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Counterinsurgency operations
Thursday, April 29, 2010
Ikram Sehgal
The recent spate of terrorist attacks is a desperate attempt to break public morale and use the resultant clamour to stop the army's successful counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in Swat and South Waziristan Agency (SWA). While both regions are not entirely cleansed of militant presence, they are now under the writ of civilian authority.
Before the operations in SWA last October, residents were given a window a la Swat to clear the area in order to avoid civilian casualties. This was understandable and politically necessary. It also gave Hakeemullah Mehsud, the fallen head of the TTP, an opportunity to shift back to his stronghold of Orakzai right out of the war zone along with most of the movement's leadership and manpower. "He who fights to run away lives to fight another day" is a classic guerrilla tactic.
As home to many training camps, including some run by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and other Al Qaeda-affiliated (or copycat) terrorist outfits, Orakzai is the launching-pad for numerous suicide bomb attacks conducted across Pakistan. Retaking this area is the key to destroying the leadership capacity of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), crippling its ability to train and launch attacks, and denying it another safe haven for regrouping. The military's offensive codenamed "Khwakh Ba de Sham" literally translates into "I see you". The Pakistani security forces, including the paramilitary FC, backed up by PAF jets, helicopter gunships and artillery support, entered Taliban-controlled areas on the midnight of March 23-24. In the words of Maj-Gen Tariq, IG Frontier Corps, the military commander leading the assault, "Orakzai will be the final battle".
Finding their escape cut off, the militants have chosen to fight and have launched significant assaults on military positions. While the scale of the current operations is far less when compared to last year's, the fighting has been just as bloody. A cordon has been established around many of Orakzai's entry and exit points. Bombarding TTP locations relentlessly, casualties on the militants have been heavy, many of the dead include foreign fighters, Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks, etc. While the PAF has taken many precautions, aerial bombing is tragically never an exact science in COIN operations and should only be a means of last resort. The collateral damage because of a PAF bomb going astray in the Tirah Valley among the Kukikhel tribe was so high that the COAS had to publicly apologise, and promise compensation. Aerial attacks must be selective and coordinated with accurate "actionable intelligence". Otherwise they can be very counterproductive. The complaints of the locals must be taken very seriously and addressed. The state must establish itself as an ally in the eyes of the people.
Without being rooted out completely terrorists will again gather momentum. The dangerous militarism can also appear in forms other than religious extremism. Terrorist acts have recently been carried out in Peshawar and in Swat, including an unsuccessful attack on the US Consulate in Peshawar. Recently a number of local leaders sympathetic to the government have been summarily executed by these elements in Swat. These incidents only confirm why Maulana Fazlullah etc. should have been eliminated in the initial assault. The COAS had to publicly visit Swat to shore up sagging public morale. It is counterproductive to keep the army engaged over a long time because (1) the local population starts to react to what the militants propagate as army excesses and (2) there is a debilitating and corrosive influence on the efficiency, morale and motivation of army personnel. Far more worrying is that success in the battlefield leads to overconfidence and that can breed arrogance, the signs of it are already noticeable, particularly among those who have not seen battle, but revel in the publicity of its success thereof.
The continuing urban terrorism reinforces the need to have an independent counter-terrorist force (CTF) in place, sooner rather than later. The Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) is presently under the civilian control of a superb professional federal secretary narcotics division, Tariq Khosa. Why not convert it into a CTF? The US can help the CTF, providing fund and the tools and training for a well-equipped entity. How long can the intelligentsia and the masses keep on absorbing this tragic collateral damage (in both urban areas and battle zone) as a price to be paid to be rid of the evil incarnate?
Counterterrorism efforts can never be successful without non-violent initiatives viz. (1) dispensing of equitable justice (2) maintaining absolute credibility (3) providing sound education and (4) curbing religious militancy. Preceding all this must be an immediate and adequate relief to those affected by the fighting. For some time the people will believe what you want them to hear, the backlash will come when they find out the truth. The militants will exploit this lack of credibility. It is grist for those who have chosen the path of militancy. The political compulsions of the elected representatives force them to (a) deny acknowledging the obvious (b) shift all the blame for terrorism on the warped ideology of its perpetrators instead of coping with the root causes and (3) passing on the buck on circumstantial evidence.
The madressahs are a very welcome alternative for parents without means to send their children to school. In nearly all cases, it ensures their children get at least one decent meal everyday, No substitute to providing comprehensive education, a vast majority of madressahs impart religious education to the exclusion of almost everything else particularly in the early formative years of the children. Madressahs need re-structuring as educational institutions with a wide range of disciplines.
The US "military surge" in Afghanistan must ensure that the Afghan National Army (ANA) sheds its ceremonial status and seals off the border to prevent the Taliban fleeing across the border. Blunt warnings to Pakistan for not engaging the (Haqqani) HQN and (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) HiG networks are counterproductive, Even if Pakistan had the military means to do so at this time, nobody seems to assess the resultant backlash for Pakistan. There is an immediate need to break up the nexus between India's RAW and the Afghan intelligence agencies. A vast percentage (80 per cent) of bureaucrats of former Soviet vintage has come back from exile in Russia and other CIS countries and now run government departments. They are an anathema to the population outside Kabul. India is interfering in Pakistan's internal stability while defaming Pakistan as a "terrorist sponsor" state on each and every world forum, from every platform imaginable. While Pakistan should certainly do more to stop the Taliban from FATA from going across the Durand Line, the US must decide what is good or bad for the region and reciprocally stop Indian activity on our western borders, particularly Balochistan.
A gigantic effort must aim to improve the quality of lives that people lead, requiring across-the-board economic bolstering of Pakistan, particularly in the tribal areas. Energy being vital for the economy, the US must give serious consideration to our requests for its cheaper form, nuclear energy. The country cannot afford unemployment. With an increasing number of factories closing a religious problem could easily morph into social upheaval. Pakistan has no choice; we must be willing participants against the nemesis of terrorism that clouds our future, not only as a civilised society but as an independent and responsible state in the comity of nations. This war must be won -- it can be won if the US realises that it will take time as well as pragmatic initiatives.
(Excerpts from the talk given at the Atlantic Council, Washington DC, US on April 27, 2010).
The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com
Thursday, April 29, 2010
Ikram Sehgal
The recent spate of terrorist attacks is a desperate attempt to break public morale and use the resultant clamour to stop the army's successful counter-insurgency (COIN) operations in Swat and South Waziristan Agency (SWA). While both regions are not entirely cleansed of militant presence, they are now under the writ of civilian authority.
Before the operations in SWA last October, residents were given a window a la Swat to clear the area in order to avoid civilian casualties. This was understandable and politically necessary. It also gave Hakeemullah Mehsud, the fallen head of the TTP, an opportunity to shift back to his stronghold of Orakzai right out of the war zone along with most of the movement's leadership and manpower. "He who fights to run away lives to fight another day" is a classic guerrilla tactic.
As home to many training camps, including some run by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and other Al Qaeda-affiliated (or copycat) terrorist outfits, Orakzai is the launching-pad for numerous suicide bomb attacks conducted across Pakistan. Retaking this area is the key to destroying the leadership capacity of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), crippling its ability to train and launch attacks, and denying it another safe haven for regrouping. The military's offensive codenamed "Khwakh Ba de Sham" literally translates into "I see you". The Pakistani security forces, including the paramilitary FC, backed up by PAF jets, helicopter gunships and artillery support, entered Taliban-controlled areas on the midnight of March 23-24. In the words of Maj-Gen Tariq, IG Frontier Corps, the military commander leading the assault, "Orakzai will be the final battle".
Finding their escape cut off, the militants have chosen to fight and have launched significant assaults on military positions. While the scale of the current operations is far less when compared to last year's, the fighting has been just as bloody. A cordon has been established around many of Orakzai's entry and exit points. Bombarding TTP locations relentlessly, casualties on the militants have been heavy, many of the dead include foreign fighters, Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks, etc. While the PAF has taken many precautions, aerial bombing is tragically never an exact science in COIN operations and should only be a means of last resort. The collateral damage because of a PAF bomb going astray in the Tirah Valley among the Kukikhel tribe was so high that the COAS had to publicly apologise, and promise compensation. Aerial attacks must be selective and coordinated with accurate "actionable intelligence". Otherwise they can be very counterproductive. The complaints of the locals must be taken very seriously and addressed. The state must establish itself as an ally in the eyes of the people.
Without being rooted out completely terrorists will again gather momentum. The dangerous militarism can also appear in forms other than religious extremism. Terrorist acts have recently been carried out in Peshawar and in Swat, including an unsuccessful attack on the US Consulate in Peshawar. Recently a number of local leaders sympathetic to the government have been summarily executed by these elements in Swat. These incidents only confirm why Maulana Fazlullah etc. should have been eliminated in the initial assault. The COAS had to publicly visit Swat to shore up sagging public morale. It is counterproductive to keep the army engaged over a long time because (1) the local population starts to react to what the militants propagate as army excesses and (2) there is a debilitating and corrosive influence on the efficiency, morale and motivation of army personnel. Far more worrying is that success in the battlefield leads to overconfidence and that can breed arrogance, the signs of it are already noticeable, particularly among those who have not seen battle, but revel in the publicity of its success thereof.
The continuing urban terrorism reinforces the need to have an independent counter-terrorist force (CTF) in place, sooner rather than later. The Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) is presently under the civilian control of a superb professional federal secretary narcotics division, Tariq Khosa. Why not convert it into a CTF? The US can help the CTF, providing fund and the tools and training for a well-equipped entity. How long can the intelligentsia and the masses keep on absorbing this tragic collateral damage (in both urban areas and battle zone) as a price to be paid to be rid of the evil incarnate?
Counterterrorism efforts can never be successful without non-violent initiatives viz. (1) dispensing of equitable justice (2) maintaining absolute credibility (3) providing sound education and (4) curbing religious militancy. Preceding all this must be an immediate and adequate relief to those affected by the fighting. For some time the people will believe what you want them to hear, the backlash will come when they find out the truth. The militants will exploit this lack of credibility. It is grist for those who have chosen the path of militancy. The political compulsions of the elected representatives force them to (a) deny acknowledging the obvious (b) shift all the blame for terrorism on the warped ideology of its perpetrators instead of coping with the root causes and (3) passing on the buck on circumstantial evidence.
The madressahs are a very welcome alternative for parents without means to send their children to school. In nearly all cases, it ensures their children get at least one decent meal everyday, No substitute to providing comprehensive education, a vast majority of madressahs impart religious education to the exclusion of almost everything else particularly in the early formative years of the children. Madressahs need re-structuring as educational institutions with a wide range of disciplines.
The US "military surge" in Afghanistan must ensure that the Afghan National Army (ANA) sheds its ceremonial status and seals off the border to prevent the Taliban fleeing across the border. Blunt warnings to Pakistan for not engaging the (Haqqani) HQN and (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar) HiG networks are counterproductive, Even if Pakistan had the military means to do so at this time, nobody seems to assess the resultant backlash for Pakistan. There is an immediate need to break up the nexus between India's RAW and the Afghan intelligence agencies. A vast percentage (80 per cent) of bureaucrats of former Soviet vintage has come back from exile in Russia and other CIS countries and now run government departments. They are an anathema to the population outside Kabul. India is interfering in Pakistan's internal stability while defaming Pakistan as a "terrorist sponsor" state on each and every world forum, from every platform imaginable. While Pakistan should certainly do more to stop the Taliban from FATA from going across the Durand Line, the US must decide what is good or bad for the region and reciprocally stop Indian activity on our western borders, particularly Balochistan.
A gigantic effort must aim to improve the quality of lives that people lead, requiring across-the-board economic bolstering of Pakistan, particularly in the tribal areas. Energy being vital for the economy, the US must give serious consideration to our requests for its cheaper form, nuclear energy. The country cannot afford unemployment. With an increasing number of factories closing a religious problem could easily morph into social upheaval. Pakistan has no choice; we must be willing participants against the nemesis of terrorism that clouds our future, not only as a civilised society but as an independent and responsible state in the comity of nations. This war must be won -- it can be won if the US realises that it will take time as well as pragmatic initiatives.
(Excerpts from the talk given at the Atlantic Council, Washington DC, US on April 27, 2010).
The writer is a defence and political analyst. Email: isehgal@pathfinder9.com
