatic and in military terms is closely connected to the national security interests of the United States.
The United States benefits directly from a Japan whose voice is respected by its neighbors. The United States suffers strategically when tensions between Japan and its neighbors, particularly democratic neighbors, rise.
In March, in The Hague, President Obama hosted a meeting with Prime Minister Abe and (South Korean) President Park Geun-hye. The three leaders reached a very important agreement on our strategic approach to regional security and to handling the threat from North Korea. That was very positive, and has had an extremely beneficial impact on the alliance.
HELPING CHINA TO BE HEARD
Q: There was a survey on regional issues released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank. It was a survey of policy experts in 10 countries plus Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific region. When they were asked about their views on the U.S. rebalance, the entire region welcomed that policy initiative with an overwhelming majority. But only China did not. Only China said that it was too confrontational to China. Even though the United States has been saying that it’s not about China, Chinese do not believe you. What is wrong?
A: There is a widespread storyline among Chinese officials, and perhaps among the Chinese people, that the U.S. goal is containment of China. There is also a theory that the United States is somehow using “magical powers” to “create trouble” for China. That’s not supported by the facts. To the contrary, nothing could be further from the truth.
No country, no major power, has done more to facilitate the emergence of a prosperous and stable China than the United States. Whether it is China’s membership in the World Trade Organization or whether it is China’s participation in the G-20, or any other number of examples, the United States has looked for ways to ensure that China, China’s voice, was heard in international and regional fora.
What we ask in exchange for the ability to help shape the rules that have allowed China to grow and prosper is that China accepts the principle and rules that bind the big and strong countries, as well as the small and weak. That is our message to China with regard to a number of the outstanding problems and challenges in the region.
Take, for example, the deployment by China of its oil rig to waters in the Paracel Islands. The United States doesn’t take Vietnam’s side against China or China’s side against Vietnam. But we, of course, have called repeatedly on all claimants to clarify their claims in the South China Sea and elsewhere in terms consistent with international law because we very much think that ambiguity about claims creates an opening for misunderstanding and confrontation.
The issue, though, is a matter of judgment. Whether or not China has a right to move an oil rig, along with many, many coast guard ships and, I would add, a number of military vessels, PLA (People’s Liberation Army) Navy vessels, hovering just over the horizon, the question that we are all asking is: Is it a good idea? Does it make sense? Why, in a period of significant tension in the region when Chinese leaders have made public proclamations about their commitment to a peaceful environment, is it necessary for China to suddenly and abruptly deploy this rig in waters that, as is well known, the Vietnamese consider to be their exclusive economic zone? Near areas where the Vietnamese, themselves have been operating for years? Why now? Is it a good idea?
Is it any surprise that the response by the region is one of intense anxiety? We want China to have good relations with its neighbors.
Q: The implementability or sustainability of the rebalance has been questioned. The recent deterioration of the Iraq situation is making this concern and skepticism among regional states much stronger. On top of Iraq, Syria and Iran also present serious problems. Ukraine is also another serious diplomatic and security issue that the United States has to pay attention to. With all these problems in the Middle East and Europe, is the U.S. rebalance to Asia still implementable? Can the regional countries, including Japan, count on it?
A: There’s only one reason why the strategy of rebalance would be sustained over time in the face of an endless series of competing global challenges. That would be: if rebalance were in the strategic interests of the United States.
It is. For that reason, the policy, which we refer to as “rebalance,” in other words, a policy of active and intense engagement in the part of the world that serves as the driver of global growth, the part of the world that will shape the 21st century--the “good news story” on planet Earth--will continue.
Look, there will be threats of terrorism and radical fundamentalism in the Middle East, there will be outbreaks of war, famine, plague, floods, pestilence and maybe even asteroids heading for Earth. This is not an either/or proposition. We’re engaged across a very wide spectrum of challenges and, frankly, we always have been.
Q: It seems that there is a widely shared view in China that the bilateral relationship with the United States has been deteriorating since the Obama-Xi summit talks in Sunnylands, Calif., last June. What is your view?
A: Since Sunnylands, there has been continuous engagement at very high levels between the United States and China. The reason that is so important is that the leaders and the governments continue to work to develop strategies to ensure that we are cooperating on areas of importance to each of us; that we are managing our differences; and that we are being direct and candid about the areas where we disagree.
Now, there are events that we have to deal with and that we react to. There are some Chinese actions with regard to cyber-enabled theft of U.S. economic information that is then transferred to Chinese companies who commercialize it and use it for business purposes. There are issues in which China, by declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) without consultations, raised tensions.
But there are also areas like climate change, HFCs (hydrofluorocarbons) or Sudan, in which the United States and China have made significant progress and moved measurably toward solutions that benefit both of us and the international community.
When you take a snapshot of the relationship at any given moment, some things will be up, some things will be down. The important thing is not where we are at any given moment but where are we going?
The direction that the United States wants to go in our relations with China is forward. By “forward” I mean to ensure that we are working together to the maximum extent on the most important issues. To ensure that we are addressing our differences candidly and constructively. To ensure that China and China’s neighbors are reassured that the United States will continue to stand up for and defend both the principles we live by and the international system that has allowed China to grow.
* * *
Daniel Russel has served as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs since 2013. Prior to his current position, Russel served at the White House as National Security Council senior director for Asian affairs.
(This interview was conducted by national security correspondent Yoichi Kato and Astushi Okudera, diplomatic correspondent of the American General Bureau.)
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN
July 05, 2014
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN
The top Asia policymaker in the Obama administration said he believes that the watchword for territorial disputes in East Asia should be “restraint.”
In a recent interview with The Asahi Shimbun, Daniel Russel, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, explained that the statement by President Barack Obama that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty would be applied to the Senkaku Islands is not a threat. Instead, it creates the “diplomatic and political space” for Japan and China to engage in negotiations, Russel said.
He praised Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s call for dialogue and crisis prevention mechanisms as “very constructive,” adding that “it would be highly desirable if the Chinese side would respond favorably to that initiative.”
Commenting on the recent Chinese action over a major dispute with Vietnam in the South China Sea, Russel pointed out that it is a question of judgment.
“Is it a good idea for China to suddenly deploy this oil rig in waters that the Vietnamese consider to be their exclusive economic zone?” he asked.
He categorically denied the view that the United States is trying to contain China through its rebalance policy.
“No country, no major power, has done more to facilitate the emergence of a prosperous and stable China than the United States,” he said.
As for the current status of Japan-U.S. relations, Russel said, “We are in a very good place,” and welcomed the decision by the Abe administration to relax Japan’s self-imposed restriction on the exercise of the right to collective self-defense.
“We expect it will be a positive factor and advance the interests of the United States by having the effect of enabling Japan to become an even more active contributor to stability in the region,” he said.
Excerpts from his interview follow:
* * *
Question: How do you assess the current status of Japan-U.S. relations?
Russel: As someone who has been involved personally and deeply in Japan and in Japan-U.S. relations (through) my entire career, it feels like we are in a very good place. This is an important time, obviously, not only in Asia, but globally. The benefit that accrues to the United States for having a friend and partner like Japan is immense.
Q: Now in Tokyo one of the most controversial issues is the relaxation of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. At first, can you clarify the position of the U.S. government on this issue?
A: The effort to change Japan’s interpretation (of the Constitution) to allow for the exercise of (the right to) collective self-defense, which is a recognized right in the United Nations Charter, is a Japanese effort, not an American effort. We are not pushing Japan to do things that the Japanese people are not comfortable with.
We welcome it and we support it. But we respect the right of Japan, through its governmental processes, to make the determination of what exactly that’s going to look like and how they’re going to implement a decision that is Japan’s to take.
Q: Is it fair to say that the U.S. government regards this relaxation of self-imposed restrictions as a positive factor in terms of enhancing the alliance?
A: We expect it will be a positive factor and advance the interests of the United States, by having the effect of enabling Japan to become an even more active contributor to stability in the region. Building out the already formidable U.S.-Japan security partnership is in the best interests of the United States, Japan and the countries of the region.
Q: Prime Minister Abe repeatedly said that he wanted to make the Cabinet decision on this initiative in time for the review of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Last October, both governments agreed to complete that review by the end of this year. This deadline has worked as a strong driver for the Japanese government to make the decision on the right to collective self-defense issue. Can you give me your sense on this time frame issue?
A: Here’s the way to look at it. Both the United States and Japan believe that the time has come to revise our Defense Guidelines to make the alliance more effective and more relevant to the challenges of the 21st century.
Last October, I went to Tokyo with Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to attend the Security Consultative Committee, or the two-plus-two meeting, and they decided (with their Japanese counterparts) that they would work to complete the Guidelines review in the course of 2014. But I wouldn’t overstate the significance of a particular time frame. The important thing is doing it right.
The fact that there is open discussion of the right to collective self-defense issue in Japan ensures that, when an ultimate decision is made, it will be understood and it will be supported, in the first instance, by the Japanese people, which is the most important thing, but, in the second instance, that it will be understood and, one hopes, supported in the region as well.
Q: As for the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa Prefecture, both Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima and the mayor of Ginowan, which currently hosts the base, have been requesting a termination of base operations within five years as part of the relocation deal. Is there any possibility at all that the U.S. government will accept and act on this request?
A: We are always open to steps that we can take to minimize the impact of base operations on people who live nearby, and we have been the champions in urging for an expeditious process to begin construction of the replacement facility at Henoko (of Nago city in northern Okinawa Prefecture).
But let’s not forget what the purpose of the bases and the mission of U.S. Forces Japan are. It is to protect Japan, to defend Japan and to keep the peace. We are unwilling to trade steps that would ameliorate local concerns for the security of Japan. We are seeking to achieve both ends, and that’s why we have taken a number of steps with regard to land return, with regard to the environment, with regard to noise mitigation and so on. But it is also why we believe that it’s essential that the Marines continue to operate.
Q: The Japanese government has just decided to lift some of its sanctions on North Korea in return for the start of the investigation into the abductees issue by North Korean authorities. Do you have any concern about this decision? Do you think it could undermine the position of the other member states of the Six Party talks, including the United States, to resolve the missile and nuclear issues?
A: We deeply empathize with the families of abductee victims, and understand fully why this is a priority for so many Japanese people and for the Japanese government.
There is no fundamental contradiction between each of us seeking to protect and defend the interests of our citizens, and pursuing those pending humanitarian issues and, on the other hand, our close coordination on the nuclear and missile programs.
I am confident that Japan will pursue this issue in a way that is responsible, both toward the abductees’ families and toward its partners in the denuclearization effort.
LESSON NOT LOST
Q: Japan recently invited Sergei Naryshkin, speaker of the Lower House of the Russian Duma, on whom the U.S. government imposed a travel ban as part of the sanctions against Russia regarding its annexation of Crimea. This is just one recent example of Japan’s approach to Russia, which is a bit different from that of the United States. How much of a disturbing element could this kind of difference be for the bilateral alliance relationship between the United States and Japan?
A: There are, and can be, and should be, variations in how individual countries respond. That’s fine as long as they are responding along the same basic lines, and as long as they are manifesting unity of policy and unity of purpose.
The Japanese government clearly recognizes that the unity in the international community will ultimately be one of the factors that convinces Russia that it must adjust its behavior and stop the challenge to international law and values.
I have a high degree of confidence that the Japanese government also recognizes that unity in this issue also has significant implications for the Asia-Pacific region. There are abundant analogies that can be drawn between Russia’s behavior and the threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity, much closer to home for Japan. That lesson has not been lost on the Japanese government, and we’re counting on them.
Q: I was surprised to hear Obama mention, when he visited Japan, that Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty would be applied to the Senkaku Islands. The article stipulates the U.S. commitment to defend Japan. I know that it was not a new statement for the U.S. government but, coming from the president, it creates totally different political and diplomatic dynamics. What made the U.S. government decide to do that?
A: In April, we found ourselves in the final planning stages for President Obama’s visit, and I think it is probably fair to say that there were, notwithstanding the many statements by Cabinet officials and below, plenty of people in Japan, including in the media, who still seemed to question whether or not this was in fact the authoritative U.S. position. It’s also conceivable that there were people outside of Japan who might have harbored some doubt.
Q: With regard to the actions by China in the South China Sea, you made a statement in a recent teleconference with the media, “China should remove the oil rig.” I wonder if you also have any specific advice to China regarding the Senkaku issue.
A: Well, I have specific advice that applies in all such cases, which is that the watchword here is “restraint.”
Let me say, in the first instance, with regard to Article 5 and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, statements such as the one that the president made, clearly and unequivocally reaffirming our commitment, are not threats. These statements create the diplomatic and political space that ensures that Japan and China, or any protagonist on a territorial issue, understands that the only acceptable vehicle for resolving these issues is a peaceful vehicle.
It can be a diplomatic channel, which is everybody’s first choice. It can entail recourse to an international legal mechanism, as the Philippines case showed. But it should not be through the use of force, the threat of force or coercion.
The principle of restraint, which is frankly a matter of common sense, directly applies in the East China Sea.
I think that Prime Minister Abe’s call for dialogue, and his call for practical mechanisms that will help prevent incidents or manage incidents so that they don’t escalate, is very constructive. I think it would be highly desirable if the Chinese side would respond favorably to that initiative.
Things like hotlines, (and) things like professional military-to-military agreements on handling unplanned incidents, all help hedge against a crisis. Let’s not forget that we’re in the 21st century, where the extraordinary interdependence among countries means that “your pain is my pain.” There is every reason for China and Japan, I believe, to look for political and diplomatic ways to either manage their differences in the East China Sea or shelve their differences.
Q: When Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine last December, the U.S. government issued a statement that it was disappointed. Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard University criticized Abe’s handling of these history-related issues for putting “nationalistic wrapping paper” on the defense and alliance policy package. Does it really make it harder for the U.S. government to work on the alliance management when the prime minister takes actions that make neighboring countries uncomfortable?
A: Well, let me put it this way. When a good friend of Japan, like Joe Nye, criticizes the prime minister of Japan, my job doesn’t get easier.
But regardless of what individual pundits are saying, the key thing to remember when asking ourselves about the alliance, and the effect that domestic policies or political actions have on it, is that the strength of Japan in economic, diplomatic and in military terms is closely connected to the national security interests of the United States.
The United States benefits directly from a Japan whose voice is respected by its neighbors. The United States suffers strategically when tensions between Japan and its neighbors, particularly democratic neighbors, rise.
In March, in The Hague, President Obama hosted a meeting with Prime Minister Abe and (South Korean) President Park Geun-hye. The three leaders reached a very important agreement on our strategic approach to regional security and to handling the threat from North Korea. That was very positive, and has had an extremely beneficial impact on the alliance.
HELPING CHINA TO BE HEARD
Q: There was a survey on regional issues released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank. It was a survey of policy experts in 10 countries plus Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific region. When they were asked about their views on the U.S. rebalance, the entire region welcomed that policy initiative with an overwhelming majority. But only China did not. Only China said that it was too confrontational to China. Even though the United States has been saying that it’s not about China, Chinese do not believe you. What is wrong?
A: There is a widespread storyline among Chinese officials, and perhaps among the Chinese people, that the U.S. goal is containment of China. There is also a theory that the United States is somehow using “magical powers” to “create trouble” for China. That’s not supported by the facts. To the contrary, nothing could be further from the truth.
No country, no major power, has done more to facilitate the emergence of a prosperous and stable China than the United States. Whether it is China’s membership in the World Trade Organization or whether it is China’s participation in the G-20, or any other number of examples, the United States has looked for ways to ensure that China, China’s voice, was heard in international and regional fora.
What we ask in exchange for the ability to help shape the rules that have allowed China to grow and prosper is that China accepts the principle and rules that bind the big and strong countries, as well as the small and weak. That is our message to China with regard to a number of the outstanding problems and challenges in the region.
Take, for example, the deployment by China of its oil rig to waters in the Paracel Islands. The United States doesn’t take Vietnam’s side against China or China’s side against Vietnam. But we, of course, have called repeatedly on all claimants to clarify their claims in the South China Sea and elsewhere in terms consistent with international law because we very much think that ambiguity about claims creates an opening for misunderstanding and confrontation.
The issue, though, is a matter of judgment. Whether or not China has a right to move an oil rig, along with many, many coast guard ships and, I would add, a number of military vessels, PLA (People’s Liberation Army) Navy vessels, hovering just over the horizon, the question that we are all asking is: Is it a good idea? Does it make sense? Why, in a period of significant tension in the region when Chinese leaders have made public proclamations about their commitment to a peaceful environment, is it necessary for China to suddenly and abruptly deploy this rig in waters that, as is well known, the Vietnamese consider to be their exclusive economic zone? Near areas where the Vietnamese, themselves have been operating for years? Why now? Is it a good idea?
Is it any surprise that the response by the region is one of intense anxiety? We want China to have good relations with its neighbors.
Q: The implementability or sustainability of the rebalance has been questioned. The recent deterioration of the Iraq situation is making this concern and skepticism among regional states much stronger. On top of Iraq, Syria and Iran also present serious problems. Ukraine is also another serious diplomatic and security issue that the United States has to pay attention to. With all these problems in the Middle East and Europe, is the U.S. rebalance to Asia still implementable? Can the regional countries, including Japan, count on it?
A: There’s only one reason why the strategy of rebalance would be sustained over time in the face of an endless series of competing global challenges. That would be: if rebalance were in the strategic interests of the United States.
It is. For that reason, the policy, which we refer to as “rebalance,” in other words, a policy of active and intense engagement in the part of the world that serves as the driver of global growth, the part of the world that will shape the 21st century--the “good news story” on planet Earth--will continue.
Look, there will be threats of terrorism and radical fundamentalism in the Middle East, there will be outbreaks of war, famine, plague, floods, pestilence and maybe even asteroids heading for Earth. This is not an either/or proposition. We’re engaged across a very wide spectrum of challenges and, frankly, we always have been.
Q: It seems that there is a widely shared view in China that the bilateral relationship with the United States has been deteriorating since the Obama-Xi summit talks in Sunnylands, Calif., last June. What is your view?
A: Since Sunnylands, there has been continuous engagement at very high levels between the United States and China. The reason that is so important is that the leaders and the governments continue to work to develop strategies to ensure that we are cooperating on areas of importance to each of us; that we are managing our differences; and that we are being direct and candid about the areas where we disagree.
Now, there are events that we have to deal with and that we react to. There are some Chinese actions with regard to cyber-enabled theft of U.S. economic information that is then transferred to Chinese companies who commercialize it and use it for business purposes. There are issues in which China, by declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) without consultations, raised tensions.
But there are also areas like climate change, HFCs (hydrofluorocarbons) or Sudan, in which the United States and China have made significant progress and moved measurably toward solutions that benefit both of us and the international community.
When you take a snapshot of the relationship at any given moment, some things will be up, some things will be down. The important thing is not where we are at any given moment but where are we going?
The direction that the United States wants to go in our relations with China is forward. By “forward” I mean to ensure that we are working together to the maximum extent on the most important issues. To ensure that we are addressing our differences candidly and constructively. To ensure that China and China’s neighbors are reassured that the United States will continue to stand up for and defend both the principles we live by and the international system that has allowed China to grow.
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Daniel Russel has served as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs since 2013. Prior to his current position, Russel served at the White House as National Security Council senior director for Asian affairs.
(This interview was conducted by national security correspondent Yoichi Kato and Astushi Okudera, diplomatic correspondent of the American General Bureau.)
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN
