Conflicting U.S. Strategies Cause Problems with Pakistan

[5link]

I find Stratfor to be a very non partisan company and their intelligence is always evidence based and omniscient . So here's an analysis of the current situation.
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Conflicting U.S. Strategies Cause Problems with Pakistan

Pakistan closed on Thursday the most important supply route for U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The move came after NATO helicopters pursued militants across the border and killed three Pakistani security personnel. Militants frequently use Pakistani territory as a launch pad for attacks against coalition forces on the Afghan side of the border. This latest incident is the fourth instance in less than a week of NATO gunships crossing the border into the Pakistani tribal belt — in what is being described by NATO as the “hot pursuit” of militants.

This recent uptick in cross-border incursions involving helicopter-borne forces could very well be an attempt by the United States to impose a new norm, having successfully established unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes in Pakistan as a fait accompli. From Pakistan’s perspective, although UAV strikes have been tolerated, when foreign forces publicly cross the border, they also cross a redline that Islamabad cannot bear. At a time when the Pakistanis are heavily dependent upon American financial assistance (now more than ever before because of the floods), the move to shut down the supply route shows that Pakistan is not without options when it comes to limiting the United States’ unilateral maneuvers against Islamist militants on Pakistani soil.

Though this is the most serious escalation of tensions between the two sides since the beginning of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the two sides are likely to reach an understanding in which Washington will agree to keep NATO forces from crossing the border — at least until the next time such an incident occurs. This is because the United States is trying to address two separate and contradictory issues. On one hand, Washington is struggling to stabilize Afghanistan and extricate its forces from the country as soon as possible. On the other hand, it is trying to fight al Qaeda-linked transnational jihadists headquartered in Pakistan.

“The bottom line is that the United States cannot afford to alienate Pakistan, nor can it afford to worsen the situation for a country that is already significantly destabilized. “

The United States is extremely dependent upon a close working relationship with Pakistan to achieve the first goal. Washington needs Islamabad’s help in its efforts to undermine the momentum of a growing Taliban insurgency. But more important, Pakistan’s assistance will be needed in the not-too-distant phase of reaching a negotiated settlement with the Afghan Taliban, which would create the circumstances for Western forces to exit Afghanistan.

To achieve the second objective, Washington needs to be able to strike at jihadists that maintain safe havens in the border areas in northwestern Pakistan; in this region, jihadists not only target coalition troops in eastern Afghanistan, but they also hatch plots to stage attacks in Europe and North America. And this is where the United States runs into problems. Pakistan is limited on its side of the border because it has its own counterinsurgency efforts against Taliban rebels and needs to avoid stirring up conflict with those Taliban who are focused on Afghanistan instead of Pakistan.

Indeed, the United States has seen that pressure on Pakistan to “do more” against Islamist militants on its soil has limited effectiveness. Likewise, the United States is limited in its options for unilateral action, as anything beyond UAV strikes will trigger the Pakistanis to react strongly — as they did Thursday. The bottom line is that the United States cannot afford to alienate Pakistan, nor can it afford to worsen the situation for a country that is already significantly destabilized.

On the contrary, for the United States to achieve anything resembling success in Afghanistan, it needs to stabilize Pakistan and ensure Islamabad’s cooperation so that Washington can withdraw its forces. The Obama administration needs to be able to find a way to balance the goal of militarily withdrawing from Afghanistan with the need to fight transnational jihadists in Pakistan. This can only be achieved by de-linking the strategy against the Taliban in Afghanistan from the strategy against al Qaeda in Pakistan.

 

[muse]

for the United States to achieve anything resembling success in Afghanistan, it needs to stabilize Pakistan and ensure Islamabad’s cooperation so that Washington can withdraw its forces. The Obama administration needs to be able to find a way to balance the goal of militarily withdrawing from Afghanistan with the need to fight transnational jihadists in Pakistan. This can only be achieved by de-linking the strategy against the Taliban in Afghanistan from the strategy against al Qaeda in Pakistan.

For now nearly 10 years, this is the conflict we see playing out among factions of US policy makers, one faction in particular, uses the NYT to promote it's arguments. This faction, to my thinking, fanatics, couch their, again, to my thinking, ethnocentric and nationalistic "sentiment" in a cloud of fear to keep both public opinion and the opposing faction in check -- BTW, the opposing faction's point of view, is encapsulated above in quotes - - Pakistani policy makers in the meantime, play damsel in distress (read damsel awaiting Dollars) - these policy makers have literally made it impossible for their own citizenry to have any kind of effect on them, by ensuring that all "action" or "active" elements are the responsibility (read, blame for) of the US while they play the "passive" element - hence, the Pakistani ambassador in Washington advice that the US pursue Pakistan, as if a nubile, yet intrigued waif.

A sad spectacle for Pakistanis and an example of just how deep this struggle between factions of US policy makers is that so important a relationship(in the context of US engagement in Afghanistan) is held hostage to these policy makers.

 

[5link]

For now nearly 10 years, this is the conflict we see playing out among factions of US policy makers, one faction in particular, uses the NYT to promote it's arguments. This faction, to my thinking, fanatics, couch their, again, to my thinking, ethnocentric and nationalistic "sentiment" in a cloud of fear to keep both public opinion and the opposing faction in check -- BTW, the opposing faction's point of view, is encapsulated above in quotes - - Pakistani policy makers in the meantime, play damsel in distress (read damsel awaiting Dollars) - these policy makers have literally made it impossible for their own citizenry to have any kind of effect on them, by ensuring that all "action" or "active" elements are the responsibility (read, blame for) of the US while they play the "passive" element - hence, the Pakistani ambassador in Washington advice that the US pursue Pakistan, as if a nubile, yet intrigued waif.

A sad spectacle for Pakistanis and an example of just how deep this struggle between factions of US policy makers is that so important a relationship(in the context of US engagement in Afghanistan) is held hostage to these policy makers.

Thanks for that concise and meaningful reply. Good to see that there are people on this form who use pragmatic and reasonable arguments to discuss this topic. It's a relief from the constant bickering of some Indian and Pakistani idiots that fight endlessly over things that don't matter.

 

[muse]

I invite readers to review the piece below, but do be mindful, that if now after ten years, again, ten years, the US remains unclear about it's interests, who in their right mind can blame Pakistani policy makers for being cautious when dealing with US policy makers :


Petraeusian colours
Shahzad Chaudhry



David Petraeus has made his mark, not in Afghanistan but in Pakistan. As I had indicated in an earlier column when anticipating changes in his strategy vis-à-vis McChrystal, he was unlikely to fight in Afghanistan where the war would be messy and unwinnable. He was more likely to export his conflict into Pakistan. That is what seems to be emerging in the repeated attacks and violations on Pakistan’s border. To recapitulate the essence of the thrust in that article: McChrystal was a warring general beholden to his given task of securing Afghanistan, while Petraeus would be a political general keeping his losses down in Afghanistan by not fighting there — Obama has said almost as much lamenting almost nil progress in Kandahar that was to be NATO/ISAF’s next frontier — instead seeking to find action which could be appeasing back home to Congress yet seen to be fighting a war of sorts. This he has done by an effort to externalise the Afghan conflict. What would he gain in military terms should come later, but of essence is what is really playing out in Washington as we speak.

Look at the mix of players in Afghanistan today. There is a resurrected Eikenberry, the American ambassador, virtually sidelined by McChrystal and keen to make his mark with his principals at the state department. There is a rejuvenated Spanta, the Afghan National Security Advisor and a vitriolic fire-breathing voice against Pakistan, and hence an increasingly popular figure with the American establishment. There is a Karzai who has a multi-forked tongue, not knowing which way his mentors would need him to respond on any given day and, of course, Petraeus, the collaborator with most voices in Washington.

In Washington itself we have an entirely confused Obama who, unfortunately, for the umpteenth time has taken his eye off the ball in Afghanistan. He puts such large gaps in monitoring execution of his stated policies that divisive voices within his own administration end up filling the void and exploit the gaps to their own ends. He will, as part of a self-conceived script, now only review Afghanistan in December to determine the state of his union and its Afghanistan policy, and then in March 2011 provide his National Security Statement, an annual feature, in an oratorical expression that he may then find at complete odds with his given direction. In the interregnum there is space for the likes of Bob Woodward to add further venom with his characterisation of Pakistan as the ‘cancer’. What Obama can do in the meanwhile is shed tears before such scribes and lament on his inability to seek a unified position among his principal players. If Pakistan was his prime interest to seek stability in Afghanistan and support in Pakistan, it is no more as his team plays on in the region with the abandon of a group gone berserk. The state department is the most hawkish of them all — much more than Bob Gates or his own joint chiefs — which only sees red when looking at Pakistan despite Madam Hillary’s pronouncements in Pakistan on her two fence-mending visits. So while President Obama languishes in inactivity besieged by his poor ratings in public perception, an upcoming November election and his own long-term prospects, on which the jury is out, sees his team of disparate voices ruling the roost.

Join the dots. The state department wants an aggressive treatment for Pakistan’s imbroglio in South and North Waziristan. Their representative Eikenberry pursues the policy at close hand and overrides any Afghan pragmatism into virtual acquiescence — Spanta and company can only relish that. Petraeus is answerable, by the book, to his commander-in-chief. The president being virtually absent from the scene permits him the flexibility to exercise variations of a strategy that no one has a handle on at the moment, and the politics of it all comes into shape. What we see as repeated forays into Pakistan by their offensive helicopter missions is just that — a manifestation of a confused the US’s Afghan policy going awry.

Let us review the possible reaction of Pakistan. Red lines are clearly laid out: no American or NATO boots on the ground and no violation of its territory and airspace under any circumstances — drones are another chapter best left to a separate treatment. Hence a polite reminder as an initial rejoinder: ‘Your first instance is unacceptable even though it may have been under the rubric of hot pursuit.’ We did a lot of that against the Soviets between 1984-1989, but with a lot more care, and that was against a declared threat to Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty and integrity — but repetitions since the first instance are but clear, deliberate and resolved manifestations by an assumed ally against its most important ally in their mission in Afghanistan. This is clear ‘offensive action’ — unacceptable and very different from ‘hot pursuit’ that may carry a mitigating tactical justification and an implicit sanctification. Remember, almost 80 percent of US logistics still pass through Pakistan to sustain the NATO/ISAF forces. Another illuminating variation that must be factored into this reincarnation of a changing strategy is a total abstention of the CIA-controlled and -employed drones against any of Pakistan’s military targets though they have been at it now for years and operating against their own list of al Qaeda-Taliban targets in Pakistan’s FATA region.

What does it all say? CIA does its own war and Petraeus is fighting his. And between the two the original concept of the US’s involvement is being blown to smithereens under a guard that is in no one’s control. Mr Obama would rise to the fray when it is time for another oration.

What should Pakistan do? Place your relevant assets in the area to shoot down an intruder when it ventures in the next time, even if we are still in the process of formulating our political responses to these wanton acts of unfathomable consequences to the US’s long-term interests. We did that to the Soviets and many times over, so why not another violator of reason? If for nothing else, this should awaken the sleeping heads in Washington to be more prudent and rein in those riding their disparate horses in different directions. Pakistan may be down but it is not out.

The consequences? Many. None are easy to digest in a difficult domestic environment. So be it. Changes need to come overnight in the American mindset prevailing in the Afghan theatre. Soft measures would and should follow including suspending NATO supplies and, hopefully, some hard talk to ascertain if the alliance is over and done with. There is, however, a need for some resolute defensive measures as well in line with Pakistan’s right to protect the violation of its own interests and as per international conventions to protect its territories. Once, twice or thrice, we may make space for some uncalled for exuberance of a field commander, but externalising the war because nothing seems to be gained in the main theatre is a step too far. American interests are wide and varied as they search for sense in their Afghan expedition. They should not let a few hijack those interests for their own sake and for the sake of the region.

The writer is a defence and political analyst

 

[5link]

"In Washington itself we have an entirely confused Obama..."

This line describes America's position well. They are essentially scratching their heads in Afghanistan. Obama has chosen a policy of "bluff" where he announces damning threats to the Taliban while hoping no one notices the deals they'll soon be making with the Taliban after 2011.

 

[muse]

If you are new on this forum, search past threads, you will find any number of Pakistanis with experience pointing out to US types how the kinds of goals they choose to pursue came with consequences and of course unintended consequences -- you will notice that Pakistan is either solution or 180 degrees, the problem, depending on which set of personalities and interests are ascendant in Washington and kabul - honestly, who can say they understand US interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia, what is clear though is that continuation of war, seems not to be something they seriously want an end to.