fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
Comment: The challenge ahead Zafar Hilaly
To succeed today, it seems essential that first and foremost the power of the armed groups within Pakistan be broken. Without an all-out effort to do so, the terrorised population will not lend us support
The outside world does not see us as we see ourselves and that is understandably a cause of much anguish and hand wringing. And while often, all too often, our critics get us wrong, rather than dismiss their perspective of Pakistan out of hand, let us concede that, on occasion, they are right and that the image and the reality do not conflict, and that we do indeed seem to dream when we are awake and not only when we are asleep.
The fact is that nowhere else today have so many armed foreign outlaws been able to use the territory of a sovereign state to wage war for so long, and with such impunity, against other countries. And now, these foreigners who roam more or less unchallenged have become the junior partners of more powerful homegrown extremists in a war against the country itself.
Another reality is that nowhere else has a country been in denial for as long as we have been in the face of such open threats and attacks when our future, perhaps our very existence, depends on eliminating this self-created monster.
Half-baked measures and flaky concepts such as the good and bad Taliban, soft or hard strategic depth, have failed time and time again and the country continues to spiral downwards, creating an anarchical situation which weakens the state further while strengthening the non-state elements. It is best, therefore, that this vicious cycle is broken, and now, through a decisive long-term strategy rather than hesitant, patchwork measures, which, because they have not been thought through, carry little conviction.
Strategic depth, for example, was never a sensible idea. National security must be built on national strength, buttressed, when necessary, by traditional alliances and not through an idea that encroaches on the sovereignty of another country, which can as easily be directed against Pakistan by others seeking similar strategic depths. Besides, how can one, from the practical standpoint, fight an adversary, in our case India, from beyond our borders, without becoming dangerously dependent on the goodwill of the other state? Would it not be far better to repair and rebuild our state-to-state relationship with Afghanistan? Not only would that make it considerably easier to offset the Indian influence in Afghanistan but, given Afghanistans geographical imperatives, Kabul too would be far better off politically and economically developing a cooperative relationship with Pakistan.
As for the notion of good and bad Taliban, the Taliban are now frankly an autonomous force beyond the control and manipulation of Pakistan or, for that matter, any other country or militant umbrella group.
As long ago as 1995-96, when the Taliban were almost wholly dependant on Pakistans goodwill for recruits, supplies and funding, they had balked at being ordered around. And on even a matter as strategically peripheral as blowing up the Buddhas of Bamiyan had scornfully rejected our counsel. Perhaps that was the time for us to draw the conclusion that the Taliban mindset could as easily be directed against our civilisational values and pose as great a threat to us as they did to our adversaries. And to be fair, Benazir Bhutto saw the danger. Her antipathy to the Taliban cause was no secret and nor was their animus towards her. And she did try and gather support, but to no avail. Her counsels were rejected and her orders flouted. The prospect of Afghanistan and subsequently Central Asia being drawn into an axis of Islamic fundamentalist states centred around Kandahar and dominated by Pakistan was a prospect that was simply too alluring. When nationalism and religion combine with the personal aggrandisement of some, nothing can stand in the way and certainly not a woman.
Of course, we can continue to blame it on others and there is so much blame to spread around that attention is easily deflected. But that is hardly the answer or the requirement of the moment. To succeed today, it seems essential that first and foremost the power of the armed groups within Pakistan be broken. Without an all-out effort to do so, the terrorised population will not lend us support. They will sit on the fence as spectators, rather than players. They will be coerced to provide the enemy shelter and supplies. They will be forcibly recruited and serve as foot soldiers and once in the service of the enemy, albeit reluctantly, they become the enemy.
But defeating the extremists can only be one dimension of the strategy. The other is to seek the reintegration of rank and file elements and this is a no less challenging task. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants are concepts that the UN has pursued in many civil conflicts around the world. The idea is to wean away former combatants, including non-state elements, with the assistance of donor countries in situations where such elements have agreed to lay down arms or have been captured. We see no signs of such a policy at present.
Since Pakistan is effectively at war, the country should be brought on a war footing. That will help the public realise that sacrifices are inevitable. It cannot be business as usual. Civil-military relations, that have never been good, must be repaired and rebuilt. A united front must be forged against terrorism. Moreover, since the armed power of the extremists can only be curbed by the army, and since the army will require broad political support, the initiative for putting the country on a war footing must come from the army. The mainstream political parties undoubtedly will provide the required support and also help galvanise civil society. In this regard, the role of Punjab, where extremism is entrenched, will be crucial, which means that Punjab will have to emerge from its current mood of denial.
Only such dramatic measures would ensure long-term stability and send a powerful message to friends and foes alike that Pakistan finally means business. The world has been waiting for such a message. It would encourage them to do more to help the country economically and in other ways. Under Obama, the US has certainly shown welcome signs of that and so may others if they see us manifestly willing and determined to measure up to the challenge.
The writer is a former ambassador. He can be reached at charles123it@hotmail.com
To succeed today, it seems essential that first and foremost the power of the armed groups within Pakistan be broken. Without an all-out effort to do so, the terrorised population will not lend us support
The outside world does not see us as we see ourselves and that is understandably a cause of much anguish and hand wringing. And while often, all too often, our critics get us wrong, rather than dismiss their perspective of Pakistan out of hand, let us concede that, on occasion, they are right and that the image and the reality do not conflict, and that we do indeed seem to dream when we are awake and not only when we are asleep.
The fact is that nowhere else today have so many armed foreign outlaws been able to use the territory of a sovereign state to wage war for so long, and with such impunity, against other countries. And now, these foreigners who roam more or less unchallenged have become the junior partners of more powerful homegrown extremists in a war against the country itself.
Another reality is that nowhere else has a country been in denial for as long as we have been in the face of such open threats and attacks when our future, perhaps our very existence, depends on eliminating this self-created monster.
Half-baked measures and flaky concepts such as the good and bad Taliban, soft or hard strategic depth, have failed time and time again and the country continues to spiral downwards, creating an anarchical situation which weakens the state further while strengthening the non-state elements. It is best, therefore, that this vicious cycle is broken, and now, through a decisive long-term strategy rather than hesitant, patchwork measures, which, because they have not been thought through, carry little conviction.
Strategic depth, for example, was never a sensible idea. National security must be built on national strength, buttressed, when necessary, by traditional alliances and not through an idea that encroaches on the sovereignty of another country, which can as easily be directed against Pakistan by others seeking similar strategic depths. Besides, how can one, from the practical standpoint, fight an adversary, in our case India, from beyond our borders, without becoming dangerously dependent on the goodwill of the other state? Would it not be far better to repair and rebuild our state-to-state relationship with Afghanistan? Not only would that make it considerably easier to offset the Indian influence in Afghanistan but, given Afghanistans geographical imperatives, Kabul too would be far better off politically and economically developing a cooperative relationship with Pakistan.
As for the notion of good and bad Taliban, the Taliban are now frankly an autonomous force beyond the control and manipulation of Pakistan or, for that matter, any other country or militant umbrella group.
As long ago as 1995-96, when the Taliban were almost wholly dependant on Pakistans goodwill for recruits, supplies and funding, they had balked at being ordered around. And on even a matter as strategically peripheral as blowing up the Buddhas of Bamiyan had scornfully rejected our counsel. Perhaps that was the time for us to draw the conclusion that the Taliban mindset could as easily be directed against our civilisational values and pose as great a threat to us as they did to our adversaries. And to be fair, Benazir Bhutto saw the danger. Her antipathy to the Taliban cause was no secret and nor was their animus towards her. And she did try and gather support, but to no avail. Her counsels were rejected and her orders flouted. The prospect of Afghanistan and subsequently Central Asia being drawn into an axis of Islamic fundamentalist states centred around Kandahar and dominated by Pakistan was a prospect that was simply too alluring. When nationalism and religion combine with the personal aggrandisement of some, nothing can stand in the way and certainly not a woman.
Of course, we can continue to blame it on others and there is so much blame to spread around that attention is easily deflected. But that is hardly the answer or the requirement of the moment. To succeed today, it seems essential that first and foremost the power of the armed groups within Pakistan be broken. Without an all-out effort to do so, the terrorised population will not lend us support. They will sit on the fence as spectators, rather than players. They will be coerced to provide the enemy shelter and supplies. They will be forcibly recruited and serve as foot soldiers and once in the service of the enemy, albeit reluctantly, they become the enemy.
But defeating the extremists can only be one dimension of the strategy. The other is to seek the reintegration of rank and file elements and this is a no less challenging task. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants are concepts that the UN has pursued in many civil conflicts around the world. The idea is to wean away former combatants, including non-state elements, with the assistance of donor countries in situations where such elements have agreed to lay down arms or have been captured. We see no signs of such a policy at present.
Since Pakistan is effectively at war, the country should be brought on a war footing. That will help the public realise that sacrifices are inevitable. It cannot be business as usual. Civil-military relations, that have never been good, must be repaired and rebuilt. A united front must be forged against terrorism. Moreover, since the armed power of the extremists can only be curbed by the army, and since the army will require broad political support, the initiative for putting the country on a war footing must come from the army. The mainstream political parties undoubtedly will provide the required support and also help galvanise civil society. In this regard, the role of Punjab, where extremism is entrenched, will be crucial, which means that Punjab will have to emerge from its current mood of denial.
Only such dramatic measures would ensure long-term stability and send a powerful message to friends and foes alike that Pakistan finally means business. The world has been waiting for such a message. It would encourage them to do more to help the country economically and in other ways. Under Obama, the US has certainly shown welcome signs of that and so may others if they see us manifestly willing and determined to measure up to the challenge.
The writer is a former ambassador. He can be reached at charles123it@hotmail.com
